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The Worshipper’s Half-Holiday:  
G.K. Chesterton and Parody 
Michael Ronald Shallcross 
Abstract 
This thesis constitutes the first study of G.K. Chesterton’s status as a theorist and 
practitioner of parody. Employing a combination of original archival research, 
historical contextualisation, theoretical analysis, and textual close reading, I 
demonstrate that an extensive range of parodic strategies permeate Chesterton’s 
diverse output, from his detective fiction, to his nonsense verse, journalism, 
novels, and critical essays. I particularly focus upon elaborating the affinity of 
Chesterton’s work with the literary and cultural theory of Mikhail Bakhtin, in 
relation to the latter’s principle of dialogism, and his account of the parodic basis 
of the carnivalesque. In this context, I interpret The Man Who Was Thursday 
(1908) and Father Brown (1910-1936) as archetypal dialogic and carnivalesque 
texts. Reading Chesterton in this way not only produces a unified framework 
through which to understand his aesthetic method, but also enables a far-reaching 
reassessment of his relationship to aesthetic programmes that he opposed. In 
particular, I discuss his parodic engagement with the ascendant tropes of literary 
modernism, employing archival research into his youthful friendship with E.C. 
Bentley and close textual analysis of his later relationship to T.S. Eliot to trace the 
chronology of Chesterton’s interaction with diverse voices of cultural modernity. 
In pursuing this analysis, I use the simultaneous inscription of similarity and 
difference encoded within the parodic act as a means of questioning 
compartmentalising approaches to genre and literary history which militate 
against accurate valuation of essentially dialogic thinkers such as Chesterton. In 
this way, I apply Chesterton’s work as an exemplary model through which to 
develop a more comprehensive theory of the culturally disruptive operation of 
literary dialogism. 
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Introduction 
 
The real advice I could give to a young journalist, now that I am an old journalist, is 
simply this: to write an article for the Sporting Times and another for the Church 
Times, and put them into the wrong envelopes.  
G.K. Chesterton (Autobiography 183) 
 
When G.K. Chesterton entered public life in 1900, as a twenty-six-year-old 
fledgling journalist, he brought with him a carefully thought-out cultural 
programme, which he immediately began to elucidate in articles for The Speaker 
and, a year later, The Daily News. Chesterton’s readers quickly discovered a truth 
already familiar to his boyhood friend, E.C. Bentley—that this highly original 
cultural thinker ‘had at least a double dose of the faculty of enjoying things, from 
a nineteenth-century sausage-and-mashed to a fifteenth-century Madonna and 
Child’ (Those 46). Though this remark may appear frivolous at first glance, 
Bentley’s juxtaposition of extremes of the corporeal and the sublime offers an 
insight into the deeper programme underpinning the explosion of critical 
appreciation that Chesterton unleashed in the first years of the century. In article 
after article, areas of culture conventionally partitioned into discrete categories of 
‘low’ and ‘high’ are juxtaposed, subjected to rigorous discriminative evaluation, 
and discovered to possess a distinct, equivalent, or analogous cultural value. The 
concerted challenge to received cultural wisdom that this methodology 
represented is particularly highlighted by Chesterton’s early essays on aesthetics. 
From his ‘defences’ of nonsense and farce (collected in The Defendant, 1901), to 
his article on ‘The Decline of Satire’ (DN 14 Feb. 1902), to his advocacy of the 
grotesque in ‘A Defence of Ugly Things’ (collected in The Defendant) and Robert 
Browning (1903), Chesterton repeatedly focuses upon forms conventionally 
considered frivolous, scurrilous, or unrefined, which he re-evaluates as ‘high and 
legitimate forms of art […] worthy of moral reverence and artistic ambition’ 
(Defendant 123/125).  
Having established this principle in his criticism, Chesterton went on to 
practice it in his early novels, The Napoleon of Notting Hill (1904) and The Man 
Who Was Thursday (1908), in which farcical, uproarious scenarios form the basis 
upon which to build serious political critiques and searching inquiries into the 
10 
 
nature of human identity. The resulting ‘medley of the sublime and the 
ridiculous’ (CW 8: 235), as the method is described by the narrator of his later 
novel, The Return of Don Quixote (1927), finds most complete expression in his 
epic ‘detective comedy’ (Chesterton, Autobiography 323), Father Brown. Here 
Chesterton imbues the critically denigrated genre of detective fiction with 
elements of nonsense, farce, satire, and the grotesque, which are then employed 
as the formal means of conveying his most deeply held theological beliefs. When 
the narrator of the opening story, ‘The Blue Cross’ (1910), prefaces the first 
direct appearance of the heroes, Father Brown and Flambeau, with an account of 
‘the sublime vulgarity of man’ (FB 13), we discover the same principle of 
dualistic counterbalance embedded within the core of Chesterton’s existential 
vision.
1
  
The present thesis makes the case that this consistent preoccupation with 
juxtaposing ostensibly incongruous binaries of ‘high’ and ‘low’, and ‘serious’ and 
‘comic’, discourse is illustrative of an essentially parodic temperament, which not 
only suffuses Chesterton’s poetics, but derives from a complex aggregation of 
mutually informing political, philosophical, and psychological concerns. The 
aesthetic modes acclaimed by Chesterton—nonsense, farce, satire, and the 
grotesque—all operate within the range of parody. Parody is a favourite tool of 
the satirist and the nonsense writer, its burlesque elements inform the farcical 
premises of pantomime and festive comedy, while the grotesque corresponds to 
parody in its hybridising ethos and frequent recourse to a ‘clashing contrast 
between form and content’ (Kayser, Grotesque 53). In exploring the diverse 
purposes to which Chesterton puts these interrelated forms in his life and work, I 
argue that analysis of his status as a theorist and practitioner of parody constitutes 
an indispensable means of recovering an accurate valuation of his contribution to 
early-twentieth-century letters, and of elaborating his enduring relevance as a 
cultural thinker.  
This reading also sheds a prismatic light back upon wider parodic practice 
throughout the modernist era with which Chesterton’s working life ran parallel, 
while illuminating the most pressing social and cultural disputes of the period, the 
                                                 
1
 ‘The Blue Cross’ was first published on 23 June 1910 as ‘Valentin Follows a Curious Trail’, in 
the American periodical, The Saturday Evening Post. It was re-named for British publication in 
The Storyteller, in September 1910. 
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presuppositions informing which Chesterton consistently set out to challenge 
through parody. Appropriately enough, one of the cultural presuppositions that 
Chesterton most forcefully challenged was the critical orthodoxy on parody itself. 
G.D. Kiremidjian evocatively summarises the prevalent critical view of the time: 
‘The parodist is seen as some sort of scrofular, scurrilous second-rater who failed 
to make the grade himself and now indulges his spleen by jeering, mocking, and 
ridiculing his helpless subject’ (‘Aesthetics’ 232). As Linda Hutcheon explains, 
this interpretation of parody stands within a ‘long tradition—dating back to 
Quintilian […] at least—that demands that parody be considered pejorative in 
intent and ridiculing in its ethos’ (50).  
Late nineteenth-century discourse is rife with such readings. Famously, 
Matthew Arnold dismissed parody as ‘a vile art’ (qtd. in Tinker and Lowry 314), 
perhaps taking his cue from Goethe’s blustering self-characterisation as the ‘“arch 
enemy of all parody and travesty […] because this vile breed abases the beautiful, 
the noble and the great in order to destroy”’ (qtd. in Kiremidjian, Study 70). In a 
similar spirit, George Eliot charged burlesque dramatists with ‘Debasing the 
Moral Currency’, employing her critical alter ego, ‘Theophrastus Such’, to attack 
‘the sadly confused inference of the monotonous jester that he is establishing his 
superiority over every less facetious person, and over every topic on which he is 
ignorant or insensible, by being uneasy until he has distorted it in the small 
cracked mirror which he carries about with him as a joking apparatus’ (95). With 
this atmosphere of high-handed deprecation as an immediate critical precedent, 
Chesterton added an unusually nuanced note to the cultural conversation with his 
own definition of parody: ‘the worshipper’s half-holiday’ (Varied 186).  
Chesterton coined the phrase in another of his early statements on 
aesthetics, an article on the nineteenth-century American parodist, Bret Harte 
(collected in Varied Types, 1903).
2
 Rather than proceeding from a spirit of 
maladjusted mockery, Chesterton asserts that ‘real parody [is] inseparable from 
admiration’, and consequently ‘[m]ere derision, mere contempt, never produced 
or could produce parody’ (Varied 184). Chesterton considers successful criticism 
to arise only from a prior grounding in appreciation, and this stress upon the 
                                                 
2
 The provenance of this essay is uncertain. Julia Stapleton suggests that it may have been culled 
from Chesterton’s contributions to The New York American, although I have been unable to verify 
this (message to the author. 7 Aug. 2012. Email). 
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juxtaposition of mutually corrective binaries informs his wider belief in the 
necessity of balancing praise and demurral in critical dialogue. In ‘The Decline of 
Satire’, he explains that this dual-mindedness is also essential to the production of 
effective satire: ‘To write great satire, to attack a man so that he feels the attack 
and half acknowledges its justice, it is necessary to have a certain intellectual 
magnanimity which realises the merits of the opponent as well as his defects’ 
(Twelve 52).  
In a near-contemporaneous essay, ‘Thomas Carlyle’ (collected in Twelve 
Types, 1902), Chesterton slightly modifies the terms of this balancing act, in his 
account of the combination of qualities necessary to construct a cogent intellectual 
framework of one’s own: the ‘man building up an intellectual system has to build 
like Nehemiah, with the sword in one hand and the trowel in the other. The 
imagination, the constructive quality, is the trowel, and argument is the sword’ 
(Twelve 125). As this suggests, for Chesterton it is not enough simply to argue 
against the grain, one must also produce an imaginative response which 
establishes alternative possibilities. Consequently, while he consistently projected 
himself as a contrarian jester in the court of culture, proudly vaunting his status as 
a ‘controversialist’ (CW 3: 339), he did not conceive this as a purely critical, 
oppositional role. Instead, as Hilaire Belloc noted, Chesterton ‘approached 
controversy, his delight, hardly ever as conflict, nearly always as an appreciation, 
including that of his opponent’ (39). Rather than simply implying praise or 
magnanimity, or a corollary of the prodigious capacity for ‘enjoying things’ 
remarked upon by Bentley, Belloc’s use of ‘appreciation’ corresponds to 
Chesterton’s invocation of the constructive ‘trowel’ of imagination as a tool with 
which to accrete new perspectives by building upon prior discourses. This 
additional connotation of critical appreciation closely resembles Barbara Hardy’s 
definition of parody as ‘“a critical act of imaginative reproduction”’, which seeks 
to ‘“criticize by creating”’ (qtd. in Kiremidjian, Study 46).  
In this respect, the combination of adherence (worship) and departure 
(holiday) conveyed by Chesterton’s definition of parody also connotes a blazing 
of future trails informed by a measured observance of past conventions. This 
duality, which is closely analogous to Chesterton’s enduring philosophical 
preference for ‘the combination of something that is strange with something that 
is secure’ (Orthodoxy 3), also corresponds to Hutcheon’s account of the 
13 
 
‘ambivalence set up between conservative repetition and revolutionary 
difference’, which ‘is part of the very paradoxical essence of parody’ (77). The 
Janus-faced structure of parody is singularly amenable to Chesterton’s 
philosophical programme, which Garry Wills accurately characterises as deriving 
from the conviction that ‘[r]ebellion and conservation are correlates, meaningful 
only when united in dynamic balance’ (Man 101). As with Hutcheon’s reading of 
parody, Chesterton’s hybridisation of worship and holiday stresses the fact that by 
its very nature parody ‘implicitly reinforces even as it ironically debunks’ 
(Hutcheon xii).  
In the ‘Bret Harte’ essay, Chesterton also discusses parody as a mode in 
which ‘absurdity’ and ‘sublimity’ (Varied 183) are comingled to produce a 
counterweighted balance. Consequently, for Chesterton, parody not only connotes 
an inextricable duality of adherence and departure, but also an inextricable duality 
of ‘low’ and ‘high’ (or comic and serious) discourse, so that a confluence of each 
of these apparent binaries becomes the structural sine qua non of the form. Since 
the term, ‘half-holiday’, most probably alludes to the popular comic, Ally Sloper’s 
Half-Holiday (1884-1977), Chesterton’s phrase also impishly conflates the 
sublime principle of worship with the absurd ‘low’ of a form of literature that 
would conventionally be considered artistically negligible. However, crucially, 
Chesterton argues that this interposition of the absurd is not intended to debase the 
sublime, as Goethe, Arnold, and Eliot assume. Instead, he sees the co-presence of 
these elements as the means of establishing a mutually balancing whole, whereas 
the excessive predominance of one or the other quality would be artificially 
delimiting. This again resonates with Chesterton’s existential vision, which is 
based on the truth value of the grotesque as a mode of accumulative appreciation: 
‘the more serious is the discussion the more grotesque should be the terms. […] 
For a subject is really solemn and important in so far as it applies to the whole 
cosmos […] So far as a thing is universal it is serious. And so far as a thing is 
universal it is full of comic things.’ In consequence, ‘[i]t is the test of a good 
philosophy whether you can defend it grotesquely’ (‘Spiritualism and Frivolity.’ 
ILN 9 June 1906; CW 27: 205-06).  
A comparable principle is discernible in Chesterton’s advice to would-be 
journalists, which forms the epigraph to this introduction, in which the 
comparative examples cited—church and sport—again gesture towards the 
14 
 
conflation of reverence and play, the sublime and the absurd, or worship and 
holiday, in Chesterton’s definition of parody. This further context also indicates 
that a comingling of the absurd and sublime not only guided Chesterton’s 
philosophical principles, but also satisfied more prosaic material imperatives, 
since he posits the wilful confusion of apparent cultural antitheses as a means of 
piquing reader interest.
3
 When Chesterton established his own newspaper, G.K.’s 
Weekly, in 1925, he announced that a comparable principle of ‘contrast and 
combination’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 423) would guide the venture. However, by 
this stage he had discovered that the gambit also had its commercial downsides—
his relationship with The Daily News had been strained to breaking point by his 
relentless submission of articles that derided the political values of its core 
readership. Consequently, Chesterton’s continued advocacy of this method when 
establishing his own periodical represented a statement of philosophical adherence 
to the principle of the newspaper as a dialogic forum, as much as a strategy to 
secure commercial success. 
The foregoing account demonstrates that Chesterton’s approach to 
aesthetics, philosophy, and cultural and political controversy consistently turned 
upon imaginative concepts and discursive methods which conform to the structure 
of parody. Even his explanation of the surest means of maintaining psychological 
balance derives from the principle of parodic counterweighting: ‘of a sane man 
there is only one safe definition. He is a man who can have tragedy in his heart 
and comedy in his head’ (‘The Travellers in State.’ DN 6 June 1908; CDN 5: 85). 
Chesterton’s rhetoric draws the parameters of parody far beyond literary comic 
play—though he delighted equally in textual parody as an exuberant formal 
game—to emphasise a considerably more profound and wide-ranging conception 
of the potential scale of its application. In this respect, Chesterton begins to 
emerge as a prescient herald of later theoretical perspectives, the most valuable of 
which echo his terms in emphasising both the formal dualism and exceptionally 
wide discursive range of parody, while eschewing the culturally loaded value 
judgements common to nineteenth-century criticism.  
                                                 
3
 Chesterton first makes this point in ‘Succeeding in Journalism’ (ILN 21 Aug. 1909): ‘A man 
might actually succeed in journalism by writing articles exactly appropriate to all the journals, and 
then putting them all into the wrong envelopes’ (CW 28: 378).  
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For example, Chesterton’s assertion that ‘[m]ere derision, mere contempt, 
never produced or could produce parody’ receives a theoretical makeover in 
Robert Phiddian’s contention that ‘[p]arodies deconstruct the discourses they 
invade; they do not blankly destroy’ them (‘Parody’ 682). In discussing the formal 
range of parody, Hutcheon argues that ‘[a]ny codified form can, theoretically, be 
treated in terms of repetition with critical distance’ (18), while Simon Dentith 
contends that ‘“[p]arody” should be thought of, not as a single and tightly 
definable genre or practice, but as a range of cultural practices which are all more 
or less parodic’ (Parody 19). These accounts, which extend the parameters of 
parody to embrace ‘general principles such as stylistic characteristics of a person, 
a period or a culture’ (Sheinberg 187), are prefigured in the extra-textual terms 
employed by Chesterton in ‘The White Horses’ (collected in Alarms and 
Discursions, 1910), when he refers to motoring as an opportunity for the 
individual to conduct a ‘parody of the military’ (Alarms 105). Similarly, in 
‘Americans in Sport and Jingoism’ (ILN 15 Aug. 1908), he uses parody as a 
means of explaining the interaction of nation states: ‘America is a serious parody. 
America is an exaggeration not more comic, but more solemn, than its original’ 
(CW 28: 159).  
However, Chesterton’s most important anticipation of later theory perhaps 
resides in the collapsed bipolarity of the phrase, ‘the worshipper’s half-holiday’, 
itself, which finds an echo in Hutcheon’s definition of parody as ‘repetition with 
ironic critical distance’ (xii). The dualism of Hutcheon’s definition is built upon in 
Michael McKeon’s more elaborate rendering: ‘a single dialectical gesture of 
recapitulation and repudiation, imitation and disillusion, continuity and rupture’ 
(13)—in other words, of worship and holiday. Indeed, the ‘Bret Harte’ essay was 
sufficiently innovative in its approach to the subject to persuade Chesterton’s 
contemporary, the reviewer, E.C. Marsh, that ‘[t]he delicate, elusive art of the 
parodist has been grossly misunderstood [… and] I know of no critic who has 
done anything toward elucidating the philosophy of parody save Mr. Chesterton’ 
(193). It is striking, then, that Marsh’s recognition of Chesterton’s pioneering 
status has not been echoed by any subsequent writers on parody. I can find only 
one glancing reference to Chesterton in the considerable array of theoretical texts 
that have emerged in the intervening hundred years (Hutcheon 11).  
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The increasing proliferation of such analyses corroborates Malcolm 
Bradbury’s contention that over the course of the twentieth century, ‘parodic 
activity […] vastly increased, moved, in art and literature, in practice and theory, 
from the margins to the centre’ (‘Age’ 60), first through the high-cultural 
influence of the literary methods of modernists such as Eliot and Joyce, and later 
through the more thoroughgoing deconstruction of principles of ‘high’ and ‘low’ 
conducted within postmodern culture. In view of this cultural shift, it is curious to 
consider that over the same period Chesterton moved, inversely, from the centre 
to the margins of culture. In order to explain this ostensible paradox it will be 
useful to briefly examine the elements of Chesterton’s reception that may have 
contributed to his occlusion from critical discourse on parody. 
 
Chesterton’s Critical Reception  
 
All reputations […] dwindle and rise again; capable men are praised twice, first for the 
wrong reasons and then again, after a cycle of obloquy, for the right. 
 
Chesterton, ‘A Plea for Partial Historians’ (DN 17 Dec. 1902; CDN 1: 449) 
 
The absence of wider critical discussion of Chesterton’s contribution to the theory 
and practice of parody becomes comprehensible when we consider that even 
critical works exclusively dedicated to him have consistently overlooked his 
reliance upon parodic modes of discourse. Brief references do appear in the most 
perceptive analyses. W.H. Auden admiringly acknowledged his flair for poetic 
parody (‘Gift’ 322), while John Coates corroborates Chesterton’s benign reading 
of the parodist’s intent when he argues that ‘Chesterton’s imaginative sympathy 
with authors like Browning resulted in what were quite arguably, his finest works 
of criticism, his parodies’ (Controversialist 173). Despite being relegated to 
footnote status, Wills’ appraisal offers perhaps the most penetrating insight: 
‘Chesterton was a brilliant parodist, and some of his finest criticism is parody 
meant to uncover strength instead of weakness. […] This appreciative mimicry is 
perfectly suited to his literary persona of metaphysical jester’ (Man 226 fn.75). 
While such assessments are accurate and valuable, their understanding of parody 
remains restricted to textual close reading, and none of the extant critical work 
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builds upon these brief insights to consider large swathes of his cultural activity as 
formally and thematically parodic in conception. 
This oversight can be understood to have arisen from a combination of 
factors, which have also contributed to Chesterton’s critical neglect in a wider 
sense. First, many of the early biographical and critical readings suffer from an 
excessive weighting toward either the sublime or the ridiculous in his life and 
work, producing an imbalance comparable to that which Chesterton sought to 
avoid in his definition of parody. An adhesion to either pole characterises many of 
the essays collected in Denis Conlon’s compendious volume, A Half-Century of 
Views (1987). In contrast to Bentley’s intimate juxtaposition of Chesterton’s 
diverse enthusiasms, here the sympathetic readings tend to be all Madonna and 
Child or nothing but sausage-and-mashed. In a comparable vein, the hostile 
accounts tend to draw upon one or another of the elements hybridised in 
Wyndham Lewis’s pithy dismissal of Chesterton as a ‘dogmatic toby-jug’ (Time 
387). Adherents to the latter pole emphasise the roistering Falstaff, perpetually 
wiring telegrams from Market Harborough, while those of a more solemn 
persuasion accentuate the doctrinaire religious visionary, conducting an obdurate 
one-man war against the modern world.
4
  
The cognitive dissonance produced by such readings is particularly 
highlighted by Marshall McLuhan’s essay, ‘Where Chesterton Comes In’ (1948). 
McLuhan’s argument inadvertently evokes the incongruous separation of form 
and theme so central to parody when he explains that his sympathy with 
Chesterton’s theological exposition of the sublime is tempered by hostility 
towards his apparently ridiculous mode of expression. This disparity leads 
McLuhan to imply that the responsibility for subsequent caricatures lies with the 
faulty, almost schizophrenically contradictious author himself.
5
 In lamenting the 
‘desperate jauntiness’ and ‘self-conscious jollity’ of Chesterton’s prose, McLuhan 
figures Chesterton’s style as an inexplicably indecorous, ‘embarrassing’ means of 
conveying the otherwise valuable philosophy of the ‘essential Chesterton’, the 
‘metaphysical moralist’ (76-77). McLuhan’s position endures in the habit of later 
                                                 
4
 Conscious of the dangers of such misrepresentation, Chesterton dismissed the latter caricature as 
that of the ‘notorious G.K. Chesterton, a reactionary Torquemada whose one gloomy pleasure was 
in the defence of orthodoxy and the pursuit of heretics’ (‘The Real Journalist.’ DN 17 Dec. 1910; 
CDN 7: 42). 
5
 See below, p.21, for Chesterton’s use of the term, ‘contradictious’, to define his own position. 
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advocates to focus upon elucidating the philosophical messages of Chesterton’s 
texts in isolation from their form, a tendency most recently discernible in William 
Oddie’s otherwise illuminating critical biography, Chesterton and the Romance of 
Orthodoxy (2008). By arguing that McLuhan was ‘surely’ correct ‘to direct our 
attention away from questions of “literary” merit’ (64), Oddie implies that 
Chesterton will find no succour in the latter arena, and that a more elegantly 
constructed parsing of his philosophical teachings on the part of the critical 
interpreter offers the most likely path to Chesterton’s critical rejuvenation. 
This combination of factors—an excessive stress upon either forbidding 
dogmatism or buffoonish anecdote in the popular criticism, and a reluctance on 
the part of more high-minded advocates to defend his aesthetic methods—has 
fostered the cycle of obloquy that Chesterton identifies as the intermediate lot of 
the capable man. Valuable critical texts have sporadically emerged; either 
elaborating his formal merits (Wills 1961; Boyd 1975; Coates 2002) or offering 
illuminating contextualisation of his theological and political concerns (Canovan 
1977; Knight 2004; Stapleton 2009). However, these isolated voices have been 
overwhelmed by a wider academic consensus that has learned to shun Chesterton 
in both formal and thematic terms, as an aesthetically negligible and socially 
reactionary anomaly in the twentieth-century literary canon, antipathetic to the 
aesthetically radical age of modernism, and with equally little of relevance to 
contribute to the philosophically pluralistic age of postmodernism.  
This situation informs Mark Knight’s rueful observation that having first 
made his name with a series of spirited countercultural ‘defence’ essays, 
Chesterton now stands in need of a good defence counsel himself (Evil 1). We 
might add that the weight of cultural misapprehension that Chesterton sought to 
clear with those early articles—not least his essay on parody—is now the task 
faced by the Chestertonian critic. As I have argued, the particular merit of 
Chesterton’s account of parody lies in his eschewal of extraneous cultural value 
judgements in favour of a renewed focus upon the fundamental structural 
operation of parody, an approach which reflects his critical gift for ‘looking to the 
artefact’s own mode of existence’ (Man 57), in Wills’ phrase. Similarly, this 
thesis aims to clear away much of the accumulated cultural baggage that currently 
obstructs Chesterton’s academic reception, through a detailed exposition of the 
complexity, sophistication, and ingrained ambivalence of his parodic means of 
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expression. In a complementary action, I employ the simultaneous inscription of 
similarity and difference encoded within the parodic act to enable a wider 
questioning of compartmentalising approaches to genre and literary history, which 
tend to marginalise figures whose methods defy conventional modes of 
categorisation.  
Viewing Chesterton’s work through the prism of parody enables us to 
transcend the limitations of periodization, instead locating Chesterton within a 
trans-generic, diachronic European cultural tradition of ‘serio-comical’ (Problems 
106) discourse, in Bakhtin’s terminology. As Chesterton’s most doughty 
antagonist, George Bernard Shaw, was the first to recognise, ‘France did not break 
the mould in which it formed Rabelais. It got to Campden Hill in the year 1874’ 
(‘Chesterbelloc’ 136). Chesterton repeatedly drew attention to this lineage 
himself. In ‘Prohibition and the Press’ (collected in Fancies versus Fads, 1923), 
he lauds the strain of literary culture that runs ‘from Pantagruel to Pickwick’ 
(Fancies 84), while a later essay on ‘Humour’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica May 
1928; collected in The Spice of Life, 1965) charts an ancestral line of humourists 
from Chaucer, Cervantes, and Rabelais, to Swift, Sterne, and Dickens (Spice 28). 
Here Chesterton closely anticipates Dentith’s critical exposition of the parodic 
dynasty of European literature (Parody 75-81), the particular distinction of which 
is a shared propensity to propagandise and problematize simultaneously. With this 
framework in mind, we can begin to explicate the curious paradox of Chesterton 
himself—that of a self-styled propagandist who intuitively gravitates towards 
dialogically problematizing modes of expression. As Phiddian explains of a 
comparable disjuncture between Swift’s rhetoric and practice, ‘[t]he main 
problem in reading [his work] as a general advocacy of the rhetoric of a small, 
clean, straightforward world is that the theory in it does not fit the most 
memorable of Swift’s own writings’ (Swift’s 8).  
Chesterton counsels a comparable return to the text in his own critical 
writing. In an early essay on Tolstoy, he argues that the typical writer ‘teaches far 
more by his […] costumes, his idiom and technique—all the part of his work, in 
short, of which he is probably unconscious, than by the elaborate and pompous 
moral dicta which he fondly imagines to be his opinions’ (Twelve 147). In this 
light, McLuhan might have profitably searched his own critical precepts for 
guidance—with Chesterton the medium truly is the message. Interestingly, the 
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first critic to grasp this was McLuhan’s protégé, Hugh Kenner, who famously 
went on to become the critical documenter-in-chief of the dramatis personae of 
The Pound Era (1971), and whose first critical work, Paradox in Chesterton 
(1948), featured McLuhan’s essay as a preface. Unfortunately, Kenner’s insight 
that Chesterton’s existential intuition of ‘the complexity of being’ (16) directly 
informed his grotesque mode of expression was not accompanied by an 
appreciation of the aesthetic consequences. Tangibly crestfallen at the duty before 
him, Kenner affirms that ‘[i]t is essential to consider him as an artist, however 
inartistic he may be’ (103), before arguing that Chesterton’s ‘poetic failure’ (107) 
was an inevitable ‘by-product’ (103) of his philosophical achievement.6  
Thankfully, a criticism has finally begun to emerge which not only 
accurately elucidates the derivation of Chesterton’s formal methodology, but also 
recognises its value. Michael Hurley’s recent study, G.K. Chesterton (2012), sets 
out to examine ‘the ways in which [Chesterton’s] literary imagination and his 
philosophical thinking are mutually informing’ (8). As Hurley explains, ‘[t]he 
atmosphere of his writing cannot be dismissed as adventitious; how he argues 
defines what he is arguing’ (62). Consequently, Hurley devotes each of his 
chapters to a different genre or medium in which Chesterton worked, on the 
grounds that he ‘must be taken whole, or you do not have half of him, you have 
none of him’ (9). While I concur with Hurley in considering the texts’ form to 
provide the key to their philosophical meaning, my approach modifies his 
compartmentalised, purposefully inconclusive methodology, by identifying 
Chesterton’s parodic method as a coherent, unifying, and enduring framework 
through which to understand his life and work.  
Of course, it is important to bear in mind that Chesterton’s use of parodic 
techniques in differing generic contexts often serves differing purposes. For 
example, the pedagogic and/or whimsical intent of the close parodies that 
permeate his journalism is distinct in both form and function from the 
comprehensive philosophical method that underpins the parodic structure of 
Father Brown. Nonetheless, the ‘conversation’ of ‘mutually correcting bearings’ 
(17) that Hurley seeks to establish between Chesterton’s diverse areas of literary 
practice is also promoted, in a trans-generic sense, by the balancing binaries that 
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 John Gross debunks the McLuhan/Kenner position incisively in Rise 235-36. 
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underpin all forms of parodic discourse—adherence and departure, the serious and 
the comic, the secure and the strange—which enable us to take Chesterton in the 
round as Hurley prescribes, while guarding against the critical temptation to 
artificially schematise his fundamental aesthetic catholicity.  
The latter quality stems from an attitude towards aesthetic contradiction 
that was considerably more sanguine than that of Kenner: ‘Every book I write, 
every article I pen, every argument I use, contradicts some other book, some other 
article, some other argument of my own. What does it matter? Life is 
contradictious’ (‘G.B.S. v. G.K.C.’ The Adelphi Magazine September 1923; CW 
11: 582). If we approach Chesterton in this spirit we begin to comprehend the 
philosophical basis of the heterogeneous, amalgamative ethos that he consistently 
invoked to convey his literary ideal. This is aptly illustrated by his account of the 
disruptive narrative structure of dreams, which might equally serve as a definition 
of textual parody: ‘works which mix up abstractions fit for an epic with fooleries 
not fit for a pantomime […] which present such a picture of literary chaos as 
might be produced if the characters of every book from Paradise Lost to Pickwick 
broke from their covers and mingled in one mad romance’ (‘Dreams’, 1901; 
collected in Coloured 81-82).  
In a comparable vein of multiplicity, Chesterton’s life and work present a 
panoramic exposition of the extraordinarily varied purposes and practices of 
parody, from its most conventional connotation as a rhetorical tool wielded in 
controversy by the satirist, to its application as a more nuanced method of self-
analysis and frank acknowledgement of inner contradiction. Chesterton’s oeuvre 
also corroborates Hutcheon’s stress upon the exceptionally wide textual 
parameters of parody: ‘Its physical dimension can be as vast as Joyce’s Ulysses or 
as small as the changing of one letter or word of a text’ (18). Similarly, 
Chesterton’s parodic repertoire extends from the most glancing of bathetic 
allusions—‘Stilton, thou shouldst be living at this hour’ (‘The Shy Town.’ DN 29 
Apr. 1911; CDN 7: 120) and ‘they also serve who only stand and wait for the two 
fifteen’ (‘Enjoying the Floods and Other Disasters.’ ILN 21 July 1906; CW 27: 
239) are just two of the many Milton-baiting skits scattered throughout his 
corpus—to the highly sophisticated parodic odyssey of Father Brown, 
Chesterton’s divine comedy of ‘the sublime vulgarity of man’. 
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Structural Overview 
 
My opening chapter draws upon an eclectic range of examples from Chesterton’s 
literary practice and his statements on aesthetics and culture, spanning the 
duration of his career, to demonstrate the centrality of parody to his oeuvre. I 
begin with a comprehensive account of the parameters of parody, framed by its 
relationship to verbal satire and the existential grotesque, which I discuss as the 
poles between which parody vacillates.
7
 This account leads to an exploration of 
the extraordinary affinity of Chesterton’s work with that of Mikhail Bakhtin, the 
pioneering Russian theorist of parody, a correspondence which has received scant 
critical attention to date.
8
  
At first glance, a number of significant factors appear to differentiate the 
two men—Bakhtin’s ‘scholarly life’ and writing, his unconventional theological 
stance, the role of ‘Stalinist repression’ (Dentith, Bakhtinian 4) in informing his 
work; in contrast to Chesterton’s impatience with scholarly discourse, his 
orthodox religious dogmatism, and his location within a relatively tolerant liberal 
democracy. Nonetheless, detailed analysis of the philosophical sympathies that 
bridge these contextual divides offers a revelatory means of reading both figures 
anew. I argue that Chesterton’s stylistic methods and thematic preoccupations 
closely anticipate Bakhtin’s complementary principles of dialogism and the 
carnivalesque, thus locating Chesterton within a lineage of writers who operate 
beyond the monologic extremes of cultural authoritarianism and cultural 
relativism. In developing this reading, I elaborate the interrelated political, 
philosophical, and psychological utilities which cause parody to become such a 
ubiquitous discursive method in Chesterton’s work. Within this account a number 
of key strands in my wider thesis emerge, including the efficacy of parody in 
balancing earnestness and irony through serio-comic discourse; the status of 
parody as an anti-Hegelian poetics and a democratically immersive medium; and 
                                                 
7
 Chesterton’s use of the grotesque has been discussed incisively by Coates (Edwardian 169-90) 
and Knight (Evil 59-124), though not in the terms that I elaborate in this thesis. 
8
 Philip Thompson draws the two names together glancingly in a list of figures who evince a 
comparably ‘unconcealed delight’ (28) in the grotesque, as does Elmar Schenkel in relation to 
carnival (105). Don M. Shipley’s unpublished doctoral thesis, ‘Chesterton and his interlocutors: 
Dialogical style and ethical debate on eugenics’ (Baylor University, 2007) includes a discussion of 
Chesterton’s dialogic method, informed by Bakhtinian theory. The present study does not draw on 
Shipley’s thesis because it is not currently available in the public domain. 
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the application of parody and self-parody as interrelated means of managing and 
disrupting the boundaries of authorial identity.  
From my second chapter onwards I pursue a broadly chronological 
narrative, so as to establish Chesterton’s consistent recourse to comparable 
structural methods, while exploring the evolving themes and concerns which he 
employed these forms to address as his career progressed and his allegiances 
shifted. My second chapter analyses the formative period of Chesterton’s 
intellectual development, which I take to span the years 1890 to 1910. This 
chapter builds upon my introductory assertion that Chesterton already possessed a 
carefully though-out cultural programme when he first achieved prominence, by 
exploring the private prehistory of his emergence onto the public stage in 1900, 
with particular reference to his adolescent friendship with Edmund Clerihew 
Bentley. In doing so, I focus upon an area of Chesterton’s imaginative life—his 
production of nonsense—which is commonly passed over with a tactfully averted 
gaze by Chesterton’s critics, perhaps fearful that advertising such apparent 
frivolity might undermine his critical standing still further.
9
 However, through 
sustained analysis of his relationship to Bentley, I demonstrate that Chesterton’s 
ambivalent attitude towards nonsense operates as a vitally important context 
through which to understand his wider parodic philosophy, and the oppositional 
stance that he subsequently developed towards the culture of his time.  
While it has become a critical and biographical standby to identify 
Chesterton’s reaction against the ontological pessimism and scepticism of fin de 
siècle decadence as decisive in shaping his later worldview (Ffinch 30-46; Knight 
29-36; Oddie 84-125), the formative significance of his youthful relationship to 
his closest friend in this period has so far eluded sustained and accurate critical 
examination. In rectifying this oversight, I employ the hitherto untapped resource 
of the Bodleian Library’s archive of Bentley’s diaries, as well as the British 
Library’s archive of Chesterton’s manuscripts and correspondence with Bentley, 
as the foundation upon which to build a theoretical analysis of the interrelation of 
nonsense, parody, and friendship in Chesterton’s life and work. This reading 
situates Chesterton’s highly ambivalent personal relationship with Bentley in the 
context of his equally ambivalent textual relationship with a number of near-
                                                 
9
 Important exceptions are Lynette Hunter’s Explorations (25-30), and Elizabeth Sewell’s ‘Giant’ 
(555-76). 
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contemporary literary influences—including Max Beerbohm, Lewis Carroll, 
Rudyard Kipling, Walt Whitman, and Oscar Wilde—in order to elaborate 
Chesterton’s apprehension (in the fullest sense) of the philosophical drift of turn-
of-the-century culture. I end this chapter with an account of how nonsense, 
parody, and friendship come together in Chesterton’s most fully realised novel, 
The Man Who Was Thursday, drawing attention to a series of illuminating 
intertextual dialogues set up by the text, which have previously escaped critical 
attention.  
My third chapter focuses upon a close reading of Chesterton’s first three 
Father Brown stories, composed in 1910. The chapter borrows its title, ‘Serious 
Things in Holiday Time London’, from Chesterton’s debut article for the 
Illustrated London News (ILN 14 Oct. 1905), since the phrase aptly encapsulates 
the serio-comic modulation of the stories under discussion. I argue that 
Chesterton’s satirical premise in these stories is to send the detection genre on a 
carnivalesque urban holiday, in order to convey a multifaceted critique of 
contemporary society. While a number of commentators have recognised Father 
Brown as a deliberate departure from the generic model of Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories (Boyd 139; Ker 287), the specifically parodic 
foundation of Chesterton’s challenge to the generic archetype is a further aspect of 
his literary practice that has eluded critical examination. I argue that these stories 
constitute Chesterton’s most audacious attempt to balance the poles of verbal 
satire and the existential grotesque, and that he particularly selects detective 
fiction as the locus of this aesthetic balancing act in order to prove a combined 
formal and thematic point—that a critically undervalued genre which he 
considered ‘a perfectly legitimate form of art’ also possesses ‘certain definite 
advantages as an agent of the public weal’ (Defendant 158).  
Again, this analysis challenges the conventions of Chestertonian criticism. 
His most recent biographer, Ian Ker, claims that the Father Brown stories ‘are not 
among his major writings, and they can hardly be called his “masterpiece” 
compared with his great non-fictional prose works’ (290). Ian Boyd is similarly 
dismissive: ‘they were occasional work, ordered in batches by magazine editors, 
and hastily written by Chesterton to help finance his own newspaper. The themes 
which are developed fully in the full-length novels are only sketched in them. 
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Consequently, there is no larger pattern to which they can be related’ (xii).10 
However, when examined through the prism of Bakhtinian theory, it becomes 
clear that these stories are central to a proper understanding of the formal method 
through which Chesterton consistently conveys his social message. By elaborating 
their previously unexplored symbiotic relationship with his non-fictional prose 
works, I demonstrate that these stories are not only relatable, but integral to the 
larger pattern of Chesterton’s life and work. I discuss ‘The Blue Cross’ as a satire 
of the urban reform movement, a premise that Chesterton employs to construct a 
utopian resolution of the agon of detection. I go on to argue that Chesterton 
purposefully inverts this conceit in the dystopian follow-up story, ‘The Secret 
Garden’ (Storyteller Oct. 1910), thus producing a sophisticated example of what 
Gary Saul Morson terms ‘[m]etaparody’ (‘Parody’ 81). In the case of ‘The Queer 
Feet’ (Storyteller Nov. 1910), I identify Chesterton’s self-reflexive manipulation 
of an array of generic tropes, which enable him to turn a carnivalesque account of 
a travesty of popular feasting into a vehicle through which to pursue artistically 
ambitious social satire. 
My final chapter explores the evolution of Chesterton’s relationship to 
cultural modernism, as emblematised by the progress of T.S. Eliot’s interaction 
with Chesterton from 1910 to the latter’s death in 1936. This reading disproves 
the critical shibboleth that Chesterton’s engagement with modernist aesthetics was 
‘cursory’ (Coates, Controversialist 8), that he ‘never made the slightest attempt to 
understand the aims and ideas of the modernist movement’ (Cavendish-Jones 
186), and that he remained unswervingly and unreflectively hostile to the 
movement throughout his career (Hynes 85-86; Lodge, Crossroads 145). 
According to this critical orthodoxy, a seamless, un-shifting polarisation pertained 
between the figureheads of ‘high modernism’ who formed an aesthetically radical, 
though culturally elitist vanguard; and Chesterton, who led a culturally 
democratic, though aesthetically retrograde counter-insurgence. As a consequence 
of this narrative, which has derived much of its pertinacity from the public 
pronouncements of the artists themselves, Chesterton and Eliot have 
                                                 
10
 Again, Hurley offers an antidote to this critical consensus. His recent edition of The Complete 
Father Brown (2012) includes an introductory essay which notes that the stories ‘are bursting with 
speculations that exceed the traditional business of detection’ (FB xxii). 
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conventionally been considered such pristine opposites that it would be ‘almost 
ludicrous to compare them’ (Mason 13).11  
Luke Seaber has recently challenged this orthodoxy, with a subtle analysis 
that proceeds from the conviction that ‘questions of similarity and difference in a 
comparative examination of Chesterton’s and Eliot’s artistic undertakings are far 
more complex and ambiguous than might initially appear to be the case’ 
(‘Meaning’ 203). Nonetheless, Seaber’s reading is tentative, and maintains the 
line that Chesterton’s view of Eliot remained relatively antagonistic throughout 
his career. In building upon Seaber’s foundational insight, I elaborate the ways in 
which an apparently static impasse of mutual incomprehension underwent various 
phases of subtle modification. I begin by elaborating the private development of 
Eliot’s aesthetic sensibility during 1910-11. I then go on to analyse the parodic 
progress of the agon of Eliot and Chesterton between 1917 and 1925, before 
ending with an account of the rapprochement of the pair between 1925 and 1936.  
While not wishing to overstate Chesterton’s influence upon Eliot’s 
aesthetic and philosophical development, which is well known to have been 
informed by a prodigious cornucopia of cultural influences, my analysis 
demonstrates that Chesterton occupied a more significant role in this retinue than 
is commonly supposed. By using parody as the prism through which to view this 
contest of cultural values, my reading serves not only to initiate a more nuanced 
understanding of Chesterton’s ambivalent engagement with that which he rejects, 
but also to draw attention to the complex motivations underpinning the 
antagonism that modernist authors such as Eliot initially projected towards 
Chesterton. This approach reveals the utility of parody as both a constructive 
disrupter and unifier of different strands of culture, enriching our understanding of 
literary history by encouraging a technique of cross-reading which ‘forces the 
reader to make associations between texts not normally placed together’ (77), as 
Margaret Rose puts it.  
Matthew Taunton has recently counselled against the temptation of 
‘seeking to make [Chesterton] safe for the canon by pointing to affinities with 
literary modernism’ (204), and I am mindful that this endeavour would be as 
reductive as that of perpetuating Chesterton’s reputation as unambiguously anti-
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 See also Kenner, Paradox 105-07; Kirk 184; Oser 39. In each case, Chesterton and Eliot are 
posited as antitheses. 
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modernist. Instead, my analysis seeks to retain an awareness of the clearly 
demarcated philosophical grounds upon which Chesterton parted company with 
leading modernists, while also demonstrating the ways in which the subtly 
comparable aesthetic methods of the two factions complicate the projection of a 
straightforward binary division. This inscription of critical dialogism operates as a 
macrocosmic corollary of the paradoxical dynamic of the parodic act itself, 
revealing the simultaneous co-presence of similarity and difference on a broad 
cultural canvas, and destabilising conventional approaches to literary-historical 
compartmentalisation in the process. 
In view of my contention that both Chesterton and Eliot deliberately 
promulgated a belief in their aesthetic disparity, it is perhaps telling that Eliot was 
one of the first commentators to attempt to divert critical attention away from 
Chesterton’s literary merits, when he argued, in his obituary notice in The Tablet 
(20 June 1936), that to ‘judge Chesterton on his “contributions to literature,” […] 
would be to apply the wrong standards of measurement’ (Critical 531). Despite 
Kenner’s faithful adherence to Eliot’s line, his unique status as a thoughtful 
respondent to both Chesterton and modernism leads him to offer an early, 
tentative exception to the critical binarism discussed above. In a discussion of 
analogy and myth, Kenner compares Chesterton to Joyce, with the observation 
that ‘[i]t is surely a demonstration of the contemporary critical muddle to find the 
most advanced experimenter of his time building upon the same first principles, 
and exploiting the same kind of analogical perception, as the man whom avant-
garde critics decry as the very type of hearty Toryism’ (Paradox 127-28). Four 
years earlier, in 1944, Graham Greene had drawn attention to an equally marked 
stylistic correspondence between the two authors, noting the curious fact that ‘a 
generation that appreciates Joyce finds for some reason Chesterton’s equally 
fanatical play on words exhausting’ (105).  
The incongruous concept of ‘fanatical play’ returns us once more to the 
collapsed dualism of Chesterton’s epigrammatic definition of parody, ‘the 
worshipper’s half-holiday’. Appropriately enough, my opening chapter will now 
turn to an analysis of the ways in which Chesterton employs parody to navigate 
the extremes of fanaticism and play in cultural discourse. 
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Chapter One 
Renewing the Varieties For Ever: The Political, 
Philosophical, and Psychological Framework of 
Chestertonian Parody 
 
Holbrook Jackson: As soon as an idea is accepted it is time to reject it. 
Chesterton: No: it is time to build another idea on it. 
 
Inscription in Chesterton’s copy of Jackson’s Platitudes in the Making (13) 
 
In this chapter, I introduce the three principal contexts that will inform my 
subsequent account of Chesterton’s parodic method—the political, the 
philosophical, and the psychological. In political and philosophical terms, I 
discuss the mutually informing preoccupations that led Chesterton to employ 
parodic methodologies to express his opposition to the philosophical programme 
of G.W.F. Hegel and the cultural programme of Matthew Arnold. In developing 
this argument, I elucidate Chesterton’s philosophical affinity with Mikhail 
Bakhtin, arguing that Chesterton consistently turned to dialogic and carnivalesque 
structures as aesthetic methods which mount a democratic challenge to cultural 
authoritarianism, eschewing critical detachment and valorising the corporeal 
realm over abstract intellection. I go on to discuss the psychological concerns that 
drew Chesterton to these positions, arguing that the balance of differentiation and 
identification embedded within the dynamic of parody constitutes a means 
simultaneously to preserve subjecthood and to preclude solipsism, thus 
maintaining identity while securing relation. However, before beginning this 
exposition, it will be helpful to preface what follows with a more thorough 
analysis of the parameters of parody. To this end, I begin with a brief account of 
two polarised critiques of parody, before challenging the partiality of these 
readings through an analysis of Chesterton’s conception of the range and dexterity 
of parodic discourse.  
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Two Contrary Critics of Parody: Leavis and Barthes 
 
In January 1962, the preeminent British literary critic of the day, F.R. Leavis, 
launched a scathing attack upon parody in the letters pages of The Spectator, 
railing that ‘the cult of parody […] belongs to that literary culture [...] which, in its 
obtuse and smug complacency, is always the worst enemy of creative genius’ 
(Letters 91). From this, he concluded that ‘[p]eople who are really interested in 
creative originality regard the parodist’s game with distaste and contempt’ 
(Letters 91). A month later, Leavis made his notoriously vituperative intervention 
in the ‘Two Cultures’ debate instigated by Sir Charles Snow, using his valedictory 
Richmond lecture to denounce Snow’s assertion that the British cultural 
establishment should give greater recognition to the scientific disciplines, and 
should encourage the convergence of discrete specialisms to forge a common 
culture. Instead, Leavis asserted the fundamental cultural primacy of literature, 
while arguing that literary endeavour was unsuitable for co-option with other 
disciplines, since it occupies a state of annexation within an ephemeral ‘third 
realm’, in which creative genius renders the collective consciousness of any given 
era artistically coherent.  
In order to sustain this vision of literature as an isolated special case, 
Leavis not only considered it necessary to guard against the infiltration of other 
academic disciplines, but also the infiltration of pollutants from popular culture. In 
this respect, his near-contemporary diatribes against parodic and academic 
dialogue can be understood to arise from an interconnected fear of encroachment 
upon the moral autonomy of literature from ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture alike. In his 
letter to The Spectator, Leavis refers to parody as ‘a branch of “social 
civilization”’ (Letters 91), a phrase that he used to connote the realm of mass 
entertainment, against which he ranged the embattled forces of ‘culture’ as a 
bulwark. The parodist becomes a particularly disturbing figure for Leavis because 
he/she breaches the divide between these two allegedly distinct arenas, a 
transgression implied by his simultaneous description of parody as a branch of 
‘literary culture’.  
The tendency that Leavis consequently highlights to exemplify all that he 
disdains is ‘the absurd and significant cult of Max Beerbohm’ (Letters 91), an 
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Oxford alumnus whose work stands in an enduring tradition of academic parody, 
stretching from medieval monastic life to Victorian varsity culture (see Malcolm 
119), the ostensible frivolity of which Leavis abhorred as an example of the 
enemy having breached the academic citadel. The disconcerting cultural dexterity 
of parody accounts for the defensive air of Leavis’s claim that the parodist’s 
incursion merely succeeds in demonstrating ‘how inaccessible to any but the most 
superficial, and falsifying, imitation the truly characteristic effects’ of writers of 
distinction are (Letters 91, my emphasis). As Gary Day argues of Leavis’s earlier 
critique of mass culture, Culture and Environment (1933), ‘[w]hat is at stake […] 
is not the meaning of a text but its inviolateness’ (71).  
A decade after Leavis had discharged his critical fusillade, a comparable 
antipathy to parody was expressed by the post-structuralist critic, Roland Barthes, 
a figure who might be considered Leavis’s antipode, insofar as he argues that 
there is no such thing as an inviolate text. Although, as Rick Rylance notes, 
Leavis and Barthes ‘share an equal investment […] in the notion of spontaneous 
formal organisation’ (115) as a justification for literature’s privileged cultural 
status, Barthes’s project essentially subverts Leavis’s critical aims by identifying 
the reader as the locus of this formal organisation, arguing that ‘a text’s unity lies 
not in its origin but in its destination’ (Barthes, Image 148). As this distinction 
suggests, while Leavis wishes to safeguard the writer’s autonomy at all costs, 
Barthes delights in playfully undermining the very concept of ‘creative 
originality’ (my emphasis), insisting upon the writer’s essential dispossession 
within the indeterminate play of textuality.  
In highlighting the ways in which the act of reception productively 
complicates the authorship of meaning, Barthes evinces an affinity with 
Chesterton, who argues that ‘if truth exists at all, it must be often possible for a 
writer to uncover a corner of it which he happens not to understand, but which his 
reader does happen to understand. The author sees only two lines; the reader sees 
where they meet and what is the angle’ (CW 15: 278). Similarly, whereas Leavis 
virulently opposes the interpenetration of ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, this is precisely 
the quality that Barthes identifies as a marker of superior art. In a close echo of 
Chesterton’s account of the operation of parody, he particularly approves of works 
in which ‘antipathetic codes (the noble and the trivial, for example) come into 
contact [so that two] edges are created: an obedient, conformist, plagiarizing edge 
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[…] and another edge, mobile, blank (ready to assume any contours)’ (Barthes, 
Pleasure 6).  
Barthes’s account corresponds with exactitude to the purposeful 
juxtaposition of ‘high’ and ‘low’ (or noble and trivial), as well as the simultaneous 
repetition (obedience, plagiarism) and deviation (mobility), encoded within the 
parodic act. Consequently, it may seem surprising that when Barthes discusses 
parody directly, his understanding of its parameters proves to be as reductive as 
that of Leavis. In The Pleasure of the Text (1973), Barthes negatively compares 
parodic texts to the novels of Flaubert, which are ‘so radically ambiguous 
(ambiguous at the root) that the text never succumbs to the good conscience (and 
bad faith) of parody (of castrating laughter, of “the comical that makes us laugh”)’ 
(9). Here Barthes identifies the comic element in parody as a paradoxical means 
of stifling play, a timorous backward step from the brink of multivalence to the 
safe distance of bluff mockery.  
Barthes’s analysis criticises the form for possessing the very attributes 
which Leavis considers it to lack, portraying the parodist as a reactionary upholder 
of literary authority, whose coercive value judgements are based upon ‘classic’ 
notions of what constitutes literary legitimacy: ‘irony acts as a signpost, and 
thereby it destroys the multivalence we might expect from quoted discourse.’ 
Therefore, while ‘multivalence (contradicted by irony) is a transgression of 
ownership […] parody, or irony at work, is always classic language’ (Barthes, S/Z 
44-45). As these contradictory accounts demonstrate, both Leavis and Barthes see 
parody as essentially univocal in its critical laughter, whether irreverently making 
‘game’ of textual authority, or directing an authoritarian ‘castrating laughter’ 
toward multivalent discourse. The most tenable explanation for this contradiction 
is that parody is capable of activating both of these tendencies—even 
simultaneously—as the following account of Chesterton’s theory and practice will 
demonstrate. 
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The Poles of Parody 
 
Gregory struck out with his stick at the lamp-post, and then at the tree. 
“About this and this,” he cried; “about order and anarchy. There is your precious 
order, that lean, iron lamp, ugly and barren; and there is anarchy, rich, living, 
reproducing itself—” […] 
“All the same,” replied Syme patiently, “just at present you only see the tree by the 
light of the lamp.” 
Chesterton, The Man Who Was Thursday (CW 6: 483) 
 
In Paradox in Chesterton, Kenner identifies an important distinction between 
‘verbal paradox’ and ‘metaphysical paradox’ (17) in Chesterton’s work. Although 
Kenner makes no reference to parody as an aspect of Chesterton’s exploration and 
application of paradox, these terms offer a particularly illuminating means of 
understanding the structure of parody as I define it in this thesis. As Kenner 
summarises the distinction, ‘paradoxes arise either out of our own confusion, which 
thinking can more and more nearly resolve, or from the nature of Being which is 
unresolvable’ (23). These two forms of paradox correspond with exactitude to Esti 
Sheinberg’s account of satire and the grotesque as two distinct discursive 
manifestations of irony—irony being the rhetorical parent model from which both 
parody and paradox derive (Sheinberg 27-28; Hutcheon 25). As Sheinberg explains, 
the discursive ambiguity encoded within the ironic act can be employed either 
satirically, as ‘a prolongation device in a deciphering process, at the end of which 
there will be a resolution’, or as ‘an autonomous reflection on unresolvable 
paradoxes’ (15). Sheinberg discusses the latter application as an expression of 
existential irony, which is manifested artistically in the grotesque: ‘an unresolvable 
ironic utterance, a hybrid’ (207).  
If taken to their respective extremes, these two approaches find expression 
in the authoritarian pedagogy of Juvenalian satire and the anti-authoritarian 
relativism of the Rabelaisian grotesque. For Dustin Griffin (after William 
Anderson), the former mode is predicated upon conveying an edifying ‘moral 
indignation’ (76), while Bakhtin argues that in Rabelais, conversely, ‘a parodic 
attitude toward almost all forms of ideological discourse—philosophical, moral, 
scholarly, rhetorical, poetic […] was intensified to the point where it became a 
parody of the very act of conceptualising anything in language’ (Dialogic 309). In 
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Kenner’s terms, these two extremes embody ‘a rhetorical use that answers merely 
to the complexity of human folly [and a] metaphysical use of paradox that answers 
to the complexity of being’ (Paradox 16). Finally, Kenner identifies a third 
context—‘aesthetic paradox’ (Paradox 18)—which serves to balance the two poles, 
allowing neither to gain total ascendancy. For Kenner, ‘aesthetic paradox’ involves 
‘a resolution of the tensions within things and the tensions within language into a 
third kind of tension from which art takes its vitality’ (Paradox 18). This provides a 
strikingly apt description of parody as I conceive it in this thesis.  
Reconsidering Kenner’s terms in the context of parody is also helpful in 
lending a structural rigour to the slightly ambiguous phrase, ‘aesthetic paradox’. 
Again, this opacity derives from Kenner’s inability to adequately engage with 
Chesterton’s artistry. As Wills notes, ‘“aesthetic paradox” becomes a maze of 
meaningless distinctions because Kenner tries to make Chesterton wield “aesthetic 
paradox” without engaging in the activities of the artist’ (Man 38). While this leads 
Wills to question the entire validity of Kenner’s framework, we can begin to 
explicate its usefulness if we consider the three forms of paradox outlined by 
Kenner—verbal, metaphysical, and aesthetic, which he defines as ‘the Word, the 
World, and that union of the Word and the World which is Art’ (Paradox 18)—to 
correspond to the artistic spheres of the satirical, the grotesque, and the parodic. In 
this sense, parody plies its trade in the space of tension between the Word, as 
challengeable discursive act, and the World, as unresolvable paradox.  
Hurley shares Wills’ misgivings over Kenner’s terminology, arguing that 
the latter’s account fails to show ‘how different instances of its use may be 
identified as being either ‘“essentially verbal” or “essentially metaphysical”’ 
(Chesterton 59). This failure can be explained by the subtext of the ‘tension’ 
invoked by Kenner, which suggests that in the case of parody (or ‘aesthetic 
paradox’) it is impossible to extract such essentials. Rather, as Thompson explains, 
satire, parody, and the grotesque should be understood to possess an essentially 
‘interdependent relationship’ (Grotesque 41). For example, if the element of satire, 
or verbal paradox, is entirely expunged, we are left not with parody, but with 
uncritical pastiche (or imitation); whereas if the element of grotesque irony, or 
metaphysical paradox, is fully extracted we are left merely with a diatribe. Looked 
at another way, when taken to their respective extremes, satire unreflectively 
destroys, while the grotesque uncritically accumulates.  
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These extremes are exemplified by the discourses of the critics with which 
my account began. Barthes’s valorisation of an absolute textual relativism is very 
close in principle to the endlessly appreciative action of the grotesque—as 
Sheinberg explains, structurally ‘the grotesque is the result of an additive process, 
in which all meanings are accepted and accumulated’ (209). However, his 
uncritical adherence to this approach causes Barthes to underestimate the 
epistemological dangers presented by an undermining of the viability of objective 
valuation. Conversely, Leavis’s Juvenalian stress upon ‘valuation and judgement’ 
(Bradbury, ‘Matter’ 190) causes him to over-state the disruptive potential of 
textual play to such an extent that he becomes exorbitantly culturally 
authoritarian. In this respect, Barthes and Leavis come to embody extremes of the 
poles under discussion—Leavis is the aloof satirist on his judgement seat, Barthes 
the iconoclastic proponent of the multivalent grotesque—and consequently each 
sees in parody only a manifestation of the pole to which he is opposed. Wherever 
parody infiltrates such discourses, these extremes will be productively 
complicated, because its ambivalently imitative dynamic causes it to rebound 
intractably between a retention and subversion of authority. As Dentith explains 
this dynamic, parody possesses a ‘mobility and flexibility’ which enables it both 
to ‘subvert the accents of authority and police the boundaries of the sayable’, with 
the consequence that ‘no single social or political meaning can be attached to it’ 
(Parody 27-28).  
This lithe fluidity derives from the etymological root shared by paradox and 
parody—‘para’, meaning both ‘beside’ and ‘contrary to’ (Barnhart 754)—which 
imbeds an interpretative duality within the linguistic core of each term. As Rose has 
noted, ‘the ambiguity of the prefix “para” [lies in] its ability to describe both 
nearness and opposition’ (8).1 Consequently, the juxtaposition of ‘para’ with ‘odos’ 
in Aristotle’s original coinage, parodia, enables the term to be interpreted either as 
‘oppositional song’, or the less adversarial ‘parallel song’.2 Again, this reflects the 
capacity of textual parody to occupy a dialogic position at any point on a sliding 
scale between the most affectionate homage and the most critical polemic, since it 
                                                 
1
 Rose is paraphrasing F.J. Leviere. Hutcheon also notes the interpretative duality of the ‘para’ in 
‘parody’ (32). Hutcheon later discusses the ‘paradox of parody’ (69), but only in terms of its 
‘authorised transgression’ (76). As with Rose’s definition, Hutcheon does not link ‘para’ to 
paradox in the literal sense in which I am using it here. 
2
 These are my terms. 
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is structurally predicated upon a variable admixture of adherence and departure. A 
comparable multivalence arises when the ambiguous prefix is conjoined to the 
‘doxa’ of paradox, meaning ‘opinion’ (Barnhart 754). This renders ‘paradox’ 
construable as either ‘opposing opinion’, connoting a satirical contradiction of a 
cultural orthodoxy, or ‘parallel opinion’, connoting a grotesque accumulation of 
contexts—the latter serving to more subtly undermine the absolute authority of the 
orthodoxy, by drawing attention to the discordant aspect of any apparently coherent 
worldview, which is located in its slight off-centeredness in relation to every other 
conceivable worldview.  
  A particularly instructive example of the complex interaction of the poles of 
parody under discussion is offered by an early journalistic fracas involving 
Chesterton, in which parody and paradox come together. Chesterton’s eagerness to 
challenge cultural orthodoxies had quickly established his reputation as a purveyor 
of extravagant verbal paradox, an idiosyncrasy which occasionally caused irritation 
among the readers of his earliest columns. One correspondent to The Speaker 
sardonically ascribed deliberate parody to Chesterton’s ostensible excesses, 
ironically expressing his ‘unbounded admiration for “G.K.C.” as a humourist. As a 
parodist of that fantastical modern style which revels in forced and false antitheses 
he is simply un-equalled’ (‘Correspondence.’ Speaker 1 Feb. 1902). Chesterton 
responded with a vigorous rebuttal (‘Bacon and Beastliness.’ Speaker 8 Feb. 1902), 
which anticipates Kenner’s account of metaphysical paradox as the expression of 
‘something inherently intractable in being itself’ (Paradox 17), by drawing 
attention to the element of existential irony in paradox. Chesterton surmises that his 
correspondent had ‘got into his head [the] extraordinary idea that paradox is a 
flowery, artificial thing, invented by literary flâneurs’, whereas the fact ‘that 
paradox is continuous and ancient (the word itself dates from the time of Plato) is 
quite clear’. Chesterton goes on to account for the cultural permanence of paradox: 
‘the reason is that there is really a strand of contradiction running through the whole 
universe, in proportion as men perceive it, they admit a contradiction: in proportion 
as men become honest they become paradoxical’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.87).3  
                                                 
3
 British Library manuscript references are given when the document has not been published 
elsewhere. The manuscript referred to here contains clippings of all Chesterton’s articles for The 
Speaker, many of which have never been republished. Both sides of this correspondence are 
collected in BL MS Add. 73381 ff.87. Chesterton’s side of the exchange is also quoted in Oddie 
189-90. 
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In the example at hand, Chesterton’s understanding of the complexities of 
the rhetorical framework under discussion enables him to wield the devices of 
parody in particularly dextrous fashion, to the detriment of his would-be opponent. 
His antagonist posits himself as a satirist—an ironical exponent of verbal paradox, 
delivered to correct the wayward rhetorician. Chesterton then counters with an 
exposition of the intractability of the existential grotesque which, ironically enough, 
he delivers in a pedagogic manner, thus satirically parodying the presumption of the 
satirist. In this curious exchange, the consistent coexistence and intertwining of the 
two poles of parody comes into focus with particular clarity. Later in his reply, 
Chesterton employs the paradox of courage to illustrate the existential ‘strand of 
contradiction’ that he is concerned with elaborating: ‘I have only to say, “Courage 
involves the power to be frightened,” and you have a paradox and a plain fact of 
common sense’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.87). As he explains elsewhere, in an account 
which corresponds to Maebh Long’s description of irony as ‘the hyphenation of 
extremes’ (17), bravery is meaningless unless conjoined with potential cowardice, 
so that unresolved antithesis is ingrained within the conceptual structure of the 
word, ‘courage’, itself: ‘the paradox of Courage [...] says, “You must defy the thing 
that is terrifying; unless you are frightened, you are not brave”’ (‘Fairy Tales.’ 
World 27 Sept. 1904; qtd. in Ahlquist, Common 46).  
Chesterton’s example is an archetypal expression of the rhetorical 
grotesque, in which ‘semantic contraries’ (Sheinberg 207) are hybridised within a 
single lexical unit. As Chesterton explains in George Bernard Shaw (1909), through 
this procedure, ‘two opposite cords of truth become entangled in an inextricable 
knot’ (CW 11: 449). Notably, Chesterton’s definition of parody—‘the worshipper’s 
half-holiday’—is itself a version of the existential grotesque, in the sense that the 
juxtaposition of worship and holiday conveys a collapsed conjunction of antitheses. 
These apparently contrary principles are also hybridised in the etymology of 
holiday itself, which, as Chesterton notes elsewhere, derives from ‘holy day’ 
(Heretics 54), a duality which suggests that reverence and play are indissolubly 
bound up with one another. Indeed, when we consider that a combination of 
repetition and deviation, producing simultaneous destruction and renewal, is the 
structural hallmark of parody, we can see that the act itself is founded upon the 
same hybridising premise as the grotesque.  
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A later attempt on Chesterton’s part to define his terms again illustrates his 
understanding of the duality inherent in his preferred modes of discourse. In 
‘Paradox’ (DN 28 Oct. 1911), Chesterton cites the Biblical example, ‘“Whosoever 
shall lose his life the same shall save it”’ (CDN 7: 231), as a further instance of 
metaphysical paradox. However, he notes that this does not constitute paradox in 
the strictest etymological sense: ‘In mere derivation, of course, the word means that 
which is against opinion; presumably public opinion’ (CDN 7: 231). Chesterton 
argues that his use of this form of paradox, which corresponds to ‘verbal paradox’ 
in Kenner’s terms, does not set out to challenge what he perceives to be the 
enduring consensus of ‘public’ opinion, but rather the transient orthodoxies of 
fashionable coteries: it ‘does not mean that which differs from democratic tradition, 
but that which differs from intellectual fashion recently made current in a 
comparatively small circle’ (CDN 7: 232). In a near-contemporaneous essay, ‘The 
End of Parody’ (DN 18 Mar. 1911), Chesterton anticipates this more adversarial 
reading of paradox by placing an emphasis upon the local, combative aspects of 
parody, in contrast to the more universal, ambivalent rendering of the earlier ‘Bret 
Harte’ essay, with its rhetorically grotesque definition of the form.  
In ‘The End of Parody’, Chesterton figures parody as a tool of the satirist, 
employed in the cause of reasoning out errors in fashionable orthodoxies, thus 
reading satire as the ‘end’ for which parody offers the means. Chesterton argues 
that the modern state is in the process of enacting the literal end of this procedure, 
by criminalising the techniques through which such parody functions. He reaches 
this conclusion in response to a case of libel brought against his friend, W.R. 
Titterton, for a recently published parody of Daily Express journalism. As 
Chesterton explains, Titterton had ‘adopted that method of satire […] called in 
Euclid the reductio ad absurdum’ (CDN 7: 93). This is ‘the most ancient and 
obvious of methods of light controversy—the turning of an opponent’s case against 
himself’ (CDN 7: 93), a technique comparable to that employed by Chesterton 
against his epistolary antagonist in The Speaker. To this end, Titterton’s piece was 
composed with ‘a monstrous and ironical gravity: like that of Voltaire’s “Candide” 
or Swift’s “Modest Proposal” […] But the obvious point was that it was a parody’ 
(CDN 7: 93). The fact that such a parody could be prosecuted as a textual slur 
demonstrates to Chesterton that ‘points of libel have gone very near to making 
literature impossible. At least, they tend to force literature to drop satire and adopt 
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pure eulogy’ (CDN 7: 92). As Chesterton concludes, ‘I think it is the twilight of 
liberty; but I am sure it is the sunset of satire’ (CDN 7: 93).  
As these examples demonstrate, the poles of satirical and grotesque parody 
inform Chesterton’s approach towards—respectively—his social, political, and 
cultural moment, and his wider understanding of existence itself. However, he also 
argues that a recognition of the grotesque contradictions of existence should temper 
any inclination to be excessively adversarial or dogmatic in controversy. In a 
further irony, in George Bernard Shaw, Chesterton employs this insight to project a 
suspiciously pristine distinction between his position and that of his most famous 
adversarial antipode. He figures the poles of verbal satire and the existential 
grotesque—which he characterises here as ‘wit’ and ‘humour’—as operating in a 
mutually dependent balance, since they embody the individual’s capacity to adopt 
an ironic stance towards the contemporary social world and the self.
4
 Chesterton 
argues that Shaw possesses only wit, and that this imbalance is his greatest failing, 
since it means that ‘there is nothing really problematic in Shaw’s mind’ (CW 11: 
447). In contrast, Chesterton approvingly notes that a ‘humorous confession of 
futility was much of the force in Charles Lamb and in Stevenson’, whereas ‘[t]here 
is nothing of this in Shaw; his wit is never a weakness; therefore it is never a sense 
of humour. For wit is always connected with the idea that truth is close and clear. 
Humour, on the other hand, is always connected with the idea that truth is tricky’ 
(CW 11: 380).  
In his essayistic definition of ‘Humour’, discussed briefly in my 
introduction, Chesterton again lays particular stress upon the mutually balancing 
nature of wit and humour as synonyms of satire and the grotesque. This much later 
essay demonstrates his enduring adherence to a dualistic position, belying the 
common critical view, articulated by David Lodge, that Chesterton’s ‘acceptance of 
Catholicism’ (‘Dual’ 335) caused his later years to be increasingly characterised by 
‘a certain rigidity which did not combine easily with […] the idea of metaphysical 
duality’ (‘Dual’ 327). Chesterton describes satire as possessing an essential critical 
function in maintaining objective value and containing the potential drift toward a 
nihilistic relativism: ‘It is a grave error to underrate wit as something trivial; for 
certain purposes of satire it can truly be the sword of the spirit’, because it 
                                                 
4
 See Martin (25-46), for an account of the enduring distinction drawn historically between wit and 
humour. 
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represents ‘reason on its judgement seat’ (Spice 23). Nonetheless, he evinces a 
temperamental preference for the grotesque aspect of ‘humour’, because ‘humour 
can be of the finest and yet lay open the guard or confess its inconsistency’ (Spice 
23). In other words, humour is more open and ambivalent than satire, and 
consequently more truly analogous to existence.  
In Chesterton’s early fiction, his protagonists are repeatedly situated as 
exemplars of an unresolved dialogue between the poles of wit and humour, 
certainty and doubt, or adherence and departure, that are tied together in the 
principle of the worshipper’s half-holiday. For example, as Boyd notes, the 
contretemps between Wayne and Quin, in The Napoleon of Notting Hill, is ‘not a 
confrontation between individuals, but a confrontation between earnestness and 
humour’ (20). The pair end the story with an understanding that ‘the pure fanatic 
[and] the pure satirist’ are really ‘two lobes of the [same] brain’ (CW 6: 379), and 
in this spirit they are last seen wandering into the distance in friendly 
conversation. A comparable principle is true of the final reconciliation of the 
morally exercised policeman, Syme, and the existential anarchist, Gregory, in The 
Man Who Was Thursday; the purposeful irresolution of the quarrel between 
Chesterton’s theological disputants, the religious fundamentalist, MacIan, and the 
iconoclastic atheist, Turnbull, in The Ball and the Cross (1909); and the 
picaresque partnership of the ‘Conservative’ Pump and the ‘Radical’ Dalroy 
(Flying 206) in The Flying Inn (1914).  
Quin’s complaint, in The Napoleon of Notting Hill, that he had ‘tried to 
compose a burlesque, and it seems to be turning into an epic’ (CW 6: 278) due to 
Wayne’s intervention, also demonstrates the way in which the co-presence of 
these two extremes manifests itself artistically in the parodic juxtaposition of the 
absurd and sublime. This aesthetic outcome arises from the fact that each 
representative of the dyads listed above embodies a characteristic of his creator—
reverence and critical distance, respectively—which cannot be sloughed off 
without producing an internal imbalance. Chesterton’s contemporary, Dixon 
Scott, noted that Chesterton was, himself, accused of both ‘undue flippancy, [and] 
of undue earnestness’ (265) by baffled critics. This confusion arises from the 
dualistic nature of his philosophical programme, which explains why he 
consistently turned to parody as a mode that is not uncomplicatedly judgemental 
or relativistic, satirical or grotesque, but rather essays a delicate, ever-shifting 
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balance between the two. When viewed in this light, we begin to understand 
Chesterton’s location within the enduring lineage of parodic writers outlined in 
my introduction—figures who, in the words of John Docker, ‘parody 
conventionality at the same time as they parody themselves and their own claims 
to truth’ (143), in a manner that essays a continual navigation of the ‘third kind of 
tension’ identified by Kenner in ‘aesthetic paradox’. 
A particularly instructive example of Chesterton’s anxiety to balance the 
poles of satire and the grotesque through parody occurs in his essay, ‘Pope and the 
Art of Satire’ (1905).5 Here Chesterton takes pains to offset his account of Pope’s 
combative use of ‘the great and civilised art of satire’ (Twelve 51) with a re-
emphasis upon the principle of the intractability of existence: Pope’s ‘antitheses 
were fully in harmony with existence, which is itself a contradiction in terms’ 
(Twelve 50). Appropriately enough, Chesterton crowns his encomium to Pope’s 
rhetorical genius with a parody of his literary style, employing the comic 
technique of exhaustively exaggerative verbalism to illustrate the superiority of 
Pope’s extreme formal concision—and the grotesque hybridisation which it 
accommodates—to the baggy superfluity characteristic of lesser Edwardian poets:  
 
Instead of writing, 
 
“A being darkly wise and rudely great,” 
 
the contemporary poet, in his elaborately ornamented book of verses, would produce 
something like the following:  
 
“a creature 
Of feature 
More dark, more dark, more dark than skies, 
Yea, darkly wise, yea, darkly wise: 
Darkly wise as a formless fate. 
And if he be great, 
If he be great, then rudely great, 
Rudely great as a plough that plies, 
And darkly wise, and darkly wise” (Twelve 47-48). 
                                                 
5
 First published as ‘The Decline of Satire’ (see above, 9). The text cited here was added to the 
amended version, collected in Twelve Types. 
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Here parody is used, counter-intuitively, to bolster the authority of a 
previous discursive statement, a goal which then becomes the occasion for the 
parodist’s verbal satire of a third context. Hutcheon has noted that ‘[l]ike Pope’s 
mock epics, many parodies today do not ridicule the background texts, but use 
them as standards by which to place the contemporary under scrutiny. The 
modernist verse of Eliot and Pound is probably the most obvious example of this 
kind of attitude, one that suggests almost a respectful or deferential ethos’ (57). 
Although Hutcheon does not refer to Chesterton’s essay, it offers a singularly apt 
corroboration of her reading, since the unspoken precedent that informs his 
methodology is Pope’s Dunciad (1728), which employs Homer’s Iliad as an 
exemplary structural template through which to launch a mock-heroic critique of 
his contemporaries.  
In this respect, Chesterton’s skit scrupulously balances the poles of parody 
in a formal, as well as conceptual, sense—it is a sympathetic pastiche (or ‘parallel 
song’) of Pope’s method, bound up with an adversarial satire (or ‘oppositional 
song’) aimed at Chesterton’s contemporaries. A further connotation of the prefix, 
‘para’, is to protect, cover, or defend (from the Latin, parare; see Barnhart 754), 
an application discernible in ‘parachute’ and ‘parasol’. In view of the recurring 
presence of epigrammatic collapsed ambivalence in Chesterton’s own stylistics—
not least in his definition of parody—this example not only serves to defend an 
aspect of Pope’s achievement, but also to mobilise the satirist in tacit defence of 
Chesterton’s own method. In this way, the forebear becomes a friend who the 
parodist takes into battle as ‘cover’ against unsympathetic contemporary fashions. 
In the process, the tension at the heart of parody is again evoked by a paean to the 
mysterious intractability of the existential grotesque (‘a being darkly wise and 
rudely great’), which becomes the simultaneous occasion for a decisively 
bifurcating act of oppositional satire. 
Perhaps the most telling proof of the centrality of these principles to 
Chesterton’s life and work is their interrelated co-presence in his theological 
imagination. In an echo of his account of satire as ‘the sword of the spirit’—an 
allusion to Ephesians 6:17—Chesterton states elsewhere that ‘a creed is the sword 
of the spirit’ (‘The Evil Day.’ DN 26 June 1909; CDN 5: 344), suggesting an 
imaginative correspondence between the moral framework and existential 
certainties offered by satirical and religious creeds. However, the principle of the 
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existential grotesque is also emblematised by a religious symbol of equal 
importance in Chesterton’s imaginative landscape—the cross—which he discusses, 
in The Ball and the Cross, as ‘primarily and above all things at enmity with itself. 
The cross is the conflict of two hostile lines, of irreconcilable direction’ (CW 7: 41). 
Appropriately enough, the purposeful irresolution of the duel between MacIan and 
Turnbull—as representatives of certainty and doubt—is symbolised by Chesterton’s 
repeated depiction of their swords meeting in the shape of a cross. At one perilous 
stage, ‘the two bright, bloodthirsty weapons made the sign of the cross in horrible 
parody upon each other’ (CW 7: 152), while the novel ends with a conceptually 
inverse image of the discarded swords having ‘fallen haphazard in the pattern of a 
cross’ (CW 7: 258), thus transmuting the ‘horrible parody’ into a benign image of 
reconciliation.  
 
Dialogism and Variety: Chesterton’s Anti-Hegelian Poetics 
 
“[T]he whole object of despotism is to get some sort of unity.” 
 
Barker, in The Napoleon of Notting Hill (CW 6: 262) 
 
As the final image of The Ball and the Cross suggests, the agon of Turnbull and 
MacIan is not resolved with one disputant triumphing over the other, either 
physically or intellectually, but instead comes to an end with Turnbull’s final 
acceptance of MacIan’s relation to him as an apparently antithetic binary—his 
‘friend and enemy’ (CW 7: 236). This construction of a harmony in unresolved 
antithesis illustrates Chesterton’s very deliberate departure from what he 
considered the ascendant philosophical doctrine of his age: neo-Hegelian 
idealism. Hegel’s dialectic, within which philosophical enquiry proceeds from 
thesis, to antithesis, to a final higher synthesis of values, can be interpreted as an 
attempt to domesticate the disruptive energies of the existential grotesque, insofar 
as Hegel expressed a distrust of the ‘negativity of irony’ (Aesthetics 66) when 
conceived as an end in itself. In order to counter this putative negativity, Hegel 
reconceived irony as the subordinate, antithetic stage in the dialectical process, 
which is ultimately transfigured through the movement toward synthesis.  
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Hegel’s dialectical structure can be understood to correspond 
approximately to Kenner’s account of verbal paradox as a procedure through 
‘which thinking can more and more nearly resolve’ contradiction (re-solution 
being conceptually akin to synthesis). As this suggests, idealist philosophy is 
prone to display overconfidence in the autonomous reasoning power of the 
intellect, unalloyed by a balancing conception that ‘truth is tricky’, as Chesterton’s 
definition of humour has it. In this sense, dialectics is a fundamentally rationalistic 
system, its tripartite structure borrowed from Aristotelian logic, or what 
Chesterton terms ‘the chains of syllogism’ (Twelve 98). Chesterton coins this 
phrase in ‘Charles II’ (collected in Twelve Types), in a discussion of the 
systematising tendency of the ‘intellectual bullies’ (Twelve 98) responsible for 
seventeenth-century Puritanism, the doctrinal inflexibility of which could not 
accommodate ‘all the chaotic and unclassed parts of human nature, the parts that 
are left over, and will always be left over, by every rationalistic system of life’ 
(Twelve 100).  
As Bakhtin argues, Hegel’s pristinely abstract system attempts a 
comparable evacuation of all that is various, capricious, and unruly in human 
relations: ‘Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of voices), 
remove the intonations (emotional and individualizing ones), carve out abstract 
concepts and judgements from living words and responses, cram everything into 
one abstract consciousness—and that’s how you get dialectics’ (Speech 147). 
Bakhtin’s ‘anti-Hegelianism’ (Pechey 14) derives from his belief that 
‘[i]deological monologism […] found its clearest […] expression in idealistic 
philosophy’ (Problems 80), specifically in ‘Hegel’s monological dialectic’ 
(Speech 162). Bakhtin explains that the ‘monistic principle, that is, the affirmation 
of the unity of existence, is, in idealism, transformed into the unity of 
consciousness’ (Problems 80). In opposition to this monologic striving after unity, 
Bakhtin proposed the contrary principle of dialogic relation. As Julia Kristeva 
explains, although the structure of dialogism is superficially evocative of Hegel’s 
system, it actually operates in an anti-Hegelian manner:  
 
[Dialogism] must not be confused with Hegelian dialectics, based on a triad and thus 
on struggle and projection (a movement of transcendence) […] Dialogism replaces 
these concepts by absorbing them within the concept of relation. It does not strive 
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towards transcendence but rather toward harmony, all the while implying an idea of 
rupture (of opposition and analogy) as a modality of transformation (Kristeva 58). 
 
Dialogism denies the desirability of Hegel’s progress to a transcendent 
unification of antitheses, instead halting the dialectical process at the irresolution 
of the antithetic stage, which Habib characterises as the point at which ‘the object 
is viewed as mediated: its identity and essence are seen to reside in the diversity of 
its relations with other objects’ (130). Similarly, Coates has noted that 
Chesterton’s opposition to the neo-Hegelian philosophy prevalent at the turn of 
the century led him to stringently ‘insist on the discrete identity of objects’, and 
informed ‘his resolute and continuous hostility to all the various rhetorics or 
terminologies of merging, blending, changing, developing or evolving into higher 
or unknown forms, which the age produced so liberally’ (Controversialist 25). In 
Chesterton’s fiction, a retention of un-synthesised diversity is exemplified by the 
conclusion of the duel of MacIan and Turnbull, when the pair abandon their 
swords, which symbolise their dogmatic theses, in the shape of a cross, which 
symbolises ‘irreconcilable’ antithesis, so that thesis and antithesis become frozen 
in mutual relation. In this light, Chesterton’s text can be understood as an 
archetype of the ‘polyphonic novel’ espoused by Bakhtin as an aesthetic corollary 
of dialogism, in which ‘a plurality of equally-valid consciousnesses’ (Problems 7) 
are brought together in dialogic confrontation, the ultimate irresolution of which 
enables a radical disruption of the agonistic premises of dialectical conflict when 
played out in the cultural arena.  
Chesterton outlines his anti-Hegelian position in an essay on ‘The Cosmic 
Stew-Pot’ (T.P.’s Weekly Dec. 1910), the title of which constitutes a 
characteristically burlesque analogy, parodically conflating the abstract with the 
corporeal in order to bring the lofty, arcane rhetoric of synthesis literally down to 
earth. Here Chesterton argues that ‘[t]here has crept into our thoughts [...] a 
curious and unnatural idea. I mean the idea that unity is itself a good thing; that 
there is something high and spiritual about things being blended and absorbed into 
each other’ (Man Who 108). Chesterton explains that his contrary philosophy of 
existence is based upon the principle of ‘renewing the varieties for ever’ (Man 
Who 109), a phrase which forms the titular heading to this chapter, in view of its 
exemplification of the appreciative and restorative double action upon which 
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Chestertonian parody is based. Chesterton’s emphasis upon the maintenance of 
variety is echoed in Bakhtin’s account of the structure of parody, which closely 
corresponds to his exposition of the function of dialogism. In parody ‘there cannot 
be [a] fusion of voices’, since the voices are ‘isolated from one another, separated 
by a distance’, so that ‘in parody the deliberate palpability of the other’s discourse 
must be sharp and clearly marked’ (Problems 193). Hutcheon concurs with 
Bakhtin’s reading, considering parody to be predicated upon the ‘differential but 
mutual dependence of parody and parodied texts. Its two voices neither merge nor 
cancel each other out; they work together, while remaining distinct in their 
defining difference’ (xiv).  
Chesterton’s critical work features a number of parodies designed to 
emphasise the uniqueness of discrete textual entities, anticipating Gross’s account 
of the parodist’s pleasure that a writer such as Browning ‘should choose to 
apprehend the universe in this one peculiar fashion. And […] that he should keep 
it up—that he can always be relied on to be Browningesque’ (Oxford xii). 
Chesterton’s own study of Browning features one such instance. He begins by 
taking two sublime lines from Tennyson—‘Thou art the highest, and most human 
too’, and ‘We needs must love the highest when we see it’—before rendering 
them in absurdly heightened Browning-ese—‘High’s human; man loves best, best 
visible’—to demonstrate the drawbacks in comprehensibility of the latter’s 
clamorous method (Robert 147). However, he goes on to demonstrate, through a 
deliberately pedestrian parody of his own, that Browning’s ‘outrageous gallop’ is 
frequently preferable to a more ‘conventional and classical’ (147) rendering, thus 
elaborating the unique distinction of Browning’s art. Through this approach, 
Chesterton not only illustrates the distinct value of the aesthetic entities 
themselves, but pragmatically demonstrates that they cannot be fused.   
While Chesterton stresses the equivalent value of the expressive methods of 
each poet here, it is no coincidence that it is a sublime evocation of the ‘highest’ 
on Tennyson’s part that prompts his irreverent tampering. In ‘A Step of Progress’ 
(DN 14 July 1906), he rounds upon ‘the cowardly and detestable word “high” as 
used in speaking of “high ideals” and “high thinking”. It is supposed to be so very 
ethereal, and it is really a gross material metaphor’ (CDN 4: 5). This attack should 
again be understood in the context of Chesterton’s distrust of the evanescent 
rhetoric of ‘higher’ synthesis, which, in his youth, was frequently employed to 
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lend a patina of philosophical respectability to the agonistic business of empire, 
through a transferral of Hegel’s premise of the dialectical confluence of antitheses 
to the principle of one culture being subsumed within another, ostensibly superior 
culture. As Chesterton argued, the ‘task of modern idealists […] is made too easy 
for them by the fact that they are always taught that if a thing has been defeated it 
has been disproved’ (CW 4: 59). In contradistinction, Chesterton’s satirical 
adherence to verbal paradox, as a statement that runs contrary to conventional 
opinion, is predicated upon a programmatic questioning of the dominant ideology 
which, in Hegel, has triumphed due to its greater authoritative power. 
Appropriately enough, satire is the form to which Chesterton turns when deriding 
the adherent to Hegelian philosophy as a simultaneously weak and malign figure: 
‘ordinary people do not shrink from a Hegelian: they merely pity him. They do 
what they can to make his life happier: they make him Minister of War’ (‘The 
Daisy as Imperial Symbol.’ ILN 8 June 1907; CW 27: 482). 
Perhaps the first parody that Chesterton ever composed, when he was still a 
small boy struggling with basic spelling, was an inversion of W.E. Aytoun’s Lays 
of the Scottish Cavaliers (1849), which sets out to challenge the official historical 
line on a defeated uprising. Maisie Ward discusses this as ‘an excellent imitation 
[…] but on the opposite side’,  since Chesterton defends Lord Archibald 
Campbell, the first Marquess of Argyll, in his attempts to ward off the advance of 
English Royalists into Scotland, in the process turning Aytoun’s ‘hero into a 
traitor […] and his traitor Argyll into a hero’ (Gilbert 21). Chesterton’s intuitive 
support for the underdog later translated into a more philosophically rigorous anti-
imperialist stance, which was catalysed by the traumatic events of the Second 
Boer War (1899-1902). As Stapleton notes, this conflict alerted Chesterton ‘to the 
importance of differentiation at a variety of cosmic levels’ (Christianity 33). In an 
interview conducted in 1931, Chesterton asserted that ‘[p]erhaps the catastrophic 
event [of my life]—if you want one—was the South African War. There I saw 
something which seemed to me to be the meanest kind of financial grab’ (Man 
Who 171). Forty years after the fact, the note of passionate indignation resounds 
with undiminished force in Chesterton’s Autobiography: ‘I hated the whole thing 
as I had never hated anything before’ (113). 
In an incisive crystallisation of the philosophical sophistries employed by 
imperial powers to justify land-grabs of this kind, Chesterton objected to what he 
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termed the ‘“opportunist cosmopolitanism”’ (qtd. in Ker 134) of the philosophers 
of empire. Again evoking Hegelian synthesis, such apologists valorised the 
incorporation of other cultures into the imperial body in the name of a speciously 
utopian, cosmopolitan ‘progress’, the bad faith of which was exposed by the 
suspiciously opportune nature of the targets selected. The sophistries to which this 
principle led are illustrated by the discreditable position that Chesterton ascribed 
to his friend, H.G. Wells: ‘He says that […] it might be necessary, in policing the 
planet, to force backward peoples to open their resources to cosmopolitan 
commerce’ (Autobiography 225). In contrast, Chesterton derided the blithe, 
solipsistic assumption of superiority which imperialist powers brought to this 
clash of values: ‘cosmopolitanism [is] really a rather one-sided affair […] It 
means that there shall be a Professor of Sloyd Carpentry sent among the Maoris of 
New Zealand; it does not mean that there shall be a Professor of Tattooing at 
Oxford or Cambridge’ (‘The Sacred Street.’ DN 4 June 1904; CDN 2: 238).  
As with his irreverent image of ‘The Cosmic Stew-Pot’, Chesterton 
frequently challenges the philosophical justification of territorial conquest by 
substituting material metaphors for sublime rhetoric. This reveals a further 
important application of the grotesque in his parodic repertoire—its emphasis 
upon the unvarnished physicality of the material world over the evasive 
abstractions of intellectual systems. Chesterton’s consistent recourse to 
bathetically materialistic analogies as a means of debunking rhetorical duplicity 
inverts the conventional view of ‘coarse’ language as a morally dubious 
profanation of the sublime, instead employing the parodic modes of burlesque 
(situational parody, in which lofty themes are transposed into ‘low’ scenarios) and 
travesty (stylistic parody, in which lofty rhetoric is transposed into unrefined 
language) as the means of conveying a moral message. An example of the 
burlesque approach is offered by his essay, ‘A Defence of Patriotism’ (Speaker 4 
May 1901), in which the empire’s geographic extremities are referred to as ‘its 
fists and its boots’, an image which associates oppressive brutality with the 
furthest reaches of an imperial body-politic divested of a ‘head and heart’ 
(Defendant 167). Chesterton later essayed a comparable approach in What’s 
Wrong with the World (1910): ‘that an Empire whose heart is failing should be 
specially proud of the extremities, is to me no more sublime a fact than that an old 
dandy whose brain is gone should still be proud of his legs’ (CW 4: 90).  
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In replacing the evanescent rhetoric of Hegelian synthesis with the material 
rhetoric of physical oppression and corporeal degeneration, Chesterton 
manipulates what Pope termed ‘“the very bathos of the human Body”’ (qtd. in 
Crangle and Nicholls 4), in order to parody the sentimental cod-sublimity of a 
pristinely synthesised empire, upon which ‘the sun never sets’.6 As Kiremidjian 
argues, the function of this parodic approach is ‘to degrade and ridicule the lofty 
by transforming it into imposture of some sort […] The moral point of [burlesque 
is] to reveal that all things have two faces, that the appearance of loftiness is 
[often] a projection of vanity’ (Study 17). In this way, parody ‘raises the question 
of what the relation is between form and content’, and in the process ‘forces us to 
become aware of the manner’ (Study 17) in which form and content guide our 
reception of rhetoric. This stylistic device forms a key element of the ‘trenchant 
satire of euphemism’ (Paradox 17), which Kenner identifies as a mainstay of 
Chesterton’s polemics. For example, in Eugenics and Other Evils (1922), 
Chesterton parodically exposes the tendency of advocates of eugenics to 
strategically adopt the passive voice as a means of obscuring the violence implicit 
in their policies. In one instance, he employs a reverse-travesty—the ironic 
translation of direct expression into arcane verbalism—as a parodic parallel to 
clinch his point: ‘Hamlet said, “I should have fatted all the region kites with this 
slave’s offal.” The Eugenist would say, “The region kites should, if possible, be 
fattened; and the offal of this slave is available for the dietetic experiment”’ (CW 
4: 326).  
Chesterton’s mastery of this form of counterargument was particularly 
nurtured by his first journalistic position, at the Liberal newspaper, The Speaker. 
Stapleton notes that the senior staff of the paper were united by ‘an antipathy 
toward philosophical idealism’, especially ‘its emphasis upon opposites merging 
into a higher unity’ (Christianity 33). As Coates explains, this antipathy was 
expressed through an editorial tone which continually ‘parodied and ridiculed the 
language and demolished the moral and intellectual pretentions of empire’ 
(Controversialist 68), with a critical ear finely attuned to ‘the connotations of 
language, [and] the relation of styles of discourse to the moral and emotional life 
                                                 
6
 Luke Seaber makes a similar point about the controversial phrase, ‘“kick niggers”’, in ‘A 
Defence of Patriotism’: ‘Chesterton is unmasking the ugly truth behind the clean rhetoric of the 
empire builders’ (Literary 310). 
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of individuals and societies’ (Controversialist 52). One particularly notable 
feature of the paper was its implantation of stand-alone humorous pieces 
immediately after the serious leading articles. These articles employed parody, 
satire, and nonsense to recast the rhetorical sobriety of the opening pages as 
scurrilous invective, a juxtapositional technique which produces a formal echo of 
the conventional running order of the Greek drama, in which the final comic piece 
would parody the tragic events that preceded it.  
In view of this recourse to comedic modes borrowed from Aristophanes as a 
means of deflating the sublime rhetoric of neo-Hegelian dogma, it is telling that 
Chesterton’s ‘defence’ essays were originally published in The Speaker, since 
these not only include his burlesque critique of imperialist rhetoric, the ‘Defence 
of Patriotism’, but also his paeans to aesthetic variety—the defences of detective 
fiction, the penny dreadful, nonsense, and farce—in which Chesterton makes an 
explicit appeal to Aristophanes as an aesthetic standard: ‘two thousand years have 
beaten as vainly upon the follies of the “Frogs” as on the wisdom of the 
“Republic”’ (Defendant 127). Of course, Chesterton’s adoption of the ‘defence’ 
format also constitutes a knowing allusion to the aesthetic ‘defence’ essay 
inaugurated by Sir Phillip Sidney (‘The Defence of Poesy’, 1595), and later 
pastiched by Shelley (‘A Defence of Poetry’, 1840). However, rather than 
mimicking Sidney and Shelley in recruiting ‘high’ forms of culture to defend the 
legitimacy of art, Chesterton opts to defend ostensibly ‘low’ literary forms as 
legitimate art. In this way, Chesterton’s series parodically inverts the advocacy of 
the sublime which informed these earlier examples, so as to complement his 
political critique of sublime rhetoric on the world stage with a cultural critique of 
sublime rhetoric in the domestic arena.  
As with his challenge to the discursive authority of the eugenics movement, 
Chesterton undertakes this critique as a means of highlighting the arbitrary nature 
of the social authority projected by contemporary cultural thinkers. In pursuing 
this line of argument, Chesterton chose to set himself in opposition to the defining 
critical voice of the Victorian era, the steadfast opponent of all things parodic, 
Matthew Arnold. Chesterton’s challenge to Arnold particularly focuses upon re-
establishing an understanding of the fundamentally complementary nature of 
seriousness and comedy which had characterised the Greeks’ approach to genre, 
and which he believed to have been corrupted, from the Renaissance onwards, by 
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the imposition of extrinsic value judgements pertaining to the moral purpose and 
influential effect of literature. Before beginning his statements for the defence, 
Chesterton adopts the role of insubordinate prosecutor, curtly dismissing the 
notion that ‘low’ literature is morally degrading: ‘This is the magisterial theory, 
and this is rubbish’ (Defendant 22). In ‘A Defence of Farce’, he goes on to replace 
the rhetoric of ‘low’ and ‘high’, which he later argued ‘logically means nothing, 
but morally means priggishness’ (‘Women, Worrying, and the Higher Culture.’ 
ILN May 12 1906; CW 27: 189), with dispassionate generic discrimination:  
 
I have never been able to understand why certain forms of art should be marked off as 
something debased and trivial. A comedy is spoken of as “degenerating into farce”; it 
would be fair criticism to speak of it “changing into farce”; but as for degenerating into 
farce, we might equally reasonably speak of it as degenerating into tragedy (Defendant 
121). 
 
Similarly, Chesterton draws attention to the consistent valorisation of only 
one element of Greek aesthetics—the sublime—in post-Renaissance culture, 
while highlighting the differing value judgements that have obtained in other eras 
and cultures: in ‘the Middle Ages men broke away from the Greek standard of 
beauty’ (Defendant 117), the narrowness of which is itself belied by the diversity 
of enduring Greek art, stretching from Plato to Aristophanes. Chesterton’s 
argument challenges contemporary prejudices through a comparable technique to 
that which Morson identifies in parodic debunking: ‘parody is most readily 
invited by an utterance that claims transhistorical authority […] Parody 
historicizes, and in so doing, it exposes the conditions that engendered claims of 
unconditionality’ (‘Parody’ 78). Of course, there is an irony in this historicising 
gesture, since it coincides with Chesterton’s engagement in an impish one-
upmanship with what Stefan Collini has termed Arnold’s ‘“Greeker than thou” 
tone’ (84), a challenge which postulates Chesterton’s own status as the guardian 
of an alternative trans-historical authority, based upon a balance of earnestness 
and play. Elsewhere, he notes that ‘[w]e have forgotten that Aristophanes and 
Rabelais stand with Aeschylus and Dante; that their folly was wiser and more 
solid than our wisdom, and that their levity has outlasted a hundred philosophies’ 
(‘Charles Dickens.’ DN 8 Feb. 1902; CDN 1: 329). In this way, Chesterton 
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repeatedly reasserts the trans-historical authority of a ‘forgotten’ aesthetic model 
which he happens to practice himself.  
This attempt to re-orientate the reader’s aesthetic standards belies 
Chesterton’s protestations, in his ‘Defence of a New Edition’ of the collected 
essays, that ‘speaking legally, a defendant is not an enthusiast for King John or the 
domestic virtues of the prairie-dog. He is one who defends himself’, and this is ‘a 
thing which the present writer […] certainly never dreamed of attempting’ 
(Defendant 6). Culturally speaking, The Defendant is as much an act of self-
defence as dispassionate advocacy, much as Chesterton’s defence of the method 
of a forebear becomes indistinguishable from self-defence in the Pope essay. The 
Defendant essays constitute a pre-emptive riposte to an intellectual atmosphere in 
which certain aesthetic forms with which the writer identifies are considered 
culturally invalid, with the further implication that this culture will consider the 
author himself invalid, unless it is educated in an alternative approach to culture. 
Chesterton’s early criticism therefore takes its cue from Wordsworth, who 
famously argued (after Coleridge) that the ‘great and original writer […] must 
himself create the taste by which he is to be relished; he must teach the art by 
which he is to be seen’ (Letters 103). The necessity for Chesterton to pursue a 
comparable strategy is hinted at in E.C. Bentley’s diaries, in an entry which refers 
to the early drafts of The Napoleon of Notting Hill that Chesterton was working on 
when the pair began their careers in public life: ‘Sat up with him planning an 
absurd story of a London war that he is busying himself with just now. The kind 
of thing that never can be published until he has educated the public up to liking 
anything he writes—then they would be capable of seeing the good in his frantic, 
fanciful tales’ (4 Feb. 1900; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869).  
There is a circular irony in Chesterton’s resemblance to Wordsworth in this 
area, since the latter was Arnold’s great touchstone, and Chesterton’s attempt to 
sculpt a place for himself within a cultural landscape in which present standards 
were unfavourable to his reception was founded upon a challenge both to 
Arnold’s uncritical valorisation of the sublime, and his anti-democratic, 
authoritarian vision of culture. In his critical study of Browning, Chesterton 
employs Arnold as his subject’s antithesis: whereas ‘Browning [was] an 
intellectual democrat […] Arnold was an intellectual aristocrat’ (Robert 41). In 
The Victorian Age in Literature (1913), Chesterton claims acerbically that 
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Arnold’s critical principles ultimately resolve themselves in an aristocracy of one: 
‘some may suspect that culture was a man, whose name was Matthew Arnold [… 
He] kept a smile of heartbroken forbearance, as of the teacher in an idiot school, 
that was enormously insulting’ (CW 15: 454). Again, it is the pretence to trans-
historical legitimacy that accompanied Arnold’s aristocratic cultural precepts 
which Chesterton sets out to challenge. As he explains elsewhere, ‘every 
aristocracy, must, in its nature, be parvenu. It represents merely the temporary 
worldly success of one particular worldly fashion’ (‘The Radical.’ DN 19 Jan. 
1907; CDN 4: 140).  
It is interesting that this dismissal of ‘temporary worldly success’ should 
closely correspond to Chesterton’s critique of neo-Hegelianism, since the 
aesthetic fashion that Arnold particularly sought to initiate was a deprecation of 
irony as thoroughgoing as that espoused by Hegel. A.W. Benn argues that 
Arnold’s cultural theory possessed a close philosophical affinity with Hegel, ‘for 
whose disciple Arnold passed at one time, probably without ever having read him’ 
(55). Similarly, Leon Gottfried notes that Arnold’s ‘concept of the “poetic”, which 
was inherited from Milton and Wordsworth, prohibited the use in poetry of whole 
ranges of tone, particularly the ironic tone or method’ (21-22).7 While Arnold’s 
critical dogmatism never fully succeeded in expunging the vitalising irony and 
burlesque playfulness from his own writing, his precepts laid the foundations for 
the stress upon austere refinement that dominated the literary atmosphere of 
Chesterton’s youth. As Gross puts it, while Arnold was ‘seldom precious or over-
fastidious himself, it must be conceded that he was often the cause of preciosity 
and over-fastidiousness in others’ (Rise 68).  
Both Arnold’s cultural authoritarianism and his distrust of irony stem from 
an exorbitant anxiety over the ungovernable nature of the citizenry’s reception of 
literature, which prefigures Leavis’s anxiety over the inviolateness of the text, and 
helps to explain the comparably intemperate language used by Arnold in reference 
to parody. Arnold and Leavis exemplify Collier’s account of the presence of an 
enduring critical anxiety from the Victorian age to the late-Modernist era, in 
which ‘concern for reading habits was underpinned by a fear of contamination of 
the “best” by the “people”’ (17). Perhaps the most alarming example of Arnold’s 
                                                 
7
 Meanwhile, Collini stresses Arnold’s ‘marked […] affinities with that Idealist tradition of 
political thought that stretches back from, most notably, Hegel [to] Plato’ (91). 
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authoritarianism in this area is presented by an early letter sent to Arthur Hugh 
Clough, in which Arnold’s anxieties over the unpredictable influence of literature 
lead him to some rather drastic conclusions: those ‘who cannot read G[ree]k 
sh[ou]ld read nothing but Milton and parts of Wordsworth: the state should see to 
it’ (Arnold, Letters 97).  
In the case of Leavis, a fear of the instability of reception is discernible in 
his cautious stationing of the reader’s response as a corroborative component in 
the construction of the syllogistic ‘third realm’. Through this expediency, the 
antithetic energies of reception are harnessed in a dialectical movement towards 
an ultimate cultural synthesis which would countersign the author’s vision. As 
Day argues, Leavis’s overarching ambition was to foster ‘a critically informed 
public who [would] endorse the judgement of the minority’ (20), yet his anxiety 
over the likelihood of achieving this endorsement while disruptive parodists like 
Beerbohm were at large results in an Arnoldian urge to scrupulously monitor the 
reading habits of the citizenry. Appropriately enough, this urge is exposed to 
parody in Frederick Crews’ The Pooh Perplex (1964), a hoax-symposium of 
academic papers on Winnie the Pooh, in which Leavis appears in the thinly veiled 
guise of ‘Simon Lacerous’. Lacerous solemnly opines that ‘we must give Pooh a 
zero for moral seriousness’ (106) in the course of his essay, ‘Another Book to 
Cross Off Your List’, the title of which parodies Leavis’s emulation of Arnold’s 
relentless de-selection of approved texts.  
Arnold’s fear that if the lower orders were given access to the higher values 
they might not simply take spiritual inspiration from them, but might instead 
pollute and profane them, causes him to view the irreverence of the parodist as a 
particularly dangerous cultural precedent. It is no coincidence that Arnold 
juxtaposes ‘artists envious, and the mob profane’ (Poetical 314) in his poem, 
‘Heine’s Grave’ (1863), since for Arnold the ‘artists envious’ who produced 
parody represented an apparent proof of the volatility of democratisation. Arnold 
conceives the parodist as both an iconoclastic incitement to, and aesthetic analogy 
of, the potentially insurrectionary mob, a body which he notoriously discussed in 
intemperately punitive terms, approvingly citing his father’s views on the subject: 
‘“flog the rank and file, and fling the ringleaders from the Tarpeian Rock”’ 
(Culture 203).  
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Arnold’s position on this matter bears interesting comparison to 
Chesterton’s depiction of Syme, in Thursday, who represents a monitory self-
representation of the adolescent Chesterton, and possesses a paranoid belief that 
the world is a seething hive of dangerous anarchists, in which he is the lone 
guardian of cultural order. The narrator explains Syme’s outlook as the 
psychological quirk of ‘one of those who are driven early in life into too 
conservative an attitude by the bewildering folly of most revolutionists’ (CW 6: 
505). Syme’s eventual overcoming of excessive conservatism is accompanied by a 
revelation of the benignity of ‘“the mob”’ (CW 6: 604), comparable to that which 
dawned upon Chesterton prior to his emergence onto the public stage. It is 
appropriate, then, that Chesterton pointedly departs from Arnold on the matter of 
deprecating the mob, instead considering it ‘painful to notice that at the present 
time mobs are not properly admired’ (‘The Hysteria of Mobs.’ ILN 18 Jan. 1908; 
CW 28: 26), and noting, elsewhere, that ‘to appreciate the virtues of the mob one 
must […] be on a level with it (as I am)’ (‘The Garden of the Sea.’ DN 20 Aug. 
1910; CDN 6: 313). By using his journalistic position to act as an advocate for the 
mob, Chesterton posits himself as a cultural loudhailer applied to a silenced 
majority, in opposition to the small coterie of neo-Hegelian and neo-Arnoldian 
intellectuals who he perceived to overwhelmingly dominate the political and 
cultural conversation of the age. In this way, Chesterton becomes the public’s 
representative in the press, a disruptive fifth-column columnist: ‘the only quite 
uncultured person in England who writes articles’ (‘The Orthodoxy of Hamlet.’ 
DN 18 May 1907; CDN 4: 222).  
Again, Chesterton first initiated this construct in the Defendant essays. For 
example, his ‘Defence of Slang’ implicitly challenges Arnold’s presuppositions 
concerning what constitutes the ‘best’ use of language, by arguing that the 
language of the streets is the true locus of linguistic vitality in society, since it 
possesses an imaginative energy lacking in the discourse of the upper stratum: ‘If 
a man of fashion wished to protest against some solecism in another man of 
fashion, his utterance would be a mere string of set phrases, as lifeless as a string 
of dead fish’ (Defendant 144). Chesterton goes on to emphasise the contrasting 
literary dexterity of the streets through a puckish confounding of the ostensibly 
distinct domains of ‘high’ and ‘low’ literature: ‘Keats never put into a sonnet so 
many remote metaphors as a coster puts into a curse […] the true nature of slang 
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[…] consists in getting further and further away from the original conception, in 
treating it more and more as an assumption. It is rather like the literary doctrine of 
the Symbolists’ (Defendant 145).  
Chesterton again took inspiration from Browning as Arnold’s antithesis in 
this respect, arguing that the former’s status as an ‘intellectual democrat’ was 
demonstrated by the discursive polyphony which characterises his work. 
Chesterton identifies the particular merit of The Ring and the Book (1868) to be its 
illustration of ‘the belief, it might almost be said, the discovery, that no man ever 
lived upon this earth without possessing a point of view’ (Robert 171). In taking 
the ‘step of deciding, in the face of many serious dangers and disadvantages, to let 
everybody talk’, Browning produces ‘the epic of free speech’ (Robert 173). In 
contrast, Arnold’s apprehension of these ‘dangers’ leaves him exorbitantly 
suspicious of the challenge to authority presented by a democratisation of culture. 
As Dwight MacDonald argues of the Victorian era, ‘[n]ever before or since has 
there been such a popular appetite for the genre’ (Parodies 565) of close parody. 
MacDonald accounts for this on the grounds that the ‘nineteenth century marked 
the transition between the old elite culture and the new mass culture; on the one 
hand, the audience had enormously expanded with the increase in literacy; on the 
other, the newcomers were still close enough to the old culture to take it as a 
natural part of life’ (Parodies 565).  
Chesterton depicts this moment of cultural transition in The Return of Don 
Quixote, in which he sets up a dialogic confrontation between an Arnoldian critic, 
Almeric Wister, and a self-educated strike-leader, John Braintree. Appropriately 
enough, Chesterton encodes an allusion to Browning within the ensuing dispute. 
Braintree astonishes Wister’s coterie with a series of criticisms of ‘high’ works of 
art, including Browning’s verse, and the tenor of Braintree’s critique echoes the 
predominant method of Victorian parody in emphasising critical close reading. 
Wister’s Arnoldian credentials are first suggested by his complacent assertion that 
‘[d]emocracy, of course, is not favourable to authority. And I very much fear […] 
that democracy is not favourable to art’, because democracy leads ‘us to neglect 
all artistic authorities’ (CW 8: 81). Braintree confirms Wister in this opinion by 
answering back insubordinately to Browning with a violence that is 
simultaneously comically disproportionate and unnerving in its amalgam of the 
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discerning and the unrefined: ‘Browning deserved to be killed for rhyming 
“promise” and “from mice”’ (CW 8: 82).  
Although Wister surmises that Braintree’s attitude is ‘all part of the mob 
and its hatred of superiority. Always wants to drag merit down’ (CW 8: 83), 
Chesterton continually emphasises the status of parody not as a catalyst for 
cultural debasement, but as a form that enables a coherent questioning of the 
authority of dominant discourses, while guarding against an absolute relativizing 
of discourse, through its retention of critical discrimination. Here discrimination 
does not carry the devalued connotation of prejudice, in the sense that Arnold and 
Leavis’s binary segregation of popular and ‘high’ culture discriminates, but rather 
conveys an open-minded investigation of all potential sites of cultural value.  
This principle later informed Chesterton’s parodic vision of the ‘“Golden 
Treasury Regilded; or, the Classics Made Cockney”’ (‘The Surrender of a 
Cockney.’ DN 28 Aug. 1909; CDN 6: 36), in which he risks Arnold’s spectral 
execration by singling out Wordsworth’s ‘Ode. Intimations of Immortality’ (1804) 
for parodic emendation, translating ‘The innocent brightness of a new-born Day / 
Is lovely yet’ (Wordsworth, Poems 158) to ‘The grimy colour of the London clay 
/ Is lovely yet’ (CDN 6: 37). Again, the intent here is not to debase the sublime, 
but rather to elevate the quotidian, in a manner which corresponds to Carlyle’s 
interpretation of humour as ‘“a sort of inverse sublimity”’ (qtd. in Martin 28). As 
Carlyle explains, in ‘“exalting, as it were, into our affections what is below us,”’ 
the humourist ‘“is properly the exponent of low things […] The man of humour 
sees common life [as] poetical […] whatever has existence has a charm for him”’ 
(qtd. in Martin 28). This temperamental quality is exemplified by the project of 
cultural salvage carried out by Chesterton in The Defendant, which he articulated 
thus: ‘a defendant is chiefly required when worldlings despise the world […] I 
have investigated the dust-heaps of humanity, and found a treasure in all of them’ 
(Defendant 16). 
While this venture sees Chesterton placing the judgement of wit at the 
service of the impartiality of humour, his imaginative conflation of the political 
and aesthetic virtues of the mob is also vitally informed by his insistent emphasis 
upon maintaining a balance between the critical faculty of satire and the 
appreciative action of the grotesque. As the title of his Appreciations and 
Criticisms of Charles Dickens (1911) suggests, Chesterton found in this dynamic 
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a sympathetic means of analysing the work of a figure who stands alongside 
Browning at the head of Chesterton’s pantheon of exemplary literary democrats. 
As he explains elsewhere, Dickens’s social polemics possessed insurrectionary 
satirical bite: he ‘was a mob—and a mob in revolt’ (CW 15: 455). Nonetheless, 
Dickens’s literary imagination also turns upon grotesque appreciation: he had ‘an 
incomparable hunger and pleasure for the vitality and the variety, for the infinite 
eccentricity of existence. […] This sentiment of the grotesqueness of the universe 
ran through Dickens’s brain and body’ (Charles 144). Consequently, the 
‘intoxicating variety of men […] was his vision and conception of human 
brotherhood’, through which he evoked the ‘feeling of a grotesque democracy. By 
that is more properly meant a vastly varying democracy’ (Charles 126). While 
this image leaves us with a vision of Dickens ‘renewing the varieties for ever’, it 
is to the principle of ‘grotesque democracy’ that I will now turn in further detail. 
 
Democratic Laughter and the Chestertonian Carnival 
 
Chesterton’s anxiety to stress that his use of verbal paradox ‘does not mean that 
which differs from democratic tradition’ offers an illustration of the ‘devotion to 
democracy’ which Father John O’Connor—the chief model for Father Brown—
identified as ‘a kind of mystic passion’ (88) in his friend. This political position 
was just one of the personal attributes that Chesterton conceived as an unseemly 
affront to contemporary orthodoxies on his part: ‘You must excuse me; I am a 
democrat; I know I am out of fashion in the modern world’ (‘The Shop of 
Ghosts.’ DN 22 Dec. 1906; CDN 4: 117). O’Connor argues that this passion 
directly informed Chesterton’s production of satire, since he felt that ‘the people 
would have to cultivate their sense of the ridiculous’ (89) as a shield against those 
who sought to criminalise satirical dissent through manipulation of the libel laws. 
Chesterton’s discussion, in ‘The End of Parody’, of tolerance of the satirical 
element of parody as the benchmark of a functioning democracy finds 
commonality with the position of E.M. Forster, who famously cheered twice for 
democracy, because it ‘admits variety and […] permits criticism’ (79). As we 
have seen, these two qualities are also embedded within the dialogic structure of 
parody—it relentlessly propagates new varieties on old themes, while enacting a 
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measured criticism of the prior discursive statements that it constructively 
amends.  
Through this double action, parody takes on ethical value. As Phiddian 
argues, ‘[w]hatever the ideology informing a particular parody, parody as a 
method is anti-authoritarian. […] It queries the grounds of discourses and 
demystifies their claims of self-contained validity by pointing in one direction to 
sources and in the other to implications’ (Swift’s 100). Consequently, Hutcheon 
notes that parody can potentially act ‘as a consciousness-raising device, 
preventing the acceptance of the narrow, doctrinaire, dogmatic views of any 
particular ideological group’ (103). This challenge frequently takes the form of 
exposing the other side of a discourse that has previously been dominated by a 
single narrative voice, in a spirit comparable to Chesterton’s deprecation of the 
‘one-sided affair’ of imperial cultural traffic. The retroactive impudence of the 
parodic act, which is explicitly highlighted by the title of Carol Anne Duffy’s 
anthology of poetic parodies, Answering Back (2007), challenges the projection of 
monologic discursive authority, through an insistent exposure of hitherto effaced 
perspectives. This return of the repressed narrative voice is displayed in a wide 
range of ways in Chesterton’s work. For example, he prefigures Duffy’s collection 
in his range of ‘answers to the poets’ (CW 10.1: 332), which includes such 
conceits as ‘Dolores Replies to Swinburne’ (G.K.’s Weekly 28 Mar. 1925). Here 
Chesterton imagines the viewpoint of the writer’s muse, the object of desire 
whose subjectivity has previously been obscured by the poet’s obtrusive 
personality: ‘Oh, pagan Priapean poet / You give me a pain’ (CW 10.1: 332).  
In Robert Browning, Chesterton discusses the particular value of such 
deliberate shifts of perspective, exclaiming ‘how disturbing, how weird an 
experience it would be to read [the Odyssey] from the point of view of Antinous! 
Without contradicting a single material fact, without telling a single deliberate lie, 
the narrative would […] change the whole world around us’ (172). This conceit 
involves the parodist in a kind of ethical police work, in which statements are 
scrupulously taken from all involved parties. It is no coincidence that Chesterton 
made Father Brown his most complete expression of the potential of parody, nor 
that so many of his other fictional works—The Club of Queer Trades (1905), The 
Man Who Was Thursday, Manalive (1912), The Poet and the Lunatics (1929)—
are thematically satirical, while being structured as detective stories. As Helmut 
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Heissenbuttel notes, ‘the crime novel derives its narrative movement from the 
“reconstruction of the unnarrated”’ (83), and this is also precisely the function of 
parody.  
As Wills notes, the game-structure of detective fiction is also predicated 
upon going ‘against doxa’ (Man 122)—that is, of confounding the expectations 
that the reader might bring to the text in the light of social convention, in order to 
produce a sense of surprise at the solution. In a further unconscious gesture 
towards the structure of parody, Wills explains that the technique of detective 
fiction ‘is one of progress through negations to assertion’, and is therefore based 
on a ‘dialectic which creates by destroying’ (Man 122). In a parallel action, 
parody demands, by its nature, that the reader should hone his/her own detective 
instincts in order to recognise that something is in fact being parodied. As 
Sheinberg notes, ‘[a]ll modes of ambiguity rely on an active reader’ (28). 
Parody’s pedagogically intentioned complication of the reception process presents 
a means of promoting Hutcheon’s ‘consciousness-raising’ in the reader, much as 
detective fiction famously invites the reader to take a more-than-usually active 
role in the deciphering process of textual reception. This interactivity expedites 
the conversion motif identified by William J. Scheick in The Club of Queer 
Trades, through which the stories ‘self-reflexively vex [their] generic conventions 
even while using them and also in the process involve the subsequently 
disorientated, detecting reader in a critique of the very social, political, and 
economic reality those conventions are designed to reinforce’ (96-97). 
Perhaps most importantly, detective fiction is not only predicated upon a 
confounding of readerly prejudice, but also compels the author to continually 
think against his or her own doxas, in order to consistently retain the element of 
surprise. It is a polyphonic genre, in the sense that, in order to function 
successfully, it must be composed of ‘free people, capable of standing alongside 
their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him’ 
(Bakhtin, Problems 6). Again, The Ball and the Cross—though not itself a 
detective novel—emerges as an exemplary polyphonic text in this light, since 
Chesterton compels himself to formulate Turnbull’s atheistic arguments, which 
oppose the author’s own creed in a manner which is finally ‘unanswerable’ (CW 
8: 123), to produce an additional dialogic dynamic: an unresolved exchange 
between the author and his characters. This voluntary enactment of self-
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contradiction on the part of the author demonstrates the inscription of a further 
level of democratic accountability within the structure of parody, at the level of 
the grotesque. While Chesterton’s article on ‘The End of Parody’ discusses 
tolerance of the satirical element of parody as the benchmark of a functioning 
democracy, in a more subtle sense the grotesque pole of parody equally promotes 
democracy, insofar as it allows no-one to escape its critical lens, including the 
parodist.  
In ‘Two Cheers for Democracy’, Forster argues that if there is to be any 
form of aristocracy within a democracy, it should be composed of those who ‘can 
take a joke’ (83), and for Chesterton this principle applies equally to the figure 
who makes the joke: ‘We shall never make anything of democracy until we make 
fools of ourselves’ (Defendant 110). This element of reciprocity in parodic 
humour reveals the importance of Bakhtin’s theory of the carnivalesque to a 
proper understanding of Chesterton’s poetics. For Bakhtin, the democratic 
laughter characteristic of the medieval carnival ‘is universal in scope; it is directed 
at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants […] he who is laughing, 
also belongs to it’ (Rabelais 11-12). This conceit is echoed in Gross’s account of 
the immanence upon which successful parody is predicated: ‘it is not enough for a 
parodist to detect absurdity in others. He must create something absurd himself’ 
(Oxford xii). In Bakhtinian terms, what Gross is emphasising here is the 
requirement of an awareness on the parodist’s part that he/she is fundamentally 
implicated in the world that he/she critiques and the laughter that he/she generates, 
in line with Chesterton’s admonishment, in ‘The Flat Freak’ (DN 8 Jan. 1910), 
‘[d]o not fancy you can be a detached wit and avoid being a buffoon; you cannot. 
If you are the Court Jester you must be the Court Fool’ (CDN 6: 178). 
As Chesterton’s dictum implies, the principle of immanence is not merely 
an imperative for the production of satisfyingly sophisticated and/or intellectually 
honest parody, but is intrinsically inscribed within its formal makeup. Even if the 
reader is tacitly enjoined to prefer the parodist’s model to the parodied discourse, 
the very act of parody reveals not only the arbitrariness of the ur text, but by 
extension also that of the parody, so that both come to possess a comparable 
logical validity, within a potentially infinite panoply of viewpoints. As Hannoosh 
explains, by providing ‘a new version of an old story’, parody 
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cannot legitimately propose itself as the definitive [version], since by its own example 
it belies the concept of a definitive or authoritative work altogether. Moreover, a 
parody must even allow for a critique of itself such as it has performed on the original 
[… so that] parody actually rebounds upon itself, calling itself into question as it does 
the parodied work, and suggesting its own potential as a model or target (‘Reflexive’ 
114).  
 
This phenomenon is invoked by the title of The Return of Don Quixote, which not 
only exposes the archetypal self-reflexive text to parodic revision, but in the 
process advertises its own status as a vulnerable text by making explicit reference, 
in Hannoosh’s terms, ‘to other examples of its own story, thus signalling to the 
reader that it is merely one among many possible’ versions (‘Reflexive’ 117). 
Chesterton’s recognition of the distinct value, as well as the inevitable presence, 
of this aspect of parody, is signalled by his account of ‘humour’ as a grotesque 
form which opens itself to inner contradiction, in contrast to the would-be 
detachment of the wit. He explains that humour is composed of 
 
a certain sense of being laughed at, as well as of laughing. […] Wit is reason on its 
judgement seat; and though the offenders may be touched lightly, the point is that the 
judge is not touched at all. But humour always has in it some idea of the humourist 
himself being at a disadvantage and caught in the entanglements and contradictions of 
human life (Spice 23). 
 
Chesterton’s image of universal laughter as a symbol of willing 
entanglement in existence anticipates Bakhtin’s account of ‘the gaping jaws’ that 
leave the individual ‘not impenetrable but open’ (Rabelais 339). By way of 
contrast, Chesterton frequently employs the sneer or smirk as a symbol of the 
inward-facing laughter of the ‘judge’ who is unwilling to be ‘touched at all’. In 
Chaucer (1932), he employs this distinction to establish his subject as another 
antitype of Arnold, pointedly subverting the sublime intent of Arnold’s rhetorical 
principle of the ‘grand style’ in an account of Chaucer’s capacity to provoke a 
universal ‘laughter in the grand style’, before complaining of Arnold, in contrast, 
that ‘for all his merits, [he] did not laugh but only smiled—not to say smirked’ 
(CW 18: 161). The latter observation is, perhaps, an arch allusion to ‘Heine’s 
Grave’, since Arnold’s deprecation of ‘artists envious, and the mob profane’ arises 
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in the context of a discussion of Heine as an exemplar of the dangers of 
untrammelled irony, in which his subject’s mode of humour is compared to the 
‘sardonic smile’ (Poetical 317) of Satan. In drawing attention to Arnold’s smirk, 
Chesterton implies that the arch-enemy of irony might be of the devil’s party 
without knowing it, as Blake famously alleged of Arnold’s exemplar of the 
sublime grand style, Milton. It is a curious irony in itself that Arnold’s critical 
attitude often resembles Hegel’s account of the proud ironist who establishes an 
aloof position from which to look down inscrutably upon others: ‘the divine 
genius looks down from his high rank on all other men’ (66). Again, one thinks of 
Chesterton’s account of Syme’s fanaticism in Thursday, the extremity of which 
finally causes him to appear ‘a very satisfactory specimen of the very anarchists 
upon whom he had vowed a holy war’ (CW 6: 506).  
The urge to sidestep implication in the carnival by closing oneself off to 
laughter behind the private joke—or smirk—connotes an authoritarian refusal to 
democratically admit criticism, with the closed mouth symbolising the barring of 
a potential cite of admittance, and consequently this gesture is particularly likely 
to attract the parodist’s irreverent attentions. However, it is again essential to note 
that the humourist’s simultaneous capacity to engage in ironic self-examination 
lends an element of grotesque democracy to any such parodic critique. While 
parody identifies the discontents which derive from the lack of self-irony 
attendant to any monologic viewpoint, it also avoids the pitfalls of a comparable 
critical authoritarianism by producing ‘something absurd’ in turn, in Gross’s 
phrase, here in the form of an artefact that is implicitly in discord with itself. 
Again, The Return of Don Quixote provides an apt case study. To return to the 
dialogue between Wister and Braintree, the latter’s conversational victory reflects 
Chesterton’s approbation of the autodidact as an embodiment of the increasing 
democratisation of culture discussed by MacDonald. However, Chesterton 
considered the socialism that Braintree espouses to merely replace the old class-
based authoritarianism with an alternative form of detached paternalism.  
In this light, Braintree’s critical allusion to Browning’s The Pied Piper of 
Hamlin (1842) is not adventitious, but instead subtly enables the author to speak 
ironically back to both the men engaged in dispute. The myth of the Pied Piper 
operates, in part, as an allegory of the Danse Macabre, or Dance of Death, a late-
Medieval allegory of the skeleton leading men to the grave, which Sheinberg 
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considers perhaps ‘the most characteristic instance of the grotesque’ (219). 
Consequently, it might be thought that Braintree invokes the myth as an allusive 
reference to the imminent demise of Wister’s social order, a demise presaged by 
his own violent expression of irreverence towards the high-cultural institution of 
Browning. However, according to Webster’s, the Pied Piper also represents ‘a 
charismatic person who attracts followers’; ‘one that offers strong but delusive 
enticement’; or ‘a leader who makes irresponsible promises’ (Woolf 862).8 For 
Chesterton, each of these qualities could be applied with equal validity to the 
Arnoldian critic and the Marxist firebrand.  
Braintree’s attack can be understood as an example of Bakhtinian ‘double-
voiced discourse’ (Problems 185). As Morson explains (while citing Bakhtin), the 
‘author of a double-voiced word appropriates the utterance of another as the 
utterance of another and uses it “for his own purposes by inserting a new semantic 
orientation into a word which already has—and retains—its own semantic 
orientation”’ (‘Parody’ 65). By implicitly transforming a single ‘utterance’ into a 
‘hybrid construction’ (Bakhtin, Dialogic 304), the author of a ‘double-voiced 
word’ makes the character’s rhetoric boomerang ironically back upon his- or 
herself, in a manner which subverts the private joke, and exposes the would-be 
detached wit to carnivalesque laughter. Indeed, the Dance of Death is an 
essentially carnivalesque principle in itself, since its allegorical message is that 
death comes to everyone, regardless of temporary social ascendency. There is a 
fathomless irony in having Braintree essay a private joke at Wister’s expense, 
which simultaneously advertises the Socialist’s own worldly triumph as the 
occasion of his eventual obsolescence.  
In Robert Browning, Chesterton pre-empts his protagonist’s criticism of the 
‘promise / from mice’ rhyme, before justifying the apparent artistic lapse on the 
grounds that Browning was complicit in his own absurdity, depicting the poet as a 
carnivalesque figure whose compulsive displays of ‘buffoonery’ were of a kind 
un-witnessed ‘since the time of Rabelais’ (154). In this light, it might be argued 
that Browning has the last laugh at the expense of his would-be judge, Braintree, 
not least because his final couplet actually constitutes a fittingly inelegant finale to 
a self-consciously carnivalesque text. In a supreme irony, the socialist’s criticism 
                                                 
8
 The first of these connotations is drawn from the online version of the dictionary.  “pied piper.” 
Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, 2013. Web. 31 July 2013.  
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misfires precisely because he slavishly applies the Arnoldian aesthetic standards 
of his adversary to a text inadmissible to such a system of judgement. At a further 
level of ambivalence, just as the title of Chesterton’s novel advertises the 
transitory nature of its own adaptive authority, the ‘double-voiced word’ encoded 
within the reference to the Pied Piper—itself a cultural myth that has been subject 
to innumerable adaptations—can even be considered to rebound self-reflexively 
upon the author’s own status as ‘a charismatic person who attracts followers’ (the 
novel was serialised in Chesterton’s own periodical, G.K.’s Weekly, which lobbied 
for the institution of Distributism), so that the allusion also speaks ironically back 
to the author, who happens to be one of Browning’s most celebrated critics. In a 
single discursive action, Braintree confounds Wister’s detachment, the author 
confounds Braintree’s detachment, and the author confounds his own detachment.  
Elsewhere, Chesterton puckishly hints at his awareness of the ever-present 
danger of lapsing into hubristic demagoguery when he informs the reader, with 
mock-solemnity, that ‘I will enlighten your barbaric blindness next week’ (‘A 
Dilemma about Demons.’ DN 18 Jan. 1913; CDN 8: 227). This allusion to 
Arnold’s description of the refined aristocracy as ‘[b]arbarians’ (Culture 103) 
postulates a tentative similarity between Chesterton and his ostensible antipode, 
similar to that encoded within the character of Syme, while implying that the key 
distinction between the two men is Chesterton’s greater self-awareness. In an 
essay devoted to Arnold, Chesterton depicts the former’s unselfconsciousness as 
deriving from monologic intellection: ‘the body is an animal and a very comic 
animal. Matthew Arnold could never have felt any part of himself to be purely 
comic—not even his singular whiskers’ (Matthew viii). Chesterton goes on to 
observe that, in contrast, St. Francis ‘called his own body “my brother the 
donkey”’ (Matthew viii). Of course, Chesterton’s poetic definition of the donkey, 
in perhaps his most frequently anthologised poem, is ‘The devil’s walking parody 
/ On all four-footed things’ (Stories 283). 
Chesterton’s vision of the ‘entanglements’ embraced by ‘humour’ 
consistently finds a corollary in the unruly physical body, which implicates the 
individual within the messy business of material existence, militating against a 
capacity to withdraw into the rarefied wit of intellection. It would seem telling 
that Chesterton’s series of ‘answers to the poets’ features a particularly complex 
example in which ‘The Sea replies to Byron (As it might have appeared to 
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Wordsworth)’ (G.K.’s Weekly 21 Mar. 1925).9 Here the material world has its 
repressed voice returned, and promptly declares that it will have the last laugh at 
the solipsistic poet’s expense: ‘Thy songs are speeches, void of all save Thee […] 
Till nature blows the man-hater sky-high […] And dashes him against the Truth’ 
(CW 10.2: 333). This valorisation of an imminent relation to the corporeal is 
echoed in Chesterton’s ‘Sonnet to a Stilton Cheese’, a parody which draws 
Wordsworth into the sphere of mockery in turn: 
 
Stilton, thou shouldst be living at this hour  
[…]  
England has need of thee, and so have I—  
[…]  
my digestion, like the House of Lords,  
The heaviest burdens on herself doth lay (CDN 7: 120).  
 
Chesterton’s burlesque, corporeal reimagining of Wordsworth’s heady 
appeal to Milton would seem a singularly well-calculated affront to Arnold, 
killing the latter’s exemplary duo of sanctioned songbirds with one stone. 
However, it is again crucial to note that Chesterton’s parody not only sends up the 
occasional disposition towards monologic solemnity that he discerned in his 
targets, but also draws the parodist into the range of the mockery, via a 
carnivalesque invocation of his groaning digestive system. The immanence of the 
conceit is particularly evoked by an illustration that Chesterton appended to a later 
variation on the theme, ‘Stilton and Milton’: 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Hurley refers to this poem as a ‘double parody’ (Chesterton 44). 
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In drawing himself into the frame, Chesterton refrains from casting the first stone, 
or at least knocks himself on the head with it first, accusing himself of the sin of 
gluttony even as he accuses Wordsworth of pride, by mocking the element of 
pomposity in the latter’s state-of-the-nation address. This parody walks a 
particularly fine ethical tightrope, since it first appeared in the context of a 
journalistic article on the decline of localised food production, a theme which 
reinstates a Chestertonian moral even as the message is conveyed in a manner that 
mocks moralising rhetoric. This complex rebounding movement again results in 
an archetype of ‘grotesque democracy’ in action, framed by carnivalesque 
imagery.  
While Chesterton’s encyclopaedic knowledge of classical literature left him 
well versed in such carnivalesque motifs as ‘the reversals of the Saturnalia’ (‘On 
Being an Old Bean’, collected in Fancies 58), his extensive study of pre-
Enlightenment theology also gave him an acute understanding of the medieval 
context of carnival. Indeed, the phrase, ‘the worshipper’s half-holiday’, inevitably 
recalls Bakhtin’s argument that the parodic function of the medieval carnival in 
relation to the authority of the church was to provide a brief respite, during which 
the citizenry were free to mock the very institution which they usually revered. 
Elsewhere, Chesterton goes so far as to employ the principle of carnival as a 
metaphor for his own theological worldview, in a burlesque account of the 
metaphysical value of all discrete entities: ‘“There is no fact of life, from the death 
of a donkey to the General Post Office, which has not its place to dance and sing 
in the glorious Carnival of theology”’ (qtd. in Oddie 272-73).  
This principle is given fictional life in the ‘masquerade’ that concludes 
Thursday: ‘a vast carnival of people were dancing in motley dress. Syme seemed 
to see every shape in Nature imitated in some crazy costume. There was a man 
dressed as a windmill with enormous sails, a man dressed as an elephant, a man 
dressed as a balloon’ (CW 6: 629). There is even a subtly reserved place for 
Arnold within this utopian construct. The narrator notes that in later years, when 
Syme happened to encounter any of these phenomena he would imagine ‘that it 
was a strayed reveller from that revel of masquerade’ (CW 6: 629), thus inserting 
a glancing reference to Arnold’s poetic debut, The Strayed Reveller (1849), within 
a sentence conspicuously structured in the Arnoldian ‘grand style’, in which 
collapsed repetition is conventionally employed as an emphatic device. As this 
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detail suggests, the universal mockery of carnival simultaneously accommodates 
its utopian mirror-image, universal reconciliation.  
In ‘The Comic Constable’ (DN 2 Apr. 1910), Chesterton explicitly invokes 
medieval carnival tradition, noting that ‘[w]hen England believed in Christianity 
there were jokes in the church door—and in the church—Boy Bishops and Lords 
of Misrule’ (CDN 6: 226). This article was published just two months before the 
first appearance of Father Brown, whose adventures present Chesterton’s most 
comprehensive fictional realisation of the principles of the carnivalesque. In his 
autobiography, Chesterton refers to the carnival licence that he exploited in 
reconfiguring his revered friend, Father O’Connor, as a character of grotesque 
dimensions, via a sublimated assault: ‘I permitted myself the grave liberty of 
taking my friend and knocking him about; beating his hat and umbrella shapeless, 
untidying his clothes, punching his intelligent countenance into a condition of 
pudding-faced fatuity, and generally disguising Father O’Connor as Father 
Brown’ (Autobiography 328). While this conceit is evidently jocular, it is also 
intriguing in the light of O’Connor’s testimony that he did not share Chesterton’s 
unreserved ‘devotion’ to democracy (see O’Connor 88). It seems that allies, as 
well as adversaries, who demur at democratic principles are liable to be subjected 
to forcible immersion within Chesterton’s carnivalesque imaginative landscape.  
In the stories themselves, Chesterton consistently employs irreverently 
carnivalesque language to portray his titular hero, whether discussing the 
‘grotesque figure’ (FB 172) of Brown in vegetative terms as a ‘turnip’ (FB 118), 
‘as stagnant as any vegetable’ (FB 661), ‘a big, black mushroom’ (FB 421); or in 
folkloric terms, as ‘a short bolster in the semblance of a guy’ (FB 365), ‘a 
quadruped with a very comic human head’ (FB 172), ‘a goblin’ (FB 24). In 
addition, Brown is noted to be unusually short, with a ‘foolishly large head’ (FB 
24), while his ambivalent adversary/accomplice, Flambeau, is represented as ‘a 
Gascon of gigantic stature’ (FB 3)—the fairy-tale dwarf and giant, figures of 
vastly differing size, but of equally vibrant physicality. These images not only 
serve to render Brown ridiculous, but also, paradoxically, to exalt him within 
Chesterton’s alternative aesthetic pantheon, in which the ‘grotesque’ body is 
celebrated. As Chesterton explains in ‘A Defence of Ugly Things’, ‘[i]t does not 
follow that either the Chinese dragons or the Gothic gargoyles or the goblinish old 
women of Rembrandt were in the least intended to be comic. Their extravagance 
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was not the extravagance of satire, but simply the extravagance of vitality’ 
(Defendant 117-18).  
Chesterton’s dialogising of the narrative tone itself—whereby it becomes 
simultaneously debasing and exalting in its grotesque evocation of the 
protagonists—suggests an adaptation of the ambivalent, serio-comic mode of 
early-medieval hagiography, in which worship and holiday are juxtaposed within 
the same script. As Chesterton’s school-friend, Digby d’Avignor, recalled, 
Chesterton’s ‘“Greek primer [was] covered with drawings of goblins, all over the 
text as well as in the margins”’ (qtd. in Ward, Return 13), a habit which links 
Chesterton’s imagination to that of the medieval hagiographer, as explained by 
Bakhtin: 
 
[within] thirteenth- and fourteenth-century illuminated manuscripts […] we find on 
the same page strictly pious illustrations of the hagiographical text as well as free 
designs not connected with the story. The free designs represent chimeras (fantastic 
forms combining human, animal, and vegetable elements), comic devils, jugglers 
performing acrobatic tricks, masquerade figures, and parodical scenes (Rabelais 96). 
 
In Bakhtin’s theory of carnival, the overflowing of physical limits through 
‘animal, and vegetable elements’ is connected to a disintegration of social 
boundaries. In carnival imagery ‘all that is bodily becomes grandiose, 
exaggerated, immeasurable. This exaggeration has a positive, assertive character 
[…] Manifestations of this life refer not to the isolated biological individual, not 
to the private, egotistic “economic man,” but to the collective ancestral body of 
the people’ (Rabelais 19). This challenge to the detachment of ‘economic man’ is 
particularly highlighted by the third Father Brown story, ‘The Queer Feet’, in 
which Brown and Flambeau are both invested with a demonic ‘impudence’ in 
their incursions into the exclusive world of a private gentleman’s club, evoking 
the ‘comic devils’ in Bakhtin’s account of medieval hagiography. While 
Flambeau penetrates the club’s threshold in the guise of the Satanic ‘“archangel of 
impudence”’ (FB 49), as Brown terms him, the priest enters the club with a 
hybridised binary of ‘meek impudence’ (FB 38). Brown is then identified as ‘“the 
most up-to-date devil of the present company”’ (FB 48) by the colonel at the 
story’s conclusion.  
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Bakhtin explains that in ‘the diableries of the medieval mysteries, in the 
parodical legends and the fabliaux […] the devil is the gay ambivalent figure 
expressing the unofficial point of view’ (Rabelais 41). Similarly, in Father 
Brown, the narrator implicitly gesticulates towards his hero when he moots the 
possibility that ‘a person may become a public institution without becoming an 
official institution’ (FB 657), while the series as a whole reframes the modern 
mystery story as a generic descendant of the medieval mystery play, which 
conventionally formed the aesthetic centrepiece of carnival. As Ker elaborates, 
Chesterton saw the mystery play as an essentially serio-comic form: a ‘“daring 
mixture” of tragedy and comedy’, which he considered to have been ‘“far bolder 
in its burlesque” and […] more “democratic” in its “satire”’ (qtd. in Ker 425) than 
subsequent forms of allegory. Correspondingly, Chesterton’s burlesque 
representation of his heroes—the clown-priest, Brown, and the trickster-thief, 
Flambeau—is consistently accompanied by a satirical exposé of contemporary 
mores.  
Bakhtin explains that ‘the mystery devil is not only an extra-official figure. 
He is also an ambivalent image, like the fool and the clown, representing the 
destroying and renewing force of the material bodily lower stratum’ (Rabelais 
266-67). While Bakhtin’s reference to ‘destroying and renewing’ immediately 
brings to mind the action of parody, his account of ‘the material bodily lower 
stratum’ is also suggestive of the narrator’s depiction of Brown’s extreme 
physicality. Crucially, the physical distinction everywhere emphasised between 
Brown and Flambeau not only serves to relate Chesterton’s double-act to the 
‘typical comic pair based on contrasts: fat and thin, old and young, tall and short’ 
(Bakhtin, Rabelais 39), but also enacts a ‘destroying and renewing’ gesture on a 
generic level, by parodying the abstract intellection of the generic archetypes of 
Poe’s Dupin and Doyle’s Holmes.  
Each of these precursors propounds a detached, rationalistic philosophy, 
which is related eulogistically to the reader by a humourless acolyte, producing a 
monologic projection of authority, emblematic of Bakhtin’s view of the 
‘humourless seriousness of official culture’ (Dentith, Bakhtinian 66). By 
challenging this archetype with Father Brown, Chesterton anticipates, and 
complicates, Michel Foucault’s totalising assessment that modern detective fiction 
enacts the ‘struggle between two pure minds’ in a ‘quiet game of the well 
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behaved’ (69). Chesterton’s series precisely reverses these premises, by having 
the heroes’ grotesque physicality consistently complement their disruptive games 
of the badly-behaved. ‘In this new genre, there were no more popular heroes’ 
(69), writes Foucault, seventy-five years after Chesterton had argued, and 
pragmatically demonstrated, that the genre might potentially build a ‘rude, 
popular literature [...] as rough and refreshing as the ballads of Robin Hood’ 
(Defendant 161).  
Despite the adversarial nature of Chesterton’s construction of an alternative 
model to the generic archetype, the serio-comic mode again enables him to avoid 
the pitfalls of an equivalent lapse into cultural authoritarianism. While exposing 
the techniques of his antecedents to irreverent revision, Chesterton consistently 
focuses the laughter equally upon the text itself, in a comprehensive exposition of 
grotesque democracy, through which a ‘combination in one discourse of praise 
and abuse’ (Bakhtin, Problems 120) is meted out to Brown, Flambeau, the 
supporting cast, the generic precursors, and the reader, while the author, in the 
guise of obtrusive narrator, is also drawn into the range of mockery via the 
comically intemperate exposition of his manifold hobby-horses. ‘The Resurrection 
of Father Brown’ (c.1923-26) offers a particularly complex instance of this 
universal mockery in action. While the story parodies Doyle’s highly implausible 
re-animation of Holmes, following the latter’s apparent death, in The Return of 
Sherlock Holmes (1904), it also operates as a pastiche of the metafictional self-
awareness of the second book of Don Quixote—the priest has now become a 
famous celebrity, in the wake of the publication of a ‘series of stories about him’ 
that he is anxious to ‘stop’ (FB 367). The plot of the story itself leads Brown to 
complain of a gang of Doyle-esque conspirators, and, implicitly, the author 
beyond them, that they ‘“make copy out of me and run me as a sort of sham 
Sherlock Holmes”’ (FB 375). Thus, Chesterton’s protagonist answers back 
irreverently to his creator, in a manner which enables Chesterton to complicate the 
satire of Doyle, by drawing attention to the commercial motivations that underpin 
his own resumption of the parodic sham. 
While Chesterton notes, in the Autobiography, that ‘[m]any cheap 
parodies of Sherlock Holmes have made him a blunderer’ (280), his contrasting 
approach is hinted at in the depiction of the Holmesian detective, Valentin, in 
‘The Blue Cross’. In a more simplistic satire, Valentin might have been made to 
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represent a straightforward clone of the logician-detective, whose failure to outwit 
the ostensibly nondescript naïf, Father Brown, would parody the cognitive 
shortfalls of the Holmesian archetype. However, at the outset, the narrator rejects 
a mere caricatural model, employing an allusion to ‘The Thinking Machine’ 
(1907), by Doyle’s acolyte, Jacques Futrelle, to establish that Valentin ‘was not “a 
thinking machine”; for that is a brainless phrase of modern fatalism and 
materialism. A machine only is a machine because it cannot think. But he was a 
thinking man’ (FB 6). Hanoosh’s explanation of the function of parody is 
particularly suggestive in the light of Futrelle’s title: ‘Parody operates especially 
when the procedures of a tradition become mechanized; although by mocking the 
tradition, parody brings it to an end, it also regenerates it, altering its course rather 
than terminating it altogether’ (Parody 24).  
As this account suggests, the balance of observance and rebellion encoded 
within this dynamic also enables parody to move culture forward rather than being 
chained to its target in a cycle of retroactive negation. Elsewhere, Chesterton 
suggests that Doyle’s rhetorical seriousness resulted in an example of the latter 
flaw, which he discusses in terms that recall Arnold’s unproductive smirk: Doyle 
‘certainly weakened his excellent series of stories by being occasionally serious; 
especially he weakened it by introducing a sort of sneer at Edgar Allan Poe’s 
Dupin’ (‘On Absence of Mind.’ DN 23 Mar. 1907; CDN 4: 183). In ‘The Blue 
Cross’, the implication that Doyle’s creation is superior to the efforts of his lesser 
pasticheurs is emollient, while the narrator’s punning rejection of the ‘brainless 
phrase’ of the ‘thinking machine’ also comes directly on the heels of a brief 
narrative discursion concerning co-incidence, which is crowned with a ‘well 
expressed […] paradox’ (FB 6) from Poe.  
Rather than introducing a ‘sneer’, Chesterton finds praise for his forebears 
even as he departs from them, thus maintaining the fine balance of ‘“filial 
rejection with respect”’ (Thomas Greene qtd. in Hutcheon 10) which adheres to 
successful parody, and which leads Hutcheon to conceive parody as ‘at heart, less 
an aggressive than a conciliatory rhetorical strategy, building upon more than 
attacking its other’ (xiv). The principle of ‘building upon’ is exemplified by the 
epigraph to this chapter, which is taken from Chesterton’s private annotations of 
Holbrook Jackson’s collection of Nietzschean aphorisms, Platitudes in the 
Making (1911). In the act of demurring at Jackson’s dictum, which espouses 
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unproductive rejection, Chesterton builds another dictum on top of it which 
modifies the original, precisely as his amendment prescribes, to achieve both 
rejection and affirmation formally, while advocating it discursively. This is, then, 
the exemplary epigram in a book-length exercise in dialogic intervention, which 
also forms a pragmatic exposition of the dexterity of parodic discourse. 
Chesterton subjects each of Jackson’s would-be truisms to an enforced textual 
dialogue, some being uncritically approved, some absolutely rejected, but most 
subtly re-orientated to suggest new possibilities.  
As I have demonstrated, Chesterton’s dialogic and carnivalesque 
methodologies stand as aesthetic expressions of cogent political and philosophical 
principles. However, his anti-Hegelian poetics should also be understood to derive 
from more personal psychological anxieties, which also begin to explain why his 
advocacy of the corporeal grotesque is consistently invested with a pedagogic 
dimension which retains the existential reassurance of ‘reason on its judgement 
seat’. For Chesterton ‘humour’, in its purest form, consists in ‘passing the 
borderland, in breaking through the floor of sense and falling into some starry 
abyss of nonsense far below our ordinary human life’ (CW 15: 387). As Sheinberg 
notes, the grotesque is frequently characterised by a disturbing breakdown of 
discrete relation: ‘all boundaries […] seem to be blurred. Thus the difference 
between human, animal and vegetable is often unclear, as is the difference 
between the animate and the inanimate’, with the result that ‘another blurred 
fringe that is often purported by the grotesque [is] the boundary between sanity 
and insanity’ (220-21). A burlesque reference on Chesterton’s part to a period of 
change in the composition of G.K.’s Weekly is suggestive of his underlying 
anxieties in relation to ontological stability:  
 
We are in a Hegelian condition, a condition not so much of Being as of Becoming. 
And no generous person should spy on an unfortunate fellow creature who is going 
through the horrible and degrading experience of being Hegelian. It is even more 
embarrassing than being caught in the very act of evolution, which every clear-headed 
person would desire to avoid (G.K.’s Weekly 12 Dec. 1925; qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 424).  
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At this point it is instructive to return to Chesterton’s stilton cheese, which 
is also in an unstable condition of becoming. As he notes elsewhere, ‘[b]ad cheese 
symbolises the startling prodigy of matter taking on vitality’ (‘Popular Jokes and 
Vulgarity.’ ILN 21 Mar. 1908; CW 28: 67). Chesterton makes this remark in 
response to an article by Max Beerbohm, in which the latter had disdainfully 
complained of the banality of the ‘public’ sense of humour. As Chesterton glosses 
the piece, Beerbohm’s argument was that ‘the mob laughs [at] jokes about bad 
cheese’ (CW 28: 66). Beerbohm begins a later article on ‘Laughter’ (1920) with 
an account of his alleged inability to understand the comic theory of Henri 
Bergson, mocking Bergson’s academic convolution and his own postulated 
ignorance in one fell swoop, in a further practical example of grotesque 
democracy in action. Bergson’s theory posits humour as a cultural policing of 
others’ lapses into unnerving inanition, which contrasts with the humourist’s 
intuitive preference for a state of evolutionary vitality: in the ‘practical joke [the] 
laughable element […] consists of a certain mechanical inelasticity, just where 
one would expect to find the wide-awake adaptability and the living pliableness of 
a human being’ (Laughter 10). The exploited quality is ‘a certain rigidity of body, 
mind and character, that society would […] like to get rid of in order to obtain 
from its members the greatest possible degree of elasticity and sociability. This 
rigidity is the comic, and laughter is its corrective’ (Laughter 21).  
In conceiving humour as the expression of an urge to retain perpetual 
litheness, Bergson’s comic theory forms an aesthetic corollary of his concept of 
the élan vital—the principle of the investment of inert matter with a mysteriously 
galvanic life-force, which he espoused in Creative Evolution (1907). Bergson’s 
mystically inflected theory has much in common with the idealism of Hegelian 
rhetoric, as implied by Bertrand Russell’s gloss on the clash that Bergson 
postulated between ‘life, which climbs upward, and matter, which falls 
downward’ (qtd. in Stannard 168). Chesterton would have been familiar with the 
principle of the élan vital through Shaw’s enthusiastic advocacy (see Pharand 
249), and one wonders whether he extrapolates his uncanny explanation of the 
fascination of bad cheese as a burlesque deflation of Bergson’s evanescent 
thesis.
10
 If so, it is interesting to note that Bergson’s adaptation of Hegelian 
                                                 
10
 Chesterton draws the names of Bergson and Shaw together in his Autobiography (338). 
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‘becoming’ to the subjective plane exerted an equally strong hold upon Yeats (see 
Parkinson 79), a figure of whom Chesterton complained that he ‘tends always to 
talk of twilight, that is, of the mixed and vague thing, of the thing that is almost 
something else’ (‘George MacDonald.’ DN 23 Sept. 1905; CDN 3: 198).  
Consider, in this light, Patrick Dalroy’s derisory parody of Yeats’s ‘The 
Rose of Battle’ (1892), in Chesterton’s novel, The Flying Inn: ‘“‘Cheese of all 
Cheeses, Cheese of all the world’”, as my compatriot, Mr Yeats, says to the 
Something-or-other of Battle’ (238). This further parodic recourse to cheese draws 
our attention to parody’s comparably uncanny demonstration of an apparently 
stable textual entity suddenly being invested with new vitality. However, in the 
same novel, the character of Dorian elaborates an important point about the limits 
to which this principle can be taken. In order to maintain integrity and coherence, 
‘you can [only] distort up to a certain point: after that you lose identity […] Don’t 
you see this prime fact of identity is the limit set on all living things?”’ (Flying 
226-27). The implications of this proposition form the subject of my next section.  
 
Chesterton, Self-Parody, and Identity 
 
“There is something very queer and close to the nerves, I think, about notions affecting 
identity”[.] 
 
Dr Boyne, in Chesterton’s ‘The Dagger with Wings’ (Nash’s Magazine Feb. 1924; FB 475) 
 
In ‘Mr. Yeats Revisited’ (DN 19 Apr. 1901), Chesterton indignantly addresses 
certain amendments recently made by the poet to his early verses: ‘Mr. Yeats has 
simply no right to alter a poem; it was not he that wrote it, but another man, the 
man of a moment, who will never live again. The moment a poem has really 
passed out of him, it no more belongs to him’ (CDN 1: 76). Chesterton goes on to 
discuss ‘the destructive character of the poet’s improvements’ (CDN 1: 76), a 
phrase which recalls the modus operandi of textual close parody—not least 
Chesterton’s various cheese-related infractions—in which minor alterations are 
carried out with the purpose of rendering the ur text absurd. The implication is 
that the older Yeats has achieved such pristine distance from his younger self that 
he is unable to engage sympathetically with his own work. The schism between 
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the two Yeats’s results in a curiously circular version of Barthesian misreading, in 
which the poet’s misidentification with his own text leads him to corrupt the 
integrity of the original, producing an inadvertently bathetic self-parody. 
Although Chesterton’s analysis of the artistic lapse is persuasive, when he 
goes on to explain the grounds of his irritation, a telling note of emotionalism 
slips into his rhetoric: ‘To see a poem which already belongs to us altered is like 
seeing a friend’s face horribly deformed in a nightmare’ (CDN 1: 77). This 
gruesomely corporeal rendering of the text evokes the purposeful ‘“disfiguration”’ 
(qtd. in Kiremidjian, Study 77) that Borges identifies as the purpose of the 
exaggerative drive of parody. In an unrelated essay, Borges contends that 
Chesterton only succeeded in maintaining his sanity because he forcibly 
‘restrained […] something in the makeup of his personality [which] leaned toward 
the nightmarish’ (84). As I will argue in this section, Chesterton’s greatest fear is 
that of the non-integral self, a nightmarish vision which he restrains through the 
mastery of identity that he discovers in parody of others and intentional self-
parody—forms which continually flirt with the non-self via a vertiginous juggling 
of parodic masks, but always seek to retain the restraints of subjective integrity 
through the distancing action of wit. While Barthes sees the latter, comic element 
of parody as a kind of moral-aesthetic betrayal, I will go on to argue that this 
constitutes the means through which Chesterton maintains both moral and 
aesthetic rigour. 
As his discussion of Yeats’s amendments implies, loss of self-mastery is 
bound up with a breach of subjective integrity in Chesterton’s imagination as a 
complementary dyad of concepts that he finds disturbing. In a contemporaneous 
essay in the Defendant series, ‘A Defence of Rash Vows’ (1901), Chesterton 
notes approvingly that the ‘man who makes a vow makes an appointment with 
himself at some distant time or place’ (33). Chesterton argues that the modern 
lack of faith in the possibility of keeping vows derives from a ‘fear that by that 
time he will be, in the common but hideously significant phrase, another man. 
Now, it is this horrible fairy tale of a man constantly changing into other men that 
is the soul of decadence’ (Defendant 33-34). Of course, this fairy tale is also that 
of the parodist, whose art is predicated upon continually changing into other 
people, a build-up of selves that can be seen to proceed organically from the logic 
of the grotesque structure of parody—if the grotesque is a philosophy of 
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accumulation, this includes the accumulation of parodic selves within the subject. 
The parodist makes his or herself a one-person-mob—now one individual, now 
another, a constantly metamorphosing, multivalent crowd.  
Inversely, the parodist is equally reliant upon other artists remaining 
sufficiently like themselves to be coherently parodied. In Chesterton’s writing the 
target’s relative aesthetic stability has a bearing upon the success or failure of any 
given parody, a dynamic which helps to account further for the anxiety that he 
exhibits over Yeats’ temporal breach of subjectivity. It is notable that Chesterton’s 
later parody of Yeats, in his shape-shifting series of poetic impersonations, 
‘Variations on an Air’ (New Witness 10 Dec. 1920), suffers from its predication 
upon the faulty premise that Yeats’s poetic style underwent no ‘creative 
evolution’, in Bergson’s phrase, following the 1890s—it is all ‘grey sea-folk’ and 
‘fiddles of fairyland’ (Collected Nonsense 42). Conversely, Chesterton’s skits on 
the relatively stylistically consistent oeuvres of Browning and Whitman in the 
same collection are amongst his most perfectly realised parodies.  
Nonetheless, this urge to pin the subject down is not merely agonistic or 
monitory, in the manner suggested by Bergson’s account of the inelasticity which 
enables the practical joker to trip up the target, but is also connotative of a more 
neurotic insistence upon the ontological stability—Being, rather than Becoming—
of figures with whom the parodist identifies. As Auden explains of the 
psychological reassurance derived from caricature, ‘[w]e enjoy caricatures of our 
friends because we do not want to think of their changing, above all, of their 
dying’ (‘Notes’ 383). Chesterton’s ‘Variations on an Air’ all concern textual 
friends of his youth, and his attempt to highlight their stylistic stasis can be 
understood as expressive of an urge to stave off his own fears of mortality, as the 
ultimate incidence of subjective dis-integrity.   
Chesterton shared this desire to secure the homogeneity of the parodic 
target with the most celebrated parodist and caricaturist of the time, Beerbohm. 
Chesterton’s argument regarding Yeats is echoed in more prosaically commercial 
terms in Beerbohm’s pictorial sketch, ‘One Fine Morning, or How They Might 
Undo Me’ (1911), in which he imagines a pageant of his favourite objects of 
caricature robbing him of his livelihood by changing their appearances in various 
ways (Chesterton troops past with neat, closely-cropped hair). Beerbohm later 
adapted Chesterton’s complaint about Yeats’s poetry to apply to the physical man: 
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‘As years went by, the visual aspect of Yeats changed a little […] I found it less 
easy to draw caricatures of him. He seemed to have become subtly less like 
himself’ (qtd. in Felstiner 117). Beerbohm’s preference for his targets to remain 
unchanging runs parallel with his own famous capacity to invade their stylistic 
terrain at will. As this dissolution of subjectivity through empathetic 
impersonation implies, while straining to establish the unchanging Browningness 
of Browning, the parodist simultaneously compromises his/her haecceity through 
an act of identification which potentially raises the spectre of a schizophrenic 
breach of coherent subjecthood.  
Consequently, the parodist’s emphasis upon ontological stability runs 
parallel with a continual refrain of lost self-control. This tension informs the title 
of Malcolm Bradbury’s parody collection, Who Do You Think You Are? (1976), 
which not only evokes indignation on the part of the auspicious ur author at the 
presumed impertinence of the parodist, but also a more disturbing note of identity 
confusion engendered in both subject and target by the act of impersonation. It is 
surprisingly little remarked upon that Lewis Carroll’s celebrated parody of Isaac 
Watts (‘How doth the little crocodile’), in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 
(1865), arises, in the context of the narrative, not from a spirit of conscious 
mockery, but from a loss of volition which Alice finds extremely disturbing. Alice 
attempts to recite Watts’ poem so as to resolve the conundrum, ‘“Who in the 
world am I?”’ (Annotated 37). Upon failing to recall the lines correctly, Alice 
concludes that she cannot be herself, but must instead be her inept friend, Mabel: 
‘“I’m sure those are not the right words,” said poor Alice, and her eyes filled with 
tears as she went on, “I must be Mabel after all”’ (Annotated 38).  
This phenomenon supports Derrida’s assertion that ‘somewhere parody 
always supposes a naivety withdrawing into an unconscious, a vertiginous non-
mastery. Parody supposes a loss of consciousness, for were it to be absolutely 
calculated, it would become a confession or law table’ (101). In the case at hand, 
while depicting Alice’s disarray, Carroll also winks at the reader, who assumes 
that the unspoken purpose of the parody is to satirise the status of Watts’ poem as 
a pompous ‘law table’, in Derrida’s phrase. In this way, Carroll flirts with a 
‘vertiginous non-mastery’ within the text, while retaining an ironic distance which 
tacitly confirms his grip on his materials. A comparable dynamic is discernible in 
the White Knight’s unconscious parody of Wordsworth, ‘Haddock’s Eyes’, in 
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Through the Looking Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871). Here, the 
absurdity of the parody arises from the details of the original account having 
‘trickled through my head / Like water through a sieve’ (Annotated 311). In turn, 
Alice regains a sense of mastery by recognising the tune which the White Knight 
has unconsciously borrowed.  
This rebounding between flirtation with unconsciousness and reassertion 
of mastery is internalised in Chesterton’s own Wordsworth parody, ‘Sonnet to a 
Stilton Cheese’, which is stylistically very similar to Carroll’s preferred mode of 
close parody. Chesterton’s broader career offers a particularly complex case study 
for Derrida’s parodic ‘loss of consciousness’, since he was notoriously absent-
minded, yet highly self-conscious. For example, he famously shared the tendency 
of Alice and the White Knight to produce unconscious parodies. As Canovan 
notes, in Robert Browning he ‘misquoted a great many of Browning’s lines; 
staggeringly, he […] even unconsciously invented a new line for Browning’s 
poem “Mr. Sludge the Medium”’ (13). Conscious that he had become publically 
renowned for such lapses, Chesterton glosses the ‘Sonnet to a Stilton Cheese’ 
with a wink to the reader which exploits an assumed foreknowledge of the 
author’s absent-mindedness, as a means of ironically advertising his self-
consciousness: ‘I feel myself as if some literary influence, something that has 
haunted me, were present in this otherwise original poem; but it is hopeless to 
disentangle it now’ (CDN 7: 120).  
Such performances of self-awareness suggest that a complex mixture of 
parody of others and self-reflexive self-parody may form an effective means of 
managing one’s sense of identity within the public sphere. The word, ‘identity’, is 
central to this dynamic. Although identity conventionally denotes a reassuring 
‘continuity’ and ‘separateness’ (Rosenberg 194), it is also a pun, signifying both 
commonality and individuality, via the ambivalent relationship of the terms 
‘identification’ and ‘identical’ to that of individual identity, or ‘oneness’ (Barnhart 
505). In this sense, identity can best be understood as the subjective manifestation 
of analogy, which derives etymologically from the Greek analogia, meaning 
‘relation’ (Barnhart 32), and is predicated upon the principle of simultaneous 
similarity and difference. Parody is fundamentally grounded in analogy in this 
respect, perhaps unsurprisingly since analogy is a further connotation of ‘para’: 
‘beyond or distinct from, but analogous to’ (Thompson, D 989). Correspondingly, 
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Chesterton’s understanding of parody is based upon the principle of analogy: 
‘Parody does not consist merely of contrast; at its best it rather consists of a 
superficial contrast covering a substantial congruity’ (‘The Pantomime’, collected 
in The Common Man, 1950, 54). This highlights a further convergence between 
the philosophical positions of Bakhtin and Chesterton. Michael Holquist asserts 
that ‘Bakhtin’s work stands under the sign of plurality, the mystery of the one and 
the many’ (‘Answering’ 59), while Chesterton explains the balancing act at work 
in his own dialogic sensibility thus: the ‘“agreement we really want is the 
agreement between agreement and disagreement. It is the sense that things do 
really differ, though they are at one”’ (Autobiography 338).  
The counterweighted balance between the self and the non-self at the heart 
of ‘identity’ again enables us to understand parody as a means of navigating the 
poles of satire and the grotesque, here represented by an excessive fixity and 
fluidity of subjectivity. Again, it is instructive to consider Chesterton’s account, in 
‘Bret Harte’, of parody as a form that combines ‘absurdity’ and ‘sublimity’. In the 
literal sense, absurdity (from the Latin, absurdus) means that which is ‘out of 
tune’ (Barnhart [ed.], Chambers 5), while sublimity derives etymologically from a 
combination of ‘up to’ (sub-) and ‘limit’ (limin) (Barnhart 1083). Chesterton’s 
terms imply that the balancing act of parody promotes an internalised discord, but 
only up to a certain limit, much as a further connotation of analogia is 
‘proportion’ (Barnhart 32). At the grotesque extreme of the parodic spectrum, 
individuality begins to break down into the disorientating flux espoused by 
Barthes, which informs his complaint that parody places undesirable constraints 
upon multivalence. As Habib explains, ‘the denial of identity is perhaps the 
deepest metaphysical basis of irony […] identity itself […] is revealed as a point 
of view, a way of freezing the dynamic relations of the world’ (142).  
Conversely, to return to my account of Leavis, pure satire is the art of the 
‘inviolate’ individual. Etymologically speaking, the principle at the heart of 
individuality is indivisibility, as illustrated by Colebrook’s explanation that the 
‘subject’ is constituted of a stable, impregnable haecceity: ‘The notion of the 
subject is derived from the Latin subjectum, referring to a ground, basis, or what 
exists independently’ (72). Again, parody proportionately navigates these 
extremes. The principle of a ‘ground’ is of particular importance to Chesterton’s 
thought, since he termed modern relativistic philosophy ‘that final scepticism 
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which can find no floor to the universe’ (CW 6: 584), a situation which he 
considered to cause a simultaneous breakdown of psychological and ethical 
coherence, against which the moral certainties of satire form a bulwark. The 
correlated psychological and ethical importance of a sense of stable subjecthood is 
demonstrated by the example of Carroll’s nonsensical ‘How Doth the Little 
Crocodile’. It is no coincidence that Alice’s lapse not only causes her to imagine 
she is someone else, but also causes Watts’ highly sententious poem to be 
divested of all moral coherence; as Chesterton continually emphasised, moral 
integrity is bound up with subjective integrity.  
In ‘A Plea for Popular Philosophy’ (DN 22 June 1907), Chesterton 
confronts the challenges set to the conventional understanding of subjectivity by 
recent scientific and philosophical advances. He outlines what he considers to be 
‘the three or four sanities and certainties of human free thought’, each of which 
centres upon a discrepancy between the way ‘[a]ll sane men’ intuitively behave, 
and what is nonetheless ‘unproved and unproveable’ (CDN 4: 242) about the 
world in which they find themselves. The third of these dictums states that 
although ‘it is definitely disputed by many metaphysicians’ that ‘there is such a 
[thing as a] paramount “I”’, nonetheless ‘[a]ll sane men believe that there is such a 
thing as self or ego, which is continuous. There is no inch of my brain matter the 
same as it was ten years ago. But if I have saved a man in battle ten years ago I am 
proud, if I have run away I am ashamed’ (CDN 4: 242). In other words, despite 
compelling scientific evidence to the contrary, one must make a leap of faith in 
the existence of an enduring ‘I’ in order to extrapolate any ethical dimension to 
one’s actions. While Carroll has Alice reason that ‘it’s no use going back to 
yesterday, because I was a different person then’ (Annotated 138), Chesterton 
turns to a different nonsense authority in his autobiography, when framing his 
enduring opposition to the Boer War as a vow that he has successfully kept: ‘As 
no less an authority than Mr. Discobolus says in Lear’s Nonsense Rhymes, I 
thought so then and I think so still’ (Autobiography 115). 
A comparable view of the ethical necessity of stable subjecthood has been 
articulated more recently by the cultural-materialist critic, Fredric Jameson, in his 
critique of postmodern pastiche. Jameson argues that the latter phenomenon 
derives from a deeply ingrained disbelief in the principle of subjectivity, or ‘a 
unique self and private identity’ (1964), within late-twentieth-century society, a 
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situation which he considers to result in a collapse of value into nihilistic 
relativism. As Rose notes, Jameson describes ‘the death of parody and its 
replacement by pastiche as accompanying the “death” of the modernist individual 
subject’ (226). Since pastiche particularly connotes identification over separation, 
it operates at the furthest reaches of the grotesque pole of the parodic spectrum—
the point at which any satirical context evaporates into pure imitation. For 
Jameson, dissolution of stable identity eradicates the sense of critical distance that 
leads to the formulation of hierarchies of valuation, a situation which resolves 
itself in a value-neutral orgy of grotesque accumulation, first essayed within the 
self and then projected outward onto the culture. In contrast, Jameson valorises 
what he perceives to be bygone forms of parody which possessed clearer satirical 
judgement, because their oppositional nature extended from their creators’ greater 
faith in the stability of discrete subjectivity.  
Jameson might be reassured of the enduring cultural presence of the 
satirical judge by ‘J.C. Carlier’’s parodic mock-essay, ‘Roland Barthes’s 
Resurrection of the Author and Redemption of Biography’ (2004), which looks 
askance at Barthes’s valorisation of the ‘transgression of ownership’.11 In 
attempting to account for why Barthes should have chosen to extend ‘apparently 
plausible reasoning to the point of patent lunacy’ (117), Carlier’s ostensibly 
ingenuous essayist comes to the conclusion that ‘The Death of the Author’ should 
be understood as a hoax in the manner of Swift’s ‘A Modest Proposal’, in which 
the ‘narrator is a character who earnestly recommends the deplorable option’ 
(116). Consequently, Carlier claims to have successfully decoded Barthes’s essay 
as a sustained feat of irony which should be read, counter-intuitively, as ‘a 
defence of traditional authorship and of respect for biography’ (115).  
In prosecuting his case, Carlier employs the ‘ironical gravity’ which 
Chesterton discusses as the formal mode of ‘A Modest Proposal’, even as he 
claims this to be Barthes’s own methodology. In a similar hall-of-mirrors effect, 
Carlier’s wilful misreading of Barthes’s essay as a purposeful reductio ad 
absurdum of the concept of anti-intentional criticism mischievously turns 
Barthes’s valorisation of the multivalence of reception back upon his own text, 
curiously corroborating Barthes’s vision even as he satirically exposes the bathetic 
                                                 
11
 J.C. Carlier is a pseudonym used by Professor Cedric Watts. 
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convolutions and critical disarray to which it is likely to lead. However, the true 
sting in Carlier’s satire arrives with the punch-line, in which he adduces the final 
evidence that Barthes’s argument cannot be genuine from the fact that he ‘not 
only signed the work but claimed the copyright’ (119), a detail which exposes the 
hypocrisy attendant to the anti-capitalist utopianism which implicitly informs 
Barthes’s doctrinaire deconstruction of authority.  
Chesterton considered modern scepticism to be a condition in which 
dogmatism and relativism ultimately meet full-circle, with an attendant collapse of 
moral value: ‘[t]he real sceptic never thinks he is wrong; for the real sceptic does 
not think that there is any wrong. He sinks through floor after floor of a 
bottomless universe’ (CDN 4: 224). In this sense, the particular failing that 
exposes Barthes to parodic attack is the curiously monologic nature of his 
espousal of multivalence. Day identifies a comparable irony in Leavis’s Culture 
and Environment, when he notes the curious fact that ‘a text “committed to more 
consciousness” […] nevertheless remains “unconscious” of itself’ (96). As with 
Chesterton’s critiques of Shaw’s inability to consider himself wrong and Arnold’s 
inability to conceive of himself as ‘comic’, both Barthes and Leavis display an 
unconsciousness of the limitations of their dogmatic intellectual positions. In the 
case of Carlier’s response to Barthes, this monologism incites the parodist to 
expose the grotesque discontents that must be effaced in the drive to systematise, 
through a complex demonstration of the principle that ‘truth is tricky’, as 
Chesterton’s definition of humour has it. Here we perceive the parodist’s art not 
only to constitute a satirical bulwark against attempts to break down coherent 
authority, or a strategy designed to stave off neurotic fears of dis-integrity, but 
also a means of reining in all forms of extremism.  
Carlier’s approach also echoes that of Chesterton’s early antagonist, who 
wilfully misread the latter’s early articles as a parody of excessive paradox-
mongering. As I discussed earlier, Chesterton was able to rebut this satirical 
intervention precisely due to his capacity to scrupulous balance the extremes of 
certainty and self-doubt, in the forms of verbal and metaphysical paradox. 
Nonetheless, when Chesterton found himself under similar attack later in his 
career, a lapse into excessive certitude left him more vulnerable to the landing of 
satirical blows. This attack came in the form of another of Beerbohm’s 
caricatures, in which the morally policing facility of satirically oppositional 
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parody is again foregrounded, in a conceit which turns the critique of Yeats’ 
temporal dis-integrity back upon Chesterton, while simultaneously accusing him 
of socio-political extremism. Beerbohm depicts an encounter between the younger 
and older Chestertons, in which the former scoffs at the notion of ‘the 
determination of the Jews to enslave us’, to which the latter replies, ‘[w]ell, you 
haven’t met Belloc’ (qtd. in Blissett, ‘Max’ 122). In this instance, Chesterton’s 
uncritical desire to emulate his friend, Belloc, is figured as the cause of a 
fundamental breach in his integrity. Post-Belloc, Chesterton is no longer his own 
man; he is hamstrung by an influence which compromises his integrity in both an 
ontological and moral sense.  
Once having undergone this schismatic temporal breach, Donald Barr 
implies that Chesterton’s anti-Semitism was subsequently perpetuated by the 
reverse problem—an inflexible adherence to an idée fixe. Barr argues that in later 
years Chesterton’s ‘anti-Semitism had become a tic’ (CW 8: 41), implying a 
degeneration into unconscious habit, a blind spot which vitiated his capacity for 
self-reflection. As Auden notes, ‘[a]fter the rogue, the commonest object of satire 
is the monomaniac’ (‘Notes’ 384), and, as we have seen, it is equally true that 
unselfconscious inflexibility is nectar to the parodist. Sure enough, Reginald 
Arkell honed in on this failing in Chesterton with a cutting parody of the latter’s 
‘Song of the Dog Named Quoodle’ (New Witness 27 Nov. 1913), a poem which 
famously conjures an image of the ‘noselessness of man’ as a symbol of 
humanity’s tendency to backslide into unreflective existence, while making a 
fleeting, superfluous reference to ‘the park a Jew encloses’ (Flying 164).12 
Arkell’s variation on Chesterton’s air identifies, in the latter remark, the beam in 
Chesterton’s own eye—a comparably unwitting lapse into unreflective thinking, 
which the detective-parodist boasts of having rooted out: ‘Gilbert oft discloses / 
As only Gilbert can, / His curious hate for noses / Worn by the sons of Moses, / 
He’d like them, one supposes, / Built on a different plan’ (qtd. in Ward, Return 
116). In Arkell’s account, Chesterton’s inability to sniff out the ridiculous in his 
own contradictory rhetoric leaves him vulnerable to satirical attack. Again, these 
                                                 
12
 In CW 10.3: x, Conlon notes that this line originally read ‘the park Old Gluck encloses’, and was 
changed to ‘the Jew’ either by Frances Chesterton or the publisher, in order to avoid a potential 
prosecution. Consequently, a pertinent critique of a specific individual on Chesterton’s part came 
to appear blithely anti-Semitic. Nonetheless, Chesterton could have rectified the amendment in 
later republications and failed to do so. 
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examples demonstrate parody to be particularly effective as a method of policing 
one’s fellows, reminding them of their critical lapses and sharpening their self-
awareness. 
Chesterton could be as pitilessly forensic as Beerbohm in identifying 
bathetic lapses in other writers. In Robert Browning, he notes that even in the 
greatest poets’ work ‘you will come upon passages which read like extracts from 
an American book of parodies’, and goes on to quote a couplet from Swinburne 
which is ‘nothing but a bad imitation of himself’ (142). Elsewhere, of Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning’s lines, ‘Our Euripides, the human, / With his dropping of warm 
tears,’ he observes, with burlesque relish, that ‘[n]othing can be well conceived as 
more ridiculous than Euripides going about dropping tears with a loud splash, and 
Mrs. Browning coming after him with a thermometer’ (‘Elizabeth Barrett 
Browning’, collected in Varied 262). When identifying a similar instance of 
bathos in Blake, Chesterton explains such lapses as deriving from a ‘blind spot’ 
caused by a ‘sudden inaccessibility to laughter’ (William 28). The laughter to 
which Chesterton refers is that of critical self-policing, an act of measured 
distancing from the self, which produces the phenomenon of intentional self-
parody, in which the direction of critical laughter is turned inward to the subject, 
rather than outward to a discursive precursor.  
In the context of intentional self-parody, Chesterton’s definition of 
‘humour’—to ‘open the guard or confess its inconsistency’—can be read, 
conversely, as self-guarding. By confessing an internal inconsistency we 
demonstrate our recognition of its presence, thereby illustrating our self-
awareness to the audience—a motivation detectable in such apparently 
confessional gestures as Chesterton’s conceit of having Father Brown mock his 
creator’s use of him as ‘copy’. Anthony Burgess noted that in refusing to take 
‘himself seriously’, Chesterton consistently ‘anticipated the parodist and the 
satirical cartoon’ (‘Level’ 251). As Chesterton explains, in terms which internalise 
the dynamic of ‘praise and abuse’ that Bakhtin ascribes to carnival, ‘[y]ou can say 
anything against a man who praises himself; but a man who blames himself is 
invulnerable’ (‘The Faults of the Press.’ ILN 26 Oct. 1907; CW 27: 576). If, as 
Hutcheon states, parody enacts ‘repetition with ironic critical distance’, then 
deliberate self-parody is a guard against self-repetition divested of ironic critical 
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distance, forming a method of avoiding both aesthetic redundancy (repetition 
lapsing into cliché) and a humiliating absence of self-possession.  
In Robert Browning, Chesterton diagnoses unintentional self-parody as 
arising, paradoxically, from an unproductive form of self-consciousness which 
derives from the element of theatricality attendant to modern literary celebrity. He 
argues that unswerving self-resemblance is ‘the result of the self-consciousness 
and theatricality of modern life in which each of us is forced to conceive ourselves 
as part of a dramatic personae and act perpetually in character’ (142). In 
Chesterton’s career this danger of acting ‘perpetually in character’ is perhaps best 
illustrated by the dozens of encomiums to Christmas that he produced, year in, 
year out, for his various journalistic employers. Beerbohm again parodied this 
activity in ‘Some Damnable Errors about Christmas’, a mock-essay in his 
celebrated parody collection, A Christmas Garland (1912). While the title of 
Beerbohm’s parody skewers Chesterton’s occasional overenthusiasm for 
correcting his readers’ putative subscription to idiotic fallacies, he has 
‘Ch*st*rt*n’ end his article with the ominous threat, ‘I shall return to the subject 
of Christmas next week’ (22). The relentlessness with which Chesterton recurs to 
this subject is particularly interesting, since his vision of Christmas is directly 
comparable to his vision of parody. As he argues in one of his earliest Christmas 
pieces, ‘Christmas Day’ (DN 26 Dec. 1902), ‘this season is created by worship 
and play, not merely allied, but mingled.’ At Christmas, the ‘world is at once a 
temple and a playground; all the idols are our dolls, and all the dolls our idols’ 
(CDN 1: 455).  
Despite the efficacy of self-parody as a pre-emptive defence mechanism, it 
is important to note that these strategies not only constitute a guard against attack, 
but also a method of aesthetic and ethical self-monitoring. A capacity for self-
irony is conjoined with self-splitting in Baudelaire’s account of the ‘“philosopher 
[who] has acquired, by habit, the power to quickly ‘double himself’ and 
participate as a disinterested spectator in the phenomena of his own I”’ (qtd. in 
Sheinberg 42). As Sheinberg explains, Baudelaire’s concept of dédoublement 
(splitting, or halving) operates as a tool of self-criticism achieved through a 
purposeful estranging of the self:  
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[the] meeting point of ethics and aesthetics in irony is closely connected to the process 
of alienation. At this point alienation is required, either as […] a “parabasis” with 
which all critical processes begin, or as a personal Baudelairean act of dédoublement, 
the ability to see [oneself] from the outside, that eventually leads to philosophical 
laughter (41). 
 
This principle corresponds closely to Chesterton’s description of the progressive 
development of self-awareness which characterises his vision of ‘humour’: ‘the 
various degrees in which the eccentric has become conscious of his eccentricity. 
[…] humour does originate in the half-conscious eccentric’ (Spice 22). 
Chesterton’s analysis posits a fragmentation of the self, in which, rather than 
being schismatically split, the acting-self is kept under constant surveillance by 
the critical policeman at the artist’s shoulder. In putting this theory into practice in 
his own life, Chesterton remained alive to the potential criticisms of parodists like 
Arkell, and frequently sought to anticipate them. For example, in The Flying Inn, 
into which the ‘Song of Quoodle’ was incorporated, a ‘half-conscious’ 
advertisement of eccentricity on Chesterton’s part is surely responsible for the 
interpretation of the narrative put forward by a foolish correspondent to the 
‘Pebbleswick Globe’, ‘who called it all a plot of frenzied foreigners against 
Britain’s shore’ (91).  
While this self-policing gesture only slightly militates against the air of 
paranoid xenophobia which permeates The Flying Inn, self-reflexivity is put to 
more complex and effective use in The Return of Don Quixote. As Hutcheon 
argues, self-parodic art ‘calls into question not only its relation to other art but its 
own identity. Self-parody in this sense is not just an artist’s way of disowning 
earlier mannerisms by externalisations […] It is a way of creating a form out of 
the questioning of the very act of aesthetic production’ (10). This reading 
conforms to the self-parodic structure of Chesterton’s later novel, which extends 
from the title’s metafictional advertisement of its aesthetic lineage, to the 
monitory depiction of Michael Herne, another of Chesterton’s representatives of 
earnestness, who espouses a number of views that might have come directly from 
the pages of Chesterton’s polemics, but whose medievalist philosophy finally 
emerges as a dangerous monomania. Herne’s structural antecedent is MacIan in 
The Ball and the Cross, who ‘never saw a joke in his life’ (CW 7: 94), and each 
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character’s failings again demonstrate that an absence of internal critical laughter 
carries the ethical danger of a lapse into extremism. As Boyd notes, MacIan’s 
dystopian dream in The Ball and the Cross, ‘presents a criticism of the political 
position which is generally regarded as distinctively Chestertonian’, in which the 
author’s ideals ‘are all given concrete and vivid expression, and are all rejected’ 
(26). 
In this light, the uniform humourlessness of Chesterton’s earnest characters 
should be understood as a warning-to-self of the foolish and dangerous outcomes 
of a complete absence of ‘humour’, or self-irony. Lodge argues that ‘“[t]he 
dialogue between credulity and scepticism” would serve as a description of Don 
Quixote’ (Novelist 44). Chesterton’s novel establishes a comparable dialogue 
between Herne’s credulity and the scepticism of Douglas Murrel, who stands as 
Chesterton’s most thoroughgoing attempt to depict the well-balanced individual, 
and is frequently discussed by the narrator in terms comparable to Chesterton’s 
vision of parody. He has the ‘faculty of enjoying the absurd with a complete 
gravity’ (CW 8: 235), he notes that ‘“I happen to be able to see two sides of a 
question”’ (CW 8: 211), and is described as having a ‘plain and pleasant and 
shrewd face […] wrinkled with a laugh of irony’ (CW 8: 117). Murrel’s 
moderating presence finally succeeds in reigning in Herne’s extremism, while 
simultaneously enabling the latter to demonstrate self-mastery through an 
advertisement of self-awareness: ‘[f]or the first time in his life he seriously saw a 
joke and deliberately made it’ (CW 8: 251; my emphasis).  
Herne embodies Chesterton’s principle of the dawning self-awareness of the 
‘half-conscious eccentric’, who, like the critical parodist engaged in satirical 
controversy, ‘also discovers a contradiction, but it is in himself’ (Chesterton, 
Spice 24).  Chesterton goes on to explain that there is, ‘in the origins of humour, 
something of this idea of the eccentric caught in the act of eccentricity and 
brazening it out; something of one surprised in disarray and become conscious of 
the chaos within’ (Spice 24). This account perhaps tacitly acknowledges the 
justice of exposures, such as Arkell’s, of the contradictions in Chesterton’s 
rhetoric when polluted by anti-Semitism, criticisms which can be seen to have 
played a part in rousing him to an ethical recovery. By 1933, Chesterton was at 
the vanguard of British social critics alive to the threat posed by Hitler, declaring 
his willingness to ‘die defending the last Jew in Europe’ from the Nazis (interview 
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with The Jewish Chronicle 22 Sept. 1933; ‘Hitler’ 100). As Chesterton conceded, 
with rueful self-irony, ‘[t]hus does history play its ironical jokes upon us’ (‘Hitler’ 
100). 
Chesterton’s recovery was not only ethical, but also psychological. At the 
nadir of his anti-Semitism, around 1913-14, Maycock finds ‘a wildness of 
expression, a note sometimes rising almost to a scream, that makes one realize 
how near he was coming to breaking-point in those immediately pre-war years’ 
(28-29). In ‘The Insane Quiet’ (DN 18 Feb. 1911), Chesterton observes that ‘the 
process of going mad is dull, for the simple reason that a man does not know that 
it is going on’ (CDN 7: 77). Conversely, intentional self-parody, as an expression 
of consciousness ‘of the chaos within’, preserves the individual from succumbing 
to this chaos, by setting up a single detached consciousness above a clamorous 
parodic mob which is skilfully manipulated, thus demonstrating a heightened 
mastery of identity. It is perhaps in this sense that we should understand 
Chesterton’s riposte to another of Holbrook Jackson’s dictums: ‘In multitude of 
counsel there is confusion’. Chesterton replies, ‘[y]es: there is frequently. But a 
mob can drill itself’ (Jackson 14). Again, in this concept we discern the balance of 
multivalence and moral coherence, grotesque profusion and satirical direction, 
which is at the heart of Chesterton’s instinctive gravitation toward parodic 
methodologies. 
An indication of the psychological grounds of Chesterton’s consistent 
recourse to the self-estranging practices of critical self-parody is discernible in the 
alter-ego, ‘Chester Gilberton’ (CW 10.2: xxi), who came into being when 
Chesterton first entered the public arena. Gilberton’s trenchant criticisms of 
Chesterton’s first collection of serious verse, The Wild Knight (1900), were 
circulated amongst Chesterton’s friends, who were advised that this ‘maundering 
volume’ (CW 10.2: xxii) was a product of ‘fatuity and vanity’ (CW 10.2: xxv), 
which advanced a ‘shrill and frivolous philosophy’ (CW 10.2: xxiii). In summary, 
Gilberton surmises that ‘Mr Chesterton [is] mad enough for a whole guild of 
Hatters’ (CW 10.2: xxvi). The context of the latter remark is Chesterton’s poem, 
‘The Mirror of Madmen’ (collected in The Wild Knight), in which the speaker is 
terrified by the nightmare of discovering his own face on every person he 
encounters, a conceit which hints at a further danger presented by the extremes of 
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self-consciousness which I have been discussing: that of withdrawal into a 
miasmic solipsism.  
As Wills notes, Chesterton’s fiction abounds in disorientating motifs of 
solipsism which either refer to ‘a dream of never meeting anyone, or of meeting 
oneself everywhere one turns’ (Man 33). Again, we can view these two extremes 
as subjective manifestations of the poles between which parody vacillates. In an 
echo of Jameson’s account of pastiche, Morson explains that ‘Bakhtin finds the 
relativist view to be particularly pointless, because it makes it impossible ever to 
encounter an other, inasmuch as the other simply becomes a version of oneself’ 
(‘Introduction’ 4). However, the opposite extreme again carries an equivalent 
danger, as Leavis’s response to Snow demonstrates. Leavis’s withdrawal into 
inviolate subjecthood literally prevents him believing in his opponent. For Leavis, 
Snow represents ‘intellectual nullity’ (Nor 44), he is ‘ineffably blank’ (Nor 45), 
‘as a novelist he doesn’t exist; he doesn’t begin to exist […] the nonentity is 
apparent on every page’ (Nor 45). For Chesterton, this state of disbelief is the 
solipsistic lot of ‘The Bigot’ (DN 19 Nov. 1910): ‘Bigotry is an incapacity to 
conceive seriously the alternative to a proposition’ (CDN 7: 26). Conversely, in 
parody the validity of the discrete subjectivity of the ‘other’ is always 
acknowledged—the interlocutor is never merely ‘a version of oneself’, as in the 
backhanded compliment of absolute identification, nor so unlike oneself as to be 
beyond comprehension or beneath contempt, as in Leavis’s response to Snow. To 
borrow Leavis’s own inadvertently helpful terms, parody is ‘absurd and 
significant’. These adjectives wed the absurd—in the literal sense, discordant, 
denoting schism—to the significant—in the literal sense, conferring importance, 
projecting meaning—thus reflecting the way in which parody sets itself at discord 
with a previous discursive act, while simultaneously validating the 
meaningfulness of that act.  
Characteristically, Bakhtin frames the flaws of each dogmatic extreme in 
terms of a shutting down of conversation: ‘both relativism and dogmatism equally 
exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary 
(relativism) or impossible (dogmatism)’ (Problems 69). Boyd observes that the 
dystopian dreams experienced by the protagonists of The Ball and the Cross teach 
them that if they take their views to their logical extremes ‘there is a point at 
which the terms right and left become interchangeable’ (30). This monitory 
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conceit, which corresponds to the ‘crisis dream’ (Bakhtin, Problems 152) 
commonly employed in Menippean satire, occurs towards the conclusion of their 
picaresque adventure, in the course of which the duellers encounter figures who 
embody extremes of dogmatism and relativism, and who each attempt to bring 
their dialogue to a close. First, they encounter a Tolstoyan fanatic who attempts to 
prevent them fighting entirely, and later they meet a Nietzschean relativist who 
encourages them to fight to the death. By warding off each of these extremists, 
Turnbull and MacIan succeed in prolonging their dialogue indefinitely. My next 
chapter will elaborate the personal anxieties that first motivated Chesterton to 
develop this dialogic sensibility in the crucible of the fin de siècle, as a means of 
indefinitely prolonging the dialogue in which he was engaged with his best friend, 
Bentley.  
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Chapter Two 
The Chesterbentley: Nonsense, Parody, and Friendship  
at the Fin de Siècle 
 
[E]ven on the most familiar terms [there exists] an infinite distance, the fundamental 
separation on the basis of which what separates becomes relation. 
 
Maurice Blanchot, ‘Friendship’ (291) 
 
It is a terrible thing to be always admiring people and always differing from them. 
 
Chesterton, ‘Nothing’ (DN 2 July 1904; CDN 2: 251) 
 
It is a joke, meeting your other half. 
 
E.C. Bentley on Chesterton, diary 2 Oct. 1895 (Bod MS Eng.misc.e.864) 
 
In this chapter I argue that Chesterton’s youthful friendship with E.C. Bentley, the 
inventor of the ‘clerihew’ nonsense form, operates as a vital context through 
which to understand Chesterton’s subsequent parodic programme. I demonstrate 
that a continual struggle between identification and separation—both with one 
another and with additional cultural figures and philosophies—characterises the 
interaction of both men, a dynamic that refigures ‘the worshipper’s half-holiday’ 
as a model for the action of parody within friendship. Through a close reading of 
Bentley’s diaries and the pair’s early correspondence, in combination with 
analysis of their divergent approaches to nonsense verse, I argue that the 
ambivalence that Chesterton displayed towards literary nonsense in his later life 
was primarily engendered by the traumas that punctuated the progress of his 
friendship with Bentley; traumas which derived from the pair’s shared sense of 
immersion in the atmosphere of fin de siècle decadence. Finally, I discuss 
Chesterton’s attempt to reconcile his ambivalence toward nonsense in The Man 
Who Was Thursday, a text which manipulates a variety of popular and academic 
nonsense techniques to conjure reason from disarray, transmitting a utopian vision 
of friendship in the process. I argue that this resolution is achieved through a 
series of intertextual parodic games, which derive from the novel’s nonsense-title.  
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One Soul in Two Bodies 
 
In their respective memoirs, Bentley and Chesterton are equally effusive in their 
recollections of the importance of their friendship. In Those Days (1940), Bentley 
claims that their youthful ‘relationship did not mean so much to [Chesterton]. For 
one thing, it did not change his life as it changed mine’ (45). Nonetheless, he goes 
on to assert that ‘if I have anything to be proud of, it is that to him our friendship 
mattered a great deal’ (45), a contention supported by the fact that Chesterton 
refers to Bentley as his ‘best’ friend in works spanning thirty-six years—his first 
publication, Greybeards At Play (CW 10.2: 353), and the valedictory 
Autobiography (59). Both men also emphasised the centrality of nonsense 
literature in binding their friendship. In Bentley’s obituary of Chesterton he recalls 
that a ‘collaboration in the producing of oceans of nonsense with pencil and paper 
[…] was the favourite amusement in [our] schoolboy circle’ (‘G.K.C.’ 526). 
Similarly, Chesterton recalled that their sense of affinity was first cemented when 
Bentley quoted to him from W.S. Gilbert’s Bab Ballads (Autobiography 59). 
As these mutual tributes begin to suggest, in pursuing a proper 
understanding of Chesterton’s philosophical development, the ‘Chesterbentley’ is 
in many ways a more significant composite creature than Shaw’s famous 
Carrollean portmanteau creation, the ‘Chesterbelloc’ (‘Chesterbelloc’ 137). This 
should be unsurprising, given that Shaw intended his hybrid image to convey the 
essential temperamental misalliance of Chesterton and Belloc, whose public self-
juxtaposition he compared to the comic disjunction of a ‘pantomime elephant’ 
(‘Chesterbelloc’ 138). As Shaw explained, ‘Chesterton and Belloc are so unlike 
that they get frightfully into one another’s way’ (‘Chesterbelloc’ 138). As I 
illustrated in the last chapter with the example of Chesterton’s parodic 
juxtaposition of Tennyson and Browning, such conceits invoke fusion precisely in 
order to demonstrate its impossibility, the very intimacy of the collocation serving 
to comically accentuate the distinction of each writer. 
Conversely, in dedicating Greybeards at Play to Bentley, Chesterton 
figures the Chesterbentley as a genuine composite creature. His verse preface to 
the nonsense collection echoes Bentley’s view of Chesterton as his ‘other half’, 
adapting Aristotle’s conception of the highest form of friendship as ‘[o]ne soul 
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abiding in two bodies’ (qtd. in Laertius, Lives 188) to produce an image of the 
pair as a nonsense creature possessing ‘two hearts with single hope / Two faces in 
one hood’ (CW 10.2: 353). This idealised imagery appears to corroborate Wills’ 
arch observation that in Chesterton’s juvenile sketches, Bentley ‘is described in 
terms that a Copperfield would hesitate to use of Steerforth’ (Man 13), while 
lending credibility to A.N. Wilson’s contention that Chesterton was given to hero-
worship, which led him to excessively idealise his friends (99). This view is 
backed up by Ward’s assessment that in his youth ‘Chesterton not only admired 
[Bentley]—as he was to do all his life—but wanted to be like him, to say the kind 
of thing he thought Bentley would say’ (Gilbert 36). Ward argues that in their 
earliest correspondence, Chesterton tended to adapt his own mode of expression 
to the more detached, ironic style of Bentley, thus essaying a pastiche of his 
friend. This certainly seems true of Chesterton’s highly uncharacteristic remarks 
in an unpublished, undated letter, most probably composed in 1891: ‘as far as 
personal taste and instincts are concerned, I share all your antipathy to the noisy 
Plebeian excursionist. […] I think that the lower orders are seen unfavourably 
when enjoying themselves’ (BL MS Add.73191 ff.11). As Ward notes, such 
sentiments were ‘not in the least like either the Chesterton that was to be or the 
Chesterton that then was. But [they were] very much like Bentley’ (Gilbert 36).1  
Interestingly, in his maturity Chesterton summarised the basis of such 
dynamics in an essay titled ‘The Snob’ (DN 4 Apr. 1908): ‘idealisation implies 
imitation’ (CDN 5: 49). Chesterton’s juxtaposition of the sublime—idealisation—
and pastiche—imitation—again demonstrates the intertwined nature of his later 
philosophical and psychological distrust of the rhetoric of synthesis, which stems 
in part from his moral/psychological concern over the compromises to one’s 
integrity that arise from an abnegation of subjecthood. Chesterton seems to 
recognise that if the ideal classical friendship posits the hybridisation of a single 
spirit within two bodies—in a further example of the accumulative principle of the 
grotesque—this excessive identification offers neither party a distinct 
individuality. In a discussion of pastiche in Charles Dickens (1906), Chesterton 
suggests that such relations are structured upon uncritical deference to the other: 
‘youth in actual experience is the period of imitation and even of obedience’ (35).  
                                                 
1
 Ward appears to be alluding to this letter, though she does not cite it directly. 
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However, Sandra Lynch’s discussion of the Aristotelian ideal of friendship 
suggests that the friend who strives to imitate the ideal may also be engaging in a 
more egotistical form of identification, comparable to Bakhtin’s view of the 
dialogic shortcomings of relativism: the ‘friend in philosophical literature 
becomes an impossible ideal—a reflection of oneself and perhaps even of one’s 
own narcissism—but never a threat, never a challenge, never a genuine other’ 
(101). In this sense, if divested of the rhetoric of the sublime, abnegation of the 
self comes to seem curiously equivalent to solipsistic assimilation of the other; in 
the act of grafting the other onto the self, the friend becomes an objective 
corroborator of one’s own ego. As each participant in the relationship seeks to 
resolve this tension between deference and self-assertion, the complex reality of 
friendship comes to hinge upon the ‘balance between identity and difference upon 
which [friendship] depends’ (Lynch 106). Consequently, the dynamic of 
friendship can be considered to vacillate awkwardly between the intimacy of 
pastiche and the measured distance of parody—between worship and half-
holidays—in a manner that challenges the stability of the bond, by undermining 
the possibility of a perfect symmetry between the expectations that each friend 
brings to the relationship.  
Despite the apparently idealised, amalgamative terms of the Greybeards 
dedication, a comparable tension is detectable in the partially unpublished drafts 
of Chesterton’s preface. In an illustrated draft, Chesterton expands upon the theme 
of spiritual and physical unity of purpose: 
 
One hope, one toil 
One pair of boots 
Joined us eternally (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.4).2 
 
Here the incantatory repetition of ‘one’ again enacts a unification of the pair, 
while the juxtaposition of the sublime and the material—hope, toil, boots—serves 
to conjoin mind with body. However, the purposefully bathetic movement from 
top to bottom, or head to toes, also guards against any hint of grandiloquence, 
deflating the sublime rhetoric of one soul in two bodies with the burlesque 
                                                 
2
 The first page of this draft is published in Chesterton, Collected Nonsense 2, but the second page, 
quoted below (103-04), remains unpublished.  
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imagery of two bodies awkwardly occupying one pair of boots. This engenders a 
delicate critical distance, which is stressed further by the final phrase—‘Joined us 
eternally’—in which a subtle semantic disjunction causes a permanent avowal to 
be rendered in the past tense.  
An earlier draft contains another farcical juxtaposition of the material and 
the sublime—‘I often ate his dinner up / To prove that we were one’—along with 
another confusion of tense: ‘He was my nearest friend / We wear one hat: smoke 
one cigar / (one standing at each end)’ (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.1; my emphasis). 
In this draft, the underlying grounds of Chesterton’s anti-sublime rhetoric and 
tense-based implications of rupture become clearer, when he begins to stray free-
associatively from the eulogistic tone of the public dedication into an airing of 
more private grievances: ‘If I should make the Welkin thing— / (A thing I never 
tried) / Exclaiming “She would grace a King!” / Would he be satisfied?’ (BL MS 
Add.73242 A ff.1). Chesterton’s eschewal of ‘the Welkin thing’ perhaps refers to 
Bentley’s annoyance at Chesterton’s failure to refer to Violet Boileau, Bentley’s 
fiancé, in sufficiently exalted terms, since ‘Welkin’ connotes a sublime invocation 
of the celestial sphere.
3
 The hint of critical distance in these lines is then rendered 
startlingly explicit on the following page, as the deictic orientation switches from 
passive rumination (‘would he’) to direct second-person address (‘you are’), while 
Chesterton’s tone switches from frustrated departure to explicit enmity: 
 
For snobs and sinners are to me  
Like gases to Professor Dewar  
Be comforted: I never knew  
A more oppressive snob than you are (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.2).
4
 
 
Since Dewar’s particular scientific innovation was to freeze gases, 
Chesterton would appear to be threatening to freeze Bentley out of his affections 
here. In a subsequent revision of this stanza, Chesterton crosses out ‘snob’ and 
                                                 
3
 The draft ends with the line, ‘would it rhyme to Boileau?’ (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.3). The 
‘Welkin’ quatrain is quoted in CW 10.2 253-54, under Denis Conlon’s tentative title, ‘My Friend 
ECB in Love?’, without any further gloss, other than a brief note on Boileau’s relationship to 
Bentley.  
4
 In CW 10.2 253-54, Conlon quotes the first two lines as a separate poem, which he titles ‘To a 
Snob’, therefore implying no link between the two verses, although they appear on consecutive 
pages of the same note paper, and are bookended by direct references to Bentley and his fiancé. 
Conlon also quotes the revised lines discussed below (fn.5), without reference to the amendments.  
96 
 
replaces it with ‘cad’—perhaps the gravest insult in his vocabulary.5 The 
uncharacteristic rancour of these lines is perhaps attributable not only to Bentley’s 
snobbish attitude towards his love-interests—in the diary, he notes his approval of 
Violet’s ‘caste’, in which regard ‘she is rather an improvement on any other lady I 
know’ (14 Apr. 1898; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.867)—but also to Bentley’s intense 
dislike of Chesterton’s own fiancée, Frances Blogg. This antipathy comes to light 
in several of Bentley’s partially self-censored diary entries. For example, on 10 
December 1898, Bentley records that ‘I was [?] on by Frances Blogg’s manner 
today. She is not—I won’t mince [section cut out] too free and easy. She doesn’t 
study, I suppose, to be young-ladyish [section cut out] she did. Unconventional 
camaraderie in a woman is a thing that I could live without’ (Bod MS 
Eng.misc.e.869).
6
   
While it seems likely that some sort of verbal expression of this distaste may 
have provoked Chesterton’s outburst, his accusation of snobbery should also be 
understood in relation to a more long-standing schism between the pair, fostered 
by their differing attitudes toward ‘camaraderie’ in a wider cultural sense. This 
schism was particularly sharpened by their divergent responses to the culture of 
fin de siècle decadence, which Chesterton had come to passionately oppose by the 
late 1890s, but which Bentley responded to rather more ambivalently. For 
example, while Chesterton reacted with profound disquiet to the amorality 
preached by the decadent ‘blackguards’ (‘The Diabolist.’ DN 9 Nov. 1907; CDN 
4: 339) whom he encountered while studying at the Slade School of Art, Bentley 
enthuses, in a diary entry composed at Oxford, over having recently met a 
‘Merton Decadent […] a wonderful man, all Oscar Wilde and Yellow Book’ (3 
Feb. 1895; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.863). In view of this temperamental divergence, it 
is telling that in the first draft of the Greybeards preface, Chesterton ends his 
attack on Bentley as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
5
 The revision reads: ‘Snobs are my joy: I never [knew?] / A more oppressive [aggressive?] snob 
cad than you. / Think me not flattering or fond / Nay do not blush: it is your due’ (BL MS 
Add.73242 A ff.2). The text is written on T. Fisher Unwin headed paper, which indicates that it 
almost certainly must have been composed between 1898 and 1900, in the period between 
Bentley’s first meeting with Violet and the end of Chesterton’s tenure at the publishing house.  
6
 Over a year later, Bentley’s opinion remains unmodified: ‘Called with [Violet] on Chestertons. 
Frances Blogg was there; whom I cannot bring myself to be enthusiastic about’ (15 Mar. 1900; 
Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869). 
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And ten years hence I feel that you  
Will be a replica of Hankin (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.2).
7
 
 
This is almost certainly a reference to the playwright, St. John Hankin, a close 
predecessor of Bentley at Merton College (see Phillips 23), and a figure who 
Chesterton singles out in his autobiography as the quintessence of decadence:  
 
He was a pessimist [and] a fundamental sceptic, that is a man without fundamentals; he 
was one who disbelieved in Man much more than he did in God; he despised 
democracy even more than devotion; he was professedly without enthusiasms of any 
kind; [and] in all this he was […] very near to the centre of the culture and philosophy 
of London at that time (146).
8
 
 
Earlier in the Autobiography, Chesterton recalls that by the late 1890s he 
‘was full of a new and fiery resolution to write against the Decadents and the 
Pessimists who ruled the culture of the age’ (95). Chesterton’s rejection of this 
perceived cultural oligarchy arose from a sincere belief in the importance of being 
earnest, a quality that he felt to be embodied by his devoutly Christian fiancée. At 
the same moment, Bentley was pulling in the opposite direction, a dynamic 
evoked by another reference to Chesterton’s fiancé in the diaries: ‘If society is to 
be maintained alive, Bloggs must, I think, be kept within limits. […] I am 
willing—I am anxious to know and value them and to admire and love them; but 
not to become as them. They are not my ideal’ (28 Mar. 1897; Bod MS 
Eng.misc.e.866). The implicit stress upon the ‘my’ here suggests that Bentley’s 
animosity may have derived from an irrational annoyance at his friend’s 
acquisition of a new, discordant conduit of idealisation. Meanwhile, Chesterton’s 
belief that Bentley was pursuing a converse trajectory that would ultimately 
render him Hankin’s ‘replica’—a term connotative of identity confusion brought 
about by uncritical emulation—implies Chesterton’s comparable irritation at 
discovering in his other half a detached anti-democratic snobbery, allied to a 
radically sceptical temperament, which was drawn to the fathomless ironies 
                                                 
7
 Conlon does not quote these lines in CW 10.2 253-54, which perhaps helps to explain why he 
fails to identify the text as a single, continuing commentary on Bentley.  
8
 At the time in which Chesterton’s Greybeards dedication was composed, Hankin was known as a 
drama critic for The Times, where he worked from 1897 to ‘99, as well as for writing ‘short satiric 
pieces for Punch’, from 1898 to 1903 (Phillips 24). 
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encrypted within the implicitly mocking title of Wilde’s play. A more detailed 
analysis of Bentley’s ostensibly playful preoccupation with nonsense 
demonstrates that there is much to back up this supposition. 
 
Nonsense and Decadence: Modes of Detachment and Derangement  
 
Nonsense and parody share an intimate, long-standing association. Dentith argues 
that ‘parody is a close cousin, perhaps even a progenitor, of the tradition of 
English nonsense poetry that descends from the seventeenth century’ (Parody 38). 
Susan Stewart’s definition of nonsense illustrates the formal grounds of this 
cousinship: ‘Nonsense results from the juxtaposition of incongruities’, enacted to 
produce ‘a dispersal of any univocal meaning’ (76). While Stewart’s final 
assertion recalls the anti-authoritarian action of parody discussed in the previous 
chapter, John Felstiner’s definition of nonsense as a negative ‘parody of the 
world’s sense’ (52) hints at a more thoroughly deranging drive, divested of the 
discriminatory element that links parody to the judicial realm of satire. In a 
corollary of Jameson’s discussion of pastiche, the tendency of nonsense to 
withdraw from critical commentary upon objective reality leads Stewart to 
highlight ‘the danger of nonsense not only as a valueless activity, but as an 
activity “without values”’ (209).  
In view of the parameters set out in the previous chapter, this dissociation 
of nonsense from value suggests that nonsense-writing tends to gravitate towards 
the absolutely relativistic pole of the parodic spectrum—the realm of the 
unfettered existential grotesque—an interpretation backed up by my discussion of 
the pertinence of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to Chesterton’s assertion that 
‘changing into other men’ is ‘the soul of decadence’. This implication of a close 
conceptual relationship between nonsense and decadence is rendered explicit in 
Chesterton’s ‘Humour’ essay, which analogically connects nonsense to the amoral 
‘art for art’s sake’ doctrine of decadence: ‘Jabberwocky is not a parody on 
anything; the Jumblies are not a satire of anybody; they are folly for folly’s sake 
on the same lines as art for art’s sake’ (Spice 29). Pursuing this line of argument, 
Chesterton contends that ‘[n]onsense may be described as humour which has for 
the moment renounced all connection with wit’ (Spice 29). As we have seen, for 
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Chesterton wit is synonymous with the existential grounding of satire, while 
unalloyed humour opens a trapdoor beneath ‘ordinary human life’ to disclose an 
‘abyss of nonsense’. It is no coincidence that in Thursday, the narrator’s account 
of Syme’s apprehension of ‘that final scepticism which can find no floor to the 
universe’, comes just a few pages after the Marquis’s baleful assessment of the 
progress of the plot—‘“[g]oing to Jericho to throw a Jabberwock!” cried the other, 
tearing his hair’ (CW 6: 577)—which conflates Carrollean nonsense with a 
descent into hell (for which Jericho is a colloquial synonym). 
While Chesterton found pleasure and instruction in Carroll’s playful 
manipulation of the restrictions of rationalist discourse, he also distrusted the 
academic detachment and vertiginous deconstruction of identity which 
characterise much of Carroll’s work, and associated these qualities with the aloof 
cultural distance and relativistic scepticism of the decadent movement. Therefore, 
for Chesterton, nonsense and decadence come to represent extremes of both 
detachment and derangement—the two conditions which, perhaps above all 
others, Chesterton’s parodic methods are conceived to rein in. Again, Chesterton 
succeeded in grounding his intuitive psychological aversion to these precepts 
within a cogent ethical framework, based upon political support for immersive 
democracy and philosophical rejection of abstract intellection. In ‘A Defence of 
Penny Dreadfuls’ (1901), he explains of the pessimism that suffused the decadent 
movement that to be ‘hopeless […] is a class privilege, like cigars’ (Defendant 
27), while in a later essay (‘Books of the Day: The Works of Oscar Wilde.’ DN 19 
Oct. 1909), he complains of the ‘airy detachment’ with which Wilde ‘and his 
school professed to stand as solitary artistic souls apart from the public’ (CDN 6: 
98-99). Meanwhile, Chesterton’s principled opposition to the systematising drive 
of philosophical idealism led him to distrust Carroll’s parodies of the strictures of 
the syllogism as being suspiciously close to an exercise in abstract intellection in 
themselves: ‘Everything in Lewis Carroll is part of what he called the Game of 
Logic’ (Spice 67).  
In 1930, Chesterton asserted in a public lecture that his youthful literary 
conversations with Bentley had first convinced him that there was no ‘allegorical’ 
element in the nonsense of Carroll and Lear to connect it to external realities (see 
Connolly 295). In convincing Chesterton that an element of ontological rupture 
inhered in Victorian nonsense, Bentley was also signalling a temperamental 
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rupture from his friend. Bentley particularly singled out Carroll’s ‘splendid book’, 
The Game of Logic (1887), for praise while at Oxford (10 Apr. 1896; Bod MS 
Eng.misc.e.865), noting that he had read it with Chesterton, who presumably 
demurred at the unqualified laudation of Bentley’s assessment. In ‘Lewis Carroll’ 
(New York Times 1932; collected in A Handful of Authors, 1953), Chesterton 
complains of a lack of humanity in the work of his subject, which produces a 
conceptual imbalance: ‘there is nothing but nonsense in his nonsense. There is no 
sense in his nonsense; as there is in the more human nonsense of Rabelais’ 
(Handful 118).  
In view of Chesterton’s perception of Carroll, which is perhaps also 
informed by the chess-game conceit that imbues Through the Looking Glass with 
the abstract principles of a logic game, it is instructive to consider the terms 
employed by Bentley in a letter sent to Chesterton in January 1894, which refers 
to a prior conversation on the subject of game playing. It transpires that Bentley 
considers certain forms of game playing to be ‘unhuman’, and therefore 
‘unmoral’, a conviction that appears to have caused a disagreement between the 
pair. Bentley’s explanation is emollient, yet reiterative: 
 
Of course, you did not take quite seriously what I said the other evening about games 
like chess: to do myself justice (my favourite game) I think that the games in which 
you are in lively conversation with the rest of the world worth mentioning, like Pool or 
Billiards, are not to be included in the category of quite unhuman games. One talks and 
enjoys oneself; while chess and those silent, rapt kind of wit-contests are […] a 
spiritualized fight. One plays them […] but one loathes them, for all that. Now billiards 
may be regarded as a means of promoting intellectual conversation […] it is distinctly 
a human game. [But where chess is concerned, the] word “unhuman”, corresponding in 
ethical phraseology to the artistic “unmoral” ought, I think, to be used (BL MS 
Add.73191 ff.39).  
 
While Bentley’s terms imply an element of self-disgust in the ‘unhuman’ act 
of withdrawal (‘one loathes them’), they also indicate a compulsive urge to attain 
this condition: ‘one plays them’ all the same.9 The comparable act of psychic 
withdrawal conducted by the nonsense-practitioner is evoked in Elizabeth 
                                                 
9
 Curiously, in the diaries, Bentley later claims to have forced himself to take up chess against his 
temperamental inclinations: ‘This plan of compelling myself to play chess, for which I have 
absolutely no taste, is amusing to me’ (4 Jan. 1897; BL MS Eng.misc.e.866). 
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Sewell’s argument that ‘one of the characteristics of Nonsense’ is that ‘people 
tend to be turned into things […] not in the sense of magic, where a frog becomes 
a Prince, but in the sense of being turned into playthings’ (Field 137). 
Consequently, while ‘[p]eople are not excluded from the nonsense game […] it 
has a tendency to whittle down their humanity, to make them chessmen rather 
than men’ (Field 137-38).  
Sewell’s insight is particularly instructive in relation to Bentley’s poetic 
nonsense invention, the clerihew, which he conceived while studying with 
Chesterton at St. Paul’s School. Structurally, the clerihew invariably takes the 
form of a single quatrain, with an AABB rhyme scheme, in which any of the lines 
may differ drastically in length to any of the others, producing a formal 
incongruity aptly characterised by Chesterton as a ‘severe and stately form of Free 
Verse’ (Autobiography 61). Thematically, the clerihew always enacts an 
irreverent manipulation of the biographical details (either accurate, fictionalised, 
or a touch of both) of a ‘stately’ historical or contemporary public figure, whose 
name must formally dictate the terms of the initial rhyme. In this way, public 
figures become playthings in a detached game of referential derangement, since 
the formal and thematic rules of the clerihew particularly encourage an arbitrary 
conflation of the proper noun with a random character trait, location, object, etc., 
so as to heighten the comic effect. This attribute corroborates Stewart’s assertion 
that the purest forms of nonsense radically disrupt common-sense notions of 
relation: ‘Nonsense does not undermine the idea of causality so much as it 
undermines the sense of contingency and necessariness underlying the everyday 
sense of causality. In nonsense, anything can cause anything else’ (138). Absence 
of coherent relation is a particularly marked feature of Bentley’s most successful 
clerihews, which frequently centre upon a deliberate derangement of referential 
norms. Take, for example, his inaugural clerihew: 
 
Sir Humphrey Davy 
Abominated gravy. 
He lived in the odium 
Of having discovered sodium (Complete 38). 
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Sewell identifies four principal ‘ideas’ of nonsense: ‘inversion or upside-
down turning’, ‘rhyme, the gift of a particular language in providing unfitting 
pairs’, ‘disproportion: “A grasshopper stepped on an elephant’s toe”’, and the 
‘most important’ attribute: ‘“muddling things up”’ (‘Nonsense’ 141). The Davy 
clerihew displays each of these elements. To address Sewell’s first two precepts, 
Davy’s principal claim to fame counter-intuitively leads to his infamy, an 
‘inversion’ directly enabled by the ‘unfitting’ rhyme of odium and sodium. 
Similarly, in an incongruous conflation of the material and the sublime, the 
juxtaposition of his alleged aversion to gravy and his greatest intellectual 
achievement produces a radical ‘disproportion’ in the selection of relevant 
biographical material. The effect of the whole is to ‘muddle things up’, in the 
sense that an apparently trivial quirk of temperament, which no conventional 
biographer would be likely to mention, is given anecdotal precedence over the one 
apparently indispensable fact of Davy’s biography, his discovery of sodium, 
which is then claimed to have ruined his name, rather than made it. Through this 
approach, all the conceptual ties that conventionally unite to provide an objective 
framework for biographical assessment are splintered in a miasma of referential 
derangement. 
Bentley’s comic disregard for biographical verity is confirmed by a lengthy 
discursion on Davy’s alleged biography, in Those Days. Bentley mock-
portentously parodies the sense of elective affinity which draws the biographer to 
his/her subject, while alleging that Davy was expelled from Oxford for a series of 
outrageous, Rabelaisian pranks: ‘Adolescent myself, it was with a wistful interest 
that I had learned how Davy, as a youth, had been indulged in his passionate 
fondness for cock-fighting, trout-tickling, and brawling in church. When I found 
that, in his second term at Oxford, he had gated for cutting off his tutor’s ears, my 
enthusiasm knew no bounds’ (154).  The scholarly context of this account also 
draws attention to the clerihew’s location within a tradition of nonsense that is 
academic, rather than popular. This trait is still more evident in a mock-
confrontational clerihew, in which academic achievement is confused with moral 
rectitude, in a biographical context which throws an interesting light upon 
Chesterton’s reference to dispatching snobs via the Dewar method:   
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Professor Dewar 
Is a better man than you are. 
None of you asses 
Can condense gasses (Complete 39).
10
 
 
In The Origins of English Nonsense (1997), Noel Malcolm identifies the co-
presence of two parallel seams of nonsense in English cultural tradition. The first 
is represented by ‘English popular writing and folk materials: drinking songs, 
humorous ballads, folktales, nursery rhymes’ (4), while the second is discernible 
in the ‘parodic routines and in-jokes’ of sixteenth-century ‘comic University 
dramas’ (5), as well as the contemporaneous ‘Christmas revels’ of the Inns of 
Court, which were composed of a carnivalesque compendium of ‘mock-trials, 
comic plays, processions, banquets and dances’ (7). Of these strains, which 
correlate to the popular and the academic, Bentley evinces a marked preference 
for the latter, while Chesterton deliberately projects a preference for the former, 
while consistently employing elements of both.  
Once having graduated, Bentley trained as a lawyer at the Inns of Court, 
while his period of study at Oxford, beginning in 1894 (Bentley, Those 70), drew 
him into an academic literary lineage steeped in both nonsense and decadence. Of 
course, Carroll had been an Oxford don, while Wilde, Hankin, and Beerbohm 
(another Mertonite) were all exponents of a variable admixture of decadence, 
parody, and nonsense in the generations immediately preceding Bentley’s. 
Standing at the head of this roll-call of Victorian iconoclasts was the celebrated 
parodist, Charles Stuart Calverley, who was notoriously expelled from Oxford in 
1852 for committing insubordinate pranks, in a prefiguration of Bentley’s 
apocryphal tale of Davy’s disgrace. Of the school of academic parody that 
Calverley fathered, Chesterton argued, with considerable ambivalence, that ‘it is 
enduring in the sense that it is detached. They have got outside life, if only to 
laugh at it. In their frivolity [is] a somewhat sad philosophy’ (‘A Book of the Day: 
College Fireworks.’ DN 5 Oct. 1905; CDN 3: 205).  
 
                                                 
10
 Though most probably composed before 1900, this was first published in Bentley’s Biography 
for Beginners (1905) with an illustration by Chesterton. 
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While Beerbohm has proved to be the most enduringly renowned Oxonian 
descendant of Calverley’s school, both Bentley and Hankin were also skilled 
parodists. In the Autobiography, Chesterton recalls that Bentley produced 
burlesque parodies of Swinburne and Wordsworth in his schooldays (66/77), 
while Bentley’s diaries record that he had a parody of Kipling’s ‘Danny Deever’ 
published in Isis while at Oxford (29 Feb. 1896; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.865).
11
 For 
his part, Hankin produced two well-received parody collections, Mr. Punch’s 
Dramatic Sequels (1901) and Lost Masterpieces and Other Verses (1904), which 
focused, respectively, upon comic addendums to serious plays such as Hamlet, 
and parodies of famous verse. In the Autobiography, Chesterton acknowledges 
that Hankin’s ‘amusing literary travesties’ showed him to be ‘a man of real talent’ 
(146).  
Despite this inclination to parody, neither man shared Chesterton’s 
enthusiasm for establishing stringent moral/cultural affiliations, nor of pursuing 
the satirical engagement with external realities that goes along with such a 
discriminative drive. While Chesterton sought to foster Bentley’s parodic gifts in 
their youth, for example beginning a notebook of ‘The New Rejected Addresses’ 
(1891) which he anticipated as a collaborative project, in the Autobiography he 
acknowledges that ‘clear and unadulterated Nonsense’ (61; my emphasis) was 
Bentley’s true metier.12 In an inverse movement, Hankin’s youthful parodies soon 
gave way to pure satire in the dramatic work of his maturity. However, the 
nihilism of plays such as The Charity That Began at Home (1906) suggests that 
far from taking an exorbitantly proscriptive moral-standpoint, Hankin’s 
worldview is divested of all moral grounding, and is instead allied to the 
grotesque, as defined by Thompson: ‘the grotesque writer does not analyse and 
instruct in terms of right or wrong, or true or false, nor does he attempt to 
distinguish between these. On the contrary, he is concerned to demonstrate their 
inseparability’ (Grotesque 42).  
                                                 
11
 Chesterton also composed several parodies of Kipling, including ‘Folk Song’, which he 
inscribed in a private copy of The Secret of Father Brown, dedicated to Father O’Connor (see 
Collected Nonsense 176). 
12
 The notes for these ‘imitations of modern poets’ (BL MS Add.73348 ff.39-51) include half-
finished parodies of Dante Gabriel Rosetti and William Morris. The original Rejected Addresses 
(1812) was a collection of parodies by James and Horace Smith, which was largely responsible for 
instigating the nineteenth-century fashion for close parody. 
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Consequently, we must further refine our understanding of the nature of 
satire, to incorporate two polarised permutations. The first—moral satire—
identifies specific unsatisfactory elements in human conduct, and is exorbitantly 
judgemental in positing an ethical ideal against which this conduct falls short; 
while the second—which might be termed metaphysical satire—posits the 
unsatisfactory nature of the human condition per se, while disputing the very 
existence of ethical ideals, a position which characteristically resolves itself in 
moral nihilism. Chesterton later embodied these two poles in the persons of Syme 
and Gregory in Thursday, the former initially representing the pure satirist as 
moral policeman, and the latter representing the pure satirist as moral nihilist, who 
proclaims his determination to ‘deny all those arbitrary distinctions of vice and 
virtue, honour and treachery’, and derides the ‘sentimentalists of the French 
Revolution [who] talked of the Rights of Man! We hate Rights as we hate 
Wrongs. We have abolished Right and Wrong’ (CW 6: 490). For Chesterton, 
Hankin’s plays are the work of ‘a very fastidious judge’ (CDN 5: 344) who damns 
the world in toto, mocking all moral values and social conventions equally, while 
positing no alternative framework to take their place. Phillips backs up this 
reading, arguing that Hankin typically ‘satirize[d] the sacred cows of earnestness, 
duty, work, and marriage, while suggesting the probable meaninglessness of 
human endeavours’ (97). One thinks of Chesterton’s assessment of Swinburne, 
who ‘set out to break down without having, or even thinking he had, the 
rudiments of rebuilding in him’ (CW 15: 505), thus contravening the parodic 
principle of simultaneous deconstruction and reconstruction that informs 
Chesterton’s cultural programme.  
In presenting us with a ‘world of cool and almost heartless comedy’ (CDN 
5: 344), as Chesterton describes it, Hankin conjures a vision of an amoral 
nonsense world, dictated by a blind self-interest and arbitrary violence not far 
removed from the motiveless animus of Carroll’s Wonderland or the inexplicable 
brutality of Lear’s limericks. In translating these precepts to the everyday world, 
Hankin depicts life not only as ‘vicious and competitive’, but also as a matter of 
‘inconsequence’ (Phillips 94), a dual-proposition which would appear to be 
informed by the anti-rationalist, pessimistic idealism of Arthur Schopenhauer, a 
philosopher who Chesterton considered an even greater cultural influence than 
Hegel at the fin de siècle. As Chesterton argues in ‘The Great Pessimist’ (DN 7 
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June 1901), at the moment of writing, ‘the popularity of Schopenhauer […] far 
surpasses the popularity of any of his contemporaries in philosophy’ (CDN 1: 94).  
In The World as Will and Idea (1818), Schopenhauer argues that existence 
is essentially characterised by a perpetual rebounding between suffering and 
boredom, which stems from the individual’s subjection to the uncontrollable 
exigencies of the will, a force that endlessly strives after the possession of 
extrinsic phenomena. Schopenhauer argues that if possession is achieved, the 
result is merely a profound ennui, which can only be stanched by the pursuit of 
further objects of desire, in a dismayingly perpetual cycle of competition with 
other wills, in pursuit of goals that are fundamentally inconsequential. Moreover, 
Schopenhauer’s belief in the existential primacy of the ephemeral will leads him 
to consider the objective world essentially illusory, since it is merely composed of 
transient manifestations of a blind will-to-existence. This combination of beliefs 
leads Schopenhauer to a position diametrically opposed to another of Chesterton’s 
four proofs of sanity—the conviction that ‘this world not only exists, but matters’, 
despite the fact that it is ‘unproved and unprovable’ that ‘there is any […] duty to 
improve the things we did not make’ (CDN 4: 242). Conversely, Schopenhauer’s 
extreme ontological scepticism not only disturbingly undermines common-sense 
notions of objective relation, but simultaneously constitutes an exposition of 
moral nihilism. As Chesterton concludes, in another uncharacteristically 
rancorous judgement, insofar as he encouraged the inference that ‘all good and 
happiness is an illusion […] Schopenhauer appears to me the most contemptible 
[…] of all men whose souls have influenced the world’ (CDN 1: 95). 
Schopenhauer’s cure for the cycle of suffering and boredom that he 
diagnosed was a withdrawal into a state of artistic dispassion which would enable 
the suffering individual to escape the pain of desire and overcome the loss of 
volition caused by slavery to the will, by learning to witness life as a detached 
observer (see Schopenhauer, World 102-03), a precept which can be viewed in 
comparable terms to the nonsense-writer’s urge to establish detachment from 
objective reality. As Habib explains, ‘Schopenhauer had envisaged the artist as 
stepping outside the human drama, a live person among the puppets’ (75). That 
Bentley was also influenced by the precepts of Schopenhauerian scepticism and 
pessimism is implied by his recourse to the detachment of the ‘unhuman’ chess 
game, as well as his taste for the deranging mechanisms of the clerihew, through 
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which he treats renowned protagonists in the ‘human drama’ as puppets to be 
irreverently manipulated. This combination of detachment and derangement is 
also conveyed by a number of remarks found elsewhere in Bentley’s 
correspondence with Chesterton between the summers of 1893 and ’94, in which 
Bentley is clearly undergoing a period of psychological distress, which he 
conveys via a tone that curiously combines studied, ironical detachment with a 
rhetoric of lost volition before the exegeses of inscrutable forces beyond his 
control.   
In an exchange in the summer of 1893, Bentley refers to an apparent 
attempt on Chesterton’s part to initiate a parodic correspondence, perhaps 
motivated by a desire to draw Bentley out of himself with another of their 
knockabout games. On this occasion, Bentley is less than enthusiastic about 
joining in: ‘as for this notion of writing things to people in imitation of the styles 
of other people, I find it, in this delightful weather, quite hard enough to imitate 
my own style’ (19 Aug. 1893; BL MS Add.73191 ff.36). Despite the cheerfully 
conveyed excuse of the weather, Bentley goes on to admit to a more profound 
debilitation, having recently passed ‘the most miserable night I ever remember to 
have had’. He then seeks to reassure Chesterton with the suspiciously extravagant 
claim that ‘my existence has never been marred by a shadow of doubt or 
uneasiness on any subject whatsoever. In fact, I am at this moment hardly able to 
hold the pen on account of a paroxysm of light hearted merriment’ (BL MS 
Add.73191 ff.36).  
Bentley’s protestations of pristine intellectual certitude are somewhat 
undermined by the repeated intimations of lost volition that suffuse his letter—the 
inability to ‘imitate my own style’, accompanied by the ‘paroxysm’ of laughter 
which hinders his physical mastery of the pen—details that employ playful 
rhetoric to hint at a sense of combined mental and physical loss of control. As 
Sewell notes, apropos of Chesterton’s own work, ‘[n]onsense writing may not be 
merely a clever exercise in wit; it may be an unconscious distress signal’ (‘Giant’ 
556). Sure enough, several months later Bentley confessed to a tendency to 
dissimulate, writing of his habit of ‘[h]iding my feelings behind a sickening mask 
of gaiety,’ through which ‘I endeavour fruitlessly to dissemble the state of mind I 
am in’ (BL MS Add.73191 ff.39). Another of Bentley’s letters begins ‘[t]hank 
you for replying to my last two; I almost expected you to refuse to notice them. 
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You must think I am going mad: I daresay I am’ (25 Aug 1893; BL MS 
Add.73191 ff.37). In the margins, Chesterton has sketched a stormy-browed, 
despairing figure.  
On the unpublished second page of the illustrated draft of the Greybeards 
dedication, Chesterton addresses Bentley’s period of mental disturbance at length. 
Page two follows directly on from the line, ‘joined us eternally’, expanding upon 
the hint of temporal disjunction in the proceeding line: 
 
But a time came when he was changed 
He wept & tore his clothing 
And foamed & rolled upon the floor 
(The others noticed nothing) 
But I, with Friendship’s keener view 
Watching him writhe & yell 
And turn a vivid blue, conceived 
That all might not be well. 
 
I said “Cease rolling in the grate” 
“Relax this stoic pride” 
He hurled the fire-irons at my head 
And dreamily replied 
“To you, O friend this mask of calm 
Can scarce conceal my pain” 
He idly stood upon his head 
And seemed himself again (BL MS Add.73242 A ff.5). 
 
These stanzas were excised from the published version, and replaced with a 
briefer, sanitised version.
13
 As will be observed, the lines attributed to Bentley in 
quotation marks closely paraphrase his remarks in the correspondence, while 
Chesterton’s reference to watching Bentley ‘writhe and yell’, and the combination 
of sudden violence and implied somnambulism that permeates the draft is 
suggestive of Bentley’s consistent rhetoric of abnegated self-control.14  
                                                 
13
 ‘I marked the absent-minded scream, / The little nervous trick / Of rolling in the grate, with eyes 
/ By friendship's light made quick. / But youth's black storms are gone and past…’ (Collected 
Nonsense 3). 
14
 The lines perhaps also allude to the dialogue of the King and Queen of Hearts in Alice: 
 
“…you never had fits, my dear, I think?” he said to the Queen. 
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  When Chesterton refers, in the published dedication, to himself and 
Bentley as ‘Dolls living’ (Collected Nonsense 3), one thinks of Freud’s citation of 
Jentsch’s account of the disturbing sense of the uncanny evoked both by ‘dolls 
and automata’ and by ‘epileptic fits and […] manifestations of insanity’ (Uncanny 
135), which disturb because they imply that ‘mechanical […] processes may lie 
hidden behind the familiar image of a living person’ (Uncanny 135), much as 
Schopenhauer argues that the apparently freely willing individual is actually the 
dupe of existential forces outside his/her control. While this context evokes 
Chesterton’s fear of derangement, his allusion to classical philosophy in the 
exhortation to ‘“relax this stoic pride”’ also suggests that Bentley’s projection of 
an aloof detachment was inspired by the influence of Greek sceptic philosophy, of 
which Schopenhauerian pessimism constituted a modern reboot. In particular, the 
precepts of Pyrrhonist scepticism posit a philosophy of withdrawal, in which 
scepticism is rendered an absolute principle, resulting in a total suspension of 
judgement, or withholding of assent (epoche), a strategy pursued with the aim of 
achieving mental imperturbability, or ataraxia (see Mates 61-62). Moral satire, as 
an exercising of judgement which ends in an expression of allegiance, or selective 
assent, is consequently inimical to the precepts of classical scepticism. 
The motif of absent-mindedness is again discernible in another of Bentley’ 
letters, composed on 28 March 1894, in which he notes that ‘[t]he above 
paragraph, which my pen wrote of its own accord, I take to be of the nature of an 
imitation of somebody’s style; but I don’t know whose’ (BL MS Add.73191 
ff.43). As with the examples from Carroll’s Alice cited in the previous chapter, 
Bentley’s uncertainty evokes a loss of control, echoing his inability to ‘imitate my 
own style’, while recalling the language of spiritualist channelling and automatic 
writing. The same quirk makes an appearance in the self-consciously comedic 
account that Bentley later gave of his invention of the clerihew: ‘The pen was in 
my hand. Musing, I hardly knew what it was tracing on the page. Then, with a 
start, I saw that I had written’ the Davy clerihew (Those 153). Bentley’s account 
echoes Carroll in suggesting an intimate relationship between nonsense and 
subjective disorientation, which Bentley converts, long after the fact, from a 
                                                                                                                                     
“Never!” said the Queen, furiously, throwing an inkstand at the lizard as she spoke 
(Annotated 160). 
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disturbingly visceral personal experience into an urbanely comic account of the 
inscrutable processes of artistic inspiration. 
Having evidently become alarmed by Bentley’s confessions of mental 
disturbance, Chesterton drops the tone of adolescent flippancy that often served as 
a distancing ‘mask of gaiety’ in their correspondence, and adopts an 
uncharacteristically earnest mien in an undated letter of 1893. Referring to an 
earlier conversation, Chesterton reminds Bentley that ‘the real remedy for such 
faddists [as pessimists] is, as you said, genuine friendship’ (BL MS Add.73191 
ff.33). Chesterton reports that he has discarded a letter ‘in which I summoned up 
all my powers of spiritual consolation in the hope of fixing your state of mind, 
your hints of which worried me’. He then offers the following anti-
Schopenhauerian advice: ‘Face for a moment the conception of the world being a 
sham, of the sum of all things being barren, and you will feel it is impossible’. 
These underlinings emphasise an anti-idealist recourse to intuitive, sensory 
experience, as opposed to the intellectualised detachment of nonsense, which is 
entirely new to their correspondence, and would ultimately become Chesterton’s 
primary defence against the temptations of scepticism in his maturity. Chesterton 
ends his peroration on a rhetorical note that is immediately recognisable as the 
future voice of G.K.C., in a discussion of his recent holiday game-playing, which 
differs radically from the ‘unhuman’ form of game playing discussed by Bentley: 
‘I sally out in the evening and play with children on the sands: coastguards’ and 
visitors’ children alike, except that the coastguards’ are rather the more refined’ 
(BL MS Add.73191 ff.33).
15
  
The final remark could be considered to represent the birth moment of 
Chesterton’s strident populism, conceived in an attempt to impress a more healthy 
outlook upon his friend, while signalling a telling divergence from his previous, 
Bentleyan remarks that ‘the lower orders are seen unfavourably when enjoying 
themselves’. While Chesterton’s advice constitutes an expression of departure 
from Bentley in this respect, it is curious to note that Bentley’s period of mental 
instability formed a point of convergence with Chesterton. In the summer of 1894, 
Bentley writes that ‘I have not been for some time quite normal. There was a time 
                                                 
15
 Oddie quotes from this letter, but suppresses all references to Bentley’s mental condition, thus 
withholding the context which directly prompted the correspondence, so as to imply that the pair 
are simply discussing the perils of pessimism in a detached, theoretical sense (see Oddie 102-03). 
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in your own experience when you had something of the sort’ (BL MS Add.73191 
ff.63). This ‘time’ has long been discussed by Chesterton’s biographers as the 
period of crisis which he endured while studying at the Slade School of Art 
between the autumn of 1893 and the summer of 1894 (see Oddie 89/123)—a 
timespan almost exactly coterminous with Bentley’s period of disturbance.  
In the Autobiography, Chesterton identifies a delusion ‘of being God’ (92) 
as the basis of his particular madness, explaining that a miasmic process of 
solitary reflection induced a ‘mood of unreality and sterile isolation’ which led 
him to doubt the existence of external reality: ‘It was as if I had myself projected 
the universe from within’ (92). Curiously enough, Chesterton depicts himself as a 
replica of Hankin here. If the latter ‘disbelieved in Man much more than he did in 
God’, Chesterton confesses that while atheists would tell him ‘so pompously that 
[they] did not believe there was any God […] there were moments when I did not 
even believe there was any atheist’ (Autobiography 92). As Chesterton’s avatar, 
Syme, remarks to Dr Bull at the final extremity of his disarray in Thursday, ‘“I do 
not believe that you really have a face. I have not faith enough to believe in 
matter”’ (CW 6: 620).  
Another of Chesterton’s four proofs of sanity states that ‘[e]very sane man 
believes that the world round him and the people in it are real and not his own 
delusion or dream’, despite the fact that the principle that ‘anything exists except 
myself is unproven and unprovable’ (CDN 4: 242). Although Chesterton claims, 
in the Autobiography, that he ‘was not mad, in any medical or physical sense’, but 
‘was simply carrying the scepticism of my time as far as it would go’, the 
specifics of his condition—a ‘calm horror of detachment’ (92)—strongly resemble 
the psychological disorder of derealisation, in which the individual’s perception of 
the external world becomes distorted in a manner which causes his or her 
immediate environment to appear unreal or dreamlike (see Johnson 232). Rather 
than a considered, philosophical espousal of solipsism, this condition should be 
understood as an involuntary psychiatric state, in which the individual becomes 
unable to conceive the world as possessing a meaningful existence external to his 
or her consciousness. In turn, Bentley’s descriptions of his condition recall the 
psychological phenomenon of depersonalisation, in which the individual 
experiences the sensation of watching his- or herself act, while having no control 
over the actions performed, producing ‘the feeling that one is not oneself’ 
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(Rosenberg 193).
16
 Each of these dissociative disorders ‘usually begins in 
adolescence’ (Johnson 232), and they are closely related (and frequently 
coexistent), yet carry contrasting symptoms: derealisation promotes a sense of the 
unreality of the outside world, while depersonalisation promotes a sense of the 
unreality of the self, a distinction which produces ample grounds for mutual 
misapprehension.  
Despite Chesterton’s own testimony that ‘my morbidities […] sounded the 
most appalling depths of fundamental scepticism and solipsism’ (Autobiography 
341), Oddie has argued that Chesterton’s malaise was probably not as serious as 
he claimed: ‘the evidence is that his morbid state of mind was never at any point 
wholly debilitating, and that his struggle against the blight of what he termed 
“pessimism” [was] seen as an external and cultural threat rather than as a personal 
problem […] there was probably never a time when he was wholly engulfed’ (90). 
Similarly, Oddie claims that Chesterton had safely passed through this phase by 
the time that he left the Slade. Oddie draws this inference from another letter sent 
from Chesterton to Bentley, which is undated, but which Ward speculates may 
have been sent in the ‘Long Vac., 1894’ (Gilbert 48). Here Chesterton appears to 
be speaking of a crisis that has been fully resolved:  
 
Inwardly speaking, I have had a funny time. A meaningless fit of depression, taking 
the form of certain absurd psychological worries, came upon me, and instead of 
dismissing it and talking to people, I had it out and went very far into the abysses, 
indeed. The result was that I found that things, when examined, necessarily spelt such 
a mystically satisfactory state of things, that [… I was made] certain that it is all right 
(qtd. in Gilbert 48).
17
 
 
Again, the tone here is pedagogic, seeking to reassure Bentley—through a 
projection of similarity—that Chesterton can personally vouch for the presence of 
a light at the end of the tunnel. Oddie cites this letter as proof that by the summer 
                                                 
16
 An example of the rhetoric of depersonalisation is discernible in Bentley’s diary, in his 
ostensibly flippant account of a debate at Oxford on ‘the aesthetic movement of the present day 
[…] I spoke myself, too, which I was glad to hear myself doing; because speaking is a thing 
everyone ought to try and do, if he thinks he has anything to say. And I always make a point of 
thinking that’ (26 Nov. 1894; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.862). 
17
 This letter is not collected in the British Library’s holdings of Chesterton’s correspondence. It is 
first referred to in Ward, which is perhaps where later biographers have taken it from. Sufferers 
from derealisation frequently ‘experience anxiety disorders and depression’ (Johnson 232). 
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of 1894, ‘the nightmare through which’ Chesterton had past was ‘ended […] 
forever’ (124). As Oddie (over) stresses, at this stage Chesterton’s troubles were 
‘already over’ (132). However, a series of entries in Bentley’s diary of late 1896 
directly contradict this assertion, instead demonstrating that Chesterton’s 
debilitating neuroses continued at least up to the time of his first courting of 
Frances. These diary entries initiate an awareness that Chesterton’s psychological 
problems were not pristinely left behind in a manner both reassuring to the 
biographer, and preferable to Chesterton in his construction of a pedagogic 
autobiographical narrative. Far from being disturbing emotions later recollected in 
tranquillity, these were on-going difficulties with which he continually battled. On 
12 October 1896, Bentley writes, ‘Gilbert, returning, was very nervous and 
unwell. It appears [… that] he gets into a state of nervous frustration and terror, 
and gets overwhelmed by his imagination’ (Bod MS Eng.misc.e.865). This 
account strongly suggests that Chesterton was suffering from ‘panic disorder’, a 
recognised symptom of which is derealisation (see Johnson 179). The following 
day, Bentley records that  
 
Gilbert had a very bad attack this evening—when I had gone to bed, and almost to 
sleep, he suddenly turned up in my room—as far as I could gather, unable to face the 
thing alone, and only finding relief in talking to somebody. I did my best to converse, 
and kept on dropping asleep and dreaming short dreams between the sentences—awful 
work! He really ought to be seriously taken in hand. It would never do—few things 
would so seldom do—to have him breaking himself down for good (13 Oct. 1896; Bod 
MS Eng.misc.e.865). 
  
With its weariness and wordplay, this account retains a curiously detached 
tone. Bentley interrupts the flow of his recollection to police his use of rote 
phraseology, employing the archetypal nonsense-trick of literalising a figure of 
speech (‘never do’; ‘seldom do’) to inject an arch emotional distance into the 
account, a trait echoed in the ironical, distancing phrase, ‘“relax this stoic pride”’, 
with which Chesterton urbanely responds to Bentley’s loss of volition in the 
abandoned Greybeards preface. It is as though each man retreats into self-
preserving detachment upon encountering an objective manifestation of his own 
mental state. However, on 17 December 1896, Bentley adopts the note of 
unguarded earnestness that had emerged earlier in Chesterton’s correspondence: ‘I 
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love, and can’t help loving, a man who has been to me all that he has been; but it 
only makes my fear and sorrow for him the more acute. I am afraid, deeply afraid 
for this man’s future; for he has made his bed’ (Bod MS Eng.misc.e.866).  
The meaning of Bentley’s final, enigmatic remark is difficult to determine, 
though one plausible context is Chesterton’s increasingly strong attachment to 
Frances at this time. Another possible context is his increasing sense of literary 
purpose, which is brought to light by a slightly earlier entry, in which Bentley 
records that on another visit, ‘Gilbert toiled away at his story of the man who 
would be God. I wonder if it will be good. It should be, by the pains he’s taking 
with it’ (21 Sept. 1896; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.865). Chesterton later asserted that he 
first began to draft Thursday in the early 1890s (see Oddie 329), a project which 
he pursued throughout the following years in a variety of titular guises, including 
‘The Picture of Tuesday’ in 1896. Consequently, it seems likely that a nascent 
form of the novel is the text to which Bentley is referring here.
18
 Bentley’s diary 
entries shed an illuminating new light upon what Evelyn Waugh later intuited to 
be ‘the night-fears’ (‘Man’ 74) that inform Thursday. It seems probable that 
Chesterton’s fictional reconstruction of his psychological struggles—which took 
the form of a delusion of God-hood—initially contributed further to the author’s 
own disturbance, as he sought to establish a more healthy, creative means of 
‘project[ing a] universe from within’. As Conlon rightly contends, in Thursday, 
‘Syme’s nightmare and Chesterton’s personal nightmare from the 1890s merge: 
Syme undergoes his nightmare because he is a fragmented multi-schizoid 
personality […] broken up like light in an Impressionist painting’ (CW 6: 39).  
Syme’s antagonist, the sulphurous amoralist, Lucian Gregory, is also a ‘man 
who would be God’ in a more Miltonic sense, and a figure with whom Chesterton 
strains to dialogically engage in the final text. Since Bentley was not always on 
hand in the next room, Chesterton perhaps found the ‘relief in talking to 
somebody’ that he needed through this opening up of textual dialogue. As Knight 
explains, Chesterton ends Thursday with Syme and Gregory deep in conversation 
because in ‘recognizing the presence of another person, conversation offers a form 
of defense against solipsism’ (Evil 126). Bentley’s account of his friend being 
‘overwhelmed by his imagination’ suggests a traumatic grappling with the 
                                                 
18
 See Oddie 160-61 for a more full account of the connection of this sketch to the final novel. 
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polyphonic principles that Chesterton would later refine within the final text. 
Bakhtin conceives the polyphonic novel to be a medium in which the author ‘is 
not required to renounce himself or his own consciousness, but he must to an 
extraordinary extent broaden, deepen and rearrange his consciousness […] in 
order to accommodate the autonomous consciousnesses of others’ (Problems 68). 
Roberts characterises Bakhtin’s position as a means of staving off solipsism while 
maintaining subjecthood: ‘the Bakhtinian self is dynamic but inalienable, 
continually constituted in the dialogic armature of “I” and a world of Others’ 
(116). As the following account will demonstrate, Chesterton’s formative attempts 
to establish a comparable framework of dialogic relation simultaneously resulted 
in his first expressions of departure from his friend.  
 
Decadence and Dialogism 
 
Bentley’s private diaries occasionally focus upon the reassurance that he found in 
Chesterton’s conversation. For example, he writes that ‘[r]eading Gilbert’s letters 
one always feels he is talking to you, and one almost converses’ (1 Nov. 1895; 
Bod MS Eng.misc.e.864). There is a rather sad irony to this account, since 
Chesterton’s most consistent complaint against his friend was that his 
temperamental detachment had the effect of shutting down the conversation that 
Chesterton relied upon as a bulwark to support his own mental balance. This 
critical refrain is discernible in a number of subtle gestures in Chesterton’s private 
and public engagement with Bentley, beginning, in a particularly cryptic instance, 
with the illustrations with which Chesterton adorned the offending section of 
Bentley’s epistolary account of the ‘unhuman’ chess-game as a ‘silent, rapt kind 
of wit-contest’ (see below):  
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© The British Library Board (BL MS Add.73191 ff.39). 
 
These sketches bear a marked resemblance to Bentley, and it is 
particularly significant that Chesterton should have chosen to place a prominent 
monocle on each image of his friend. Knight asserts that ‘[f]or Chesterton, 
spectacles offer a terrifying instance of the grotesque because they involve the 
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possibility that behind the appearance of the grotesque there might be nothing at 
all’ (Evil 103). Knight’s analysis is corroborated by these sketches, in which no 
eye is depicted behind the monocle, but rather a perfectly circular void. The 
‘mono’cle is also significant here, since it particularly implies a monoscopic, 
rather than stereoscopic, mode of vision, with attendant loss of perspective. In 
Orthodoxy (1908), Chesterton employs this ocular distinction to differentiate 
between the ‘morbid logician’ and the ‘healthy […] ordinary man’ (20), in an 
account which centres upon the latter’s willingness to accommodate metaphysical 
paradox, in contradistinction to the systematising drive of the rationalistic 
intellectual. For Chesterton, the former ‘has always cared more for truth than for 
consistency. If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he would 
take the two truths and the contradiction along with them. His spiritual sight is 
stereoscopic, like his physical sight: he sees two different pictures at once and yet 
sees all the better for that’ (Orthodoxy 20).  
In the same passage, Chesterton turns once more to the cross as a positive 
emblem of this vein of existential contradiction: ‘though it has at its heart a 
collision and a contradiction, [the cross] can extend its four arms for ever without 
altering its shape. Because it has a paradox in its centre it can grow without 
changing’ (21). In contrast, Chesterton employs the circle as ‘the symbol of 
reason and madness’ (20). Discussing the rationalistic certainties of the 
intellectual, he notes that ‘the circle of the moon is […] clear and unmistakable 
[…] as the circle of Euclid on a blackboard’ (21), much like the pristine circle of 
the monocle that he affixes to his caricatures of Bentley. Chesterton concludes 
that ‘[d]etached intellectualism is (in the exact sense of a popular phrase) all 
moonshine; for it is light without heat, and it is secondary light, reflected from a 
dead world’ (Orthodoxy 21). In Chesterton’s fiction, monocles are invariably 
worn by characters who represent aloofness, worldly success, and social 
conformity. For example, a politician in ‘The Red Moon of Meru’ (The Storyteller 
Apr. 1927) possesses a ‘monocle that was the only gleam in his hard, legal face’ 
(FB 618). Perhaps the most significant of Chesterton’s references to monocles 
arises in his essay, ‘The Dulness of Cliques’ (DN 11 May 1912), in which he 
employs the monocle as a metaphor of the dangers of scepticism: 
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A fixed creed is absolutely indispensable to freedom. For while men are and should be 
various, there must be some communication between them if they are to get any 
pleasure out of their variety. […] If we all start with the agreement that the sun and 
moon exist, we can talk about our different visions of them. [… But] if once it be held 
that there is nothing but a silver blur in one man's eye or a bright circle (like a 
monocle) in the other man's, then neither is free, for each is shut up in the cell of a 
separate universe (CDN 8: 77). 
 
Here Chesterton particularly focuses upon the tendency of ontological 
scepticism to breed alienation by dispensing with the shared contexts that foster 
mutual understanding while enabling individuals to remain ‘various’. Chesterton 
argues that only a faith in the analogic nature of the things with which we 
mutually identify can offer a context that secures our freedom to cogently 
separate, without becoming locked in the solipsism of a private ‘cell’. 
Chesterton’s parody sequence, ‘Variations on an Air’, pragmatically illustrates 
this principle by setting up a comparable analogic model, in which highly distinct 
modes of expression are employed by various poets as a means of relating their 
personal visions of a shared folk memory—the nursery rhyme, Old King Cole. 
Through this conceit, Chesterton sets up a symposium of heteroglossic interaction 
in which the presence of a common cultural context enables the respondents to 
employ diverse stylistic approaches to express their simultaneous individuality 
and commonality.
19
  
A similar principle informs another of Chesterton’s later parodies, ‘School 
English Composition: Exercise CCXXII. B: The “Tomato” in Prose and Prosody’, 
in which the objective standbys of the sun and moon are replaced with a burlesque 
equivalent, the tomato.
20
 Here, a series of poets, including Poe, Burns, Milton, and 
Edith Sitwell, offer their bathetically couched ‘different pronunciations of the 
word “tomato”’ (Collected Nonsense 54), and Chesterton employs Sitwell’s 
interpretation to convey the dangers of an excessive withdrawal into sceptical 
subjectivism: ‘The sky bulges through the skylight like a blue tomato’ (Collected 
Nonsense 55). As the composer of the school exercise sardonically glosses, this 
                                                 
19
 Bakhtin explains that heteroglossia connotes ‘another’s speech in another’s language, serving to 
express authorial intentions but in a refracted way’ (Dialogic 324). 
20
 This piece was composed as a private gift for Joan Nicholl (see Ward, Return 170). Although 
the precise composition date is unknown, it must have been written after summer 1928, when the 
Chestertons first met the Nicholls (see Ffinch 319).  
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account ‘throws no light on what accent she gives to the word, or indeed what 
meaning she attaches to it’ (Collected Nonsense 55). With these imitative tours de 
force, Chesterton sets up a form of parodic community, in which the moderating 
voice of the parodist celebrates each participant’s unique mode of expression, 
while also contriving to reign in any signs of extremism which might threaten to 
fracture the cohesion of the community. 
Chesterton’s conception of the value of analogic relation bears comparison 
to Blanchot’s assessment of the dynamics of friendship, ‘the fundamental 
separation on the basis of which what separates becomes relation’. Rather than 
one soul occupying two individual bodies, the principle here is of two distinct 
souls collaborating in one collective body-politic, a conceit which again 
emphasises dialogism over synthesis. In the context of Chesterton’s dialogic 
sensibility, it is also notable that his account of scepticism’s depredation of 
relational contexts particularly emphasises the finality of this philosophical 
position—its capacity to shut down ‘communication’. This danger is invoked in 
his discussion of the retardation of the dialogic process discernible in novels that 
depict the decadent movement, which Chesterton contrasts with the ‘capping’ 
games of the Greek symposia: 
 
The most remarkable trait of the dialogue made fashionable by such works as ‘Dodo’ 
or ‘The Green Carnation’ is the entire absence of any social feeling whatever, of any 
glow of [the] great atmosphere of friendship […] The aim of the ‘Dodo’ 
conversationalist is to cut short another man’s idea, not, as in the great conversations, 
to extend and perfect it. Proverbially, in fact, it was the aim of the wit to ‘cap’ the last 
saying; the new comment is not meant as a cap, but as an extinguisher. Its inspiration is 
flippancy, the blackest of all the enemies of joy (‘Critics and Conversation.’ DN 21 
May 1901; CDN 1: 86). 
 
If the notion of capping recalls Chesterton’s admonishment to Holbrook 
Jackson that one should constructively build upon, rather than destructively reject 
one’s discursive predecessors, it is notable that Jackson went on to become a 
celebrated chronicler of the decadent movement, with his critical study, The 
Eighteen Nineties: A Review of Art and Ideas at the Close of the Nineteenth 
Century (1914). Chesterton publically discusses his thoughts on Jackson’s earlier 
book of epigrams in ‘Two Kinds of Paradox’ (ILN 11 Mar. 1911), an essay in 
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which he also articulates his view of the dialogic merit of paradox, employing 
very similar terms to his account of the ‘cap’ and the ‘extinguisher’ to 
differentiate between contrasting applications of paradox: ‘the fruitful and the 
barren’ (CW 29: 53). Chesterton advances the principle of ‘live paradox’, in 
opposition to the mode that he perceives to be at work in Wilde and Shaw, while 
also drawing nonsense into his account: ‘a live paradox ought to produce more 
paradoxes. Nonsense ought to be suggestive; but nowadays it is abortive. The new 
epigrams are not even finger posts on the wild road: they are tablets, each set into 
a brick wall’ (CW 29: 53). 
Chesterton’s reference, in ‘Critics and Conversation’, to the ‘absence of any 
social feeling’ which finds expression in ‘flippancy’ sheds an interesting light 
upon his apparently fond tribute to Bentley in the Autobiography, which soon 
proceeds towards a more ambivalent tone, in which the youthful Bentley’s ‘rigid 
flippancy’ (77) is particularly emphasised. This phrase, which enacts a grotesque 
hybridisation of extremes to again suggest the poles of dogmatism and relativism 
meeting full circle, also recalls Chesterton’s description of Hankin as an 
inscrutable ‘omnivorous observer’ who ‘had a slight smile always on his face’ 
(CDN 5: 344). He argues that Bentley’s flippancy endured into later life, leaving 
him ‘too detached and ironic to become conspicuous in connection with a cause, 
or any of the things in which youth is generally both communal and combative’ 
(Autobiography 67). Whereas Chesterton made the reverse complaint about 
Belloc—‘[t]here is always such a sundering quality about Belloc’s quarrels’ (qtd. 
in Ward, Gilbert 472), because he pursued them with such monologic self-
belief—in the case of Bentley, Chesterton argues that it is his very disinterest in 
controversies that has a sundering effect, a flaw which emerges from Bentley’s 
comparably extreme inability to believe in himself. As Chesterton notes in ‘The 
Extraordinary Cabman’ (DN 7 Apr. 1906), ‘[m]y best friends are all either 
bottomless sceptics or quite uncontrollable believers’ (CDN 3: 337).  
Learning from these negative examples, Chesterton sought a middle-ground 
between the extreme positions of his two closest friends. Unlike Belloc, he 
retained a kernel of detached self-irony which guarded against the excessive 
aggression that accompanies an inability to countenance alternative points of 
view, since he conceived absolute self-belief to represent as sure a path to 
madness as absolute scepticism: ‘“The men who really believe in themselves are 
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all in lunatic asylums”’ (Orthodoxy 6). However, he never abandoned his belief in 
the central importance of exercising judgement, since, in an echo of his appraisal 
of Browning’s even-handedness, while he was able to imaginatively engage with 
other perspectives, he nonetheless ‘held that there was a truth to discover. […] 
that in a dispute every one was to a certain extent right; not the decadent doctrine 
that in so mad a place as the world, every one must be by the nature of things 
wrong’ (Robert 175). As Chesterton summarised his position, ‘[m]oderation is not 
a compromise; moderation is a passion; the passion of great judges’ (‘Tennyson’, 
collected in Varied 255).  
A comparable ethos of arbitration and moderation is discernible in the 
parodic dialogue which he initiated with Bentley’s clerihew form, when Bentley’s 
school-friends began to join in with the production of clerihews, in which 
Chesterton pragmatically demonstrated his belief in the ‘moderation’ practiced by 
‘great judges’. The illustrated ‘Dictionary of Biography’ which ultimately found 
publication as Bentley’s Biography for Beginners (1905) was originally produced 
as a collaborative project of their ‘Junior Debating Club’ (J.D.C.) in 1893 (see CW 
10.2: 317 and Chesterton, Autobiography 61). Chesterton employed illustrative 
symbols to differentiate the contributions of the various members, distinguishing 
Bentley’s offerings with the symbol of the dodo, while representing his own 
contributions with the judicial symbol of the gavel (CW 10.2: 317).
21
 In 
Chesterton’s account of novels that depict decadence, his reference to E.F. 
Benson’s novel, Dodo: A Detail of the Day (1893), complements his description 
of the extinguishing of dialogue that he finds in such texts, to imply a pun on the 
extinct bird.
22
 When combined with the purposeful infertility of the green 
carnation, these images evoke the atmosphere of suicidal, willed finality that 
suffused the decadent movement. In ‘Milton and Merry England’ (collected in 
Fancies versus Fads), Chesterton echoes the famous exchange between Lord 
Henry Wotton and Lady Narborough in The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890) (see 
Wilde, Complete 137), explaining that ‘[i]t is now almost impossible to bring 
home to anybody, even to myself, how final that fin de siècle seemed to be; not 
the end of the century but the end of the world’ (Fancies 220).  
                                                 
21
 Other entries are marked with both the dodo and the gavel, to indicate a collaboration.  
22
 There is also a reference to Bentley having ‘the Dodo on his crest’ in Chesterton’s mock-heroic 
paean to his friend, The Legend of Sir Edmund’ (BL MS Add.73307 ff.93), again written in 1893, 
the same year as Benson’s novel. 
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Chesterton’s apocalyptic conception of the period leads William Blissett to 
argue that there is a ‘note of melodrama’ in the ‘exaggerated picture of Wilde’s 
Nineties’ (‘Max’ 104) that he paints, while Sewell argues that Chesterton ‘prefers 
a chimera of his own inventing’ to the reality, and then ‘blames Wilde for it’ 
(‘Giant’ 572). While these charges initially seem plausible in the light of the 
mental distress that Chesterton was experiencing in the mid-1890s, it is also 
important to note that the suicidal conceits of decadence were not mere rhetorical 
abstractions, extrapolated with a feverish literalism by Chesterton, but the artistic 
expression of an urgent existential reality. A disproportionately large number of 
decadent writers suffered mental breakdowns and/or committed suicide, including 
Hankin, in 1909, and Chesterton must have been seriously concerned that Bentley 
might follow the same course—indeed, the pair’s discussion of a ‘suicide 
controversy’ (BL MS Add.73191 ff.33) in the press formed the immediate context 
of Chesterton’s epistolary attempt to rally Bentley’s spirits. Although 
Schopenhauer considered his espousal of pristine artistic detachment to be a more 
subversive and philosophically cogent ‘denial of the will to life’ (Will 250-51) 
than suicide, he contended, nonetheless, that suicide was a perfectly rational 
response to the conditions of existence (see Essays 78-79), a view that informs 
Chesterton’s bitterly ironical remark that at the fin de siècle ‘an argument arose 
whether it was not a very nice thing to murder one's self’ (Orthodoxy 64).  
Bentley also expressed concern over forces that he perceived to potentially 
militate against the successful regeneration of society, albeit from a reverse 
perspective, when musing upon the ‘[v]ery earnest’ Bloggs, in his diary of 1897: 
‘In fact, I merely believe they are—what shall I say?—the least little bit neurotic. 
[…] My own belief is that if society were all Bloggs society would come to an 
abrupt conclusion’ (28 Mar. 1897; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.866). If, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, Chesterton came to view untrammelled earnestness and 
untrammelled irony as equally unbalancing extremes, his enduring recourse to 
nonsense techniques in his maturity suggests an understanding that monologic 
earnestness may ultimately be as culturally un-regenerative as the miasmic ironies 
of decadence, and may be a personal harbinger of mental disarray—a madman 
who believes himself to be God in The Ball and the Cross wears a look of 
‘horrible earnestness’ (CW 7: 184). In this spirit of moderation, Chesterton’s own 
brand of nonsense sets up a conversation with the strictures of Bentley’s preferred 
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approach, by emphasising a judgemental reengagement with objective reality, 
while retaining his friend’s playful manipulations of disproportion and 
incongruity.  
This amalgamation is particularly perceptible in Greybeards, in 
Chesterton’s nonsense-critique of decadence, ‘On the Disastrous Spread of 
Aestheticism in All Classes’, which displays an apocalyptically couched anxiety 
over the pessimistic detachment and sceptical derangement that he discerned in 
decadent philosophy: 
 
The sea had nothing but a mood 
Of “vague ironic gloom,” 
With which t’explain its presence in 
My upstairs drawing-room. 
 
The sun had read a little book 
That struck it with a notion: 
He drowned himself and all his fires 
Deep in the hissing ocean. 
 
Then all was dark, lawless, and lost: 
I heard great devilish wings: 
I knew that Art had won, and snapt 
The Covenant of Things (Collected Nonsense 16). 
 
Here Chesterton turns academic nonsense against itself. Malcolm argues that for 
centuries ‘one of the standard building-blocks of nonsense literature’ has been the 
‘category-mistake’ (11), and identifies this as a particularly prominent feature of 
the academic strain of nonsense, citing the example, ‘“to take Tobacco in Ramus 
Method”’ (11), as an absurd conflation of the physical and intellectual planes. In 
the case at hand, Chesterton manipulates disproportion—the sea entering a 
drawing room—and the category-mistake—the material world conversing and 
studying literature—in order to bolster his critique of the deranging drive of 
decadence, which finally breaks the ‘Covenant of Things’ when the sun, 
Chesterton’s symbol of the shared objective framework that enables dialogue, is 
annihilated by Art.  
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A comparable manipulation is discernible in Chesterton’s approach to the 
clerihew. Although Bentley later claimed that his invention was predicated upon a 
programmatic dismantling of biographical relation, and that a clerihew containing 
‘nothing with which the dry-as-dust historiographer could possibly quarrel’ 
should be considered ‘fatally defective’ (Those 155), the form is equally amenable 
to satirical manipulation, in the sense that nothing in its structure technically 
precludes the insertion of a genuine value judgement upon the subject, based upon 
authentic facts of his/her biography. By choosing to focus on the clerihew’s 
satirical potential, Chesterton exposes Bentley’s invention to an enforced dialogue 
with other interpretations, retaining the form of his friend’s verse while altering 
the content to suit his own agenda. This approach is exemplified by Chesterton’s 
clerihew on Thomas Carlyle, which is illustrated only with the gavel in the 
original collection: 
 
Thomas Carlyle  
Has been forgotten all this while. 
He wrote “Sartor Resartus,” 
But that shan’t part us (CW 10.2 343-44). 
  
This verse smuggles value into Bentley’s form, in a manner that inscribes 
difference while guarding against schism, by emphasising the parodic principle of 
a dialogic relation which ‘shan’t part us’. To this end, Chesterton’s second couplet 
engages in an implicit value judgement, hinging upon a qualifying ‘but’, which 
raises the implication that despite Carlyle’s infraction in producing Sartor 
Resartus (1836), the judge is willing to give the accused the benefit of the doubt. 
Thus, Chesterton’s verse exemplifies the dual action of distancing and 
amelioration at the heart of parody, as well as its tendency toward tacit aggression 
and professed magnanimity, while the assertion that Carlyle has been ‘forgotten 
all this while’ also implies that in the very act of demurral Chesterton is 
disinterestedly reintroducing an unjustly neglected name into the cultural 
conversation. Again, this results in a text that is both ‘absurd and significant’. 
Chesterton’s choice of Carlyle as a subject is also instructive in relation to 
the poles of parody. In The Victorian Age in Literature, Chesterton recurs once 
more to a distinction between wit and humour in assessing Carlyle, noting that he 
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‘had humour; he had it in his very style; but it never got into his philosophy’, 
which consisted of a ‘heavy Teutonic idealism, absurdly unaware of the 
complexity of things’ (CW 15: 443). However, in this sense, Sartor Resartus—
which Chesterton considered an ‘admirable fantasia’ (CW 15: 444)—is also a 
worshipper’s half-holiday on Carlyle’s part, since it is a metafictional parody of 
Hegelian idealism, in which the musings of an earnest philosopher are subjected 
to critical demurral and textual reorganisation by a sceptical editor. This parodic 
premise situates Sartor Resartus within the Menippean satirical lineage of Swift 
and Sterne, and in this context it is little wonder that Carlyle’s composition ‘shan’t 
part’ the judge and the accused—in fact it represents the principal site of their 
sympathetic alignment. One begins to suspect a hidden emphasis in Chesterton’s 
final line—‘[b]ut that shan’t part us’—which leads the detecting reader to 
investigate other possible areas of schism between the satirist and his subject. 
Elsewhere, Chesterton hints at the more genuine cause of his departure, when he 
argues that Carlyle’s most egregious character flaw was that he ‘failed in belief in 
other people’ (Twelve 122). This assessment again inscribes a tacit identification 
within its criticism, by gesturing back to Chesterton’s own youthful traumas, from 
which he now claims to have emerged, departing explicitly from Carlyle and 
implicitly from Bentley in the act of constructing a satirically engaged clerihew. 
While this example is demonstrative of a philosophical divergence, 
another way in which Chesterton expressed his increasingly judicial temper at the 
turn of the century was through the gesture of commitment bound up with 
choosing political sides. In the Autobiography, he recalls an incident at the height 
of the Boer War which exemplifies the ‘communal and combative’ approach to 
controversy that he admired in Belloc. Through an improvisational collaboration 
with a friend—tentatively identified as Belloc by Stapleton (CDN 8: 6)—
Chesterton initiated an agonistic game of satirical public parody, which set him at 
odds with a ‘mob’ of his fellow citizens, effectively inciting a riot:  
 
I remember waiting with a Pro-Boer friend in the midst of a Jingo mob outside the 
celebrated Queens Hall Meeting which ended in a free fight. My friend and I adopted a 
method of patriotic parody or reductio ad absurdum. We first proposed three cheers for 
Chamberlain, then three cheers for Rhodes, and then by degrees for more and more 
dubious and demi-naturalised patriots. We actually did get an innocent cheer for Beit 
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[…] But when it came to our impulsive appeal to the universal popularity of [George] 
Albu, the irony of our intention was discovered; and the fight began (Autobiography 
110-11).
23
 
 
This account turns upon a pedagogic filtration of friends and enemies, 
drawing the crowd’s attention to the status of figures such as Alfred Beit—the 
German financier whose wealth was accumulated in South Africa—as moral, if 
not literal, ‘enem[ies] of England’ (‘The Rich Man.’ DN 21 July 1906; CDN 4: 
12). Consider, in this light, Bentley’s clerihew on Beit, which was illustrated by 
Chesterton in a manner that imposes a meaning not necessarily implied by the 
verse itself. Bentley’s rhyme combines a loss of bodily volition with inscrutability 
over the cause: 
 
Mr. Alfred Beit 
Screamed suddenly in the night. 
When they asked him why 
He made no reply (Complete 8). 
 
These lines retain a fundamental ambiguity regarding the cause of Beit’s 
nightmare, implying an obscure, existential form of terror, while borrowing from 
Lear’s limericks in the invocation of an oppressive ‘they’ clamouring to demand 
an explanation. The effect is comparable to the moment of aporia that Carroll 
implants within The Hunting of the Snark (1874): 
 
To the horror of all those who were present that day, 
He uprose in full evening dress, 
And with senseless grimaces endeavoured to say 
What his tongue could no longer express (Works 752). 
 
In the clerihew at hand, in contrast to Bentley’s ambiguous verse, Chesterton’s 
accompanying illustration of Beit in bed surrounded by bags of money and 
                                                 
23
 Chesterton details the same incident in ‘The Fountain of Honour’ (DN 13 Jan. 1912). Here, he 
notes that he ‘caught the cue of my friend’s sarcasm’ (CDN 8: 5) when he cried three cheers for 
Rhodes, and proceeded to join in with the cry of Beit. George Albu (1857-1935) was a German-
born magnate, whose fortune was made in the diamond and gold mines of South Africa. 
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German insignias encourages the specific inference that his underhand activities 
in South Africa are disturbing his conscience: 
  
 
 
Chesterton’s inability to detach himself from a moral judgement leads him 
to reply on Beit’s behalf here, so as to police the reader’s reception of the verse.24 
As he argues elsewhere, ‘[p]rint is at best a temptation; a picture is an assault’ 
(‘Truth and Lies in Popular Histories.’ ILN 9 Nov. 1907; CW 27: 587). In 
particular, Beit’s screaming mouth offers Chesterton the opportunity to link the 
name to the personality, with the massed ranks of teeth in the trap-like mouth 
suggesting his association of the financier with material rapacity: the bite of Beit. 
The monitory motivation of Chesterton’s illustration is corroborated by his 
                                                 
24
 Gavin Ewart also notes the disparity between text and illustration: ‘Bentley probably thought 
that Beit was a villain, but he doesn’t say so. The illustration is far more outspoken’ (Complete 
xiii).  
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explanation, in ‘A Defence of Nonsense’, of the specific stylistic distinction 
between the exaggerative action of satire and the deranging drive of nonsense:  
 
There is all the difference in the world between the instinct of satire, which, seeing in 
the Kaiser’s moustaches something typical of him, draws them continually larger and 
larger; and the instinct of nonsense which, for no good reason whatever, imagines what 
those moustaches would look like on the present Archbishop of Canterbury if he grew 
them in a fit of absence of mind (Defendant 64-65). 
 
From this we may conclude that when the subject is particularly morally 
disagreeable to Chesterton he is incapable of allowing ambiguity to stand, instead 
satirically emphasising what he finds ‘characteristic’ in the figure, so as to 
inscribe a stable distinction between himself and the anathematised other, rather 
than propagating referential incongruities ‘for no good reason whatever’, as 
Bentley does in the Davy clerihew, or emphasising an ameliorative absence of 
schism, as Chesterton does in the Carlyle clerihew. Chesterton’s terms also offer a 
further illustration of the interrelated moral and psychological danger that he 
perceived to derive from humour entirely divested of wit. The phrase, ‘a fit of 
absence of mind’, conflates the episodic ‘fits’ upon which Carroll’s Snark is 
structured, with a loss of bodily volition caused by an ‘absence’ of intellection, 
recalling the ‘absent-minded scream’ which Chesterton ascribes to Bentley in the 
Greybeards preface, as well as ‘the shrieks of Schopenhauer’ to which he refers in 
Orthodoxy (64). Here we again perceive Chesterton’s refusal of ambiguity to 
derive not only from cogent political and philosophical principles—opposition to 
the Boer War, insistence upon preserving a link to external realities so as to 
safeguard communication and discrimination—but also from a more obscure 
psychological fear of the spectre of mental instability invoked by impenetrable 
irrationality, as emblematised by the nightmare which causes Beit to scream.  
In Auden’s account of the preservative quality of caricature, he not only 
argues that we ‘enjoy caricatures of our friends because we do not want to think of 
their […] dying’, but also that ‘we enjoy caricatures of our enemies because we do 
not want to consider the possibility of their having a change of heart so that we 
would have to forgive them’ (‘Notes’ 383). Chesterton’s Autobiography 
corroborates both points. His evocation of Lear to illustrate his unchanging 
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opposition to the war—‘I thought so then and I think so still’—demonstrates that 
he is as far from forgiving Beit as ever, while his account of Bentley’s character 
evinces a comparable anxiety to stress that his friend has never changed, precisely 
because he has never ceased being flippant. As Chesterton explains, the juvenile 
writing of ‘my first and in every sense original friend […] was by far the most 
mature’ of that produced by the J.D.C., ‘perhaps for the very reason that it largely 
confined itself to being critical or flippant […] of all men I have known, he is the 
man whose mind has least changed’ (Autobiography 67). Here Chesterton essays 
another weighing of ‘praise and abuse’, which serves to suspend Bentley 
indefinitely in the detached, ‘unmoral’ role discussed in the letter of 1894—a 
document which Chesterton compulsively covered in caricatures of Bentley. In 
this way, Bentley comes to stand in the same dialogic relation to Chesterton as 
that in which Turnbull stands to MacIan—he is his simultaneous ‘friend and 
enemy’, fixed forever in the ‘agreement between agreement and disagreement’. 
In addition to the ‘catastrophic’ political event of the Boer War, it is 
conventionally understood that the catalytic philosophical impact of the populist 
doctrine of Walt Whitman played a critical role in aiding Chesterton’s recovery 
from pessimism and solipsism. Oddie goes so far as to argue that Chesterton’s 
exposure to the work of Whitman in the early 1890s effectively ‘pre-empted’ the 
danger of any serious ‘collapse’ through the prior infusion of ‘more positive 
influences’ (90) than those supplied by exponents of decadence, such as Wilde. 
However, Chesterton’s continuing struggle to break through the barrier of 
solipsistic disorientation, as evidenced by Bentley’s diaries, shows that a course of 
Whitman had not fully inoculated the patient. At first glance, it seems a singular 
irony that Kipling’s response to reading The Wild Knight was to suggest that a 
‘“severe course of Walt Whitman”’ (qtd. in Oddie 6) was needed to cure the 
young poet’s demonstrable pessimism, given that Chesterton’s friends already 
considered him a veritable disciple of the American poet at this time (see Ward, 
Gilbert 49). As the following account will demonstrate, this irony arises from the 
fact that both Wilde and Whitman embodied extremes which contributed in more 
subtly positive and negative ways to Chesterton’s neuroses than the conventional 
biographical line would suggest. 
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The Importance of not being Oscar 
 
In the first decade of Chesterton’s career in public life, he evinced a consistent 
drive to publically position himself as the anti-Wilde, which reached its apogee in 
two texts of 1908—his most fully realised work of Christian apologetics, 
Orthodoxy, and his most fully realised novel, The Man Who Was Thursday. In the 
former, he arrives at a formula for expressing a transactional engagement with 
one’s debt of gratitude to existence: ‘we can pay for sunsets. We can pay for them 
by not being Oscar Wilde’ (50). Meanwhile, in the verse preface to Thursday, 
which forms his second dedication to Bentley, Chesterton posits himself as the 
anti-Wilde in a cultural, rather than existential sense. The verse begins by 
projecting a neat binary between himself and Bentley on one hand, and the forces 
of the ‘Green Carnation’ (CW 6: 473) on the other, while employing 
carnivalesque imagery of merry buffoonery to emphasise the distinction: 
 
Science announced nonentity and art admired decay; 
The world was old and ended: but you and I were gay;  
[…] 
Fools as we were in motley, all jangling and absurd, 
When all church bells were silent our cap and bells were heard (CW 6: 472). 
 
Chesterton’s phrase, ‘jangling and absurd’, punningly connects the pair’s 
nonsense-escapades to the discordance (again, in the literal sense of the absurd) 
that he wishes to project between the ‘fools’ and the age, much as Bentley’s 
reference, in his diary, to Napoleon as an ‘absurd’ tale serves both to imply its 
burlesque basis and to emphasise its consequent discordance with the refined 
literary milieu into which it was to be thrust. However, there is a comparable 
discordance between Chesterton’s joyous imagery and the progress of the 
dedication, in which the pair’s ‘fears’ (CW 6: 473) increasingly encroach upon the 
narrative. These fears are more frankly invoked in the earlier Greybeards 
dedication, which employs slightly different terms to suggest that the pessimistic 
mood came as much from within: 
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Far, far behind are morbid hours, 
And lonely hearts that bleed. 
Far, far behind us are the days, 
When we were old indeed (Collected Nonsense 4).  
 
As with the ‘emotional’ element that Chesterton praised in Lear’s nonsense, 
which he contrasted favourably with the ‘purely intellectual’ nonsense of 
‘Carroll’s Wonderland’ (Defendant 66), the humour of the Greybeards dedication 
enables him to be more open—here it is ‘we’ who are old, rather than ‘the world’, 
while the personal, microcosmic temporality of ‘morbid hours’ localises 
Chesterton’s usual broad-brush account of the morbidity of the age. Consequently, 
if we consider Gillian Cross’s perceptive observation that ‘the differences 
between [Chesterton’s] work and that of the major Decadents are those not of a 
complete lack of relations but of a conscious and determined opposition’ (1), we 
begin to suspect that Chesterton is protesting rather too much in his more 
polemical outings. As Cross elaborates, ‘[c]onscious opposition is […] just as 
much a relationship as fervent imitation’ (1). Canovan’s brief account of 
Chesterton’s relationship to Wilde suggests that his projection of difference was 
structurally parodic, rather than purely satirical, since it was based upon repetition 
with deviation:  
 
[Chesterton learned the] mode of paradoxical witticism from Oscar Wilde. 
Significantly, however, he used this style to put forward not the exotic viewpoint of the 
Decadents, but what he took to be the outlook of the ordinary man. […] he deliberately 
used […] the paradoxical style of the intellectual elite, in order to defend against that 
elite the common sense of the common man (21).  
 
In view of this parodic adaptation of Wilde’s rhetorical stratagems, it is 
striking that Chesterton’s early desire to emulate Bentley led him to draw his 
friend’s literary influences into his own orbit, and these influences included 
Wilde. In a letter composed in 1892, Chesterton refers to his father ‘reading your 
friend Oscar Wilde’s book on Lying, bound up with some other equally amusing 
and equally paradoxical discourses.’ Later in the same letter the possessive note is 
modified: ‘I am developing a power of reasoning out nonsense quite after the 
heart of our friend Oscar’ (BL MS Add.73191 ff.21; my emphases). In a further 
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complication of the neat binaries of the Thursday preface, it seems that both 
Chesterton and Bentley ‘admired decay’ in their youth, in the shape of their 
‘friend’, Wilde’s essay, ‘The Decay of Lying’ (1889). 
In his autobiography, Chesterton demonstrates a renewed willingness to 
address the ambivalence of his relationship to Wilde, in the chapter, ‘How to be a 
Lunatic’. Here Thursday is frankly acknowledged to have been the invention of a 
‘young half-pessimist of the ‘90s’, and the dedication is explained as a note to a 
friend ‘who had been through the same period and problems’ (Autobiography 
102). Chesterton explains that although his morbidity ‘may have been due to the 
atmosphere of the Decadents, and their perpetual hints of the luxurious horrors of 
paganism […] I am not disposed to dwell much on that defence; I suspect I 
manufactured most of my morbidities for myself’ (92-93). This readmission of 
similarity is emphasised by his alterations to the manuscript copy of the 
Autobiography. Having distinguished the nature of his own ‘madness’ from 
Wilde’s homosexuality by asserting that he never felt ‘the faintest temptation to 
the particular madness of Wilde’, Chesterton crosses out the subsequent line—
‘but I could at this time have imagined many disproportioned’ passions—and 
replaces it with ‘I could at this time imagine the worst & wildest disproportions’ 
(BL MS Add.73268A ff.98). Having initially projected difference, Chesterton’s 
revision re-inscribes identity by punningly conferring upon himself the ‘wildest 
disproportions’.  
One particular disproportion that afflicted Chesterton was his 
apprehension of the cultural size of Wilde at the fin de siècle—he ‘filled up more 
room, both in mind and body, than anybody else on that stage’ (CW 18: 75), much 
as the body of the father-figure, Sunday, is figured as occupying an unmanageable 
quantity of space in the nightmare section of Thursday (see CW 6: 620). 
Ultimately, two attributes enabled Chesterton to attain a critical distance through 
which to re-establish a sense of proportion in his attitude to Wilde, the first 
conveying similarity in aesthetic philosophy, the second difference. The first was 
the lesson in ‘reasoning out nonsense’ that Chesterton had learned from Wilde 
himself, through ‘The Decay of Lying’. Of all the points raised in Wilde’s essay, 
it is his famous account of life imitating art that would seem to have most usefully 
assisted Chesterton in this procedure. Specifically, Wilde’s avatar, Vivian, 
explains that ‘Schopenhauer has analysed the pessimism that characterises modern 
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thought, but Hamlet invented it. The world has become sad because a puppet was 
once melancholy’ (Intentions 32). In pursuing this line of argument, Vivian 
identifies a further example of the ‘imitative instinct’ in ‘silly boys who, after 
reading the adventures of Jack Sheppard or Dick Turpin, pillage the stalls of 
unfortunate applewomen, break into sweet shops at night, and alarm old 
gentlemen who are returning home from the city by leaping out on them in 
suburban lanes, with black masks and unloaded revolvers’ (Intentions 32). As 
Chesterton later concluded of Wilde, in turn, he ‘sometimes pretended that he was 
more important than morality, but that was mere play acting’ (CDN 6: 98).   
The second restorative attribute was Chesterton’s capacity to identify 
unintentional self-parody in Wilde’s work, ironically turning Wilde’s earnestness 
against him via a skirl of critical laughter which he claims to have evaded the 
unknowing ur artist. In The Victorian Age in Literature, Chesterton argues that 
‘[i]n Wilde’s poetry we have particularly a perpetually toppling possibility of the 
absurd; a sense of just falling too short or just going too far. [… One feels] that 
Wilde is poised on the edge of a precipice of bathos’ (CW 15: 518). To illustrate 
his point, Chesterton cites the lines, ‘These Christs that die upon the barricades / 
God knows that I am with them—in some ways’, before going on to conjure an 
irreverent image of ‘Wilde lolling like an elegant leviathan on a sofa’, while 
complacently composing his paean to self-endangering political agitation 
‘between the whiffs of a scented cigarette’ (CW 15: 518). Elsewhere, he notes of 
the aestheticism of Maeterlinck: ‘Once shift your sympathy by an inch, and 
“Pelleas and Melisande” becomes a roaring farce’ (‘The Failure of the Aesthetes.’ 
ILN 25 Dec. 1909; CW 28: 450). In the example of Wilde’s lines, Chesterton 
specifically identifies this shift of sympathy as one that draws the critic into line 
with the position of the populace at large—a sense of the poet’s absurdity will 
inevitably arise if ‘the reader [should only] move his standpoint one inch nearer 
the popular standpoint’ (CW 15: 518).  
Chesterton’s capacity to position himself ‘nearer the popular standpoint’ 
was first fostered by the influence of Whitman. If Wilde is the villain of the 
Thursday dedication, then Whitman is unquestionably the hero—the textual 
helpmeet to the Chesterbentley, whose Leaves of Grass (1855) first sent out a ‘cry 
of cleaner things’ from Whitman’s home in ‘fish-shaped Paumanok’ (CW 6: 472). 
Chesterton later termed Whitman ‘the greatest man of the nineteenth century’ 
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(‘Conventions and the Hero.’ DN 15 Oct. 1904; CDN 2: 313), and projected his 
sense of identification with his hero in the binary terms of a battle-line: ‘I used to 
think at one time that between the pessimists and the praisers of God, between 
Schopenhauer and Whitman, there must be a war without any truce till the stars 
fall’ (‘Lines by a Noble Lord.’ DN 16 Dec. 1904; CDN 2: 344-45). Chesterton 
considered Whitman’s most valuable lesson to have been that ‘comradeship [… 
is] the permanent foundation of democracy’ (‘Summer Festivals and Ceremonies.’ 
ILN 19 May 1906; CW 27: 190), and this utopian conjunction was decisive in 
shaping Chesterton’s later ‘mystic passion’ for democracy. His argument, in 
correspondence with Bentley, that friendship is the antidote to pessimism, also 
demonstrates that the ‘new city of Friends’ (Leaves 105) of which Whitman wrote 
in visionary terms was a key inspiration in Chesterton’s revolt against decadence. 
Cecil Chesterton recalled that his brother ecstatically embraced Whitman’s vision 
of ‘“the redemption of the world by comradeship”’, and many years later, 
Chesterton described how his youth ‘“was filled, as with a sunrise, with the 
sanguine glow of Walt Whitman […] Whitman was brotherhood in broad 
daylight”’ (each qtd. in Oddie 135).  
In another of the fragmentary creative experiments of the early 1890s in 
which Chesterton implants Bentley (titled ‘E.C. Bentley would a-wooing go’ by 
Denis Conlon in CW 14: 439), he implies that the pair’s advocacy of differing 
theorists of friendship represented a further, subtle fault-line in their relationship. 
The text initially offers another illustration of Chesterton’s capacity for hero-
worship, figuring Bentley as the virile hero who goes out courting girls, while the 
narrator—a thinly veiled Chesterton—sits at home reading Leaves of Grass (see 
CW 14: 441). However, Bentley’s amorous adventures quickly become 
subordinated to an account of the relationship between the two friends. Upon 
Bentley’s return, the reference to Whitman’s paean to brotherhood is 
complemented by Bentley’s hesitant introduction of the work of John Addington 
Symonds, the classical theorist of male friendship, to the narrator, who responds, 
dismissively, ‘“I hate your neo-pagan dilettanti”’ (CW 14: 442). Although 
Bentley’s enthusiasm finally leads the narrator to speculate that a ‘“good essay on 
friendship would interest us, I should think, more than anything”’ (CW 14: 443), 
the account remains inconclusive, and most clearly functions to signal the 
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discordance between Chesterton’s preference for Whitman’s populist, democratic 
vision of friendship, and Bentley’s advocacy of a more classical, ideal model.25  
In Chesterton’s youthful writing, his extreme sense of identification with 
Whitman initially manifested itself in pastiche. In a letter written to Bentley from 
Milan over Easter 1894, Chesterton hints at his taste for pastiching ego ideals, 
listing Whitman among a number of admired forebears who ‘I happen to affect’ 
(BL MS Add.73191 ff.44), a phrase which punningly connotes both affection and 
affectation. The utopian spirit of brotherhood that Whitman’s philosophy inspired 
in Chesterton is conveyed by an adolescent free-verse parody of a dinner 
invitation, in which Chesterton inverts the process of selection conventionally 
attendant to the format: ‘My great ambition is to give a party at which everybody 
should meet everybody else and like them very much. 
 
AN INVITATION 
 
Mr. Gilbert Chesterton 
requests the pleasure 
of humanity’s company 
to tea on Dec. 25
th
, 1896. 
Humanity Esq., The Earth, Cosmos E’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 58). 
 
However, despite the idealistic tenor of this conceit, when Blissett jokes that 
Chesterton ‘omitted the RSVP’ (‘Max’ 102), he inadvertently makes a telling 
point about Chesterton’s tacit wariness in regard to the alluring creed of 
communality. There is a contradiction at the heart of the utopian view of 
friendship to which Chesterton was drawn, since friendship is invariably bolstered 
by a sense of opposition to some ‘other’, sought to bolster group definition. It is 
based upon both likeness (to the friend) and opposition (to the other), and is 
consequently rooted in an adversarial structure which precludes a truly utopian 
progress toward a ‘brotherhood of man’. A similar tension is discernible in 
Bentley’s response to Chesterton’s utopian nonsense-invention of ‘the human 
club’, which the latter first began conceptualising in early 1895, explaining that 
                                                 
25
 Nonetheless, there is a singular irony here: Symonds and Whitman were friends, and the former 
wrote an admiring critical biography of the latter—Walt Whitman. A Study (1893)—in the same 
period in which Chesterton’s fragment was composed. It is also notable that Wilde was a great 
admirer of Whitman. 
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the club was to be composed of ‘young gentlemen’ who possessed ‘too keen a 
sense of humour not to get it mixed up with their seriousness, and thus produce a 
certain dash of burlesque in everything from the name of their club downwards’ 
(CW 14: 670). Discussing the concept in their correspondence, Bentley suggests 
that the club’s rituals should include the conferral of the academic distinction 
‘O.U’, or ‘one of us’ (BL MS Add.73191 ff.79), an idea which introduces both 
hierarchy and selectivity into a society that was ostensibly all-embracing. 
A comparable kernel of ambivalence is discernible in Whitman’s utopia. He 
establishes ‘a city invincible to the attacks of the whole of the rest of the earth’ 
(Whitman 105), a gathering of forces to slough off a worldly opponent, rather than 
a truly utopian unification of humanity, just as Chesterton (again positing a 
dubious binary) recalls, in the Thursday dedication, that he and Bentley ‘held the 
fort, our tiny flags unfurled’ (CW 6: 472) against the tide of decadence. The nature 
of the forces against which Whitman particularly sought to position himself is 
illustrated by his comically hyperbolic rejection of a world that is ‘“rich, hefted, 
lousy, reeking, with delicacy, refinement, elegance, prettiness, propriety, 
criticism, analysis’” (qtd. in Trilling 397). As Sewell observes, ‘lists have been a 
recognised Nonsense procedure from Rabelais onwards’ (Field 76), and there is 
an unmistakable note of Rabelaisian relish in Whitman’s exorbitant expression of 
distaste at all forms of refinement.  
As with the critical method established by Chesterton in The Defendant, 
one of the chief characteristics of Whitman’s verse is its ‘enumerative method of 
assembling high and low materials precisely in order “to enlarge” the literary 
empire’s “limits”’ (Johnston 65). In this mission it was inevitable that Whitman 
should find himself at odds with those who embodied the opposing principle of 
discrimination and refinement, and, ironically enough, this caused Whitman to 
inject a certain discriminatory exclusivity into his own rhetoric. For example, he 
asserts, with a self-checking equivocation, that ‘“I accept the world—most of the 
world—but somehow draw the line somewhere on [the] great army of critics, 
parlour apostles”’ (qtd. in Trilling 397). Whitman’s ire inevitably came to focus 
on the quintessential parlour apostle, Arnold. When it was suggested that his latest 
volume should be bound in vellum, Whitman responded with a reversal of his 
usual attenuated lists of laudable phenomena, to produce a self-parody which is 
peculiarly hard to assess as either intentional or inadvertent: ‘“Vellum? […] 
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pshaw! Hangings, curtains, finger-bowls, chinaware, Matthew Arnold!”’ (qtd. in 
Trilling 397).
26
 Arnold is denied access to Whitman’s friendship group, in an 
action that implies a drawing back from the subjectivity-undermining implications 
of indiscriminate fraternity.  
Although Whitman’s de-selection of Arnold would appear to present a 
further area of affinity with Chesterton, the disinclination towards ‘refinement 
[…] criticism [and] analysis’ which inspires Whitman’s rejection also reveals an 
aspect of his philosophy that Chesterton would have found more disquieting. In 
contrast to the examples cited above, Whitman’s rhetoric more commonly tends to 
imply a neutralisation of value and a confusion of identity—‘what I assume you 
shall assume’ (Whitman 24)—which derives from his excessive optimism. Denis 
Donoghue argues that ‘the defining “figure” of Whitman’s mind is the equals sign 
[…] If he found two things traditionally considered enemies, he would declare 
their identity, or at least make them friends in a larger community’ (25). This 
principle closely recalls the hybridising drive that Chesterton found so valuable in 
the existential grotesque, while the final phrase recalls the analogic strategy of 
‘Variations on an Air’, through which Chesterton brings together a diverse poetic 
community in dialogue. However, when Donoghue goes on to note that, for 
Whitman, ‘in the flow of energy A equals B’ (25), a rather more disruptive vision 
of identity confusion comes to light, veering off into the more disruptive reaches 
of the grotesque. In this respect, Whitman’s valorisation of energy comes to seem 
curiously comparable to the evanescent philosophy of fluidity which informs 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism. A sense arises that Whitman’s programmatic embrace 
of all phenomena is the mirror-image of Schopenhauer’s equally programmatic 
rejection, and that such unchecked profusion is dangerously equivalent, in 
psychological terms, to the category-defying receptive influx of schizophrenia. 
Consequently, Chesterton’s exorbitant sense of identification with 
Whitman soon became mediated by an increasing vacillation between adherence 
and departure, essayed as a means of retaining distance and discrimination. As 
with my account of the unstable rebounding between self-assertion and self-denial 
that informs the dynamic of friendship, the cause of this vacillation can again be 
linked to the disorientating effect of subsuming one’s own subjectivity within 
                                                 
26
 Each of the remarks cited by Trilling is draw from Horace Traubel’s memoir, With Walt 
Whitman in Camden (1906). 
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hero-worship of another. Chesterton later discussed the motivations of youthful 
pastiche as a curious combination of self-effacement and self-aggrandisement: in 
‘early youth we wish not only to do our own work as well as it can be done, but 
everybody else’s work a great deal better than they do it. We have a pride in being 
more Whitmanic than Whitman, more sumptuously Keatsy than Keats. The only 
poet whom the young poet refuses to be influenced by is himself’ (‘The 
Philosophy of Robert Buchanan.’ DN 28 Oct. 1901; CDN 1: 246). Ironically, 
Chesterton learned how to be influenced by himself partially through the 
instructive example of the influence of Bentley, whose deliberately bathetic 
parodies of Swinburne while at St. Paul’s formed an educative contrast to 
Chesterton’s ardent execution of embarrassingly ‘bad imitations of Swinburne’ 
(Chesterton, Autobiography 65).  
In the case of Whitman, while Chesterton’s early impersonations often 
resemble a comparably naïve form of pastiche—simple youthful exercises in 
stylistic imitation, lacking the critical distance appropriate to parody—even these 
pieces retain a subtly equivocal, parodic dimension. For example, a notebook 
entry begins by discussing Chesterton’s various friends via a typically Whitman-
esque use of repetitious listing and purposeful self-contradiction, to promote the 
sense of an overwhelming profusion which defeats the logic of hierarchical 
organisation: 
 
I have a friend, very strong and good. He is the best friend in the world. 
I know another friend, subtle and sensitive. He is certainly the best friend on earth…  
 
However, this accurate replication of the Whitman mode is slightly modified by 
the brusque penultimate line: 
 
I know another, who is young and very quick, he is the most beloved of all friends. 
I know a lot more and they are all like that. 
      Amen (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 46). 
 
The abrupt conclusion is expressive of a desire to circumscribe the number of 
friends in order to avoid loss of group-definition. Similarly, as with the deflation 
of sublime rhetoric enacted by the movement from ‘hope’ and ‘toil’ to a single 
‘pair of boots’ in the Greybeards dedication, the penultimate line implants a 
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deliberate note of bathos within the piece, employing rhetorical travesty to evoke 
a child rushing to conclude his prayers, so as to initiate the most tentative of half-
holidays for the literal worshipper of both the imitated literary hero and the 
friends.  
Chesterton’s later parody of Whitman, in ‘Variations on an Air’, constitutes 
a more sophisticated impersonation. His Whitmanian reading of ‘Old King Cole’ 
is conveyed with an irreverence that progresses beyond imitative pastiche to a 
more clearly distanced, parodic mode: 
 
…I salute your three violinists, endlessly making vibrations, 
Rigid, relentless, capable of going on for ever; 
They play my accompaniment; but I shall take no notice of any accompaniment; 
I myself am a complete orchestra. 
So long (Collected Nonsense 43). 
 
Here the phrases ‘capable of going on for ever’ and ‘so long’ again implant a note 
of subtle bathos, the latter phrase employing a pun to evoke exhaustion at 
Whitman’s prolixity, which simultaneously occasions the parodist’s verbal 
expression of departure: ‘so long’. This encodes a more sardonic note of 
playfulness to that of Chesterton’s earlier pastiche, though in each case the 
admiration ends on a note of equivocation based upon discomfort at the potential 
lack of boundaries in Whitman’s rhetoric.  
Whitman’s philosophy of unchecked reception recalls the imaginative terror 
experienced by Chesterton in his youth, which resolved itself, paradoxically, in 
the sense of solipsistic detachment which he experienced, and which finds an echo 
in the parodist’s disregard of ‘any accompaniment’. This suggests that 
internalising ‘a complete orchestra’—a variation on Whitman’s famous line, ‘I am 
large, I contain multitudes’ (73)—rather than acting as a single player in a 
collective unit, is likely to resolve itself in a disorientating internal dis-integrity, 
unless one learns to drill the mob through a process of selection and refinement, 
so as to harmonise what would otherwise be a cacophony. The psychological 
dangers posed by Whitman’s indiscriminate philosophy help to explain why 
Chesterton demurred, in a later explanatory note concerning Thursday, that ‘in 
resisting the heresy of pessimism’ he had not succumbed to ‘the equally morbid 
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and diseased insanity of optimism’ (CW 6: 470). Instead, as so often, he sought to 
establish a moderating middle-ground between the two extremes. Notably, 
Chesterton’s critique of artistic inaccessibility to laughter is one into which he 
later drew Whitman, who ‘has this as his only defect, that he never does see the 
fun of himself’ (‘The Great Simplicity.’ DN 27 July 1907; CDN 4: 269). In 
highlighting the ‘[r]igid, relentless’ quality of Whitman’s dogmatic earnestness, 
Chesterton’s ‘Old King Cole’ parody looks askance at monological extremism, in 
a further example of the mutually informing dynamic of the parodic act, which 
reins in the fanaticism of others while simultaneously seeking to preserve the 
parodist’s own mental equilibrium.  
The comparably ‘rigid’, if temperamentally opposed, ‘flippancy’ that 
Chesterton discerned in Bentley was a trait shared by Beerbohm, the final figure 
who must be added to any account of Chesterton’s formative wrestling with 
influence. Beerbohm is the anti-Whitman, the detached academic parodist par 
excellence, who possessed, for Chesterton, ‘every merit except democracy’ 
(‘Popular Jokes and Vulgarity.’ ILN 21 Mar. 1908; CW 28: 66). Writing of 
Beerbohm in relation to Chesterton, the latter’s brother, Cecil, sought to 
complicate the question of who had influenced whom, in a humorous account 
which takes inspiration from Wilde’s precept, in ‘The Decay of Lying’, that life 
imitates art: ‘I am prepared to uphold that Nature, in an hour of terrible joy, 
fashioned Mr Beerbohm after taking note of what was written in a tattered 
exercise-book of Mr Chesterton’s school days’ (92-93). If this is the case, Nature 
had cribbed Chesterton’s papers as a means of exacting a curiously apposite 
revenge upon Wilde, rather as the sea takes revenge upon Byron through the 
medium of Wordsworth’s pen in Chesterton’s parody, since, as Caesar notes, ‘a 
good part of [Beerbohm’s] early career was spent hoaxing, parodying, and 
generally making fun of [Wilde]’ (‘Betrayal’ 24).  
In the 1890s, Beerbohm used his talents chiefly to cut decadence down to 
size, ironically through such methods as drawing ever-more gigantesque, 
burlesque caricatures of Wilde, in which the latter’s would-be sublime Hellenism 
is reimagined as a ridiculous clash between the will to artifice and the exigencies 
of nature. To return to Chesterton’s dictum, ‘[i]f you are the Court Jester you must 
be the Court Fool’, Wilde projected himself as a detached jester in the court of 
Victorian culture, while Beerbohm installed himself as the jester to the jester, 
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tirelessly making it his business to impress Wilde’s comparable foolishness upon 
him. As Chesterton argues in ‘A Defence of Farce’, decadence ‘contented itself 
with the fool’s cap without the bells’ (Defendant 127), the bells perhaps being 
rung here to advertise awareness of the joke, much as Beerbohm employed 
consistent self-deprecation in order to counter any misapprehension that he 
perceived his own position to be uniquely dignified. In this way, Chesterton 
learned equally from Beerbohm’s parodic and self-parodic methods. As Michael 
Asquith later recalled, such was Chesterton’s ‘willingness to make himself 
ridiculous in public’, that he seemed ‘so far the reverse of pompous that you 
might almost say he was always standing on his indignity’ (120).  
Chesterton’s youthful debt to Beerbohm is evident in his first major 
journalistic success, the collected Defendant series, which not only operates as a 
parody of the sublime perorations of Sidney and Shelley, and a sympathetic 
adaptation of the cultural precepts of Whitman, but also as a pastiche of the essay 
that provided Beerbohm’s entrée to the literary world, ‘A Defence of Cosmetics’ 
(1894). As with Beerbohm’s deliberate ‘“hoax”’ (Beerbohm qtd. in Felstiner 15) 
on conventional essayistic practice, which took the form of a ‘mock-encomium’ 
(Felstiner 11), Chesterton’s conceit of discussing apparently trivial subjects in the 
loftiest of mock-belles-lettristic tones exploits a comic mode of rhetorical reverse-
travesty that he openly acknowledged when introducing a later essay collection: 
‘If anyone says that these are very small affairs talked about in very big language, 
I can only gracefully compliment him upon seeing the joke’ (Tremendous 6). 
Nonetheless, while Chesterton’s essays borrow Beerbohm’s playful parodic style, 
and echo his method of defending ‘low’ subject-matter through recourse to the 
authority of the ages over contemporary fashion, Chesterton’s ‘defence’ articles 
are tonally quite distinct, insofar as they shy away from the inveterate flippancy 
and programmatically non-committal character that links Beerbohm to Bentley. In 
contrast, Chesterton explicitly states that his defence essays are ‘ethically sincere’ 
(Defendant 8) in their promotion of the subjects under discussion, an assertion 
which once more infuses an act of imitative repetition with a simultaneous gesture 
of deviation.  
Thus, Beerbohm takes his place amongst the cacophony of voices that 
Chesterton marshalled into an internal forum within which to argue his way out of 
the crisis of the fin de siècle. This process suggests that finding one’s own voice is 
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finally a matter of finding the right balance between a multitude of mutually 
correcting influences. If so, it is telling that the cast of characters who have passed 
through this chapter consistently come together in dialogue within Chesterton’s 
early fiction. While Napoleon sets Whitman’s earnestness and Beerbohm’s irony 
in dialogic confrontation in the persons of Adam Wayne and Auberon Quin, 
Chesterton engages in more subtle dialogues with Bentley, Carroll, and Wilde in 
his fictional fantasia on decadence, The Man Who Was Thursday. The latter text 
also constructs his most comprehensive exposition of the correspondence between 
nonsense, parody, and friendship. As the following analysis will demonstrate, 
while the novel allegorises Chesterton’s escape from solipsism into affinitive 
relation on the level of plot, his nonsensical title also inducts a series of 
intertextual games through which to promote a complementary spirit of dialogic 
interaction with his fictional precursors. 
 
The Man Who Was Thursday and the Community of Authorship 
 
All my life I have loved frames and limits […] I also have a pretty taste in abysses and 
bottomless chasms[.] 
Chesterton, Autobiography (32-33) 
 
In ‘Both Sides of the Looking-Glass’ (Listener 29 Nov. 1933), Chesterton posits a 
distinction between popular and academic versions of the fairy-tale, comparable to 
that drawn by Malcolm in his account of the parallel seams that permeate the 
cultural history of nonsense. In expressing his preference for the fairy-tales of 
Hans Christian Anderson over those of Lewis Carroll, Chesterton explains that 
Anderson ‘remained in touch with the enormous tradition of the earth in the 
matter of mystery and glamour—he did not have to make a new and rather 
artificial sort of fairy-tale out of triangles and syllogisms’ (Spice 69). This account 
corroborates Sewell’s argument that Chesterton’s populism constituted an 
‘attempt […] to move from Nonsense, with its isolation, to Fairy tale with its 
identification’ (‘Giant’ 571). However, it is vital to note that in the case at hand, 
having appraised the relative merits of each approach, he prefers to retain both: ‘I 
only know that if you try to deprive me of either of them, there will be a row’ 
(Spice 70).  
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One reason for Chesterton’s retention of affiliation with Carroll is his 
sense that the latter’s brand of nonsense was not only a symptom, but also a 
potential cure of the intellectual maladies that I have discussed in this chapter: ‘the 
very best of Lewis Carroll was not written by a man for children, but by a don for 
dons. […] it may be questioned whether the little girls he wrote for were tortured 
by relativist scepticism’ (Spice 68). Chesterton argues that Carroll’s knack of 
giving ‘mathematics a holiday’ (CW 15: 487) is salutary in enabling the 
intellectual to look at ontological scepticism from a comic perspective—he was 
‘teaching dons to stand on their heads’ (Spice 68), much as the Greybeards draft 
figures Bentley’s act of standing on his head as a means of making him ‘seem 
himself’ once more. As this suggests, Chesterton approbates the holiday from 
reason offered by nonsense, so long as it is merely a brief respite, and not a 
permanent vacation. As he explains, ‘a good man ought to love nonsense; but he 
ought also to see nonsense—that is, to see that it is not sense’ (‘Nonsense and 
Sense.’ ILN 15 May 1909; CW 28: 324). 
Thursday exemplifies Chesterton’s desire to retain the best of both worlds, 
by grafting the disturbingly untethered irrationalism of academic nonsense to the 
democratic emphasis upon the ‘enormous tradition of the earth’ found in popular 
folk and fairy-tale nonsense. As the narrator notes of the ‘huge masquerade’ at the 
novel’s conclusion, ‘it was, somehow, as absurd as Alice in Wonderland, yet as 
grave and kind as a love story’ (CW 6: 630). In the bulk of the narrative that leads 
up to this benign denouement, Chesterton’s protagonist is unable to tell nonsense 
from sense, while the reader apprehends an array of physically improbable 
characters through the prism of Syme’s disorientated gaze, as he attempts to 
comprehend the nature of the anarchist cell that he has infiltrated. For example, in 
a terrifying vision of the corps morcele, Syme perceives the anarchist dubbed 
‘Friday’, Professor de Worms, to be ‘in the last dissolution of senile decay’, a 
state which ‘did not express decrepitude merely, but corruption’, so that ‘Syme’s 
quivering mind […] could not help thinking that whenever the man moved a leg 
or arm might fall off’ (CW 6: 523). When rational explanations for these 
nightmarish visions are revealed, the secondary characters’ assumption of more 
reassuring dimensions is repeatedly described in terms of the fairy-tale 
‘transformation scene’ (CW 6: 560/578), and the disturbing rhetoric of bodily 
corruption is replaced with the joyously burlesque imagery of ‘the Marquis, 
144 
 
recklessly throwing various parts of himself right and left about the field’ (CW 6: 
756), as he strips off his disguise.  
As Chesterton goes to pains to point out in the mock-pedagogic ‘How to 
be a Lunatic’ chapter of the Autobiography, the novel is very deliberately subtitled 
‘A Nightmare’. The purpose of the text is to establish a path out of Chesterton’s 
own nightmare of existential dislocation through a process of engagement with the 
phenomenal world, here symbolised by a return to popular cultural forms after a 
sojourn in the realms of academic nonsense. The invocations of Carroll are not 
only salient to the young Chesterton’s philosophical grappling with scepticism, 
but also to his psychological traumas, insofar as a further variant of derealisation 
is a clinical condition that has come to be known as ‘Alice in Wonderland 
syndrome’ (Magalini 28). While Alice’s bemused spectatorship of her own 
failures of volition corresponds to Bentley’s experiences of depersonalisation, the 
sufferer from derealisation often experiences Alice’s sense of sudden physical 
diminution and gigantism, a sensation caused by perceptual distortions in the size 
or shape of objects (Johnson 232). The sufferer from ‘Alice in Wonderland 
syndrome’ often experiences familiar locations as alien or surreal, with features of 
the landscape going through a dolly zoom effect which causes a disorientating 
enlargement (‘macropsia’) and/or shrinking (‘micropsia’) of objective 
phenomena. This syndrome is particularly common among migraine sufferers 
(Magalini 28), and it is perhaps telling that Chesterton later recalled experiencing 
severe headaches in his late adolescence (see Ward, Gilbert 45). 
These traumatic experiences inform much of the imagery of Chesterton’s 
fiction. As his contemporary, Dixon Scott, noted of the early Father Brown 
stories, ‘dreadful is the way some peaceful secondary thing—a group of trees, or a 
distant passer-by, or a quiet country church—will suddenly writhe out of its place 
and rush into the foreground, waxing horribly, like a face in a fever, as though 
struggling to express something too monstrous for speech’ (Dixon Scott, Critical 
267). Recall the ‘senseless grimaces’ of Carroll’s mute gentleman in Snark. A 
comparable waxing of the object world is evoked in Thursday, in Syme’s account 
of his initial conception of Sunday as a terrifyingly enormous figure: ‘the face was 
so big, that one couldn’t focus it or make it a face at all. The eye was so far away 
from the nose that it wasn’t an eye’ (CW 6: 620). Nonetheless, this disorientating 
nonsense-vision is again scrupulously balanced with imagery that Chesterton 
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associated with more benign forms of nonsense. For example, elsewhere Sunday 
is portrayed in Rabelaisian terms, as a comically gluttonous Gargantua: ‘he ate 
like twenty men; he ate incredibly, with a frightful freshness of appetite’, so that 
before long ‘he had swallowed a dozen crumpets [and] drunk a quart of coffee’ 
(CW 6: 527). 
In Orthodoxy, Chesterton explains the appeal of the traditional fairy-tale in 
comparable terms to my account of the counterbalancing dynamic of parody: ‘I 
have not found any modern type so sanely radical or so sanely conservative’ (50). 
Lecercle argues that this dualism is also a defining quality of more modern forms 
of nonsense: ‘nonsense is on the whole a conservative-revolutionary genre’ since 
in linguistic terms it is ‘structured by the contradiction […] between over-
structuring and de-structuring, subversion and support’ (2-3). This sympathetic 
relation helps to account for the consistent way in which Chesterton’s fiction 
‘muddles fairy tale and nonsense’ (‘Giant’ 567), in an attempt ‘to fuse the two into 
some fuller form of art’ (‘Giant’ 573), as Sewell puts it. Although Sewell does not 
refer to Thursday in her account, both modes are made to co-exist in the novel, in 
a manner which draws equally upon their radical and conservative poles in order 
to set up a condition of such disarray that the eventual emergence into coherence 
is rendered all the more vivid.  
The latter quality also informs the story’s structuring as a detective story, a 
facet particularly highlighted by Chesterton’s setting up of his radically de-
structuring nonsense-title as a riddle which requires detective work on the part of 
both Syme and the reader to correctly decode, as the narrative progresses through 
a process of conservative re-structuring towards its harmonious conclusion. To 
this end, the word ‘Thursday’ comes to play a decisive role in the novel. 
Elsewhere in Orthodoxy, Chesterton notes that ‘the moon is the mother of 
lunatics’ (21), and it is allegorically significant that Thursday is the fourth day of 
creation, on which God created the moon—a context which suggests that the title 
might be considered a particularly circuitous way of reframing the statement, ‘The 
Man Who Was a Lunatic’. Of course, the title is initially made to logically cohere 
through Syme’s accession to the anarchist council, an organisation in which each 
conspirator is named after a day of the week. However, Chesterton deliberately 
sets the council up as a nonsense-construct which baffles Syme’s sense of discrete 
subjectivity, initially compounding his lunacy. As Sunday explains, ‘[t]his branch 
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has always had the honour of electing Thursdays for the Central European 
Council. We have elected many and splendid Thursdays’ (CW 6: 497).  
By accepting this role, Syme submits to a voluntary abnegation of 
subjecthood, thus initiating the disorientating central section of the novel, in 
which Chesterton offers a comprehensive survey of the ‘horrible fairy tale of a 
man constantly changing into other men’, which he considered ‘the soul of 
decadence’: a ‘world where men took off their beards and their spectacles and 
their noses, and turned into other people’ (CW 6: 583). However, it is also 
essential to recognise that Syme’s madness is finally dispersed by an allegorical 
reorientation of his personification of Thursday during the culminating ‘carnival’ 
(CW 6: 629), in which he is literally dressed as the fourth day of creation. This 
conceit serves to adapt his internalised lunacy into an externalised emblem of the 
act of creation, a movement of transfiguration which re-establishes coherent 
individuality: Syme ‘seemed to be for the first time himself and no-one else’ (CW 
6: 628). Importantly, this progression from disarray to order also constitutes a 
movement of dyadic counterpoint between differing modes of the grotesque, from 
the Romantic to the carnivalesque, a distinction which can be understood as 
comparable to that which I have identified as pertaining between metaphysical 
and moral satire, as manifestations—respectively—of the deranging and 
discriminating, or detached and engaged, temperament.  
As Bakhtin explains, while carnivalesque forms of the grotesque are 
‘directly related to folk culture [...] the Romantic genre acquired a private 
“chamber” character [...] marked by a vivid sense of isolation. The carnival spirit 
was transposed into a subjective, idealistic philosophy’ (Rabelais 37). 
Consequently, for Bakhtin, ‘the world of the Romantic grotesque is [...] a 
terrifying world’ in which ‘that which was habitual and secure [...] suddenly 
becomes meaningless, dubious and hostile’ (Rabelais 39). One of the principal 
fault-lines in this transition is a movement from the material to the intellectual, as 
emblematised by ‘Hegel’s view that reality is ultimately thought’ (Habib 133), in 
opposition to which, as Medcalf notes, Chesterton’s apprehension of the 
‘unreliability of consciousness [led him] to draw attention, even with violence, to 
the external world’ (90). Insofar as Bakhtin figures this fault-line in the grotesque 
as historical, with the carnivalesque mode representing a pre-enlightenment 
standard, and the Romantic grotesque being explained as a product of post-
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Enlightenment culture, it is significant that the movement of Thursday reverses 
this historical process, to reinstate the immersive materiality of the ‘folk’ 
grotesque in the form of the culminating carnival, and that Chesterton facilitates 
this transition by drawing his novel into dialogue with other textual entities in a 
manner that challenges post-enlightenment norms of discrete authorship.  
As Sewell notes, ‘[i]n logic and nightmare, the mind is operating on itself 
and is therefore of necessity isolated. When the mind moves into the centre of 
operations, the field of language, it comes back to a point where communication 
and a sense of the reality of the natural world are possible’ (Field 51-52). In a 
comparable action, Syme’s plot-level escape from solipsism is mirrored by a 
series of subtle intertextual games based around the word, ‘Thursday’, which 
function to subvert the isolation of the text itself, in a prefiguration of the overt 
intertextual connection that Chesterton would later encode within the title of The 
Return of Don Quixote. Lechte identifies this subversion as inhering to Genette’s 
theory of ‘hypertextuality’, in which ‘Text B could not exist without text A, but it 
does not speak of it’ (Fifty 61). This sets up a form of covert conversation, which 
leads to a questioning of ‘whether any text really is the singularity it is often 
presented as being by literary history’ (Lechte, Fifty 61). Similarly, Chesterton’s 
enthusiasm for subverting notions of textual singularity as a means of 
confounding his fear of psychological seclusion leads him into an antithetical 
position in relation to post-Enlightenment expectations of immaculate authorial 
conception. As Hurley argues, Chesterton’s primary means of eluding solipsism is 
to ensure that ‘his subjectivity services more than a secular enlightenment sense of 
self’ (Chesterton 98). Elsewhere, Chesterton corroborates this intimation of a 
recourse to pre-Enlightenment cultural standards as a guard against isolation, 
when he writes that ‘our modern artistic claim to absolute originality is really a 
claim to absolute unsociability; a claim to absolute loneliness’ (CW 15: 262).  
The distinction that Chesterton postulates between the fairy-tale forms of 
Hans Christian Anderson and Lewis Carroll implies that in choosing to borrow 
from the cultural tradition that Malcolm terms ‘folk nonsense’ as a means of 
working through and overcoming the disruptive tropes of ‘literary nonsense’ 
(Origins 115), Chesterton’s text simultaneously gestures toward a pre-
Enlightenment conception of the communality of authorship, in opposition to the 
post-Enlightenment preoccupation with textual authority which finds expression 
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in the trope with which parody so irreverently toys—that of the splendid isolation 
of the man of genius. As Chesterton summarises the distinction, ‘it is always 
argued that the poem that somebody made is vastly superior to the ballad that 
everybody made’. Conversely, ‘I think there is one thing more important than the 
man of genius—and that is the genius of man’ (‘Stories Spoilt by Great Authors.’ 
ILN 9 Apr. 1910; CW 28: 507). Appropriately enough, the first of Chesterton’s 
intertextual games promotes a dialogue between the parallel seams of orally 
communicated folk nonsense and modern literary nonsense, here through an 
allusion to the nursery rhyme, ‘The Man of Thessaly’: 
 
There was a man of Thessaly, 
And he was wond'rous wise; 
He jump'd into a quickset hedge, 
And scratch'd out both his eyes. 
 
But when he saw his eyes were out, 
With all his might and main 
He jump'd into another hedge, 
And scratch'd 'em in again (Lang 133). 
 
This rhyme is collected in Andrew Lang’s anthology of children’s songs, 
The Nursery Rhyme Book (1897), a text with which Chesterton would almost 
certainly have been conversant, since he repeatedly attested to an admiration of 
Lang’s pioneering excavations of folk traditions, not least in Orthodoxy (47), the 
final text of which was composed at the same time as that of Thursday. In 
elaborating Chesterton’s imaginative connection of the nursery rhyme to the novel 
it is useful to begin by reading Chesterton’s semantically disruptive title in the 
context of the semiotic principle of allotopy, a theory of humour based upon 
purposeful disarrangement of reference, in which the presence of incompatible or 
contradictory semes within a single utterance renders the meaning absurd. In 
Precis de Semiotique Generale (1997), Jean-Marie Klinkenberg employs ‘I drink 
concrete’ (‘“Je bois du beton”’ 118) as an archetypal allotopic sentence. As this 
example suggests, allotopy is directly related to the nonsense convention of the 
category-mistake, of which the notion of a ‘man’ being ‘Thursday’ offers a further 
exemplary model. Chesterton particularly emphasises the allotopic quality of his 
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title in the Autobiography, when he has fun exploring some variations on an air, 
by free-associatively juggling referents: ‘“The Woman Who was Half-past Eight,” 
or “The Cow Who was Tomorrow Evening”’ (102).  
As a contrast to the allotopic construct, Klinkenberg uses the phrase, ‘I 
drink some water’ (‘je bois de l’eau’; Edeline, Klinkenberg, and Minguet 263) as 
an example of an uncomplicatedly comprehensible, or isotopic, sentence. Again, 
this illustrative model is curiously prefigured by Chesterton’s autobiographical 
account of Thursday, in which he jokingly claims that some critics, alive to the 
author’s bibulous reputation, misread his title as ‘The Man Who Was Thirsty’ 
(Autobiography 101). In these instances, ‘drink’ and ‘water’, and ‘man’ and 
‘thirsty’, are logically compatible semes—Chesterton’s presumably apocryphal 
readers have altered the title to render the stand-alone phrase intelligible. This 
account presents two suggestive links to ‘The Man of Thessaly’. First, 
Chesterton’s discussion of the readers who misread ‘Thursday’ as ‘Thirsty’ is 
complemented by the resemblance of his own title to a mishearing of ‘Thessaly’; 
second, his free-associative play between ‘Thursday’—with its symbolic 
connection to the moon—and ‘Cow’, implies the status of his novel as a highly 
elaborate form of nursery rhyme.  
Elsewhere, Chesterton employs a characteristically parodic conflation of 
‘low’ and ‘high’ literature to argue that in ‘hey-diddle-diddle’, ‘the incident of the 
cow [has] something of the moonstruck ecstasy of Endymion’ (‘The Romance of 
Rhyme’, collected in Fancies 1). This juxtaposition hints at the comparable 
complication of notions of ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture that informs Chesterton’s 
translation of the forty-seven word nursery rhyme of ‘Thessaly’ into a fifty-seven-
thousand word literary novel, a parodic methodology which inverts Bret Harte’s 
celebrated technique of condensing interminably lengthy novels into comically 
breakneck summaries. This vision of Thursday as a gigantesque rendition of the 
rhyme is corroborated by the marked thematic and formal resemblance of the 
texts. In thematic terms, the ostensible nonsense of the man’s eyes being scratched 
out, only to be scratched back in again, functions as a burlesque, corporeal 
rendition of an allegorical truism: ‘I was blind but now I see’. This is precisely the 
revelatory message of Chesterton’s novel, in which the intellectual monomania 
(‘he was wond’rous wise’) of the protagonist causes him to lose sight of the 
reality of his environment, a condition manifested in his mistaken belief that he is 
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surrounded by dangerous anarchists. When events demonstrate that the population 
has actually been fighting in unison to uphold order, Syme recognises that ‘his 
eyes were out’, as the rhyme states; or, as Syme puts it in the text, he and his 
fellow policemen have inadvertently been ‘“playing blind man’s buff […] in a 
field”’ (CW 6: 580).27  
To complete the thematic correspondence between the two texts, the 
penultimate chapter of the novel contains a disproportionately large number of 
references to hedges—eight in total. The chapter begins with the detectives 
trailing raggedly ‘through blooming hedges’ (CW 6: 617) in pursuit of Sunday, 
while Syme later jumps through ‘a gap in the hedge, which let in suddenly the 
light of a white road’ (CW 6: 624) immediately prior to the final dispersal of the 
plot-mystery. This threshold moment recalls Alice’s emergence from the rabbit-
hole, which also happens to be placed ‘under [a] hedge’ (Carroll, Annotated 26). 
As the narrator explains—in another example of the Arnoldian ‘grand style’, in 
which the orator employs collapsed repetition to draw attention to the special 
significance of a single facet of his/her discourse—these ‘hedges were ordinary 
hedges […] yet [Syme] felt like a man entrapped in fairy-land’ (CW 6: 623). This 
liminal conceit is illustrative of Chesterton’s belief that the healthy individual 
possesses ‘one foot in earth and the other in fairy land’ (Orthodoxy 20). Syme’s 
recovery is based upon a comparable achievement of balance, which not only 
relates to the ‘sanely radical […] sanely conservative’ nature of the traditional 
fairy-tale, but also to the coexistent antitheses of moral policeman and merry 
relativist that Chesterton identifies within the single entity, Dodgson/Carroll, who 
possessed ‘one life in which he would have thundered morally against any one 
who walked on the wrong plot of grass, and another life in which he would 
cheerfully call the sun green and the moon blue’ (Defendant 66). 
The second area of correspondence between ‘The Man of Thessaly’ and 
Chesterton’s novel lies in the self-contained formal balance essayed by both texts. 
The second quatrain of ‘Thessaly’ operates as a pristine rewind of the first, 
returning to the point of departure, and consequently offers a means of defeating 
the threat of open-ended derangement, or unmanageable infinitude, which Sewell 
identifies as a component of nightmares, in which the mind typically ‘tries to run 
                                                 
27
 In ‘The Mistake of the Machine’ (Pall Mall Magazine Oct. 1913), a character refers to runners 
‘scratch[ing] their eyes out in bramble hedges’ (FB 233). 
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everything into one’ (Field 51), rather in the manner of Hegelian idealism. 
Conversely, the ‘Nonsense universe must be the sum of its parts and nothing 
more. There must be no fusion or synthesis’ (Field 98). Chesterton considered a 
disinclination to submit to boundaries to be a further characteristic of the decadent 
sceptic. In ‘The Extraordinary Cabman’, he again invokes the credo of ‘art for 
art’s sake’ in his account of the sceptic’s mind, ‘opening for opening’s sake, 
opening infinitely for ever’ (CDN 3: 337). The hedge is again symbolic here, since 
Chesterton argues elsewhere that the ‘finest thing about a free meadow is the 
hedge at the end of it. The moment the hedge is abolished it is no longer a 
meadow, but a waste’ (CW 28: 508).  
Thursday corresponds directly to ‘Thessaly’ in its deliberate promotion of 
containment through formal inversion. Chesterton achieves this closure through a 
comparable two-part structure, in which the six anarchists are first lined up before 
the reader, and then revealed, one by one, to be fellow policemen. This produces a 
counting game in reverse, in which seven progresses sequentially to zero, and the 
conspiracy finally evaporates into thin air. Stewart notes that a similar 
containment strategy pertains to nonsense games in which the seven days of the 
week are used to create a ‘closed field’ of ‘arbitrary and sequential’ order—
‘Monday for health, Tuesday for wealth’, etc. (191)—with the fixed number of 
days delimiting the length of the game, or, in the case at hand, the novel. 
Significantly, this counting game operates as the means through which Syme 
breaks out of the oppressive ‘circle of days’ (CW 6: 520) of the organisation into 
which he implicates himself. As Stewart explains, although circles are a common 
feature of children’s play, they represent a distinct danger to the game-player: ‘To 
form the circle is to be implicated in it, to be caught up in it. The problem is to get 
in or out, on or off. The problem is one of mastery, of stopping infinity arbitrarily’ 
(130). In Thursday, Syme is aided in re-establishing psychological self-mastery by 
the sequential emergence of fellow players who possess an equal investment in 
‘stopping infinity arbitrarily’, by breaking the circle. Once all the players have left 
the circle, the novel ends where it began, with Syme and Gregory in dialogue, 
with the important distinction that the pair are now ‘walking like old friends, and 
[…] in the middle of a conversation’ (CW 6: 635), in a neat internalisation of the 
parodic dynamic of formal repetition with thematic deviation.  
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The novel’s formal retracing of its steps complements the implicit historical 
reversal discussed earlier, through which the cultural misadventure, as Chesterton 
perceived it, of post-Enlightenment Romanticism, is cancelled out by a reverse 
movement which turns the clock back to a medieval mode of carnivalesque, folk 
grotesque. In a further example of repetition with deviation, Bakhtin notes that 
these historical strands are distinguished by their contrary deployment of an 
identical symbol—the mask—a trope which is also key to a proper understanding 
of Thursday. For Bakhtin, the mask ‘reveals the essence of the grotesque’ in both 
its ‘folk carnival’ and ‘Romantic’ manifestations (Rabelais 40), but with a crucial 
distinction—the former ‘is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation 
[…] with the merry negation of uniformity and similarity’ (Rabelais 39), while 
the latter ‘loses almost entirely its regenerating and renewing element and 
acquires a sombre hue. A terrible vacuum, a nothingness lurks behind it’ 
(Rabelais 40).  
At the height of Syme’s disarray, this ‘vacuum’ is evoked when the thought 
occurs to him, ‘[w]as he wearing a mask? Was any one wearing a mask? Was any 
one anything?’ (CW 6: 583). The climactic pageant replaces this vision with the 
benign spectacle of the dramatis personae clad in vibrant carnivalesque disguises, 
which emblematise the ‘inexhaustible and many-colored life’ that Bakhtin finds 
‘behind the mask of folk grotesque’ (Rabelais 40). As the narrator of Thursday 
notes, ‘these disguises did not disguise, but reveal’ (CW 6: 627); a phrase almost 
exactly echoed in Lechte’s analysis of Bakhtin’s account of the carnivalesque 
mask as a symbol ‘which does not hide but reveals’ (Fifty 9). Of course, this 
image is also very close to the dictum famously coined in Wilde’s essay, ‘The 
Critic as Artist’ (1890), in which, by curious coincidence, a character named 
Gilbert asserts that a man ‘will tell you the truth’ if given ‘a mask’ (Complete 
1045). This correlation is particularly suggestive, since the novel’s historical 
footstep-retracing conceit accrues a microcosmic corollary in a subtle symbolic 
allusion which rewinds the biographical progress of Wilde. In The Victorian Age 
in Literature, Chesterton contends that the  
 
movement of those called Aesthetes (as satirised in Patience) and the movement of 
those afterwards called Decadents (satirised in […] Autobiography of a Boy) had the 
same captain; or at any rate the same bandmaster. Oscar Wilde walked in front of the 
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first procession wearing a sunflower, and in front of the second procession wearing a 
green carnation (CW 15: 516).  
 
While it is notable that Chesterton compulsively inserts superfluous 
references to satires of each movement into this account, almost as an incantatory 
psychological aide-mémoire, it is surely significant that the pageant leader bearing 
a metaphorical sunflower in Chesterton’s novel is Sunday, whose name combines 
Christian and Apollonian connotations, and who begins the novel as a dreaded 
father-figure who seems to augur annihilation. If Bakhtin’s account of the decay 
of the regenerative element of the mask in post-Enlightenment Romanticism 
correlates to the chronology of Wilde’s swapping of the sunflower for the green 
carnation, Thursday sets Wilde’s biography on a process of reverse-Becoming, 
catapulting him back to the unworldly, lower-case romanticism of his earliest 
theorising, in a gesture of utopian reconciliation. Appropriately enough, this 
reconciliation is inspired by the reassuring lessons of Wilde’s texts. Chesterton 
later explained the novel’s parodic relationship to the conventional agon of 
detective fiction in terms that closely recall both the revelatory connotation of the 
mask in ‘The Critic as Artist’ and the image of innocent children’s games that 
Wilde elaborates in ‘The Decay of Lying’: ‘[i]n an ordinary detective tale the 
investigator discovers that some amiable-looking fellow who subscribes to all the 
charities […] has murdered his grandmother […] I thought it would be fun to 
make the tearing away of menacing masks reveal benevolence’ (qtd. in Ward, 
Gilbert 168). 
While an appropriation of Wilde’s texts enables Chesterton to overcome his 
fear of their creator, the text of Thursday also employs a confusion of life and art 
to reason out the nonsense of Chesterton’s perception of Bentley, the friend who 
first introduced Chesterton to this traumatic influence. This is achieved through 
another of Thursday’s enforced collaborations, in which Bentley appears as a 
character within the narrative. If Syme can be considered an avatar of the young 
Chesterton, it is significant that among the anarchists who he initially conceives 
himself to be battling, the most vividly nightmarish is Professor de Worms, whose 
name conflates academia with decay—here the title of Professor Dewar undergoes 
a literal process of corruption—and whose features bear a marked resemblance to 
Bentley. The narrator notes that de Worms’ scholarly spectacles jar incongruously 
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with his spritely body: ‘the head upon that bounding body was still pale, grave 
and professional, like the head of a lecturer upon the body of a harlequin’ (CW 6: 
540). This is almost precisely how Chesterton describes Bentley in the 
Autobiography: ‘I used to say that he had the head of a professor on the body of a 
harlequin’ (61).28  
Consequently, it is particularly telling that de Worms is a ‘German Nihilist 
philosopher’ (CW 6: 549), most probably intended to connote Schopenhauer, 
since the latter’s theory of the primacy of the will is evoked in an irreverent 
explanation of de Worms’ philosophy: ‘“Energy, he said, was the All. He was 
lame, short-sighted, and partially paralytic”’ (CW 6: 549). Crucially, Syme 
eventually discovers that the apparent anarchist before him is actually a fellow 
policeman, who has been physically parodying the original de Worms. As the 
policeman explains, in a burlesque personification of the central conceit of Dorian 
Gray, ‘“I am a portrait of the celebrated Professor”’ (CW 6: 549). This 
impersonation has proved so convincing that the real philosopher is now trapped 
in a nightmare in which he is perpetually assumed to be the copyist, much as 
Wilde argued that Schopenhauer had merely been a real-life impersonator of 
Hamlet. Upon moving between rooms in the outfit, the policeman is warned that 
‘“an impertinent fellow had dressed himself up as a preposterous parody of 
myself”’ (CW 6: 550). This curiously horrifying revenge upon the philosopher, in 
which ‘he is [now] received everywhere in Europe as a delightful imposter’ whose 
‘apparent earnestness and anger […] make him all the more entertaining’ (CW 6: 
551), conveys a psychological cruelty which goes blithely unremarked by the 
narrator, a detail which again draws attention to the singular virulence of 
Chesterton’s reaction against Schopenhauer.  
The policeman’s drawing of the professor into enforced collaboration in a 
burlesque double-act constitutes a feat of audacious boldness which contrasts 
sharply with Chesterton’s view of Schopenhauer’s philosophy as ‘a mere 
nightmare induced by lack of nerve’ (CDN 1: 95; my emphasis). It would seem 
that Chesterton now considered himself to have mistaken the teenage Bentley for 
a bona fide sceptic, when the latter had simply been putting on a particularly 
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 An echo of this image is also discernible, in a more negative light, in the Bentleyan Pym’s ‘dress 
and gestures’ in Manalive, which are ‘bright enough for a boy’s; it was only when you looked at 
the fish-bone face that you beheld something acrid and old’ (32).  
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accomplished performance. As with his description of Yeats’s poetic 
amendments, Chesterton had seen ‘a friend’s face horribly deformed in a 
nightmare’, but had since concluded that the miasmic impenetrability of his 
friend’s persona was merely a consequence of acting a perilous part which 
ironically conveyed his animus toward the figures whose ‘replica’ he seemed to 
resemble. As the policeman counter-intuitively explains to Syme, in an account 
that recalls the motivation underpinning the most adversarial forms of parody, ‘I 
disliked [de Worms] so much that I resolved to imitate him’ (CW 6: 549). 
Chesterton’s dedication of Thursday to Bentley ends on an optimistic, re-
integrative note, which pre-empts the conclusion of the novel itself: ‘We have 
found common things at last and marriage and a creed’ (CW 6: 474). The 
reference to a common creed, with its connotations for Chesterton of satirical 
grounding and dialogic communication, most probably refers to a political, rather 
than theological, affinity, since Bentley never shared Chesterton’s religious 
faith.
29
 Instead, Chesterton and Bentley were bonded by a common, lifelong 
adherence to the political creeds of Liberalism and anti-imperialism, which 
somewhat belies Chesterton’s account of Bentley’s enduringly ‘detached and 
ironic’ persona. The latter’s opposition to the Boer War was as principled as that 
of Belloc, if less ‘conspicuous’. In his diary of 5 March 1900, Bentley notes ‘how 
bitterly I am feeling the foolish and ruinous war that is still raging. I never have 
been so much affected by any public matter yet’ (Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869), and 
nearly half a century later his indignation at Kipling’s propagandizing of the 
conflict is expressed in equally strong terms: ‘Kipling’s enormous literary power’ 
misled the British public into thinking that ‘we were dealing out righteous 
punishment to a “lesser breed”’ (Those 184). 
Bentley’s complaint is instructive in the context of the second intertextual 
game in which Thursday engages, which functions precisely to highlight the 
moral degeneration of Kipling’s gifts, while emphasising, by way of contrast, the 
utopian theme of ‘marriage’ which the dedication asserts Chesterton and Bentley 
to have ‘found’. Again, a distinction between folk conventions and decadence 
frames this departure. While Chesterton strongly approved of Kipling’s principled 
advocacy of popular culture, he was bitterly opposed to the imperialist worldview 
                                                 
29
 In reference to the dedication, Bentley told Christopher Hollis that Chesterton had ‘ascribed to 
him a far more definite creed than any he in fact possessed’ (Hollis 62). 
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which Kipling employed popular forms to promote, and explicitly identified 
Kipling’s imperialism as a corollary of decadence. Much as Chesterton’s broader 
attacks on imperialism turn upon imagery of corporeal and moral decay, his 
critical work repeatedly employs imperialism as a synonym of cultural 
decadence—in Charles Dickens he refers to ‘decadent jingoism’ (95), elsewhere 
he discusses ‘imperial, and therefore decadent, passions’ (CDN 1: 419), while in 
What’s Wrong with the World he terms Kipling ‘a man of real though decadent 
genius’ (CW 4: 90).  
The specific titular context of Chesterton’s engagement with Kipling in 
Thursday is the latter’s short story, ‘The Man Who Was’. Although first published 
in 1890, Kipling’s story was adapted to the stage in 1907, the same year in which 
Chesterton was composing the final draft of his novel. Earlier in his career, 
Chesterton had discussed ‘The Man Who Was’ in his article, ‘Who Killed 
Rudyard Kipling?’ (DN 15 Oct. 1902), the title of which frames Kipling’s artistic 
decline in the terms of a detective story. Here Chesterton unfavourably compares 
Kipling’s most recent publication, ‘The Comprehension of Private Copper’ 
(1902), with ‘The Man Who Was’, which he considers ‘one of the stories of 
[Kipling’s] great literary period’ (CDN 1: 418). Chesterton employs the earlier 
story as an exemplary model against which to attack Kipling’s new story as 
‘without form’, expressive merely of ‘a great indignation against Boers’ (CDN 1: 
419) which displays an inglorious ‘hatred of the conquered’ (CDN 1: 421).  
The context of the Boer war returns us to the definitive political crisis 
moment of Chesterton’s fin de siècle, as well as the recourse to the irreverent 
running order of Greek drama through which the staff of The Speaker expressed 
their dissent against the conflict. Three years before Chesterton’s article in The 
Daily News, Kipling’s ‘hatred of the conquered’ had been highlighted by an 
anonymous contributor to The Speaker, who supplied the parodic afterword to the 
serious leaders in the first edition of the ‘new’ Speaker, following its takeover by 
a group of Oxford graduates assembled by J.L. Hammond. This insubordinate 
gang of ex-Isis contributors included Belloc and Bentley, as well as non-Oxonian 
fellow-travellers such as Chesterton, and it was almost certainly one of these three 
who composed the skit in question—a parody of a journalistic interview with 
Kipling, which attacks the philosophical complacency that led culturally-
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influential figures to support unjust imperial policies. The piece is adorned with 
verses allegedly declaimed by the poet: 
 
I’m sorry for Mister Naboth 
I’m sorry to make him squeak 
But the Lord above made me strong 
In order to pummel the weak (Speaker 7 Oct. 1899; British Newspaper Library holdings). 
 
It has generally been assumed that Chesterton made no contribution to the 
first edition of the ‘new’ Speaker because, bizarrely, the literary editor, F.Y. 
Eccles, refused to publish his work on the grounds that his handwriting looked 
Jewish (see Ward, Gilbert 113; Ffinch 66; Oddie 176). Nonetheless, when 
Chesterton wrote to Frances on the subject, he framed his hopes of publication in 
the context of current affairs, rather than the literary pages: the edition ‘may 
contain something of mine though I cannot be quite sure. A rush of the Boers on 
Natal […] is expected by politicians’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 105). Despite the 
biographical tenacity of the handwriting anecdote, it is based only on the hearsay 
report of Chesterton’s friend, Lucien Oldershaw (see Ward, Gilbert 113), the 
internal logic of which both Ffinch (67) and Oddie (176) find somewhat baffling, 
and there is no material evidence to prove that Chesterton was successfully 
prevented from contributing anonymously to the first edition. Indeed, if 
Chesterton’s peers would have considered Eccles’s objection as offensive as 
Oddie claims, this would presumably have made the irreverent contributors all the 
more eager to sneak in a piece by their friend.30   
The supposition that the Kipling skit was composed by Chesterton is not 
only supported by the correspondence between the contributor’s mockery of 
Kipling’s contempt for ‘the weak’ and Chesterton’s subsequent deprecation of 
Kipling’s ‘hatred of the conquered’, but also, more strikingly, by the fact that the 
quatrain quoted above is a parody of the final lines of ‘The Man Who Was’, in 
which a Hussar sings a popular burlesque tune, as a gesture of defiant opposition 
to military malpractice on the part of an amoral aggressor: 
                                                 
30
 The rhyme is also quoted in Coates, Controversialist (50), as an example of the satirical tone of 
The Speaker. ‘Naboth’ is presumably an amalgam of Louis Botha (1862-1919), the figurehead of 
the Boer insurrection, and the biblical figure, Naboth, who symbolises victimhood in the face of 
injustice. 
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I’m sorry for Mister Bluebeard, 
I’m sorry to cause him pain; 
But a terrible spree there’s sure to be 
When he comes back again (Kipling 101). 
 
Whether it was indeed Chesterton, or one of his friends, who composed the 
parody in The Speaker, the satirical amendment clearly reflects the sense shared 
by Chesterton’s circle that Kipling had sold out his former ideals to an amorally 
nationalistic imperialist agenda.
31
 Chesterton derided the latter position, in ‘A 
Defence of Patriotism’, as the attitude of ‘“My country, right or wrong”’, before 
debunking the superficial patriotism of this premise through the Carrollean trick 
of close parody, in which alternative referents are substituted in order to confound 
the moral authority of the ur statement: ‘It is like saying, “My mother, drunk or 
sober”’ (Defendant 166).  
As Chesterton concludes in ‘Who Killed Rudyard Kipling?’, in the years 
following ‘The Man Who Was’, ‘Mr. Kipling has been caught in the net of a 
merely temporary political faddism’, which explains why he now produces 
‘nothing eternal or essential, even symbolically’ (CDN 1: 419). By the time of the 
publication of Thursday, Chesterton had come to consider Kipling ‘largely 
repulsive’ (‘Shakspere and Zola.’ ILN 18 Apr. 1908; CW 28: 84).32 Chesterton’s 
critique of the ‘faddism’ and absence of anything ‘eternal’ in Kipling is 
particularly interesting, given that Thursday ultimately derives an existentially 
grotesque, utopian allegory from a story which begins as a local satire of the 
nationalistic paranoia over a ‘yellow peril’ that accompanied the Boxer uprising 
(1899-1900)—an event which inclines Syme to misapprehend his own situation as 
one of ‘huge and pitiless peril, like a Chinese invasion’ (CW 6: 505). Kipling has 
also been caught in the net of Chesterton’s novel here, and consequently the 
presumptuous step of finishing off Kipling’s earlier title should be understood as 
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 Insofar as Kipling is depicted as a ‘somewhat unpleasant schoolboy’ (Coates, Controversialist 
50) in the Speaker article, it is perhaps notable that Bentley imagines ‘the juvenile Kipling’ to have 
been the ‘sort of boy that many schoolmasters cannot bear, and do their best to harry and humble’ 
(Those 53). On 18 Dec. 1899, Bentley refers to having had a ‘humorous little middle’ (Bod MS 
Eng.misc.e.869) piece published in an earlier issue of The Speaker, though he does not specify the 
edition. 
32
 In this respect, Chesterton again drew close to Beerbohm, whose ‘lifelong rejection of Kipling 
amounted almost to a vendetta’ (Blissett 120). 
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an expression of parodic distance, in contrast to the sympathetic pastiche that is 
encoded within the allusion to ‘Thessaly’. 
In addition to the implied political critique, Chesterton’s dispute with 
Kipling is again framed by the former’s sympathy with the traditions of folk 
storytelling over literary tendencies that he perceived to be decadent. This context 
is illuminated by a later essay, ‘The Three Fools’ (DN 3 Apr. 1909), in which 
Chesterton employs a folk tale as an exemplary model against which to judge 
more contemporary literary forms. He discusses the work of Kipling and 
Maeterlinck as embodying a flaw in modern narrative whereby the tale is made to 
end prematurely at a stage of irresolution, thus eliminating the ‘splendid explosion 
of common sense at the end [which] is like [the] sudden smashing of a coloured 
window, letting in fresh air’ (CDN 5: 295). Chesterton illustrates this point by 
relating the plot of a folk tale in which the pessimistic fears of the family of a 
potential bride are challenged by the suitor, who finally marries the girl after 
having exposed and cured the family’s folly. Chesterton speculates that Kipling 
would have ended the story at the moment of schism, in which the bride’s fear of 
engagement (in every sense) has temporarily alienated her from the suitor: ‘in Mr. 
Kipling’s story the young man would have ridden away from his betrothed and 
never come back at all’ (CDN 5: 295). This account portrays modern narrative as 
undergoing a literal process of decadence, in which its essential constituent parts 
have begun falling off, like the limbs of Professor de Worms in Syme’s feverish 
vision.  
In the light of Chesterton’s view that contemporary storytellers had 
abandoned the traditional folk tale’s formal stress upon marriage, it is instructive 
to compare Kipling to Hankin, whose plays programmatically ‘rejected 
conventional “happy endings”’ (Phillips 45). As Phillips explains, The Charity 
That Began at Home posits the final ‘disengagement’ of a couple as a salutary 
event: ‘In contrast to a long tradition in comedy, at least as old as Aristophanes, 
Hankin always refused to end his comedies with marriages’ (59). In a 
characteristically cynical conceit, Hankin claimed that his discordant conclusions 
were actually examples of positive resolution, and collected a portion of his 
corpus under the heading, Three Plays with Happy Endings (1907) a year before 
the publication of Thursday. Chesterton’s later novel, The Flying Inn, operates as 
an instructive companion-text to Thursday in this sense, insofar as it also enters 
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into dialogue with the endings preferred by Hankin et al, by subverting the 
valorisation of schismatic disengagement which these writers introduced into the 
conventional marriage resolution.  
At the novel’s conclusion, the villain of the piece, Lord Ivywood, attains a 
state of pristine isolation by attempting to embody the evolutionary principle of 
the Nietzschean Superman—a speculative figure who Chesterton winningly terms, 
elsewhere, ‘that preposterous pre-natal bore’ (‘The Bottom Dog and the 
Superman.’ ILN 19 Dec. 1908; CW 28: 235)—after which Ivywood goes mad and 
is committed. Here it is the would-be innovatory madman who is, in a terrible 
sense, certain to live ‘happily ever after’, while Chesterton posits the prosaic 
marriages of the other characters as the more truly audacious punt on an unstable 
future. As he argues in an essay on Dickens’s Christmas stories, happiness 
possesses a ‘dramatic quality’, since it ‘is not a state; it is a crisis’ (CW 15: 313)—
in other words, it is a threshold moment, leading to another state, the nature of 
which is uncertain. Consequently, Chesterton implies that the apparently 
subversive conceits of contemporary storytellers actually constitute a timorous 
escape from the complexities of engagement with quotidian reality into the un-
regenerative cul-de-sac of existential divorce. Tellingly, Ivywood articulates his 
obsession with establishing a state of pure intellection via a metaphor that directly 
inverts the picaresque bordering motif employed in Thursday to defeat solipsism: 
‘my adventures shall not be in the hedges […] but in the borders of the ever-
advancing brain’ (Flying 228).  
The temperamental quirk symbolised by the open-ended title of Kipling’s 
‘The Man Who Was’ recalls Chesterton’s account of the sceptic’s mind ‘opening 
infinitely for ever’, through a deliberate installation of indeterminacy which 
corresponds formally to the ambivalence ‘at the root’ that Barthes praises in the 
Flaubertian multivalent text. Chesterton’s titular amendment suggests that he has 
irreverently taken Kipling’s withholding of the final referent to be the pretext for a 
game, in which the challenge is to finish the sentence. This game corresponds, in 
morphological terms, to a challenge to complete the narrative. Although there is 
no clear thematic correspondence between the plot of Thursday and Kipling’s tale 
of a Hussar’s return to his regiment after torture in Siberia, beyond a loose 
interplay between themes of isolation and comradeship, the texts possess a more 
subtle correspondence, or rather distinction, on the level of narrative morphology. 
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Specifically, Chesterton resolves the alienation of the middle-section of Thursday 
with an integrative climax, in contrast to the agonistic note upon which Kipling’s 
vignette concludes, in which the Hussar speculates that the return of the fairy-tale 
villain, ‘Mister Bluebeard’, will be the occasion for a ‘terrible spree’ of violence, 
rather than the final reinstallation of harmonious cohesion which characterises 
conventional festive comedy. 
Not only does Chesterton’s title parodically build upon Kipling’s phrase, 
but in narrative terms, his text also ‘caps’ the forebear’s work, in a similar manner 
to the conversational mode that Chesterton favourably contrasted with the 
decadent approach of  cutting ‘short another man’s idea, not, as in the great 
conversations [seeking] to extend and perfect it’. It might be argued that a certain 
irony attends to this dialogic gesture, insofar as Chesterton’s progressive step 
from the alienation stage of the conventional folk tale to the final community 
marriage would seem to imply a sense of completion, so that in moving the 
conversation forward, Chesterton is also closing it in a manner which gives him 
the final word. However, even in essaying a formal resolution, Chesterton 
inscribes a thematic element of cyclical regeneration, by basing the final carnival 
on the Biblical account of Genesis, and having the novel end with ‘[d]awn […] 
breaking’ (CW VI 635) at the very instant at which the narrator intimates that 
Syme will ultimately marry the sister of his erstwhile enemy, Gregory, thus 
instigating a new threshold moment of ‘crisis’. The story is ‘to be continued’, and 
not necessarily by Chesterton, but by anyone who might conceive the notion to 
‘build another idea on top of it’. As Chesterton later observed, the themes of his 
novels typically offered ‘a very promising subject—for somebody else’ 
(Autobiography 288). 
Following the publication of Thursday, Bentley took Chesterton up on this 
challenge, by composing his own parody of detective fiction, finally published as 
Trent’s Last Case in 1913. Bentley’s belated willingness to join in with one of 
Chesterton’s dialogic games is implied by the dedication that he affixed to his 
novel, which highlights the reciprocal nature of the pair’s literary output: ‘I owe 
you a book in return for “The Man Who Was Thursday”’ (Trent’s).33 If Bentley 
read Chesterton’s text as the first move in a turn-taking game of parodic one-
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 The dedication of this edition is not paginated. 
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upmanship to establish who could most thoroughly debunk Doyle’s generic 
archetype, it is notable that his hero, Trent, is made to share Syme’s playful 
disposition. Bentley later explained that what ‘troubled me was the extreme 
seriousness of Holmes, and the equal seriousness of his imitators’ (Those 251). As 
Chris Baldick has observed, the refusal of Bentley’s hero ‘to take himself 
seriously distance[d] him from the awe-inspiring gravity of Holmes’, to construct 
a ‘parodic challenge to the mystique of literary sleuths’ (Modern 275). Bentley’s 
novel also replicates Chesterton’s taste for implanting a satirical creed and a 
matrimonial dimension within the conventional detection plot. In reviewing the 
novel, Chesterton particularly approved of the murder of an amoral financier: ‘the 
man murdered [is] a man one would like to have murdered’ (‘The Merry Log-
Roller.’ New Witness 6 Mar. 1913; British Newspaper Library holdings). This 
crime eventually leads to a prosaic rendition of Thursday’s allegorical emphasis 
upon marriage over schism, when Bentley contravenes generic orthodoxy by 
having his detective fall in love with the principal female character, the financier’s 
widow.  
Although Bentley’s novel was not published until 1913, he later recalled 
that it was ‘[s]ome time in the year 1910’ (Those 249) that he first conceived its 
basic premise, and that soon after, ‘when my wife and I met the Chestertons by 
chance in Paris, I sketched the by-then completed plot to him in a hotel lounge’ 
(Those 254). This dating is significant, since it suggests that a further cross-
pollination of ideas occurred between Bentley and Chesterton when the latter was 
conceptualising his own most audacious attempt to enact a comic regeneration of 
the detection genre: Father Brown. If Bentley’s novel reads as a sympathetic 
pastiche of elements of Thursday, his more pointedly satirical debunking of the 
Holmesian method added a new dimension to Chesterton’s parodic formula, an 
approach which Chesterton then sympathetically pastiched, in turn, with the serio-
comic framework of Father Brown, the premises of which carry considerably 
more satirical bite than is found in Thursday.  
In a microcosm of the macro-parody in which both Trent’s Last Case and 
Father Brown generically engage, the writers’ protagonists also share a 
predilection for executing off-the-cuff, verbal parodies. For example, Trent 
improvises a materially themed burlesque of the sublime lyricism of Scott: ‘Why 
sit’st thou by that ruined breakfast?’ (Trent’s 19), while Father Brown parodies 
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Herbert with ‘idiotic cheerfulness’ (FB 279), in ‘The Perishing of the Pendragons’ 
(Pall Mall Magazine June 1914).
34
 In a later story (‘The Curse of the Golden 
Cross.’ Nash’s Magazine May 1925), Brown employs a near-verbatim quotation 
from ‘The Decay of Lying’—‘“I can believe the impossible, but not the 
improbable”’ (FB 452)—as a means of challenging Holmes’ famous contention, 
in The Sign of Four (1890), that ‘“[w]hen you have eliminated the impossible, 
whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth”’ (Doyle, Sherlock 
111). In doing so, the priest invests Wilde’s apercu with an implicit investigative 
and theological moral, formally repeating Wilde’s words in order to disprove 
Doyle, while thematically deviating from their intended meaning in order to 
subvert Wilde. As my next chapter will demonstrate, the precepts of Wilde’s 
essay also vitally inform the earliest Father Brown stories, which explore the 
complex political and philosophical benefits and dangers of life imitating art, 
while employing various parodic techniques to debunk the improbable 
investigative framework of Sherlock Holmes. 
                                                 
34
 ‘“Who sweeps an admiral’s garden in Cornwall as for Thy laws makes that and the action fine”’ 
(FB 279). 
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Chapter Three 
Serious Things in Holiday Time London:  
Father Brown as Carnival 
 
[P]rogress should be something else besides a continual parricide[.]  
 
Chesterton, introduction to The Defendant (16) 
 
In this chapter, I turn to a detailed analysis of Chesterton’s first three Father 
Brown stories, in which his carnivalesque aesthetic method finds most 
comprehensive expression. The major themes discussed in the preceding chapters 
are brought together in complex interrelation within this analysis, including 
Chesterton’s scrupulous balancing of the poles of parody, his intertwined political 
and philosophical critique of domestic culture and imperial policy, and his 
manipulation of disruptive nonsense techniques to pedagogic purpose. I begin 
with an exposition of ‘The Blue Cross’ as a parodic challenge to Chesterton’s 
generic forebears, Poe and Doyle, in which an imaginative recreation of the 
archetypes of detective fiction is combined with an imaginative recreation of the 
conditions of the modern metropolis. This dual purpose stems from the intimate 
literary and social correlation of Chesterton’s views on progress and parricide. 
Chesterton employs the reconstructive action of parody to militate against generic 
parricide, inscribing a simultaneous homage to, and departure from, his 
forefathers in the act of unveiling his own Father-figure. He then complements 
this conceit thematically with a satirical riposte to the wider cultural parricide 
contemplated by urban reformers, whose calls for a radical architectural and social 
restructuring of the city he viewed as a pernicious attempt to divorce progress 
from observance of tradition. As Chesterton enjoins the reader in ‘Serious Things 
in Holiday Time London’, the first of his 1,535 contributions to The Illustrated 
London News, ‘do not destroy London. It is a sacred ruin’ (CW 27: 39).  
In ‘The Blue Cross’, Chesterton posits an alternative, retroactive model of 
reform, employing a process of urban detection as the means of re-inscribing 
medieval London within the modern cityscape. The analogical possibilities of the 
pun again come to the fore here, since this act of urban and generic recreation 
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centres upon an exposition of the restorative benefits of recreational play. By 
reconfiguring the cityscape as a giant anti-rational playground, Chesterton 
develops an alternative investigative framework to the rationalist methodology of 
both Holmesian detection and the urban reform movement. In the process, he 
enacts a particularly complex and literal rendering of the worshipper’s half-
holiday, in which an act of generic irreverence is bound up with a proto-
Bakhtinian account of a carnivalesque holiday from social norms, masterminded 
by a disruptive priest. This enables Chesterton to elaborate a new, benign form of 
detection-game, which builds upon the utopian subversion of the agon of 
Holmesian detective fiction first essayed in Thursday. 
I go on to discuss the ways in which Chesterton’s follow-up story, ‘The 
Secret Garden’, complicates this utopianism, operating in tandem with ‘The Blue 
Cross’ to produce an example of what Morson terms ‘metaparody’, in which the 
parodist progresses beyond a centrifugal critique of outside discourses to a 
centripetal engagement with the implications of his/her own parody. Finally, I 
analyse the formal and thematic means through which Chesterton expands the 
parameters of his generic parody and social satire in ‘The Queer Feet’, to produce 
a thoroughgoing assault upon the camaraderie deficit fostered by the class system 
of early-twentieth-century Britain. Here Chesterton satirically challenges cultural 
segregation on two distinct narratorial levels—the story is related via heavily 
stylised skaz narration which subjects the reader to a carnivalesque implication 
within the action, while the plot skews the conventional feast motif of festive 
comedy to portray a bathetic travesty of popular carnival. 
 
Some Urgent Reforms 
 
Chesterton first articulates his sense of the reciprocity of urban investigation and 
literary detection in ‘The Value of Detective Stories’ (Speaker 22 June 1901), in a 
discussion of the collective, inter-generational enterprise that is manifested in the 
tiniest minutia of the city: ‘The narrowest street possesses, in every crook and 
twist of its intention, the soul of the man who built it, perhaps long in his grave. 
Every brick has a human hieroglyph as if it were a graven brick of Babylon’ 
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(Defendant 159).
1
 Chesterton goes on to argue that Doyle’s generic archetype is 
particularly effective in impressing this vision upon the reader, since ‘the fantastic 
form of the minutiae of Sherlock Holmes [tends] to assert this romance in the 
detail in civilization, to emphasize this unfathomably human character in flints 
and tiles’ (Defendant 159-60). However, while Doyle’s copious attentiveness to 
the significance of the built environment is of revelatory value in this sense, his 
prioritisation of the collation of material data over psychological insight also 
reflects the essential flaw of his hero—Holmes’s chronic empathy deficit.  
Chesterton addresses this inverse side of the coin in a complementary 
article on ‘The Danger of Detective Stories’ (Speaker 13 July 1901) three weeks 
later. Here he argues that the ascendant generic model is most ‘likely to do […] 
the harm of spreading that worship of the intellect which now makes the educated 
classes so foolish a spectacle’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.57). He notes that in much 
post-Holmesian detective fiction, the absence of sympathy projects outward from 
the text to pollute the reader in turn: ‘[i]t is strangely difficult to sympathise with 
any figure in the scene. The criminal seems as cold as the law, the law seems as 
bestial as the criminal.’ For Chesterton, the resulting ‘arid’ atmosphere derives 
partially from the genre’s structural predication upon perpetual contest, which 
makes it ‘bound to attach [too] much importance to that somewhat trifling 
incident of human life which is called success’. This structural quirk is then 
compounded by the thematic interposition of ‘an uneducated and almost innocent 
materialism […] which has not studied the long chronicle of the vanity and fall of 
kings, which has not learned from history that there is nothing that fails like 
success’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.57).2 
A prioritisation of intellectual victory was first encoded within the genre 
by Poe, when he prefaced the first Dupin mystery, ‘The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue’ (1841), with an exposition of whist and chess as analytic battlegrounds 
in which ‘mind struggles with mind’ in pursuit of ‘perfection in the game’ (119). 
This analogy introduced a more agonistic element to the capricious leisure games 
of Poe’s earlier urban detective story, ‘The Man of the Crowd’ (1940), in which a 
convalescent flâneur sets out in disinterested pursuit of an intriguing figure 
through the streets of London. Between them, Poe’s two stories formed the 
                                                 
1
 Collected in The Defendant as ‘A Defence of Detective Stories’. 
2
 See above, Ch.1, fn.3.   
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template for Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes series, in which the modern metropolis 
operates as the site of play wherein Holmes relentlessly pursues victory over the 
elusive Moriarty in a never-ending logical battle of wills, the perpetuity of which 
recalls Schopenhauer’s Sisyphean vision of the struggle of existence. Poe’s choice 
of chess as an analogic model also corresponds to the nonsense conceits of 
Bentley and Carroll—particularly Bentley’s reference to chess as ‘a spiritualized 
fight’—thus backing up Sewell’s account of the logic-puzzle form of detective 
fiction as a ‘nonsense-detective world’ (‘Giant’ 574). As Syme observes to 
Gregory in Thursday, shortly before Chesterton begins deconstructing the 
agonistic premises of conventional detection, ‘“[d]on’t you see we’ve checkmated 
each other? […] it’s a lonely, intellectual duel, my head against yours”’ (CW 6: 
495). 
While this further hint of Chesterton’s fear of intellectual alienation again 
draws attention to the psychological grounds of Thursday’s subversion of textual 
isolation through intertextual dialogue, in the case of Father Brown, Chesterton’s 
questioning of the generic orthodoxy of detective fiction extends beyond this 
psychological base, to find sophisticated political and philosophical expression in 
a challenge to the literary propagation of wider social fallacies. An example of the 
latter phenomenon is presented by the rhetoric of the late-nineteenth-century 
Social Darwinist, Herbert Spencer, who echoed the imagery of Poe in his claim 
that ‘“[n]o matter what the game, the satisfaction is in achieving victory—in 
getting the better of the antagonist. This love of conquest, so dominant in all 
creatures because it is the correlative of success in the struggle for existence, gets 
gratification from a victory at chess in the absence of ruder victories’ (qtd. in 
Blake, K. 37). This traffic of influence perhaps informed Chesterton’s suspicion 
that social thinkers were ‘probably really influenced, mad as it may seem, by 
contemporary detective fiction’ (‘Detectives and Detective Fictions.’ ILN 4 Nov. 
1905; CW 27: 53). In turn, Spencer’s adaptation of evolutionary theory to the 
social realm went on to influence Doyle, as reflected by Holmes’s baleful 
assertion, in ‘The Final Problem’ (1893), that Moriarty’s criminality stems from 
‘hereditary tendencies of the most diabolical kind’ (470-71).  
If Chesterton’s reflections on influence appear to contradict his earlier 
dismissal of the ‘magisterial theory’ that popular literature might form a source of 
moral infection, it is telling that in this instance Chesterton is charging the 
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intellectual with polluting the healthy literature of the masses. For Chesterton, Poe 
and Doyle gratuitously imposed a pseudo-scientific intellectualism upon a genre 
which derives structurally from folk literature—its blocking/unblocking schema 
corresponds closely to that of the fairy-tale and festive comedy—which then went 
on to exert a pernicious influence upon the credulous intellectual in a position of 
social authority, to the detriment of the masses. Consequently, Chesterton mounts 
his critique of detective fiction from a position of diametric cultural opposition to 
that of the majority of later critical commentators, who have more commonly 
figured detective fiction as a dangerous threat to intellectual standards emerging 
from popular culture. Much as Leavis evinced discomfort over the capacity of 
parody to traverse ostensibly distinct areas of culture, Baldick refers to Q.D. 
Leavis’s fear of ‘the infection of intellectuals through the detective craze by the 
values and tastes of the common mob’ (274)—an infection that Chesterton would 
consider to be of great restorative benefit to the intellectual. 
Perhaps most disturbingly for Chesterton, Poe’s chess analogy posits 
literary detection as an exercise in detached rationalism. As I argued in my 
opening chapter, Chesterton’s philosophical anti-rationalism derived from his 
distrust of ‘the chains of syllogism’. This not only led him to oppose Hegelian 
dialectics, but also the application of normative syllogisms which characterises 
Holmesian detection, as exemplified by Holmes’s confident ‘inferences’ (Doyle 
246) in ‘The Blue Carbuncle’ (1892) that an ‘unbrushed hat’s owner has a wife; 
all loving wives brush their husband’s hats; therefore [the owner’s] wife is not 
loving’ (Priestman 91). The fallacious assumptions to which this methodology is 
likely to lead are lampooned throughout Father Brown. For example, in ‘The 
Absence of Mr. Glass’ (1913), Holmes’s hat syllogism is specifically parodied, 
with Brown revealing the supposed owner of a ‘systematically brushed and 
burnished’ (FB 183; my emphasis) hat to have been the figment of a logician-
detective’s imagination. Here Holmes’s method is philosophically deconstructed 
via a literal reductio ad absurdum, while the ‘chains of syllogism’ are lent a 
burlesque physical correlative in the form of the ropes with which the true owner 
of the hat—an amateur magician—has voluntarily bound himself. When the 
magician is finally ungagged, the story closes with him emitting an open-mouthed 
guffaw at the expense of the detective, who has previously been depicted with a 
‘sneer’ (FB 187), in a further example of Chesterton’s corporeal manner of 
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distinguishing between open and closed modes of humour.  
In ‘A Defence of Nonsense’, Chesterton argues that ‘to draw out the soul 
of things with a syllogism is as impossible as to draw out Leviathan with a hook’ 
(Defendant 70), a principle that he illustrates in the ‘Brett Harte’ essay, by 
emphasising the irreducible singularity of his subject via an off-the-cuff anti-
syllogism. Chesterton contends ‘first, that [Harte] was a genuine American; 
second, that he was a genuine humourist; and, third, that he was not an American 
Humourist’ (Varied 179). This precise reversal of the structure of Aristotelian 
formal logic illustrates the way in which parody—and even discussion of 
parodists—problematizes the model upon which both Hegelian dialectics and 
Holmesian deduction are structurally founded, instead placing an existentially 
grotesque emphasis upon the ‘intractability of being’, in Kenner’s phrase. As with 
Chesterton’s distinction between the ‘ordinary’ man who can accept contradiction 
and the ‘morbid’ systematising of the logician, the locus of this fault-line lies in 
the individual’s relative willingness to submit to the irony of events. Kathleen 
Blake’s account of the purity of the Carrollean nonsense game is peculiarly 
apposite to the Holmesian method in this regard: ‘an objection based on 
experience or consequences bears very little weight. It is outside the game and 
must simply be left outside’ (70).  
For Chesterton, the influence of Holmes’s espousal of extremes of idealist 
and materialist philosophy was most perniciously demonstrated on the 
philosophical battlefield of the streets of London, in the tendency of contemporary 
social reformers to apply a detached rationalism to the social and architectural 
conceptualisation of the city, and to associate worldly achievement with moral 
rectitude. As Knight argues, while Chesterton embraced the city as a chaos of 
conscious forces, ‘Doyle’s detective is perpetually trying to map the city and 
assimilate cultural difference’ (‘Signs’ 131). The same was true of urban 
reformers such as Beatrice Webb (née Potter), who was heavily influenced in her 
youth by Herbert Spencer (see Inwood 50), and began mapping the city in the 
1890s, before going on to join Chesterton’s ideological nemesis, George Bernard 
Shaw, as a leading figure in the Fabian movement, alongside her husband, Sidney 
Webb. Characteristically, Chesterton identified the root of his controversy with 
the Fabians as a confluence of similarity and difference. As he explained, while 
everyone agreed that the living conditions of the urban poor were a blight that 
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must be addressed, ‘[i]t is when we begin to imagine alternative and reform […] 
that we begin to differ. The school of Mr. Sidney Webb would cure the evil by a 
re-planning of London on scientific, bureaucratic principles’ (‘The Sacred Street.’ 
DN 4 June 1904; CDN 2: 239). 
Chesterton’s editor at The Daily News, Alfred George Gardiner, chose the 
issue of urban reform as the context through which to explain the essential 
distinction between Chesterton and Shaw to his readers. In ‘A Character Study’ 
(DN 18 July 1908), Gardiner notes that Shaw would prefer to ‘raze the whole 
fabric to the ground, and build all anew upon an ordered and symmetrical plan. 
Mr Chesterton has none of this impatience with the external garment of society. 
He enjoys disorder and loves the haphazard’ (CDN 5: 104-05). As these accounts 
begin to suggest, Chesterton was writing at a pivotal moment in the history of the 
capital, in which the overwhelmingly ‘arbitrary and unplanned’ (Jones 159) cycle 
of construction and demolition that had hitherto characterised urban development 
was yielding to the dogma of rationalist interventionism, which eventually 
achieved schematic realisation in the modernist architectural putsch of the mid-
twentieth century. In many ways, the pioneer of this movement was Charles 
Booth, the conservative businessman-cum-philanthropic sociologist whose spatial 
survey of the class-breakdown of the city found pictorial representation in the 
colour-coded ‘poverty maps’ (Booth, Portrait xxxi) which accompanied his 
ambitious attempt to socially map the city, Life and Labour of the People in 
London (1892–97). 
  Booth’s innovative plan to ‘formalize a method of impersonal inquiry’ 
(xi), as Raymond Williams puts it, was borne of a desire to establish a rigorous 
empiricism to clear the ‘fog of fear, sensationalism and guesswork’ (Inwood 48) 
surrounding the conditions of the urban poor, which sensationalist crime fiction 
perpetuated. Nonetheless, it is a curious irony that his pretence to pristine 
impersonality so closely echoes the methods of Holmes and Dupin. Despite his 
philanthropic intentions, Booth’s rationalistic premises ultimately resulted in a 
failure to sympathise with either the landscape or its inhabitants. Of the landscape, 
he complained ‘[l]et anyone now design a place of residence for our four or five 
million inhabitants, and how greatly it would differ in plan and structure from 
London’ (Physical 123). Booth’s maps offered the blueprint for a new plan 
conducted along strictly rationalistic and paternalistic lines. By literally 
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illustrating the neighbouring coexistence of poverty and relative wealth, and thus 
producing a disorganised chaos of colours, Booth’s survey implied that this 
situation was both morally unsanitary and philosophically irrational, encouraging 
the inference of later planners that a segregation enabled by radical architectural 
redesign might result in a more orderly, logical colour scheme. 
Booth’s scheme to achieve a radical spatial re-organisation of the city was 
simultaneously a plan to tidy up its inhabitants. To this end, he proposed the 
expulsion of an entire section of the populace, in line with his belief that the 
‘deserving poor must be separated from the idle loafers’ (43), as Canovan puts it. 
While Booth denied that a considerable percentage of the urban poor belonged to 
what he termed ‘Class A’—‘“the vicious and semi-criminal”’—he contended that 
the ‘deserving poor’ were being demoralized by a second distinct underclass: 
‘Class B’ (Booth qtd. in Jones 320). As Gareth Stedman Jones explains, for Booth 
this class ‘was not so much vicious as feckless. These were the failures in the 
industrial race’ (321). Booth’s rhetoric is more forthright: these people ‘degrade 
whatever they touch, and as individuals are perhaps incapable of improvement’, 
because—much like Moriarty—their condition is apparently ‘hereditary’ (Portrait 
11-12). Booth argues that ‘[e]very other class takes care of itself, or could do so if 
Class B were out of the way. These unfortunate people form a sort of quagmire 
underlying the social structure’ (Physical 30).  
This Spencerian vision of society as an agonistic game—‘“the competition 
of the very poor”’—underpins Booth’s argument for the ‘“entire removal”’ 
(Booth qtd. in Jones 307) of this section of society from the field of play. In The 
Ball and the Cross, Chesterton employs a malign syllogism to crystallise the 
rationale of such solutions: ‘“Dr. Hertz has convinced everybody […] that nothing 
can really be done with the real slums. His celebrated maxim has been quite 
adopted. I mean the three celebrated sentences: ‘No man should be unemployed. 
Employ the employables. Destroy the unemployables’”’ (CW 7: 213). As Jones’s 
account indicates, Booth’s own solution was only marginally less extreme: ‘a 
policy of relentless “dispersion” for class “A” and the provision of labour colonies 
for class “B”’ (321). Fried and Elman summarise the latter plan thus: ‘if the poor 
failed in their special camps, they would be sent to poorhouses and their children 
taken from them. If they succeeded, they would be allowed to re-enter 
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civilization’ (xxix). As Chesterton surmised, ‘[a]pparently, progress means being 
moved on – by the police’ (CW 4: 209). 
In view of Chesterton’s belief that detective fiction played a significant 
role in encouraging social materialism, it is no coincidence that his earliest 
fictional critique of the structural changes wrought upon the city by social 
reformers occurs in his first collection of satires of Holmesian detection, The Club 
of Queer Trades. The second story in the collection, ‘The Painful Fall of a Great 
Reputation’, relates a bus journey through the new working-class housing 
developments that increasingly populated the ‘vast blank space of North London’ 
(CW 6: 83). As the narrator explains, the panoptic view from the top deck gave ‘a 
sense of [the scheme’s] immensity and its meanness. […] In a narrow street, in a 
den of vice, you do not expect civilisation, you do not expect order. But the horror 
of this was the fact that there was civilisation, that there was order, but that 
civilisation only showed its morbidity, and order only its monotony’ (CW 6: 83). 
In attempting to account for the architectural poverty of the new projects, the 
narrator concludes that the philanthropist possesses ‘contempt for the people’ (CW 
6: 83). Chesterton’s loathing of philanthropists was not only inspired by the cold 
functionalism of these architectural schemes, but also the assumption that the 
worldly success of the rich constituted a qualification to interfere in the lives of 
others—to move people around the city like pieces on a giant chessboard.  
The authoritarian rationalism underpinning Booth’s philanthropic 
endeavours is illustrated by the context that seems to have brought his work to 
Chesterton’s attention—his influence upon the social theories of leading Fabians, 
including Beatrice Webb, who was Booth’s wife’s cousin, and an assistant in the 
early stages of his project.
3
 In a series of journalistic essays, published in the same 
year as his articles on detective fiction, Chesterton deconstructs the presumptions 
of this new wave of social reformers via a series of parodies of social 
pamphleteering—‘Some Urgent Reforms’—in which he develops various 
apparently fantastical conceits in order to turn the urge for reform back upon the 
reformer. The final article in the series, ‘Missions to the Cultivated’ (Speaker 7 
Dec. 1901), sets out to overturn the complacent notion that the philanthropist 
carries de facto authority to carry out missionary work: ‘The real problem of the 
                                                 
3
 In ‘Mr. Shaw’s Escape’ (DN 20 July 1907), Chesterton quotes Shaw’s discussion of Booth’s 
work amongst other reformist tracts (CDN 4: 263).  
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present day is the problem of the educated classes. [… The] suburban pessimist 
[is] a type far lower than the hooligan […] And any attempt on their part to teach 
and preach to the poor is as sensational a piece of impudence as a thief in 
Holloway Gaol preaching piety to the chaplain’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.78). 
The first article in the series, ‘The Human Circulating Library’ (Speaker 2 
Nov. 1901), advances a possible solution to this ‘problem of the educated classes’. 
In a corollary of his journalistic advocacy of placing apparently incongruous 
articles in diversely targeted periodicals, Chesterton proposes that adapting the 
model of the lending library to human interaction might operate as a means of 
encouraging the mingling of different social sectors, so as to inculcate in the ‘vast 
herds of suburban citizens living perpetually among people like themselves’ (BL 
MS Add.73381 ff.75) a salutary understanding of the diversity of human 
experience. The second of his proposals, ‘Playgrounds for Adults’ (Speaker 16 
Nov. 1901), builds upon this motif of engagement. In a burlesque parallel of 
Booth’s projected labour colonies, Chesterton advances the concept of nurseries 
for the intelligentsia, arguing that such a policy might serve to reconnect the 
educated classes to their cultural heritage: ‘What is needed is nurseries for the 
adult, nurseries in which stockbrokers can be instructed in “Puss in the Corner”, 
and those who have a more grave and aesthetic order of intellect in the more 
solemn ritual of bells and fruit which is called “Oranges and Lemons”’ (BL MS 
Add.73381 ff.76). 
The communal ethos of Chesterton’s reforms is particularly salient in view 
of Booth’s assumption of detached impersonality in his investigations, a position 
which arises in part from his failure to recognize his activities as a form of 
recreational play. Booth’s project effectively began as a hobby, arising from his 
habit of taking urban constitutionals as a means of ameliorating the periodic 
breakdowns to which he was prone (see Booth, Physical 10). In this sense, he was 
engaged in a personal leisure activity masquerading as public work, much as 
Holmes’s detection hobby offers relief from the ennui that manifests itself in his 
drug addiction. As Auden observes, in an account that might be seamlessly 
applied to Booth, Holmes’s ‘motive for being a detective is, positively, a love of 
the neutral truth […] and negatively, a need to escape from his own feelings of 
melancholy. His attitude towards people and his technique of observation and 
deduction are those of the chemist or physicist’ (‘Guilty’ 155). This concatenation 
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of fictive and real-life phenomena also extends to Booth’s exercises in social 
classification, which closely recall the complacent speculations of the narrator of 
Poe’s ‘The Man of the Crowd’, who categorises passers-by from the isolation of 
his café table. Although Booth’s preferred mode of play involved circulating 
among different classes, he never thought to lend himself out, in the manner of 
Chesterton’s human library, but would instead take up a solitary position in public 
houses in order to make notes on the people surrounding him (see Booth, Portrait 
224). As Fried and Elman argue, Booth’s lack of engagement arises from the fact 
that he ‘truly believed that between himself and the poor there was an 
unbridgeable gap of class and culture’ (xxvii).  
In a later essay, ‘The Anti-Liberal’ (DN 7 Sept. 1912), Chesterton employs 
the rhetoric of detection to challenge such assumptions of benevolent distance, 
refiguring the philanthropist as one of a number of potentially villainous detective 
story characters: ‘There is a great deal in my plumber’s or my cab man’s life that I 
do not know; and, stranger still, I think there ought to be. I am not ambitious to 
possess that particular sort of knowledge of domestic life which is possessed by 
spies, informers, blackmailers, and philanthropists’ (CDN 8: 152). This gesture of 
implication proves salient in the light of Booth’s less-guarded observations on his 
activities, in which he comes to resemble the wide-eyed reader of a sensational 
detective novel. In one notable instance, he describes his fascination with the 
‘clash of contest, man against man, and men against fate—the absorbing interest 
of a battle-field [...] this excitement of life which can accept murder as a dramatic 
incident, and drunkenness as the buffoonery of the stage … looked it in this way, 
what a drama it is!’ (Booth, Portrait xx).  
If Booth’s theatrical conception of city life as a detection ‘drama’ 
unfolding before his eyes superficially resembles the play-reconfiguration of 
Chesterton’s ‘Playgrounds for Adults’, it also possesses the vital distinction that 
Booth considers himself uncomplicatedly shielded by the footlights. In contrast, 
the communal element of Chesterton’s vision of play is particularly evoked by a 
sequel to the ‘Playgrounds for Adults’ piece, which he composed a fortnight later 
(‘Some Urgent Reforms: Playgrounds for Adults II’ Speaker 30 Nov. 1901). Here 
he develops a distinction between the benign games conducted by children, and 
the more agonistic adult version of play, which corresponds to the ‘clash of 
contest’ invoked both in Booth’s rhetoric and in Holmesian detection: ‘Games as 
175 
 
ordinarily understood do not constitute play, they constitute sport. In a game, as 
the adult understands a game, the essential is competition, and the aim victory’ 
(BL MS Add.73381 ff.77). By way of contrast, Chesterton advances ‘the great 
and Royal game of “Hide and Seek”, the noblest of all earthly games’, the 
particular beauty of which is its taking of 
 
the whole earth for its chess-board. Every object of the landscape, tree or hole or 
hedge, has, like a huge chess-man, its own peculiar powers and functions in the game. 
[. . .] The game includes planning, thinking, remembering, inventing, running, 
climbing, jumping, seeing, hearing, and waiting. The player has the emotions of all the 
outlaws since the world began (BL MS Add.73381 ff.77). 
 
Here Chesterton figures hide and seek as a real-life version of detective 
fiction, in which the intellectual combat of Poe’s chess analogy, and Booth’s 
detached observation of the ‘battle-field’, are transmuted into a liberating physical 
engagement with topography and an emotional engagement with human history, 
in which the player becomes a self-determining piece in the game, rather than the 
omnipotent hand guiding play. The location of Chesterton’s panegyric to hide and 
seek within his series of ‘urgent reforms’ reflects his sense that in order to counter 
the reformer’s dubious combination of rigid rationalism and solipsistic tourism, a 
direct challenge to the literary archetype of detection would also be necessary. 
The form that this challenge would ultimately take is first hinted at in ‘Missions to 
the Cultivated’, in which Chesterton’s conviction that ‘[t]he great need of the age 
is philanthropy to the rich’ inspires him to produce a brilliant parody of the 
language of the reformist tract: 
 
It is not enough for the person of limited means merely to think charitably of 
millionaires at Christmas, to bestow a word on them now and then, to support 
institutions designed for their improvement. The real philanthropist must go down and 
live among these people. He must take the rough-and-tumble of their gloomy, cynical, 
and lawless life. He must not be put off by the exhibition of many grossnesses and 
vulgarities [. . .] I do not think it is any good merely to preach and prose to these 
people. A little merriment and geniality, a little sympathy with their amusements, 
would go much further towards converting the millionaires and really attaching them 
to us by ties of affection (BL MS Add.73381 ff.78). 
 
This is where Father Brown steps in.  
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Recreating the Carnivalesque City in ‘The Blue Cross’ 
 
Turnbull and MacIan were sitting on one of the barren sweeps behind Hampstead, 
they could see the whole of London [… as] the splendid monstrosity that it is. Its 
bewildering squares and parallelograms were compact and perfect as a Chinese 
puzzle; an enormous hieroglyph which man must decipher or die.  
 
Chesterton, The Ball and the Cross (CW 7: 77)  
 
In ‘The Fear of the Past’ (DN 7 Dec. 1907), Chesterton argues that ‘Man is like 
Perseus, he cannot look at the Gorgon of the future except in the mirror of the 
past’ (CDN 4: 368). It seems significant that Chesterton turns to the mythic city-
builder, Perseus, to crystallise this vision. Again we are reminded of his 
contention that the ‘man building up an intellectual system has to build like 
Nehemiah, with the sword in one hand and the trowel in the other. The 
imagination, the constructive quality, is the trowel, and argument is the sword’. 
Nehemiah was another city builder, who employed his sword and trowel in the 
task of rebuilding Jerusalem—an appropriate context given that Chesterton’s 
project, like Blake’s before him, was to restore his personal vision of Jerusalem to 
England. To this end, the opening Father Brown story, ‘The Blue Cross’, takes up 
the trowel to enact an imaginative excavation of the hidden London, while 
employing satire—Chesterton’s ‘sword of the spirit’—to  deconstruct the truth-
claims of rivalling approaches to urban reform.  
On a generic level, ‘The Blue Cross’ directly challenges Doyle’s agonistic 
model in its portrayal of the Holmesian investigator, Aristide Valentin, possessor 
of ‘one of the most powerful intellects in Europe’ (FB 3), who is discovered 
wandering alone through the city in pursuit of the criminal mastermind, 
Flambeau, only to be taken in hand by the childlike Father Brown, and given a 
lesson in the more benign recreational possibilities of the city.
4
 Simultaneously, 
the putative remove of the social reformer is challenged by Brown’s carnivalesque 
modus operandi, which marshals the submerged festive spirit of the city to draw 
the intellectual into an enforced communality, designed to recover a capacity for 
empathetic engagement. Meanwhile, the various acts of urban disruption that 
                                                 
4
 Brown’s childlike qualities are repeatedly emphasised in the series, as in the narrator’s account of 
his ‘high and almost childish voice’ (FB 14). 
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Brown perpetrates in order to achieve this resolution illustrate his identification 
with the ‘undeserving’ poor who Booth sought to expel from the city, while 
simultaneously teaching the systematising intellectual a lesson in the positive 
applications of urban disorder. 
On the surface, ‘The Blue Cross’ is the story of Valentin’s attempt to 
apprehend Flambeau before he can steal a valuable item of ecclesiastical 
paraphernalia, which is being carried across London to a religious conference by 
Father Brown. From their entry to the capital at Liverpool Street station to the end 
of the pursuit on Hampstead Heath it appears that Flambeau has been leading 
Father Brown out of town in order to rob him in an isolated spot. A series of 
bizarre disturbances along the way confuse Valentin as to Flambeau’s strategy, 
while providing the trail which enables him to maintain his pursuit. On the Heath 
it transpires that Brown has been orchestrating these disturbances himself in order 
to help Valentin along, and that he has, as it were, double-crossed Flambeau en 
route, by swapping the package containing the cross and posting it to its 
destination.  
In this way, Chesterton employs various structurally disruptive motifs to 
toy with both the fixity of the characters’ roles and the reader’s epistemological 
bearings. For example, the narrator’s introductory assertion that Valentin is ‘the 
most famous investigator of the world’ (FB 3) encourages the inference that an 
infallible detective hero, modelled upon the Holmes archetype, has been 
introduced, a conception gradually undermined throughout the following action, 
in which Valentin fumbles his way to the conclusion, increasingly exasperated by 
the apparently irrational nature of events. Since the reader is compelled to follow 
Valentin as the focus of narrative perplexity, both occupy a ‘naked state of 
nescience’ (FB 6) which enables Chesterton to induct a new approach to 
detection, on the principle that the detective must attempt to empathise with the 
mind of the criminal in order to successfully second-guess the next move in the 
game. 
The criminal minds that Valentin and the reader must attempt to 
comprehend are those of Father Brown and Chesterton, since, as Priestman notes, 
Brown occupies ‘the structural space that would belong to the criminal in a 
normal detective story’ (126). This structural displacement enables Brown to 
overturn Valentin’s complacent segregation of the detective and the criminal, as 
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illustrated at the outset by his reflection that the ‘“criminal is the creative artist; 
the detective only the critic”’ (FB 7), as he sits, like Poe’s ruminative flâneur, 
alone in a café. Valentin’s categorical epigram is immediately challenged by the 
first of the practical jokes that punctuate the story, in which the ‘sour smile’ that 
accompanies the bon mot—which closely recalls the ‘sneer’ that Chesterton 
attributed to Doyle’s handling of Poe, and operates as a symbol of the 
unconstructive nature of Valentin’s inward-facing, superior sense of humour at the 
outset—is parodied by the surprise absence of sweetness in his coffee: ‘He had 
put salt in it’ (FB 7), because the condiments have been swapped by Brown.  
The priest’s joke echoes Chesterton’s advocacy of a grotesque democracy 
that would subvert ‘the modern notion that a clever man can make a joke without 
taking part in it’, engendering an enforced communality that initiates Valentin into 
the disorientating conditions of the game. As Stewart explains, ‘in children’s 
games, the formation of a boundary is intrinsic to getting in or out of the game. 
The way to form such a boundary is to make a play gesture, a movement that 
sends the message “this is play” and marks off the particularly space and time that 
will characterize the game. This movement may take the form of a mock attack or 
stunt’ (91). In each of the opening three Father Brown stories Chesterton employs 
the term ‘borderland’ (FB 15, 33, 38) in one context or another, and a common 
preoccupation of the stories is the construction of liminal spaces which open up 
sites of carnivalesque disturbance. In this instance, the swapping of the salt and 
sugar is the stunt that signals the beginning of a game of hide and seek, through 
which Chesterton achieves a fictional realization of his vision of the city as a 
‘playground for adults’. 
Brown’s strategic promotion of a topsy-turvy game atmosphere highlights 
the carnivalesque basis of the story, in which the priest’s anarchic actions parody 
the conventional intellectual riddles of modern mystery writing. As Bakhtin 
explains, in medieval Europe a ‘carnival atmosphere reigned on days when 
mysteries and soties [broad satires] were produced’ (Rabelais 5), while in carnival 
itself ‘the images of games, prophecies (as parodies), and riddles [were] combined 
with folk elements to form an organic whole’ (Rabelais 236–37). Brown’s 
subversion of Valentin’s private joke not only delivers the first riddle to be solved, 
but also corroborates Bakhtin’s assertion that carnival laughter ‘is universal in 
scope; it is directed at all and everyone, including the carnival’s participants […] 
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he who is laughing also belongs to it’. This principle corresponds to the 
communal ethos of Chesterton’s ‘reforms’ articles, as exemplified by his account 
of the resemblance of children’s play to the origins of theatre: ‘the theatre was 
originally what children’s play is, a festival, a strictly ceremonial rejoicing. 
Children merely reproduce the theatre in a more human, direct, and powerful 
manner, by being themselvs [sic] both the spectators and the actors’ (BL MS 
Add.73381 ff.77). Again, Bakhtin’s view of carnival is strikingly comparable: it is 
‘life itself, but shaped according to a certain pattern of play. In fact, carnival does 
not know footlights, in the sense that it does not acknowledge any distinction 
between actors and spectators’ (Rabelais 7). 
Bakhtin explains that the ‘common denominator’ of carnival is the 
establishment of a period of ‘gay time’ (Rabelais 237), which he terms a ‘“hiatus 
between two moments of biographical time […] a pure digression from the 
normal course of life”’ (qtd. in Clark and Holquist 281). The central section of 
‘The Blue Cross’, which begins with Brown’s first practical joke, operates as just 
such a demonstration of ‘gay time’, book-ended by the introductory biographical 
description of the protagonists and the closing explanation of events on the Heath. 
Stewart’s account of the realm of play is again relevant: ‘Once the world of 
everyday life and realism is cut off from the fiction, there is a concurrent 
movement toward play time’ (118). Significantly, this results in ‘the removal of 
hierarchical order and privileged signification’ (Stewart 118), an action which 
divests Valentin of the worldly prestige of his investigator status and opens up a 
carnivalesque space, which temporarily privileges the unofficial figure, the ‘“wise 
fool”’ (Bakhtin, Problems 150), Father Brown.5 
Simultaneously, ‘The Blue Cross’ enacts an eccentric pastiche of the 
medieval mystery play—the form that Chesterton considered ‘“far bolder in its 
burlesque” and […] more “democratic” in its “satire”’ than any modern theatrical 
spectacle—as we pursue a follower of Christ, temporarily reimagined as a 
carnivalesque ‘Abbot of Unreason’ (Rozik, Comedy 160), who carries a miniature 
cross on a mad dash across the city. The last detail is significant, since the 
symbolism of the cross is central to the story’s principle of urban recreation. 
Chesterton finds a physical correlative of his vision of the cross as ‘a signpost for 
                                                 
5
 The grocer in ‘The Blue Cross’ refers to Brown as a ‘fool’ (FB 9). 
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free travellers’ (Orthodoxy 21) in the streets that link each block of housing, civic 
square and area of public parkland in the form of a crossroads. As Gabrielle Dean 
has noted, in Chesterton’s essay on the value of detective fiction ‘[t]he city is [...] 
rather remarkably described by Chesterton as the incarnation of the visual-textual 
grid’ (328). However, Dean does not account for the subversive intent of this 
apparently rationalistic vision, which is located in Chesterton’s reorganisation of 
the city on the principle of a game-board, configured, like the children’s game of 
hide and seek, in 1:1 scale. In the crossroads that link every square of the urban 
game-board, Chesterton discovers a connective design which encourages ‘free-
travel’ to a vast grid of new playgrounds.6 
As Hayes and Tololyan have noted, the progress of the protagonists in 
‘The Blue Cross’ also sketches a cross upon the city, since the pursuit follows an 
axis ‘east to west, and south to north, Liverpool Street Station to Scotland Yard 
and on to Victoria Station, then north to Camden Town and Hampstead Heath’ 
(398). Thus, Brown compels his fellow players to follow a route which enacts a 
benediction of the city; an appropriate image, since the pedagogic play that Brown 
engages in along the way is intended to safeguard the city’s structure, by exposing 
the investigator to a process of festive re-education. This motif of benediction is 
prefigured in ‘The Painful Fall of a Great Reputation’, in which the narrator 
contrasts the enervated landscape of the new projects with the ‘crooked entries, to 
those really mean streets, to those genuine slums which lie round the Thames and 
the City, in which nevertheless a real possibility remains that at any chance corner 
the great cross of the great cathedral of Wren may strike down the street like a 
thunderbolt’ (CW 6: 83-84). It is almost as though the city’s very structure 
proceeds organically from the focal nexus of St Paul’s, with the thunderbolts 
projected from the dome blasting crossroads into the landscape at every turning.  
This image of the church as a benevolent guardian of vibrant disorder is 
complemented by Chesterton’s account, in London (1914), of the iconoclasm of 
the city’s inhabitants, a trait that he directly associates with the capital’s 
happenstance structure: ‘A rather surly love of liberty (or rather of independence) 
is written in the straggling map of London, and proclaimed in its patchwork 
                                                 
6
 Another example of Chesterton refiguring the landscape as a board game is found in ‘The 
Ballade of a Strange Town’ (DN 2 May 1908). Discussing a trip to Flanders, Chesterton writes of 
‘a cross-roads’, beyond which lay ‘only the infinite flat chess-board of the little fields’ (CDN 5: 
63). 
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architecture. There is in it something that every Englishman feels in himself […]; 
something of the amateur; something of the eccentric. The nearest phrase is the 
negative one of “unofficial”’ (London 12; my emphasis). Chesterton’s invocation 
of an ‘unofficial’ spirit again recalls Bakhtin’s account of the destabilisation of 
official life that took place during the medieval carnival, within which the church 
would temporarily collaborate in subverting the very authority that it 
conventionally embodied. Chesterton’s connection of this anti-authoritarian ethos 
to the city’s ‘patchwork architecture’ also helps to explain his use of the squares 
of London as the locus of much of the action in ‘The Blue Cross’. The narrator 
refers to the ‘patchwork’ (FB 5) quality of the city’s layout, while building a 
chiming refrain upon the word ‘square’, in a manner that recalls the insistent 
repetition of ‘hedge’ in Thursday: Valentin ‘was walking in the streets and 
squares beyond Victoria, he paused suddenly and stood. It was a quaint and quiet 
square, very typical of London, full of an accidental stillness [… with a] square of 
shrubbery in the centre’ (FB 5). When Valentin begins his active pursuit, 
Chesterton again employs collapsed repetition to draw attention to the 
significance of the symbol: 
 
‘Which way did these parsons go?’ asked Valentin. 
‘Up that second road on the left-hand side, and then across the square’, said the other 
promptly. 
‘Thanks’, said Valentin, and vanished like a fairy. On the other side of the second 
square he found a policeman (FB 9).  
 
Heissenbuttel has argued that in the conventional detective story ‘the 
reconstruction of the trace of the unnarrated […] does not happen in a merely 
psychological, sociological, or even ethnological humanization; it happens, 
remarkably enough, topographically’ (85). Still more remarkably, in ‘The Blue 
Cross’ Chesterton’s ‘reconstruction’ is principally concerned with detecting the 
hidden narrative of the topography itself, the original purposes of which he seeks 
to excavate, as a means of renovating the past to perpetually revitalise the present. 
To this end, the square refrain not only evokes the concept of a 1:1 board-game, 
but also a proto-Bakhtinian recovery of the communal public market square as a 
festive space. As Bakhtin explains, ‘[p]eople who in life are separated by 
impenetrable hierarchical barriers enter into free familiar contact on the carnival 
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square’ (Problems 123), and consequently ‘[t]he main arena for carnival acts was 
the square and the streets adjoining it’ (Problems 128). Therefore, in ‘carnivalized 
literature the square, as a setting for the action of the plot, becomes two-levelled 
and ambivalent’ (Problems 128). Correspondingly, Valentin passes through 
streets which ‘seemed built out of the blank backs of everything and everywhere’ 
(FB 11-12), a vision of spatial/temporal heterogeneity which accords with the 
‘heterogeneous architectural sources’ (McKellar 193) of the typical post-1660 
London square. 
The almost hallucinatory imagery of Valentin’s passage through the city 
evokes a sense of the old city shining through the new, a conceit comparable to 
the visual trick which the Edwardian pantomime borrowed from a convention of 
the fairy-tale: ‘the Transformation Scene when the front scene is still there, but the 
back scene begins to glow through it’ (‘The Peasant.’ DN 8 July 1911; CDN 7: 
163). As Chesterton observes in his essay on London, it ‘is a mediaeval town […] 
but its soul has been sunk deeper under other things than any other town that 
remembers mediaevalism at all. It is very hard indeed to find London in London’ 
(London 10). This rhetoric of detection posits the submersion of the true city not 
so much as structural, but rather conceptual—the overground landscape of 
London invites the possibilities of play, yet the scales of convention cause these 
possibilities to remain concealed in plain sight, like Poe’s purloined letter. In 
London, Chesterton illustrates this conceptual submersion through a discussion of 
the original meanings of the names of various tube stations, particularly focusing 
upon Blackfriars (8). In view of this example, if we adopt L. P. Hartley’s adage 
that the past is a foreign country, the disruptive presence of ‘“foreign parsons […] 
running about”’ (FB 11) in the guise of Brown and Flambeau, each dressed as 
Catholic priests, begins to look peculiarly like a return of the culturally repressed 
in poltergeist form. 
The disorderly conduct of Chesterton’s avatars of carnivalesque tradition is 
also significant in view of the recurrent occlusion, by representatives of urban 
officialdom, of the purpose of the city square as a site of play. For example, in the 
early eighteenth century a reformation of open squares such as Lincoln’s Inn 
Fields was urged on the grounds that in these spaces ‘disorderly Persons have 
frequented and met together therein, using unlawful Sports and Games, and 
drawing in and enticing young persons into Gaming, Idleness and other vicious 
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Courses’ (act of 1735, cited in McKellar 204–05). This account prefigures 
Brown’s enticement of Valentin into his unlawful games, a motif of disruption 
that forms a point of intersection between Chesterton’s critique of architectural 
rationalization and social authoritarianism. As McKellar explains, such pleas for 
reform operated as the pretext for these spaces to become ‘more regularized and 
privatized. It was this trend which led towards the enclosing and railing in of 
squares resulting in the more contained and socially segregated spaces of the 
1720s onwards’ (205). 
Knight is correct to argue that ‘Chesterton’s reading of culture is committed 
to the importance of public space’ (‘Signs’ 134), a commitment that leads 
Chesterton to perceive the diminution of free public land as a psychologically 
demoralising act of repression upon the populace. In response, his first urgent 
reform, ‘The Human Circulating Library’, is calculated to overturn the status of 
the modern city as the site of the ‘last and darkest of Cosmic jests, whereby a 
desert can be made of houses’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.75). Similarly, Bakhtin’s 
valorisation of the public square partially operates as a critique of early twentieth-
century capitalist society’s figuring of the domestic space as a safe-haven, 
ostensibly offering protection from a forbidding world lying beyond the door, 
while actually screening the individual from a politically empowering connection 
with his/her cultural heritage. As Hirschkop notes, in Bakhtin ‘the marvelously 
open expanses of the public square are not only literally but metaphorically 
spacious, allowing history a room for movement which it is denied in the 
bourgeois parlour or home’ (249). 
In a comparable spirit, Chesterton’s fiction not only emphasizes the 
psychological benefits of communal urban spaces, but also their political facility. 
This is perhaps best illustrated by The Napoleon of Notting Hill, which details the 
revolt of the citizens of Notting Hill against city planners who intend to build a 
large arterial road through their district. The streets and squares of Campden Hill 
form the stronghold of the dissenters (see CW 6: 339), a significant detail since 
McKellar describes the public square itself as arising ‘out of a long history of 
open land in towns [which] formed part of a struggle to maintain common land 
against private interests’ (198). Life began to imitate art once more shortly after 
the novel’s publication, as Chesterton later recalled in ‘The Break’ (DN 13 July 
1912), in an account which again turns upon a compulsive repetition of ‘square’: 
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‘I wrote it in a small square in Kensington [...] and when I had left this square to 
live in more barbaric places, the inhabitants of that very square did in fact 
barricade themselves in it against similar capitalistic improvements—and, I am 
happy to say, won’ (CDN 8: 121).7  
This event occurred in May 1910, and would have been fresh in 
Chesterton’s memory when he composed ‘The Blue Cross’ a month later. It seems 
likely that this revelation of the political efficacy of urban disruption, which 
presented a practical example of the more positive connotations of the symbiotic 
traffic of influence between fiction and reality, informed the conceptualisation of 
Chesterton’s new story. In ‘The Blue Cross’, he again depicts the public square as 
a space in which ideological schemes can be disrupted, although on this occasion 
his attention turns from subverting the utilitarian spatial demands of commercial 
interests to the utilitarian social demands of the philanthropic reformer. 
 
Father Brown and ‘Class B’ 
 
In June 1910, Chesterton not only published ‘The Blue Cross’, but also What’s 
Wrong with the World, a social polemic which contains his most sustained 
satirical critique of contemporary urban reform. The centrepiece of the text is the 
‘History of Hudge and Gudge’, a sardonic account of the machinations of two 
social reformers of ostensibly polarised political persuasions. This conceit 
embodies Chesterton’s belief that the apparently contrary motivations of the 
capitalist free-marketer and the philanthropic socialist are ultimately allied in their 
impatiently authoritarian attitude toward the poor, whose lives obdurately stand in 
the way of ‘progress’. As Chesterton explains, he has a dark ‘suspicion that 
Hudge and Gudge are secretly in partnership. That the quarrel they keep up in 
public is very much of a put-up job’ (CW 4: 214). Chesterton’s projection of a 
convergence in opposition between these Tweedledum and Tweedledee figures 
was perhaps inspired by the solitary example of Booth, whose combination of 
commercial pragmatism and social paternalism renders him a pristine amalgam of 
Hudge and Gudge. This convergence is illustrated with particular clarity by 
                                                 
7
 See Hobhouse, ch.17, for an account of this event. 
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Booth’s somewhat perverse skewing of socialist ideology:  
 
Our Individualism fails because our Socialism is incomplete. In taking charge of the 
lives of the incapable, State Socialism finds its proper work […] interference on the 
part of the State with the lives of a small fraction of the population would make it 
possible, ultimately, to dispense with any socialistic interference in the lives of the 
rest (Physical 31). 
 
In November 1910, Chesterton published another significant non-fictional 
text, his critical study, William Blake. Here he identifies ‘one figure [… who is] 
quite monotonously recurrent’ in Blake’s art, an entity with a comparably 
dualistic bearing to that of Hudge and Gudge, though here rendered benign: ‘the 
Ancient of Days; the thing which is old with all the awfulness of its past, but 
young with all the energies of the future’ (17). In Father Brown, this temporally 
Janus-faced being is split into the persons of Father Brown and Flambeau. As 
Walter Raubicheck notes, Brown symbolises the wisdom of the ages in his 
between-time status as ‘an Aquinas transferred from thirteenth-century France and 
Italy to twentieth-century England, alienated from the spirit of his time’ (45). In a 
complementary conceit, Flambeau’s nom de plume symbolises elemental, 
regenerative energy, while also hinting at his mythic status as an innocently 
disruptive folk-devil. As Chesterton notes in a later essay on ‘William Blake and 
Inspiration’ (ILN 1929, collected in Handful), in Blake ‘devils stood for the divine 
principle of energy and angels for the divine principle of wisdom’ (Handful 79).  
In view of Chesterton’s elaboration of the conflicting dyads of Hudge and 
Gudge and the Ancient of Days in his non-fictional work of 1910, it is notable that 
in ‘The Blue Cross’ Father Brown and Flambeau are structurally aligned as the 
pairing who lead Valentin—a ‘humanitarian’ whose ‘mercy [was] even colder 
than justice’ (FB 19)—on an urban expedition designed to pedagogically convert 
the misguided rationalist. In this way, Chesterton sets up a thematic conflict 
between ‘a quite temporary social atmosphere [and] the eternal sanity’ 
(‘Education by Fairy Tales.’ ILN 2 Dec. 1905; CW 27: 73), in which his mythic 
representatives of the existential grotesque satirically interact with, and ultimately 
overcome, the fallacious ‘doxas’ of the contemporary world. In pursuing this 
agenda, Chesterton particularly sets out to challenge the contemporary view that 
urban disruption represented an expression of degeneracy that must be purged 
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from the city. In London, Chesterton expands his account of the city’s rebellious 
spirit to conjure an anthropomorphic vision of the city as an uncooperative 
suspect, evading utilitarian demands to justify its conduct, thus positing the whole 
metropolis as a metaphor for the anti-utilitarian class anathematized by Booth: 
‘there is something shy about London: it is full of secrets and anomalies; and it 
does not like to be asked what it is for’ (13). It has been ‘a sort of half-rebel 
through […] many centuries. Hence it is a city of side streets that only lead into 
side streets; a city of short-cuts that take a long time’ (13).  
The acute existential urgency that Chesterton attached to the question of 
social utility can be explained, in part, by the fact that he identified so readily with 
the ‘class’ of people who the reformer sought to expel. Booth’s complaint that 
‘Class B’ ‘cannot stand the regularity and dulness of civilized existence, and find 
the excitement they need in the life of the streets’ (Booth, Portrait 14) could be 
seamlessly applied to Chesterton—and, oddly enough, to Booth himself—and 
Chesterton was acutely aware that only the accident of his birth into the middle-
class rendered the vagaries of his character socially acceptable. For example, in a 
later essay, ‘The Witch-Smellers’ (DN 20 July 1912), Chesterton employs another 
self-reflexive reference to his famous absent-mindedness to elaborate a social 
moral: ‘[i]f any tramp were as vague as I am about what happened last Tuesday he 
would be segregated before you could say Saleeby’ (CDN 8: 127). At this time, 
the Fabian movement remained tentatively sympathetic to the theories 
promulgated by Caleb Saleeby’s ‘Eugenics Education Society’, and this 
receptivity informs Stapleton’s speculation that Herbert Spencer and Beatrice 
Webb may have been the models for the proud parents in Chesterton’s burlesque 
parody of investigative journalism, ‘How I found the Superman’ (DN 5 Dec. 
1908). Here Chesterton derides the notion that social engineering might further 
the cause of human progress towards a higher evolutionary state, instead 
rendering the concept of the Superman gruesomely corporeal in his satirical 
account of uncovering an abject nonsense-creature ‘not of any human shape’, who 
possesses feathers in place of hair, though ‘“[n]ot feathers, as we understand 
feathers”’, as the father explains ‘in an awful voice’ (CDN 5: 224).  
In this climate, Chesterton’s sense of affinity with obdurately anti-utilitarian 
members of society also derived from his status as a creative artist, a constituency 
which Valentin associates with ‘[t]he criminal’ in his initial epigram. As Shaw 
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later recalled, despite his close association with the Fabians, he considered himself 
‘highly obnoxious to Beatrice [Webb] for the technical reason that I could not be 
classified’; Webb ‘had no use for […] the complications introduced by artists, 
Irishmen and […] eccentric and anarchic individuals’ (My 11). In this light, a 
satirical dimension pertains to the communicative methodology employed by 
Chesterton’s abbot of unreason, in which the spirit of the creative artist is 
conflated with that of the occupants of ‘Class B’, who Booth considered ‘du trop’ 
(Booth, Portrait 293), a term that translates as both ‘unwelcome’ (‘de trop’ 
Thompson, D. 391), and ‘unreasonably excessive’ (‘de trop’ Wiktionary). In 
attempting to understand the actions of his apparent adversaries, Valentin ‘coldly 
and carefully followed the train of the unreasonable […] he systematically went 
to the wrong places’ (FB 6; my emphasis), and his success in pursuing this policy 
ultimately serves to challenge Booth’s conception of the degeneracy of aimless 
itinerancy.  
In his autobiography, Chesterton expresses delight at a correspondent’s 
description of Brown as a ‘“loafer”’ (Autobiography 328), a term that identifies 
the priest with the ‘loafers and semi-criminals’ (Booth qtd. in Inwood 54) of 
Booth’s underclass, and which Chesterton considers an ‘appropriate compliment’ 
(Autobiography 328) for his hero. When Valentin first encounters Brown he 
considers him ‘helpless’ (FB 5)—precisely the term used by Booth to characterise 
‘Class B’, when he bemoans the ‘shiftlessness, helplessness, [and] idleness’ 
(Portrait 14) of that group. Given the apparent shiftlessness attendant to Brown’s 
traversal of the capital, he succeeds in embodying the full trinity of Booth’s 
negative traits within a single story, a detail which serves to promote a sense of 
Brown’s correspondence with increasingly maligned social groups. Indeed, 
Brown is not only depicted as an aimless loafer, but also as a semi-criminal 
vandal. In addition to throwing a cup of soup against a café wall, and, somewhat 
metaphorically, upsetting an apple cart in a greengrocers, his penchant for public 
disorder is encapsulated by the account of his actions in a pub, in which he 
smashes a window with his umbrella. The latter act identifies him with ‘Class A’ 
in Booth’s terms: ‘the worst class of corner men who hang round the doors of 
public-houses [… and supply] the ready materials for disorder when occasion 
serves’ (Portrait 11).  
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While Brown’s disorderly behaviour is undertaken to assist Valentin in his 
pursuit of Flambeau, it also functions in a deeper pedagogic context, the satirical 
purpose of which is directly related to the notion that the occupants of ‘Class B’ 
possess the capacity to demoralise those around them. In a precise inversion, the 
purpose of Brown’s vandalism is to re-moralise his companions. First, the priest’s 
actions introduce Flambeau to a new perspective on the creative possibilities of 
detection, which eventually convinces him to terminate his criminal activities, 
effecting the regeneration of a representative of ‘Class A’—the ‘semi-criminal’—
who Booth considered so far beyond redemption that they should simply be 
‘gradually harried out of existence’ (Portrait 299). Simultaneously, Brown 
attempts to re-moralise Valentin, as a member of the investigating class, via a 
lesson in the importance of imaginative empathy, a pedagogic aim that he 
achieves by replacing the rationalistic materialism of the conventional Holmesian 
clue with the empathetic lateral thinking of the joke.  
The structural joke of ‘The Blue Cross’ is that which Chesterton describes, 
in an unrelated context, in ‘Modern and Medieval Monsters’ (ILN 5 Sept. 1908): 
‘the elf capturing the constable’ (CW 28: 174). This conceit adds a further 
pedagogic dimension to the folkloric fairy-tale motif that also runs through 
Thursday, since Brown commits a series of Puckish, physically disruptive acts, 
while being defined throughout by an elusive physical absence, in a manner which 
renders Moriarty’s ominous evanescence benignly effervescent. Shaw recalled 
that Beatrice Webb finally reconciled herself to him when she ‘discovered a 
classification for me. I was a Sprite; and in that category I became happily 
domesticated at holiday times’ (My 11). This is also how Valentin ultimately 
engages with Brown, and the latter’s elfish machinations finally produce a 
positive metamorphosis on Valentin’s part, in turn—upon leaving the 
greengrocer’s, the investigator ‘vanished like a fairy’ (FB 9). 
The thoroughgoing success of Brown’s strategy is demonstrated when 
Valentin successfully reaches his destination, and promptly suspends his authority 
upon discovering the truth of the mystery. The dramatis personae are put in such 
good humour by the carnivalesque game-plot that Valentin forgets to bother 
arresting Flambeau, and Flambeau forgets to run away, they merely stand 
applauding Brown’s ingenuity, while exchanging expressions of respect and 
friendship—Flambeau sweeps ‘Valentin a great bow’, and Valentin terms his 
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erstwhile foe, ‘mon ami’ (FB 18). The story’s denouement solves the puzzle of 
Brown’s purpose in leading Valentin on his bracing cross-city jaunt, as well as 
Chesterton’s purpose in constructing this play-reorientation of the detection genre. 
As he explains in Orthodoxy, ‘if you or I were dealing with a mind that was 
growing morbid, we should be chiefly concerned not so much to give it arguments 
as to give it air, to convince it that there was something cleaner and cooler outside 
the suffocation of a single argument’ (12).  
In this way, the priest achieves a utopian reconfiguration of Booth’s 
agonistic precepts, persuading the misguided to change their minds through a 
combination of reasoned argument (in dialogue with Flambeau at the conclusion) 
and unreasoned play (in the preceding chase with Valentin), rather than 
eliminating unlike minds through forcible expulsion. Here Chesterton’s 
psychological concerns can again be understood to inform his philosophy, both in 
the sense that Brown’s mediating position between the two men enables him to 
counterbalance the former’s relativism (as expounded on the Heath) and the 
latter’s dogmatism (as expounded in the café), and insofar as his tempering of this 
extremism convinces both men to effect a personal change of outlook, in an echo 
of the ministrations of the monitory parodist, discussed in chapter one.  
The last of Chesterton’s four proofs of sanity states that ‘most sane men 
believe, and all sane men in practice assume, that they have a power of choice and 
responsibility for action’ (CDN 4: 242). The conversion narrative of ‘The Blue 
Cross’ not only exemplifies Chesterton’s belief in the capacity of individuals to 
engage autonomously in positive change, rather than being bound by the 
deterministic chains of heredity, but also constitutes the formula for the 
construction of a brotherhood of man. Chesterton’s utopian conclusion produces 
an existentially grotesque reconciliation of the binaries of the detective, Valentin, 
and the criminal, Flambeau—binaries which are also internally hybridised through 
the structural location of Father Brown as a detective-criminal. This grotesque 
premise is then lent satirical grounding by its challenge both to generic 
monologism and to the ‘monotony’ of urban planning and social classification, to 
produce a sophisticated counterweighting of the poles of parody.  
In view of the role of the excavated play-spirit of the city in abetting Father 
Brown’s raucous constitutional, it is appropriate that the game should finally be 
brought to an end when the urban landscape melts into the ‘Vale of Health’ (FB 
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13) that leads on to the communal leisure space of Hampstead Heath, a protected 
area of common land described, in a contemporary poster, as ‘London’s 
Playground’ (‘London’s Playground’), and populated, in the story at hand, with 
‘holiday makers’ (FB 13). This final touch brings Chesterton’s re-creation of the 
city as a playground for adults to an appropriately literal resolution, in a context 
that again suggests a critique of social segregation. Seven years earlier, in ‘The 
Gate of Town and Country’ (DN 8 Aug. 1903), Chesterton had written in praise of 
the success of a movement to prevent Eton College building upon the Heath. In 
summarizing the importance of this victory, Chesterton explains that ‘Hampstead 
Heath is beautiful, but it is something more than beautiful [. . .] It is a real 
playground of the poor’ (CDN 2: 110).  
The interplay of urban satire and urban grotesque in ‘The Blue Cross’ 
suggests that Chesterton’s critical ruminations on William Blake at this time 
spilled over into his creative work. The titles of the first Father Brown 
collections—The Innocence of Father Brown (1911), and The Wisdom of Father 
Brown (1914)—borrow Blake’s Innocence and Experience schema, representing 
Brown as a hybrid of the purity of childhood and the judgement of age, while the 
imagery of Blake’s ‘London’ finds an echo in Brown’s attempts to divest Valentin 
of his ‘mind-forged manacles’ by refiguring the utilitarian cityscape of the 
‘chartered streets’ (Blake, W; Plate 46) as a game-board. Chesterton later 
identified the particular appeal of Blake to lie in the incongruous quality of his 
urban imagination: ‘the great golden lions of Blake roared and roamed in a small 
court off the Strand’ (Autobiography 140). Similarly, Flambeau’s elemental nom 
de plume evokes the ‘furnace’ in which the ‘Tyger, burning bright’ (Songs Plate 
42) is wrought, while anthropomorphising and relocating the image to the streets 
of London. At the denouement, Flambeau is poised ‘to leap like a tiger’ (FB 17), 
only to be restrained by the curiosity that Brown’s unclassifiable behaviour 
engenders, before finally achieving utopian reconciliation with the priestly 
representative of the meek ‘lamb’ (Blake, W; Plate 42), an allusive framework 
which lends the local social context a universal theological dimension. 
In Chesterton’s pedagogically disruptive urban vision, incongruity is 
celebrated for the same qualities which the Victorian parodist, H.D. Traill, 
considered the word to encapsulate: ‘the unfit, the unsuitable, the discordant, the 
imperfect […] the unsymmetrical, the disorderly, in one word, the wrong’ (qtd. in 
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Martin 23). As well as embodying all those elements which are ‘left over, by 
every rationalistic system of life’ in Chesterton’s view, incongruity literally means 
‘disagreement’ (inverting the Latin, congruere, or ‘agree’; Barnhart 207). If the 
story at hand sets up an incongruity, or disagreement, with Holmesian detection, 
in order to celebrate ‘the wrong’, or excluded, in a social sense, it is also notable 
that Colebrook discerns a further dimension of disagreement, or wrongness, in 
Blake’s myriad-minded vocabulary. In discussing the democratically grotesque 
immanence of ‘London’, Colebrook argues that Blake’s text ‘both manages to 
express its lament and suggests that this lament is part of the problem’ (58).  
A similar quality of internalised disagreement is discernible in Sewell’s 
account of the ‘curious doubleness of vision […] apparent’ (‘Giant’ 559) in 
Chesterton’s symbolic landscape, which is manifested in his use of identical 
images to represent both good and evil in differing contexts and essays. While 
Sewell sees this as evidence of psychological disarray, Chesterton’s follow-up to 
‘The Blue Cross’, ‘The Secret Garden’, discloses a comparable ‘doubleness of 
vision’ being put to work in a deliberate act of collapsed self-dialogising, which 
implies that Chesterton was conscious that the philosophical limitations of 
monologic utopianism were also ‘part of the problem’. In consequence, to echo 
Chesterton’s account of the temporary nature of happiness, the utopian conclusion 
of ‘The Blue Cross’ is ‘not a state; it is a crisis’, which is immediately followed 
by a gesture of self-reflexive contradiction. As the following analysis will 
demonstrate, this causes the opening dyad of Father Brown stories to rebound 
inconclusively between aporic irresolution and a thoroughly anti-utopian form of 
narrative closure. 
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Metaparody, and the Limits of Utopian Brotherhood 
 
[W]here were these extravagant amputations going to stop? First one head was hacked 
off, and then another; in this case ([O’Brien] told himself bitterly) it was not true that 
two heads were better than one. 
Chesterton, ‘The Secret Garden’ (29) 
 
There is a mystical, even a monstrous truth, in the statement that two heads are better 
than one. But they ought both to grow on the same body. 
Chesterton, Manalive (52) 
 
In the opening line of ‘The Blue Cross’, Chesterton teases the reader by 
withholding the specifics of Valentin’s identity, merely noting that ‘the man we 
must follow was by no means conspicuous—nor wished to be’ (FB 3), a phrase 
that could equally apply to a detective or a criminal. This initial hint of the 
ambiguously interchangeable nature of ostensibly binary roles is fully realised in 
the stories that follow, in which Valentin becomes a criminal, and Flambeau later 
becomes a detective. Valentin’s negative conversion occurs in ‘The Secret 
Garden’, when the investigator returns to his official working life in Paris, and 
once more mislays his sense of humour, to such an extent that he gruesomely 
murders Julius K. Brayne, a philanthropic benefactor to nonconformist religions, 
before killing himself in turn. This plotline directly inverts the crimeless utopia of 
the previous story, much as Chesterton immediately followed up his critical essay 
on the ‘value’ of detective fiction with a complementary essay on its ‘danger’. In 
‘The Secret Garden’, Chesterton constructs the antithesis to the thesis of ‘The 
Blue Cross’, mocking the naivety of his own idealism in an act of collapsed self-
parody.  
Internalisation of adversarial dialogue was an everyday feature of 
Chesterton’s life—as Wills notes, he would walk up and down in his garden 
‘“heckling himself” for hours with ideas and arguments and symbolic duels’ (Man 
209). As I demonstrated in my opening chapter, this self-critical quality also 
found its way into Chesterton’s creative work, in his monitory representation of 
MacIan in The Ball and the Cross and Herne in The Return of Don Quixote. Boyd 
observes that the latter text ultimately conveys the message that the ‘restoration of 
pageantry and colour to political life which delights Herne and his followers is 
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also a means of deceiving them. It might be argued that the Distributist criticism 
of State Socialism and Capitalism is now turned against Distributism itself’ (192-
93). When the opening Father Brown stories are read together in the context of 
their parodic relationship to Sherlock Holmes, the result is a comparable act of 
self-questioning, which produces an example of what Morson terms ‘metaparody’.  
Morson argues that conventional parody establishes a position ‘of open 
disagreement’ with an ur text, in which the ‘second utterance represents the first 
in order to discredit it, and so introduce a “semantic direction” which subverts that 
of the original’ (‘Parody’ 66). As I have demonstrated, ‘The Blue Cross’ conforms 
to this principle by discrediting the perpetual schism of Doyle’s play-world, and 
introducing the alternative semantic direction necessary to produce a contrastive 
state of utopian brotherhood. In this way, ‘the second voice clearly [claims to 
represent] a higher “semantic authority” than the first’, so that the ‘audience of the 
conflict knows for sure with whom it is expected to agree’ (Morson, ‘Parody’ 66-
67). Morson argues that metaparody constitutes a further dialogic step beyond this 
combative stage, ‘by first parodying an original, then parodying the parody of the 
original’, with the effect that ‘[r]eaders of metaparody […] comprehend the work 
not as the compromise between book and counterbook, but as their ultimately 
inconclusive dialogue’ (‘Parody’ 81).  
 ‘The Secret Garden’ conforms to this principle, by thematically re-
establishing a Holmesian model of agonistic alienation, even as it enacts the 
structural extermination of the logician detective, while drawing both the reader 
and the parodist into the sphere of criticism by disclosing the dangers of credulity 
before the claims of romance—whether those of the Holmesian rationalist or the 
Chestertonian demagogue. Significantly, Morson identifies ‘meta-utopia’ as a 
characteristically ‘metaparodic genre. A type of threshold literature, meta-utopias 
are designed to be interpreted as dialogues between utopia and the parody of 
utopia’ (‘Parody’ 85). In the case at hand, by having Valentin commit the two 
most serious crimes in Christian doctrine, Chesterton showcases the fragility of 
the utopian brotherhood constructed by ‘The Blue Cross’, which is parodied in a 
dystopian exposition of monomaniacal derangement and violence. If ‘The Blue 
Cross’ constitutes an apparently self-contained and convincing realisation of 
Chesterton’s critical and creative aims, it seems that he is drawn, nonetheless, to 
exposing any narrative that his own thesis might have ‘left over’, even if this 
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means disturbing the unity of his original vision, in order to expose the artificial 
limitations that this unity imposes. As Bakhtin argues, ‘[a]ll of European 
utopianism’ has been ‘built on [the] monologic principle’ (Problems 82), and the 
anti-utopia of ‘The Secret Garden’ acknowledges the comparable danger of 
single-mindedness in the drift of Chesterton’s own thought.  
By arresting Aristide’s dramatic presence in a manner which serves to 
deselect the representative of officialdom from his circle of friends, Chesterton 
also hints at the tension between his Whitmanian ethical ideal of the ‘new city of 
friends’ and his equally strong urge to maintain subjective definition through 
opposition. In one sense, Chesterton’s metaparodic sequel operates in another 
subtly utopian context, as an attempt to overcome the agonism of the game of 
parody between one author and another, in which a fight for discursive authority 
is staged, by implying that Chesterton’s crimeless utopias ‘may be no more 
authoritative’ as a generic model than the paranoiac fantasias of Doyle’s 
imaginative landscape. However, in another sense the story represents 
Chesterton’s final, unequivocal assertion that there is no place for the Holmesian 
logician within his vision of the genre, and the unresolved dialogic tension 
between these incompatible positions informs the imagery and plot development 
of ‘The Secret Garden’ in a number of subtle ways. 
In view of my earlier account of Chesterton’s symbolic association of the 
cross and the sword with the poles of the grotesque and the satiric, it is telling that 
the cross, which operates as the abiding symbol of free play in the ‘The Blue 
Cross’, is conspicuously absent from ‘The Secret Garden’, and is replaced by the 
sword as the object around which the crime centres. Since a sword is the weapon 
with which Valentin brutally dispatches Brayne—he hated ‘his foe so fiendishly 
that he stood sabring his body in the moonlight’ (FB 29)—this operates as a 
symbol of the dogmatic certainties that inform Valentin’s dry wit, unalloyed by 
the confession of internal contradiction which Chesterton ascribes to humour. On 
the other hand, the metaparodic status of the text in relation to the previous story 
corresponds to Chesterton’s account of the symbolic meaning of the cross, as 
discussed in chapter one, insofar as it is enacts ‘the conflict of two hostile lines, of 
irreconcilable direction’.  
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The implicit interrelation of the opening stories covertly smuggles the 
grotesque principle of the cross into a narrative which thematically critiques 
monomania by expelling that symbol on the action level, and replacing it with the 
satirical symbol of the sword, which I discussed in the previous section as the 
weapon taken up by Chesterton himself, after Nehemiah, in order to dogmatically 
refute the validity of the Holmesian model of detection. Consequently, 
metaparody can be understood to operate as a creative expression of the capacity 
for self-contradictory internal dialogue that Chesterton claims to be the augur of 
the healthy self-doubt which governs ‘humour’. Ironically, when this element is 
injected into ‘The Secret Garden’, the effect is to celebrate the author’s capacity to 
consider himself wrong, in a manner which subtly encodes a further implied 
criticism of the monologic certainties of Doyle’s fictional world, so that the very 
confession of internal contradiction subtly reinstates a sense of the author’s more 
fundamental rectitude.  
In the ‘Humour’ essay, Chesterton describes fictional self-parody as an 
innovation of Cervantes, in Don Quixote: ‘with the great Cervantes [comes] an 
element new in its explicit expression; that grand and very Christian quality of the 
man who laughs at himself. Cervantes was himself more chivalrous than most 
men when he began to mock at chivalry’ (Spice 28). Similarly, Chesterton’s 
scrupulously chivalrous approach to debunking the romances of Doyle is 
reinforced by his capacity to laugh at his own utopian ambitions. As Dentith 
argues, in Cervantes’ novel, ‘it is not the falseness of parodied genres that makes 
them subject to attack, but their one-sided seriousness’ (Parody 76). In an earlier 
article, which figures Don Quixote as ‘The Divine Parody’ (DN 3 Sept. 1901), 
Chesterton claims that Cervantes’ text is also wholesomely anti-Hegelian in its 
purposeful irresolution, thus hinting at the status of dialogism as a freezing of the 
dialectical process at the inconclusive stage of antithetic relation: it ‘will always 
remain and give a great deal of trouble to any persons who wish to tie us up 
finally in any political constitution or synthetic philosophy’ (CDN 1: 178). In the 
same article, Chesterton conjures a gravely visionary, yet tangibly utopian vision 
of the novel’s dialogic message, which figures Don Quixote as an archetype of the 
existential grotesque, or ‘an irony that is older than the world’: 
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Deep underneath all the superficial wit and palpable gaiety of [Don Quixote] there 
runs a far deeper kind of irony—an irony that is older than the world. It is the irony 
that tells us that we live in a maddening and perplexing world, in which we are all 
right; and that the battle of existence has always been like King Arthur’s last battle in 
the mist, one in which “friend slew friend, not knowing whom he slew” (CDN 1: 
177). 
 
This is also the message that Chesterton attempts to encode within the 
metaparodic structure of ‘The Secret Garden’, mitigating his attack upon Doyle 
with the implication that perhaps, generically, ‘we are all right’, in a story that 
depicts, by way of negative example, Valentin slaying a figure who he takes to be 
an implacable existential enemy, in the red mist of his irrational, ‘monomaniac’ 
(FB 29) rationalism. Much as ‘The Secret Garden’ operates in unresolved 
dialogue with ‘The Blue Cross’, the story thematically welds together two 
discordant narratives within itself —one utopian, the other anti-utopian. The first 
sets up a conventional romance, in which Chesterton faithfully employs the tropes 
of festive comedy in depicting the trials of Commandant O’Brien, an ‘Irish-
Algerian n’er-do-weel’ (FB 22), who is initially barred from marrying the story’s 
bridal figure, Lady Margaret Graham, by a suspicion of guilt in connection to the 
murder. The second, interlinked narrative is a satire of the modern romance of 
detection, in which the secondary characters are impugned for their credulity, and 
the figure conventionally relied upon to secure the folkloric unblocking action, the 
detective, is revealed to have placed the blockage in O’Brien’s path, by 
committing the murder which he briefly attempts to pass off as O’Brien’s crime.  
In developing this plot-strand, Chesterton also implants a more politically 
pointed satirical subtext within the conventional rendering of a festive comic 
narrative. Much as the unofficial spirit of London triumphs over the modern 
professional investigator in ‘The Blue Cross’, O’Brien’s membership of the 
Foreign Legion renders him an unofficial figure, who triumphs over the 
establishment archetypes surrounding him, such as Lord Graham, who despises 
him for his unorthodox military status—blustering, ‘“[w]here’s his confounded 
cavalry”’ (FB 26)—by winning the affection of Graham’s daughter, who 
insubordinately terms her father an ‘old fool’ (FB 26) when he questions 
O’Brien’s innocence. When the narrator refers to the Foreign Legion as a 
grotesquely hybridised troupe of ‘victorious failures’ (FB 20), O’Brien’s success 
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in winning the girl structurally inverts the dictum which informed the anti-
materialist premise of ‘The Blue Cross’—Chesterton’s monitory moral that 
‘nothing fails like success’. The wider geopolitical context implied by O’Brien’s 
dual-nationality also enables Chesterton to implicitly expand his domestic critique 
to the imperial arena. In 1910, Algeria was subjugated by the French state, as 
represented in the story at hand by the official figure of Valentin, while 
Chesterton argued in a near-contemporaneous article (‘The Kind of Man.’ DN 26 
Aug. 1911) that Britain occupied an equally ignominious position: the ‘police in 
Ireland are practically an army of occupation’, and consequently ‘the whole 
civilised world sees Ireland […] as a typical oppressed nation’ (CDN 7: 191).8  
The readiness of the guests to believe in O’Brien’s guilt merges the satire 
of political conformity with a satire of generic conventionality, through which the 
characters are critiqued as excessively credulous in the face of romantic cliché, a 
motif which suggests a further correspondence to Don Quixote. Morson cites 
Cervantes’ novel as a prototypical metaparodic text (see ‘Parody’ 81), and it is 
notable that the parodic movement of the opening Father Brown stories 
approximately corresponds to that of the two books of Don Quixote. As with 
Cervantes’ dyadic text, Chesterton’s opening stories gradually re-orientate the site 
of satirical attack from an initial criticism of the producers of devalued 
literature—as represented by the narrator’s mockery of Futrelle’s ‘thinking 
machine’ in ‘The Blue Cross’—to a criticism of the uncritical consumers in ‘The 
Secret Garden’. In ‘The Divine Parody’, Chesterton notes that Cervantes’ second 
book is lacking in the ‘“farcical episode, in [the] burlesque force, and in the most 
obvious effects of humour”’ (CDN 1: 177) possessed by the first. These effects 
are also those employed by ‘The Blue Cross’, and singularly lacking in ‘The 
Secret Garden’. In the latter story, these ebullient qualities are replaced with a 
more sombre critique of the negative influence of sensational literature—
including, potentially, Chesterton’s own—upon the complacent reader, which 
corresponds to that which Cervantes encodes within his complexly self-parodic 
second book. As Morson elaborates, ‘[r]eaders of the Quixote […] may be 
reasonably sure that the first book is a parody directed at naïve readers of 
romances and tales of knight errantry. But they may be less sure about the second 
                                                 
8
 In William Blake, published contemporaneously with ‘The Secret Garden’, Chesterton appeals 
for Ireland to be made ‘free, like any other Christian nation, to create her own institutions’ (4). 
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book, which seems to be directed at readers of the first book as well (‘Parody’ 81).  
When O’Brien stands accused of the murder, the narrator mockingly depicts 
the guests ‘tingling at the touch of those satanic tragedies that have been between 
lovers before now. [… Tales] of murdered husbands and poisonous paramours’ 
(FB 27). In this way, romance is employed to debunk romance, with the 
secondary characters, and implicitly the reader beyond them, being figured as 
credulous romantics who must be taught a lesson in prosaic reality, a comic 
conceit which stands in a parodic lineage stretching from Don Quixote to 
Northanger Abbey (see Dentith, Parody 64). In contrast, Valentin’s servant, Ivan, 
is represented as a meta-textually self-aware respondent to the conventions of the 
mystery story. The narrator notes that Ivan seems to irreverently enjoy ‘the glow 
of the domestic detective story’ (FB 24), while his forbidding bearing and ‘scarred 
face’ (FB 27), operate as deliberately clichéd evocations of detective fiction 
archetypes on the part of the narrator. Father Brown shares Ivan’s air of arch 
detachment, interrupting the pseudo-fictional reverie of the guests with the 
nonsensical imputation that Brayne must have been smoking a vastly elongated 
cigar to have been absent for so long. Ivan then complements Brown’s 
interposition of a burlesque sanity upon morbid reveries, by contributing a 
rhetorical travesty of the situation, announcing that Brayne has ‘“Gone. Scooted. 
Evaporated”’ (FB 27), and later referring to ‘“that old buffer you found on the 
lawn” […] without pretence of reverence’ (FB 31).  
Chesterton’s debunking of the conventions of romance is not only reflected 
in the status of ‘The Secret Garden’ as a sympathetic pastiche of Cervantes, but 
also in the tale’s extension of Chesterton’s critical parodying of Poe. While ‘The 
Blue Cross’ parodically recontextualises the mutual alienation of the urban 
flâneurs of ‘The Man of the Crowd’ in order to enact a utopian resolution, ‘The 
Secret Garden’ satirises the alternative path of detection that Poe instigated with 
his introduction of the rationalist detective, Dupin, in ‘The Murders in the Rue 
Morgue’. Valentin, whose French nationality links him as much to Dupin as to 
Holmes, asserts that the killer ‘“must have been as strong as a gorilla”’ (FB 23), 
thus planting a seed of doubt in the other characters’ minds by conflating the case 
at hand with a well-known story based on brute physical force rather than diseased 
intellect, in which the mystery derives from a locked-room puzzle, as here a 
locked-garden: ‘“the garden was sealed up like an air-tight chamber”’ (FB 33). 
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This topographical vacuum operates as a travesty of the bucolic space of 
Hampstead Heath in ‘The Blue Cross’, directly inverting Chesterton’s account of 
giving ‘air’ to the diseased mind, in the manner of Brown’s urban constitutional, 
so that the garden becomes a metaphor for the claustrophobic restrictions of 
Valentin’s monologic mind-set.  
As Knight observes of the comparable metaphorical significance of the 
asylum in The Ball and the Cross, by ‘dissolving the existence of the external 
world, the house creates a labyrinth reality that imprisons its inhabitants in the 
world of the grotesque’ (Evil 82). This version of the grotesque is again the 
intellectually isolated, ‘Romantic’ variety that Bakhtin contrasts with the benign 
‘folk’ grotesque of the carnivalesque. Poe originally planned his inaugural Dupin 
mystery to be published as one of his Tales of the Grotesque and Arabesque 
(1840), and, as Kayser notes, Poe ‘uses the word grotesque […] to describe a 
situation in which chaos prevails’ (79), much as O’Brien apprehends ‘an insane 
universe crashing about his ears’ (FB 30) in ‘The Secret Garden’. As with the 
dyadic structure of Thursday, Chesterton’s opening suite of Father Brown stories 
essays a movement between distinct forms of the grotesque, though in this 
instance the movement is, significantly, reversed—the fairy-tale, carnivalesque 
world of ‘The Blue Cross’ dissolves into the fractured, nonsensical nightmare of 
‘The Secret Garden’.  
The nature of the distinction is neatly encapsulated by the imaginative leap 
from Valentin’s carnivalesque bodily incongruity in ‘The Blue Cross’, which is 
located in the ‘contrast between the holiday gaiety of his clothes and the official 
gravity of his face’ (FB 3), to the grisly manner in which he transplants a 
criminal’s head onto Brayne’s decapitated body in ‘The Secret Garden’. Bakhtin 
notes that the Romantic grotesque is a ‘nocturnal’ form, whereas ‘folk grotesque’ 
is a festival of ‘morning’ (Rabelais 41). The opening stories progress from ‘the 
silver ribbon of morning’ (FB 3) with which ‘The Blue Cross’ opens, to the 
nocturnal realm of ‘The Secret Garden’, which is presided over by the moon, 
Chesterton’s circular symbol of ‘reason and madness’, which is invoked on nine 
separate occasions in the text. While Bakhtin’s argument that in ‘folk grotesque, 
madness is a gay parody of official reason’ corresponds to the festive unreason of 
‘The Blue Cross’, he notes that the theme of madness in the Romantic grotesque 
‘acquires a somber, tragic aspect of individual isolation’ (Rabelais 39). The 
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atmosphere of dread promoted by Valentin’s crime finally causes another liminal 
space to emerge, this time within O’Brien’s imagination, to produce an evocative 
image of mental disarray: ‘The borderland of the brain, where all the monsters are 
made, moved horribly in the Gaelic O’Brien. He felt the chaotic presence of all 
the horse-men and fish-women that man’s unnatural fancy has begotten’ (FB 33; 
my emphasis).  
If the respective locations of Chesterton’s opening stories—London and 
Paris—hark back, with arch generic self-reference, to Poe’s progress from the 
London streets of ‘The Man of the Crowd’ to the Parisian locked-room of ‘The 
Murders in the Rue Morgue’, these sites also contribute to the projection of 
complementary opposites. Chesterton’s freewheeling, carnivalesque depiction of 
London, in which urban disorder serves as the means of inducting a more subtly 
harmonious social order, gives way to the diseased romanticism of O’Brien’s 
vision of Paris: ‘He saw the whole city as one ugly energy, from the sanguinary 
sketch lying on Valentin’s table up to where, above a mountain and forest of 
gargoyles, the great devil grins on Notre Dame’ (FB 30). The implication that this 
‘ugly energy’ projects from a ‘great devil’ associated with Notre Dame not only 
inverts Chesterton’s benign conception of St. Paul’s as the topographical nucleus 
of London, but also inverts the positive, Blakean schema of Flambeau’s 
carnivalesque devilry. Correspondingly, in ‘The Secret Garden’, Valentin 
becomes a Miltonic Romantic Satan, who ultimately refuses to ‘bow to [his] 
master’ (FB 18), Father Brown. When the investigator rises up in rebellion against 
the authority of the church, Brown asserts that ‘“the fanatic took flame”’ (FB 34). 
As Bakhtin explains, the ‘Romantic treatment of the devil is […] completely 
different from that of popular grotesque’, with the formerly ‘gay ambivalent 
figure’ becoming ‘terrifying, melancholy, and tragic’ (Rabelais 40-41). 
Valentin’s progress operates as a further example of the extremes of 
relativism and dogmatism converging in Chesterton’s imaginative landscape—the 
‘sour smile’ of the inscrutable ironist of the ‘The Blue Cross’ runs full circle to 
translate seamlessly into the ‘blasting sneer’ of the ‘fanatic’ (FB 31). Again, this 
symbolism anticipates Bakhtin’s account of the distinction between the two 
modes of grotesque. In the Romantic form, ‘laughter [was] cut down to cold 
humour, irony, sarcasm [...] Its positive regenerating power was reduced to a 
minimum’ (Rabelais 38). When Valentin finally commits suicide, the narrator 
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identifies the ‘pride of Cato’ (FB 35) in his expression. This image finds a later 
echo in Chesterton’s parody of Poe’s ‘The Raven’ (1845), in his mock-pedagogic 
‘School English Composition’: ‘with a heart as cold as Cato’s, or the pallid bust 
of Plato’s / That I keep with canned tomatoes just above my chamber door’ 
(Collected Nonsense 55). The allusion to Cato the Younger in ‘The Secret 
Garden’ signals a return to the Holmesian realm of intractable agonism, insofar as 
Cato’s conflict with Julius Caesar (recall that the murdered philanthropist is 
named Julius) ended with Cato killing himself, in a definitive gesture of refusal to 
share the world with an antipathetic mind. In the context of a metaparodic text 
which attempts to grapple with its own relation to the antipathetic minds of Poe 
and Doyle, the circumstances of Valentin’s death are particularly ironic, since 
Chesterton considered suicide the ultimate refusal to enter into dialogue—the 
most distressingly final of conversation killers: ‘The man who kills himself, kills 
all men; as far as he is concerned he wipes out the world’ (Orthodoxy 65). 
Paradoxically, Chesterton’s sloughing off of the investigator appears to 
signal his own ultimate inability to accommodate the antithetical visions of his 
precursors within his imaginative world. In a further example of the carefully 
wrought complementarity of the opening stories, while Valentin is led to 
Hampstead Heath in ‘The Blue Cross’ as the benevolently conceived scapegoat in 
a generic fertility ritual, ‘The Secret Garden’ concludes with the assembled guests 
driving ‘the unhappy Brown before them like a hostage or a sacrifice’ (FB 35) to 
the room in which Valentin’s body is discovered, a conceit lent further irony by 
the fact that Valentin’s suicide represents Chesterton’s final, ineluctable 
scapegoating of the rationalist archetype. In a later account of the popularity of 
parodies of Sherlock Holmes (‘The World of Sherlock Holmes.’ ILN 15 Jan. 
1927), Chesterton argues that ‘even the satire against him is a sort of sacrifice to 
him. He has been parodied, but he has always been imitated’ (CW 34: 237). A 
sacrifice is, of course, offered in the hope of regeneration, and Bakhtin ultimately 
claims cultural regeneration to be the mystical purpose of carnival, which 
‘celebrates the destruction of the old and the birth of the new world’ (Rabelais 
410).  
In the case at hand, the satire against Holmes is accompanied by a sacrifice 
of him, a context which adds an interesting dimension to the frequent critical 
complaint that Bakhtin’s account of carnival is excessively utopian, a complaint 
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that might equally be directed at Chesterton’s earlier deployment of carnivalesque 
motifs, in Thursday and ‘The Blue Cross’. Valentin’s death is the first and last of 
any major character in Chesterton’s fiction, and this example of the expulsion of 
an undesirable ‘other’ to foster community cohesion offers an insight into the less 
benign dimensions of the carnivalesque, implying that the carnival’s energies 
retain an essentially agonistic, as well as affirmative, edge, as we have also seen to 
be the case with the utopian, yet oppositional construct of the ‘new city of 
friends’. In Docker’s analysis of Bakhtin’s utopianism, he cites Goethe’s 
recollection of witnessing strangers being compelled ‘to resign themselves to 
being made fun of’ in the carnival of Rome, and notes that Bakhtin’s account of 
carnival ‘plays down any opposing presence of ethnocentrism and hostility to 
foreigners or those conceived as outsiders’ (191). Nonetheless, in the case at hand 
it is essential to understand Chesterton’s expulsion of Valentin as philosophical, 
rather than nationalistic, since Flambeau also constitutes a foreign body, and is 
very deliberately brought back into Britain in the third story, ‘The Queer Feet’, in 
the wake of Valentin’s permanent removal.  
Chesterton’s parodic generic intervention with Father Brown conforms to 
Boris Eichenbaum’s analysis of ‘the evolution of each genre [in which] there are 
times when its use for entirely serious or elevated objectives degenerates and 
produces a comic or parodic form […] And thus is produced the regeneration of 
the genre’ (qtd. in Bradbury, ‘Age’ 53). In ‘The Secret Garden’, this regeneration 
is effected through the efficacy of the dual plot, in which Valentin’s death directly 
coincides with the festive-comic triumph of O’Brien. As Morson explains, the co-
presence of utopia and anti-utopia within the same text is also a characteristic of 
metaparody: ‘there exist two classes of text that enter into dialogic relation with 
utopias, namely anti-utopias, which parody utopias, and meta-utopias, in which 
utopia and anti-utopia themselves enter into an ultimately inconclusive dialogue’ 
(‘Parody’ 68).  
In a discussion of Dickens’s decision to follow up the picaresque romp of 
The Pickwick Papers (1836) with the sinister fever dream of Oliver Twist (1838), 
Chesterton argues that there ‘is nothing odd in the fact that the same man who 
conceived the humane hospitalities of Pickwick should also have imagined the 
inhuman laughter of Fagin’s den […] the whole human tradition has tied up 
together in a strange knot these strands of festivity and fear’ (CW 15: 264). In a 
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comparable spirit, Chesterton subtly intertwines the parallel narrative threads of 
‘The Secret Garden’—which embody festivity and fear—with the benign imagery 
of his preceding story. For example, the Romantic grotesque trope of the 
gruesome murder and the festive comic trope of O’Brien’s romantic betrothal both 
take place in Valentin’s ‘blue-and-silver garden’ (FB 22), hybridising death and 
renewal within a space symbolically linked to the blue and silver of Father 
Brown’s cross. When O’Brien’s triumph is followed, in ‘The Queer Feet’, with 
the return of the carnivalesque dyad of Father Brown and Flambeau, and the 
rebirth of the series as festive-comic satire, Chesterton finds a means of investing 
a further gesture towards utopianism with a still-more pugnacious satirical 
broadside against generic and social conventionality, in a text suffused with 
uproarious imagery of death and renewal. 
 
 ‘The Queer Feet’ as Carnivalesque Social Satire  
 
The English statesman […] is born with a silver spoon in his mouth, so that he may 
never afterwards be found with the silver spoons in his pocket[.] 
 
Chesterton, What’s Wrong With the World (CW 4: 61) 
 
‘The Queer Feet’ finds Father Brown entangled in the annual dinner celebrations 
of a private gentleman’s club, ‘The Twelve True Fishermen’, because one of their 
waiters, a Roman Catholic, has inconveniently died on the eve of the event. As 
Brown notes down the details of the waiter’s confession in an ante-room, he is 
disturbed by a series of unusual footsteps in the hall, which, it transpires, are those 
of Flambeau, who has been adapting his gait halfway along the corridor from the 
leisurely step of a club member to the hurried step of a waiter. In this way, 
Flambeau successfully steals the club’s cutlery merely by altering his demeanour 
as he moves between the table and the kitchen, physically parodying the 
gentlemen with silver spoons in their mouths, in order to pocket those same 
spoons. Upon guessing this explanation, Brown confronts Flambeau in the 
cloakroom, persuades him to hand back the cutlery, and then lets him go, before 
explaining to the guests what has taken place. With both his official and unofficial 
work complete, Brown leaves the guests to resume their meal, and the story ends.  
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Such are the specific action-level events of the story. However, this 
synopsis is not accurately representative of the narrative bulk of the story, which 
is substantially composed of extended authorial discursions concerning the 
inhabitants of the club—digressions which bear little relevance to the mystery at 
hand, beyond conveying the conditions of mental torpor which make the crime 
possible, a necessity incommensurate to their tone and frequency. As this implies, 
perhaps more than any other Father Brown story, ‘The Queer Feet’ subjugates the 
mystery element to the satirical component, with the conveyance of the latter 
becoming the overwhelming purpose of the narrative. Indeed, because so little of 
the account is temporally propulsive, but rather composed of a series of extra-
temporal digressions, the exposition of the execution and explanation of the crime 
takes up only around half of the text. In this way, the ‘progression/digression 
dichotomy’ (‘Backward’ 330) which Porter identifies as a key trope of the genre is 
parodically exaggerated in a manner suggestive of the perambulations of the 
criminal—dallying for a time, before suddenly shooting forward—so as to hint 
archly at a complicity between the narrator and Flambeau in the construction of 
the plot, much as the narrator and Father Brown conspire to draw Valentin and 
Flambeau into the benign trap of ‘The Blue Cross’. However, while in the earlier 
instance the enforced collaboration is enacted on the plot level, in ‘The Queer 
Feet’ the role of scapegoat is imposed upon the reader.  
In a further correspondence, ‘The Queer Feet’ establishes another scenario 
which creates a period of ‘gay time’. As Huizinga notes, ‘the relationship between 
feast and play is very close. Both proclaim a standstill to ordinary life’ (41). By 
opening up another carnivalesque space at the heart of London—though crucially 
now in a confined, rather than topographically open scenario—through the theme 
of the feast, Chesterton employs Flambeau’s status as a prankster-thief to 
encourage an interrogation of the propriety of property. To this end, Chesterton 
exploits the license opened up by the liminal space of carnival to exonerate 
Flambeau for committing the cutlery theft, while impugning the reader for aiding 
and abetting a more serious criminal act—the annexation of property from 
common access. As Chesterton succinctly summarised the issue a year earlier, in 
an augury of the intertwined satirical subtexts of ‘The Queer Feet’ and ‘The Blue 
Cross’, the wealthy man ‘will not (as a rule) steal spoons; but he will steal 
common land’ (‘The Very Decayed Gentleman.’ DN 6 Nov. 1909; CDN 6: 124).  
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In elaborating this point in ‘The Queer Feet’, Chesterton splits the story 
into two sections, each beginning with a lengthy, temporally neutral, scene-setting 
discursion on the part of the narrator, before moving on to an account of the 
events that take place, so that the preliminary exposition of the inner workings of 
the society becomes intimately wedded to the secondary exposition of the crime, 
with the society being revealed to have participated in its own undoing. In the first 
section these events are heard from Father Brown’s disempowered perspective as 
he sits in a darkened, cell-like room; in the second they are seen from the 
empowered viewpoint of the diners, whose greater topographical and sensory 
liberty only serves to emphasise their cognitive inadequacy. Brown’s 
imprisonment in a closed-off locale initially serves to symbolise his 
disempowerment in the social structure at hand, while also constituting a 
generically self-referential inversion of the Poe-derived ‘locked room’ schema, in 
which the archetype is for the crime to be perpetrated within the hermetically-
sealed room, rather than beyond it. This parodic conceit is developed by Brown’s 
subsequent explanation of Flambeau’s method, which draws a third allusion to 
Poe’s detective fiction into the opening stories, since it implies that a reading of 
‘The Purloined Letter’ (1844) has influenced the criminal. Just as Poe’s letter was 
left exposed on a table for all to see, Brown admiringly observes that Flambeau 
‘“did not go and hide in dim corners where suspicion might have searched for 
him”’ (FB 49).  
Again, the parody of detection archetypes is employed to enable social 
satire, since the latter remark signals Father Brown’s sympathetic alignment with 
the criminal rather than the society. As Brown explains to the colonel at the 
story’s conclusion, in another approving remark, once Flambeau had conceived 
his criminal method ‘“[a]ll the rest was acting, and thunderously good acting too”’ 
(FB 49). The net effect is to establish a complex air of complicity between the 
storyteller and his protagonists, with each of the three figures parodying the other 
in various ways. For example, Brown employs physical mimicry of Flambeau as a 
deductive method, copying the curious footsteps ‘with his finger on the edge of 
the table, like a man trying to learn a tune on the piano’ (FB 39). Meanwhile, 
Flambeau’s dual-role of waiter and guest operates as a satirically motivated 
embodiment of the existentially grotesque principle of parody practiced by his 
creator—in acting ‘two parts at once’ (FB 48), Flambeau splits himself into a 
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hybridised binary of the two poles of the club. At the denouement, Father Brown 
complements this relativizing of class conventions of low and high, with a gesture 
of comparable equivalence on the aesthetic plane, when he implicitly praises the 
narrator by comparing the construction of the plot to that of Hamlet (FB 49). 
In a characteristically Chestertonian development, Brown’s apparent 
disempowerment ultimately contributes to his success in solving the mystery, 
since the dark of the cloakroom annex initially heightens the acuteness of his aural 
perception, and later serves to ‘cloak’ him from Flambeau’s gaze, while the latter 
is illuminated by the light of the corridor. In an allusion to the disempowerment of 
the actor before the spectator, the lighting ‘threw little illumination on Father 
Brown himself, who seemed a mere dark outline against the dim sunset window 
behind him. But it threw an almost theatrical light on the man who stood outside 
the cloakroom in the corridor’ (FB 41). It is appropriate, then, that it is a misstep 
in Flambeau’s acting that gives him away, and that this arises from his use of a 
rhetorical pun, which operates as a verbal echo of the physical pun presented by 
his dual-identity. Brown intuits the nature of the crime when Flambeau jokingly 
leaves a tip: ‘the strange gentleman who had been feeling in his waistcoat pocket, 
said, laughing, “I haven’t got any silver; you can keep this.” And he threw down 
half a sovereign’, to which Brown replies: ‘“I think, sir […] that you have some 
silver in your pocket”’ (FB 42). As with the emphasis upon the destabilising 
communicative power of the joke in ‘The Blue Cross’, here Brown enacts the 
subversion of another would-be private joke at his expense, by successfully 
decoding the irony.  
Brown’s confounding of the private joke on the action level corresponds to 
the narrator’s refusal to allow the reader to enjoy the joke of the story without 
becoming implicated within it in turn. To this end, ‘The Queer Feet’ draws on a 
carnivalesque strategy that suffuses Chesterton’s journalism, in which the reader 
is insistently drawn into the frame, in a manner that breaks down the sense of 
distinction between speaker and auditor. For Chesterton, this frequently serves a 
self-defensive function as a means of advertising self-awareness, via an 
anticipatory reflex which treads an ambiguous line between ironical acerbity and 
obsequious flattery. In a particularly curious example (‘What You Propose.’ DN 
24 Oct. 1908), Chesterton observes that ‘I have become heartily sick of the word 
“I” in these articles. You will reply (with your old rapidity in repartee) that you 
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were sick of it a long time before I was’ (CDN 5: 195). The solution that he posits 
as a means of varying this monotony is one that draws the reader into enforced 
identification with the essayist, aggressively confounding the status of the two 
participants in the reception process. Henceforth, ‘I will not say of an adventure 
that I actually went through it. I will say that you actually went through it. My 
articles shall not be any longer a mere autobiography; they shall be the official 
biography of yourself’ (CDN 5: 195).  
While this confusion of ‘I’ and ‘you’ again hints at the parodist’s urge to 
engage in a disorientating disruption of the boundaries of subjectivity, it also 
indicates a desire to promote in the reader a sense of empathetic relation. 
Chesterton’s engagement with the reader is a dialogic act intended to break down 
mutual detachment, guarding against solipsism while promoting consciousness on 
both sides: the writer becomes more acutely aware of his or herself through 
consciousness of the presence of the audience, while the audience is made more 
self-conscious by being made aware of its ethical relation to the writer. In a rather 
Barthesian eulogy to the reader as active agent, Chesterton notes that ‘there is a 
great deal of difference between an eager man who wants to read a book and a 
tired man who wants a book to read’ (Charles 51), and his finger-jabbing at the 
sedate reader can be understood as a carnivalesque means of forcibly promoting 
this sense of active participation. As an anonymous contemporary reviewer noted, 
‘Mr. Chesterton never leaves one in a mood of dull acquiescence’ (‘The Man’ 
144). In a similar action, the withering satirical remarks of the narrator of ‘The 
Queer Feet’ are consistently aimed at both the club and the reader. The structure 
of this conceit corresponds on the narrative level to the way in which Flambeau 
vaults the cloakroom divide into Brown’s ‘off-stage’ area when he is found out. 
The narrator challenges the reader’s comparable empowerment to contemplate the 
‘golden gallery’ (FB 38) of the club from behind the two-way-mirror of the text, 
by pointing his finger out from the page in a direct ‘from me to you’ address:  
 
If you meet a member of that select club, ‘The Twelve True Fishermen,’ entering the 
Vernon Hotel for the annual club dinner, you will observe, as he takes off his overcoat, 
that his evening coat is green and not black. If (supposing that you have the star-
defying audacity to address such a being) you ask him why, he will probably answer 
that he does it to avoid being mistaken for a waiter. You will then retire crushed. […] 
But since it is immeasurably unlikely that you will ever rise high enough in the social 
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world to find ‘The Twelve True Fishermen,’ or that you will ever sink low enough 
among slums and criminals to find Father Brown, I fear that you will never hear the 
story at all unless you hear it from me (FB 36). 
 
The phrases, ‘[y]ou will then retire crushed’ and ‘it is immeasurably 
unlikely’, both employ the assertive present tense ‘will’ and ‘is’ to convey a sense 
of proximity to the reader and inevitability of outcome in the social interaction. 
Meanwhile, the phrase, ‘star-defying’, in the extraneous parenthesis explicitly 
addresses the specious, fatalistic sense of fixity surrounding class distinctions in 
early-twentieth-century Britain—this ‘phantasmal and yet fixed society’ (FB 43), 
as Chesterton refers to the club, and, beyond it, the class system of his day, later in 
the story. These parenthetic asides initiate the double-narrative quality of the 
story, in which a conventional exposition is, time and again, butted into 
obtrusively by the narrator, in a manner suggestive of an oral reading in which the 
speaker, indignant at the circumstances he is being asked to recount, continually 
adds his own sardonic, improvisatory gloss upon the events. The reader, like 
Brown, is figured as a listener, with the jarring notes in the narration forming a 
further corollary of the sudden alterations in Flambeau’s step, here serving to 
maintain the listener’s attention and jolt his/her projected passivity. This 
interactive methodology produces a striking correspondence with Chesterton’s 
article of the same year, ‘The Flat Freak’, in which he again adopts an intimate, 
insinuating narrative tone in an exposition of the dismal banality of the upper-
class fancy-dress party, rhetorically pondering why it is ‘that you and I feel that 
we would (on the whole) rather spend the evening with two or three stable boys in 
a pot-house than take part in that pallid and Arctic joke?’ (CDN 6: 177; my 
emphasis).  
In ‘The Queer Feet’, the narrator’s introductory address to the reader leads 
into an extended passage of scene-setting (albeit one still couched in the curious 
mode of direct author/reader second-person dialogue) for a further two 
uninterrupted pages, before abruptly repeating the jarring parenthetical tactic: 
‘When you enter (as you never will) the Vernon Hotel, you pass down a short 
passage’ (FB 38). This delayed repetition of the extraneous aside, with its 
declarative, finger-pointing assertion—‘you never will’—acts as an 
incontrovertible interdiction, immediately counteracting the opposing linguistic 
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liberties extended to the reader by the phrase ‘when you enter’ and the collapsed 
repetition of ‘pass’, with its suggestive connotations (‘please, pass’, ‘I have a 
pass’), removing the fourth wall only to brutally clamp it down again. We can 
view such impositions as effecting the most extreme mode of defamiliarisation 
possible without the fictional form turning into pure journalism, since the refusal 
to allow the reader to suspend his/her disbelief contradicts the first presupposition 
of the author’s intent in fiction. Chesterton’s disinclination to allow the reader to 
wallow in the romantic conventions of the form recalls Huizinga’s explanation of 
the ethical purpose of subverting the rules of a game: the ‘player who trespasses 
into the rules or ignores them is a “spoil-sport” […] the spoil-sport shatters the 
play-world itself. By withdrawing from the game he reveals the relativity and 
fragility of the play-world in which he had temporarily shut himself with others. 
He robs play of its illusion’ (30). 
Porter asserts this illusion to be particularly essential to the genre at hand: 
‘the success of a given work with a reader depends in the first place on the 
reader’s willingness not only to suspend disbelief but also to play the reading 
game according to the rules of the genre’ (Pursuit 85). In contrast, here the 
narrator actively intercedes to disenable such an action—it is as though the 
entertaining, storytelling dinner guest has temporarily forgotten himself (or 
remembered himself) and is threatening to alienate the company with his 
contentious social views. If the genre’s ‘reading game’ is exploited, it is in the 
sense that Chesterton here tests the absolute limits of his thesis that the mystery 
reader is ‘only happy if he feels a fool’ (‘The Ideal Detective Story.’ ILN 25 Oct. 
1930). The latter principle corresponds to the argument outlined in my opening 
chapter, that the success of the surprise element in a detective story is dependent 
upon the reader bringing to the text various preconceptions, informed by societal 
conventions, which are then overturned, while also hinting at Chesterton’s belief 
that true democracy can only come in to being when ‘we make fools of ourselves’. 
In the present instance, the satirical efficacy of the story is dependent upon the 
likelihood that the reader will be in ‘the habit of respecting a gentleman’, a 
propensity which Chesterton considered ‘a great national sin’ (‘Some Policemen 
and a Moral.’ DN 16 Apr. 1904; CDN 2: 218). In other words, Chesterton’s story 
frankly presupposes the reader’s subscription to a bias that the author considers 
idiotic, and even shameful, constructing an antagonist relationship toward the 
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reader which adapts the critique of romantic credulity built into ‘The Secret 
Garden’, to directly impugn the reader, rather than doing so obliquely via the 
story’s characters.  
The impudent narrative tone of ‘The Queer Feet’, which echoes the 
‘impudence’ ascribed to Brown and Flambeau on the action-level (see above, 68), 
also links Chesterton’s prose style to the salient tropes of Menippean satire. 
Bakhtin explains that this genre specialises in ‘[t]he “inappropriate word”—
inappropriate because of its cynical frankness, or because it profanely unmasks a 
holy thing, or because it crudely violates etiquette’ (Problems 118). In discussing 
the differing tonal shades operative in Menippean discourse, Weinbrot notes that 
‘[t]he Menippean satirist in his darker mood is more the isolated cynic than […] a 
sedately seated narrator’ (7). The effect in ‘The Queer Feet’ is that of the mask of 
the ‘amiable humorist’ (Tave viii) slipping to reveal the unmediated polemicist. 
As T.S. Eliot argued in his obituary of Chesterton, ‘[b]ehind the Johnsonian 
fancy-dress, so reassuring to the British public, he concealed the most serious and 
revolutionary designs’ (Critical 531). Again, a correspondence arises between 
narrator and criminal here. Eliot’s remarks echo Chesterton’s account of his 
trademark brigand outfit, which ‘disguised me’ with a ‘cloak’ (Autobiography 
164). In this light, the fancy-dress travesties—in the etymological sense of 
travesti, ‘dressed in disguise’ (Barnhart 1162)—of his fictional prankster-criminal 
can be seen to derive directly from Chesterton’s own methods of sartorial 
subversion.  
Chesterton’s outfit also included ‘a walking stick which concealed a sword’ 
(Gardner 52 fn.8), an accessory that connotes violent intent masked by a 
projection of harmless infirmity. This sheds an interesting light on the 
recollections of Father O’Connor: ‘Let me point out his terrible power of 
invective, not generally understood, because he seldom used it. And let us be 
thankful for the fine charity which kept that weapon sheathed’ (Father 13). In the 
story at hand, the very impropriety of the narrator’s interpositions forms a kind of 
textual sheath, a mediating comic effect, through which the speaker is figured as 
an amusingly opinionated great-uncle who is laughed at in turn, so that the 
argument is again costumed in a way that charms the reader into receptivity 
towards otherwise unpalatable sentiments. In this respect, the narrative conceit of 
‘The Queer Feet’ echoes Flambeau’s Poe-inspired modus operandi. Just as the 
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thief makes himself an object hidden in full view, Chesterton’s communication of 
his social principles involves ‘concealing them by exposure’ (Critical 531), as 
Eliot puts it.  
As a corollary of the narrator’s conversational approach, the action-level 
depiction of ‘table talk’ (or lack thereof) promoted by the banqueting motif of the 
story becomes parodied on the narrative level through the narrator’s provision of a 
stimulating account, producing a double-effect in which a failed party is parodied 
and its failure is amplified by the entertaining form in which it is recounted, with 
the narrator infusing a wit into the tale that is lacking in the majority of the 
protagonists. This technique contributes to the reader’s sense that an evening with 
the subversive narrator will be significantly more engaging than an unmediated 
evening in the rarefied company of the social elite he is describing. While 
Chesterton wisely avoids investing his narrative voice with heavy-handed 
idiomatic signifiers of the ‘lower’ class, the implicit class-differentiation between 
the narrator and the club-members corresponds to Bakhtin’s account of skaz 
storytelling, which stresses a distinction between the ‘storyteller’ and the ‘literary 
person’, while figuring skaz as a disguise which the author adopts in order to 
advance his/her own message:  
 
in most cases skaz is introduced precisely for the sake of someone else’s voice, a voice 
socially distinct, carrying with it precisely those points of view and evaluations 
necessary to the author. What is introduced here, in fact, is a storyteller, and a 
storyteller, after all, is not a literary person; he belongs in most cases to the lower 
social strata, to the common people (precisely this is important to the author)—and he 
brings with him oral speech (Problems 192). 
 
In Father Brown, this method proceeds organically from Chesterton’s 
preference for dictating his work to secretaries, a form of improvisational 
performance which inevitably foregrounds verbal intimacy and encourages 
colloquial asides, and which helps to explain why his short stories and journalistic 
articles often bear such marked stylistic similarities (the latter were composed in 
the same manner). Ker records that when dictating his detective stories to one 
secretary Chesterton ‘enjoyed teasing her by pretending to stop “at the exciting 
moment”’ (539), a quirk which adds to the element of propulsion and digression 
identified earlier in the story at hand. Chesterton verbally improvised almost all of 
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the Father Brown stories from brief notes made on the back of envelopes and 
other ephemera, a habit which is often adduced by commentators to be evidence 
of their literary worthlessness.
9
 Quite the contrary—this derivation is the very 
locus of their value. As Chesterton wrote of his treasured fairy-tale writing 
forebear, George Macdonald, he was ‘not a born writer; he was a born maker of 
spontaneous texts’ (‘George MacDonald.’ DN 23 Sept. 1905; CDN 3: 197). In 
establishing this distinction, Chesterton identifies Macdonald, and, by extension, 
himself, within a tradition of oral storytelling which again stands in ‘unofficial’ 
relation to post-Enlightenment norms of ‘high’ literature and rationalist discourse.  
Throughout the series, the extemporising quality of Chesterton’s oral 
narration enables stratified layers of self-referential parody to be conjoined with 
the action, while interspersing serious social points concerning ‘the horrible 
modern abyss between the souls of the rich and the poor’ (FB 45) with comically 
irascible complaints about characters possessing ‘irritating beards’ (FB 206). This 
narrative method is again suggestive of the formal approach of the Menippea, 
which combines a ‘deliberately […] multi-toned narration, the mixing of high and 
low, serious and comic; [with] a mixing of prosaic and poetic speech’ (Problems 
108). Similarly, Chesterton establishes a disorientating, multi-layered skaz 
technique that conforms to his explanation of the stratified levels of narrative in 
the detective story, which encompass ‘the crime, the detection, the description of 
the detection, and the description of the description’ (‘How to Write a Detective 
Story’ G.K.’s Weekly 17 Oct. 1925; collected in Chesterton Review 10: 2 112). 
Such techniques empower the narrator to speak conversationally to the reader 
without mediation, at a slight remove from the narrative proper, while also 
enabling Chesterton to make the reader more-than-usually aware of what is being 
withheld. In ‘The Queer Feet’, the reader is made to feel further disempowered by 
the narrator’s refusal of access to the separate, secret narrative produced by Brown 
in tandem with the narrator’s own account: ‘The story which Father Brown was 
writing down was very likely a much better story than this one, only it will never 
be known’ (FB 39). In another example of complicity between the narrator and his 
protagonists, Brown later applies the same interdiction to the colonel, in his 
explanation of the crime of Flambeau, the ersatz waiter:  
                                                 
9
 Most recently, Christopher Hitchens advanced this interpretation in his final published article, on 
Chesterton, ‘The Reactionary’ (Atlantic 6 Feb. 2012).  
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‘What did he tell you?’  
‘I beg your pardon,’ said the priest immovably, ‘that is where the story ends.’ 
‘And the interesting story begins,’ muttered Pound (FB 50-51). 
 
This interdiction constitutes a direct contravention of a critical view of 
detective fiction that derives from Foucaultian theory—in this case, Franco 
Moretti’s totalising assertion that ‘detective fiction treats every element of 
individual behaviour that desires secrecy as an offence, even if there is no trace of 
crime’ (qtd. in Knight, ‘Signs’ 128). In a more subtle action, Chesterton sets up a 
distinction between different forms of secrecy—the secrets of the powerful 
society are exposed and satirically debunked, while the personal secrets of the 
powerless individual remain sacrosanct. While this emphasis upon the 
significance of the hidden hints at the broader function of skaz in the mystery 
story as a form of ‘conjuror’s patter’ (‘How’ 117), as Chesterton puts it, or the 
attempt of a criminal to distract a witness with improvisational banter, it also 
suggests a goading of the reader into action through repeated assertions of 
disempowerment. This narrative effect returns us to the immersive principles of 
carnival. As Bakhtin explains, carnival invariably seeks to collapse the boundaries 
of spectatorship, and forcibly rouse the spectator into action: ‘the basic carnival 
nucleus of [medieval festive] culture […] belongs to the borderline between art 
and life. […] carnival does not know footlights, in the sense that it does not 
acknowledge any distinction between actors and spectators’ (Rabelais 7).  
The parodic practice of insulting the audience is one that extends back to 
antiquity. For example, as Chesterton notes in the ‘Humour’ essay, in 
Aristophanes ‘Dionysus asks to see the wicked in hell and is answered by a 
gesture pointing at the audience’ (Spice 26). Specifically, Aristophanes has his 
characters criminalise the audience by referring to them as a dangerous gang of 
‘murderers and perjurers’ (Rose, Ancient 19). This conceit was revived on the 
Elizabethan stage, within which the stage-fool conventionally evinced a 
‘familiarity with the spectators’ (Welsford, Fool 288). As with Father Brown’s 
practical jokes at Valentin’s expense in ‘The Blue Cross’, here the reader is being 
subjected to an enforced communality with the ‘fool’—in this instance, the 
buffoonish narrator rather than the abbot of unreason. To this end, Chesterton 
manipulates the famously heightened interactivity of the detection genre with its 
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audience, in which, as George N. Dove notes, the role of ‘the reader [is] an 
involved observer’ (32), to suggest that the reader has implicated his- or herself in 
the world described through the ‘act’ of reading, yet simultaneously remains 
subtly disempowered by his/her adoption of a passive role in the reception 
process.  
Again, there is a direct link here between the narrative and the action of 
‘The Queer Feet’, insofar as the figuring of Brown and Flambeau as both actor 
and spectator at the liminal footlight boundary of the cloakroom becomes 
suggestive of an extra-diegetic prompt to the reader to become an ‘actor’ 
themselves. When recounting the story to the colonel, Brown mirrors Flambeau’s 
earlier transgression by hopping ‘over the barrier’ (FB 48) from the audience onto 
the stage. From this perspective, it is suggestive that following the narrator’s 
assertion to the reader, ‘you never will’, Chesterton’s use of the second-person 
continues in an account of the interior of the hotel. In an echo of the 
methodological wink that Poe’s story, ‘The Purloined Letter’, offers Flambeau, 
this account is delivered in the manner of someone offering directions, or a tip-off, 
with the ‘you never will’ operating as the wink that the informant tips to the 
burglar, as in ‘you could do this but of course you and I know that you won’t’: 
‘you pass down a short passage […] which opens on your right into passages 
leading to the public rooms, and on your left to a similar passage pointing to the 
kitchens and offices…’ (FB 38). It is particularly characteristic of the broader 
thematic ambivalence operative in Chesterton’s detective stories that his use of 
skaz should simultaneously suggest a criminal distracting a witness and an 
informant tipping off a burglar.   
Although this reading initially suggests the uncomplicatedly liberating 
notion of the narrator ‘inviting’ the bourgeois reader into the narrative world 
along the ‘passage’ of the text, and providing access to snoop around, in the 
introductory passage quoted earlier the narrator explicitly asserts that, as things 
stand, the bourgeois reader is the only member of society currently disempowered 
to do so in reality. While the Fishermen enter ‘legitimately’ from above, Father 
Brown is asserted to have transgressed the boundary from below, through his 
association with ‘slums and criminals’ (FB 36). Conversely, the bourgeois reader 
is trapped in the middle, due to an implied failure to aspire equally to the bottom 
and to the top in his/her social manoeuvrings—the narrator notes, again in 
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parenthesis, that it is a ‘vein of improbable conjecture’ that the reader might have 
met ‘a mild, hard-working little priest, named Father Brown’ (FB 36), since the 
priest’s principal work is conducted amongst the lower-classes. As Chesterton 
bluntly appraises his middle-class contemporaries in the Autobiography: ‘we may 
say, with all graceful apologies, that this class has split up into the two great 
sections of the Snobs and the Prigs. The first are those who want to get into 
society; the second are those who want to get out of society, and into societies’ 
(16). While the snobs aspire to integrate with the higher echelons, the prigs aspire 
to assist the lower classes without the unpleasantness of integrating with them.
10
  
Through such effects, Chesterton directly contradicts John Cawelti’s claim 
that the detection genre enacts ‘the fantasy projection of guilt away from the 
reader’ (106-07). Instead, Chesterton’s narrative method enacts a particularly 
queer feat. As with the slang meaning of ‘queer’—to ‘spoil, ruin […] trick, 
swindle, cheat’ (Barnhart 874)—Chesterton queers the pitch of the conventional 
detective story, by interposing a discomfiting tonal pitch, in which he implicitly 
echoes Aristophanes in figuring the reader as a potential criminal, while 
simultaneously criminalising himself as a textual swindler, cheating the reader out 
of the expected narratorial transaction, in the cause of provoking the reader into a 
deeper ‘querying’ of his/her cultural presuppositions. Hurley has argued that 
‘queerness’ is central to Chesterton’s entire aesthetic and philosophical project, 
since this is the ‘wider context for his perception of incongruity’ (Chesterton 10). 
Intriguingly, Hurley also notes in passing that ‘quer’ means ‘cross’ (Chesterton 
10). In this sense, since Valentin twice asserts in ‘The Blue Cross’ that he is on 
the look-out for a ‘queer thing’ (FB 10), Father Brown, as the carrier of the cross, 
becomes the exemplary locus of revelatory queerness in Chesterton’s fiction.  
Indeed, the narrator of ‘The Queer Feet’ posits Brown’s profession as 
another of Chesterton’s ‘queer trades’: ‘There is in this world a very aged rioter 
and demagogue who breaks into the most refined retreats with the dreadful 
information that all men are brothers, and wherever this leveller went on his pale 
horse it was Father Brown’s trade to follow’ (FB 38; my emphasis). This 
pedagogic explanation brings a further insult to the projected reader, whose failure 
                                                 
10
 Hurley notes that the ‘“horrible modern abyss between the souls of the rich and poor” […] 
makes the theft possible in the first place’, while pointing out that there is ‘a sense that [Brown] 
approves of the crime in ethical terms’ (Chesterton 24). 
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to engage with the lower classes is implicitly linked to his/her assumed ignorance 
of Christian doctrine and lack of religious observance, thus reversing the attributes 
that enable Brown to gain entry, if not to gain respect. The theological context of 
Brown’s arrival as a father-confessor is lent further irony by the fact that the feast 
of the ‘Twelve True Fishermen’ is a parody of The Last Supper—‘they could 
occupy the terrace in the most luxurious style of all, being ranged along the inner 
side of the table, with no one opposite’ (FB 43)—in which the only religious 
figure present has been locked away in a cloakroom. 
Of course, the narrator’s reference to the leveller on a pale horse is an 
allusion to Death. Small wonder, then, that when Brown enters the building he is 
hidden away from the guests by the proprietor, since ‘a mere glimpse of him afar 
off might precipitate a crisis in the club’ (FB 38). Death is depicted here as the 
archetypal boundary-crosser, breaking into closed societies with the ‘dreadful 
information’ of the brotherhood of man, this last phrase a terrifically economical 
way of impressing factuality: ‘information’, rather than ‘assertion’ or 
‘suggestion’, again lending the narrator’s words an air of absolute irrefutability. 
The account of Death as a ‘leveller’ also illustrates the specifically carnivalesque 
nature of the story’s social satire. Since Brown is—initially unconsciously—
following Flambeau, the latter also becomes constituted as a levelling figure, a 
Harlequin-esque ‘rioter and demagogue’, whose unusual perambulations are later 
referred to as a ‘“dance of death”’ (FB 48) by Brown. In a later story, ‘The Mirror 
and the Magistrate’ (Cassell’s Magazine Apr. 1925), Brown is, himself, described 
as looking like ‘“some old black woodcut at the end of a Dance of Death”’ (FB 
528), and this association of both characters with the Danse Macabre implies that 
Flambeau’s actions, in combination with Brown’s judgement, are serving notice 
upon the club members in the story at hand.  
In ‘The Secret Society of Mankind’, the title of which gestures back to 
‘The Human Club’, Chesterton figures death as both a levelling and unifying 
phenomenon: ‘We are all in a boat which will certainly drown us all, and drown 
us equally […] we sail to the land of an ogre, edax rerum, who devours all 
without distinction’ (Fancies 120). This image of death as an insatiable feaster, 
into whose jaws all descend, is offset with apposite incongruity by the parlous 
nature of the feast into which Chesterton rides his pale horse in ‘The Queer Feet’. 
Nonetheless, while Brown and Flambeau disrupt the ‘crisis of tedium’ (FB 21) 
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that grips the institution in a manner which does indeed ‘precipitate a crisis in the 
club’, this should again be understood in the positive, festive comic sense which 
led Chesterton to interpret crisis as a potentially regenerative principle.
11
 
 
A Crisis of Tedium: Ontological Vacuity and the Official Feast 
 
[F]ear of the waiter is the beginning of dining[.] 
Chesterton, Charles Dickens (134) 
 
Chesterton was by no means dogmatically opposed to the concept of parodying 
the Last Supper—the twelve original members of the J.D.C. held a particularly 
boisterous and ‘burlesque’ commemorative club banquet in 1900 (Ward, Gilbert 
106-07)—his only condition was that the absurd parody should retain the sublime 
element of genuine festivity, and this is where the Twelve True Fishermen 
particularly miss the mark. In a further textual duality, while Chesterton’s use of 
skaz produces a spectatorship-vexing evocation of the principles of the 
‘unofficial’ carnival on the narrative-level, the action-level story of the banquet 
describes the quintessential official feast, commemorating what Bakhtin terms the 
ontologically vacuous ‘triumph of a truth already established, the predominant 
truth that was put forward as eternal and indisputable’ (Rabelais 9). Bakhtin’s 
account is closely echoed in ‘The Queer Feet’, in terms redolent of ontological 
abstraction: the ‘society had a vast number of ceremonies and observances, but it 
had no history and no object; that was where it was so very aristocratic. You did 
not have to be anything in order to be one of the Twelve Fishers’ (FB 37). Here, 
the phrase, ‘[y]ou did not have to be anything’—rather than ‘anyone’—not only 
suggests a divorce of social function from status, but a literal divorce from 
existence, a further implication that the apparently ineluctable edifice is a 
phantasm that would disperse with the merest close observation. As the narrator 
notes, in a further parenthetical aside, ‘nobody in this place ever appeared in 
person if he could help it’ (FB 38). 
In a parallel of the distrust that Chesterton and Bentley expressed toward 
the monologic seriousness of Holmesian detection, Bakhtin argues that the official 
feast’s inherent abstraction of purpose explains why its tone ‘was monolithically 
                                                 
11
 The phrase, ‘a crisis of tedium’, derives from ‘The Secret Garden’. 
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serious and why the element of laughter was alien to it. The true nature of human 
festivity was betrayed and distorted’ (Rabelais 9). In ‘The Flat Freak’, Chesterton 
expands upon the schismatic failure of humour that occurs when the upper-classes 
attempt to stage a comic event, here the ‘Freak Dinner’, a high-society fancy-dress 
party on a grand scale. Chesterton explains that what is to be deplored ‘is the 
abyss of inanity in such feasts—it may be literally called a yawning abyss […] 
What can be more abject than the union of elaborate and recherché arrangements 
with an old and obvious point?’ (CDN 6: 179). In contrast, Chesterton’s elaborate 
textual joke at the expense of the Fishermen exploits their recherché arrangements 
in order to make a new, surprising generic and social point. As Simon Critchley 
observes, ‘[t]he anti-rite of the joke shows the sheer contingency or arbitrariness 
of the social rites in which we engage. By producing a consciousness of 
contingency, humour can change the situation in which we find ourselves, and can 
even have a critical function with respect to society’ (10). In a comparable 
manner, Chesterton’s emphasis upon comic contingency in ‘The Queer Feet’, as 
represented by the disruptive appearance of the mythic dyad, Brown and 
Flambeau, calls the ‘eternal’ truth of the event into question.  
Chesterton’s criticisms are focused primarily upon the oral functions of the 
figures depicted, in the forms of verbal production and digestive consumption. In 
presenting the official feast as an etiolated travesty of the popular carnival, in 
which an ontological abstraction causes it merely to ape the actions of the truly 
joyous feast while subtracting the spirit, both Bakhtin and Chesterton argue that 
its fundamental inanity is betrayed by its modes of expression. In ‘The Queer 
Feet’, the discrepancy between Brown’s entertaining, possibly ribald untold 
narrative, the narrator’s attempts to jolly up the narrative proper, and the paucity 
of material offered by the inane chatter of the Fishermen serves to emphasise the 
vital dual-meaning of the quality of the talk in the popular festival, which Bakhtin 
identifies thus:  
 
The themes of table talk are always ‘sublime’, filled with ‘profound wisdom’, but these 
themes are uncrowned and renewed on the material bodily level. The grotesque 
symposium does not have to respect hierarchical distinctions; it freely blends the 
profane and the sacred, the lower and the higher, the spiritual and the material 
(Rabelais 285-86). 
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The absence of either ‘profound wisdom’ or boisterous repartee in the 
conversation of the Fishermen demonstrates their absolute dislocation from the 
principles of the popular feast, the emptiness of their talk echoing the emptiness of 
the event: ‘The talk was that strange, slight talk which governs the British Empire, 
which governs it in secret, and yet would scarcely enlighten an ordinary 
Englishman even if he could overhear it’ (FB 42-43). This inadequacy is further 
emphasised by the narrator’s descriptions of the contents of the banquet itself at 
the outset of the second part of the story, in which Chesterton again prefaces the 
action with a heavily accentuated, intemperate authorial intervention, tonally 
indistinguishable from his journalism: ‘I do not possess a copy of the menu; and if 
I did it would not convey anything to anybody [… The hors d’oeuvres] were taken 
seriously because they were avowedly useless extras, like the whole dinner and 
the whole club’ (FB 42). Again, the collapsed-repetition of ‘any’—‘anything to 
anybody’—evokes an air of negative presence, located, in this instance, in the 
extreme codification of the fare on offer, as an allegory of the exclusivity-ad-
absurdum of the club itself.  
While a certain potential ambivalence might be thought to pertain to the 
narrator’s remark concerning the hors d’oeuvres, since the abundance of 
‘avowedly useless extras’ is the intrinsic point of a carnival feast—a celebration 
of excess, with ‘no utilitarian connotation’ (Bakhtin, Rabelais 276)—it is essential 
that this aspect should contrast with the company itself. There should be a joyous 
dichotomy between the practicality of the company and their festive excess, 
whereas here every guest at the table is a comparably ‘useless extra’, both in terms 
of his contribution to the event, either in the guise of conversationalist or producer 
of goods, and, in Chesterton’s outlook, to society in general. All forms of heavily 
coded discourse are critiqued as epistemologically vacuous in ‘The Queer Feet’, 
from the menu’s description of what the Fishermen consume, to the vapid secret-
talk of empire—‘“Splendid work young Moocher’s doing in Burma”’ (FB 45)—
which they emit. Chesterton’s account, in ‘A Defence of Slang’, of the language 
of the ‘man of fashion’ as ‘a mere string of set phrases, as lifeless as a string of 
dead fish’, finds a corporeal counterpart in the ‘sacred fish course’ which forms 
the centrepiece of the Fishermen’s banquet, and ‘consisted (to the eyes of the 
vulgar) in a sort of monstrous pudding’ (FB 44). Here the ostentation of the food 
tips over from the sublime to the ridiculous in a material rendition of bathos, 
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while the further parenthetic interjection echoes Chesterton’s irreverent account of 
Wilde’s verse, in which the bathos is disclosed by the spectator’s capacity to see 
through ‘the eyes of the vulgar’.  
The fact that the objects stolen from the guests are the items of cutlery 
which enable them to eat with dignity is also significant from a Bakhtinian 
perspective. As he explains, ‘If food is separated from work and conceived as part 
of a private way of life, then nothing remains of the old images […] Nothing is 
left but a series of artificial, meaningless metaphors’ (Rabelais 282). 
Consequently, a further bathetic travesty of carnival is implied by the fact that the 
inert cutlery, which places the diner at one remove from the food, is more highly 
prized than the regenerative food itself, while the disappearance of the cutlery 
renders the continuation of the meal impossible, a finger buffet being most 
certainly beyond contemplation. The evanescent cutlery therefore operates as a 
metaphor for the club’s alienation from the material world, since, as Bakhtin 
asserts of the principle of imminence at stake in festive imagery, ‘[t]he encounter 
of man with the world […] takes place inside the open, biting, rending, chewing 
mouth’ (Rabelais 281). Here we again see how every detail of the mystery is 
selected for, and subordinated to, its capacity to support the social message, rather 
than vice versa, just as the satirical premise of the club’s exclusivity enables 
Chesterton to establish the conditions of a locked-room mystery.  
In the Autobiography, Chesterton discusses his literal distaste at the fine-
dining of his day: ‘those who really prefer eating good cutlets and omelets to 
living on gilt plaster and pantomime footmen had already found their way to 
delightful little dens off Leicester Square’ (116). While it is significant that 
Chesterton again finds maximum enjoyment in the least exclusive of locales, the 
reference to ‘pantomime footmen’ intriguingly hints back to the roles of Flambeau 
and Father Brown in the story at hand. As O’Brien explains, in the traditional 
pantomime the casting of the ‘“grotesque” characters like Harlequin and the 
Clown […] as servants […] flipped the usual format of mainpiece comedy, 
bringing what was typically a subplot involving servants to the foreground’ (11). 
The harlequinade conventionally occupies a structural position in relation to 
serious drama comparable to the status of Aristophanean burlesque as a ribald 
postscript in the Greek drama, a model which I also discussed earlier as the 
template for the journalistic methodology of The Speaker. While Chesterton 
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explicitly figures Flambeau as ‘the harlequin’ (FB 59) in ‘The Flying Stars’ 
(Cassell’s Magazine June 1911), the parallel is implicit in ‘The Blue Cross’, when 
the narrator discusses his ‘outbursts of athletic humour’ (FB 3), and is developed 
further in the role of mischievously insubordinate servant into which he is cast in 
‘The Queer Feet’.  
Flambeau’s nonverbal physical parody of the guests also operates as a 
mime, a comic form which Kiremidjian identifies as a progenitor of the 
Commedia dell‘Arte: in classical tradition ‘the mimes […] parodied the life of the 
lower and upper class alike, were sympathetic with the cause or grievance of the 
common people and represented a form of mediation between lowest peasant and 
highest aristocrat’ (Study 99). Chesterton’s deployment of Father Brown in ‘The 
Queer Feet’ is also informed by the festive-comic schema of pantomime, since, in 
structural terms, the priest represents the clown to Flambeau’s Harlequin. When 
the pair infiltrate the club in the guises of elemental trickster and wise fool, the 
unofficial carnival is implanted within the official construct, sowing, respectively, 
disorder and the questioning of ‘eternal’ truths of social caste. Brown’s role 
adheres to the tradition ‘at English feasts to have “some iestyng feloe, that maye 
scoff and iest upon the gestes as they sitten at the table”’ (Welsford, Fool 24). The 
clown at the medieval dining table was traditionally considered a ‘[p]arasite’ 
(Welsford, Fool 8) who must sing for his supper—parasitos, another derivation 
from the prefix, ‘para’, translates literally as ‘beside food’ (para-sitos), so that the 
original meaning of the social parasite was one ‘who eats at the table of another, 
earning meals by flattery’ (Barnhart 756). In the case at hand Chesterton produces 
a pristine reversal, in which the auspicious guests are figured as social parasites, 
who are justly derided by Chesterton’s wise-fool.  
Brown’s critique focuses upon the comedy of manners in extremis in which 
the Fishermen engage, which prevents the community marriage that festive 
comedy seeks to promulgate, thus situating the diners as the occupants of the 
blocking role which conventionally belongs to the villain in both festive comedy 
and detective fiction. When Brown delivers his final summary of events, the fact 
that Flambeau has long since handed back the stolen cutlery frees the priest to 
discuss the thief with a sympathy absent from the withering disdain that he shows 
for the institution itself: ‘“Odd, isn’t it,” he said, “that a thief and a vagabond 
should repent, when so many who are rich and secure remain hard and frivolous, 
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and without fruit for God or man?”’ (FB 47-48; my emphasis). In The Flying Inn, 
a text which Chesterton referred to as a ‘harlequinade’ (Autobiography 288), this 
criticism is echoed in Dalroy’s song of ‘Mr Mandragon the Millionaire’. Dalroy 
first indicts the fantastical fairy-tale figure, Mandragon, on the grounds of his 
enervation—he relies upon a machine to haul him out of bed and wash him—
before attacking his infertile isolation, which pertains even in death: ‘he lies there 
fluffy and soft and grey, and certainly quite refined, / When he might have rotted 
with the flowers and fruit with Adam and all mankind’ (Flying 161).  
This imagery produces a parallel with Bakhtin’s account of the resemblance 
of Dostoevsky’s gruesome short story, ‘Bobok’ (1873), to the mystery play: ‘The 
central figurative idea here is also that of the mystery play […] “contemporary 
dead men” are as sterile seed, cast on the ground, but capable neither of dying 
(that is, of being cleansed of themselves, of rising above themselves), nor of being 
renewed (that is, of bearing fruit)’ (Problems 147). Again, this motif implies a 
link to Aristophanes, whose parabasis in Wasps (422 BC) involves the chorus 
leader describing the playwright ‘as an artist who is trying to “sow a crop of new 
ideas”, and asks that spectators save up his phrases “like fruit”’ (Bevis 10). In a 
further empathetic correspondence between hero and narrator, the generic parody 
of ‘The Queer Feet’ challenges the insistent strain of critical thought that figures 
the parodist as an enervating parasite on superior artists. In ‘The Queer Feet’, this 
conception is both literalised and subverted. In infiltrating the detection genre and 
eating at its table, Chesterton nourishes the form with arresting new ideas and 
memorably rich phrases. 
The origins of festive comedy lie in the regenerative intent of the fertility 
rite, a context which helps to explain why Chesterton’s trenchant satire is offset 
with repeated gestures towards rejuvenation through pedagogic mockery, a 
balancing dynamic which again leads to a tentatively utopian conclusion. The 
period of carnival not only invites in all those normally ‘unwelcome’ to engage in 
the exclusive event, it also liberates the members of the official feast to behave for 
once like real people. The narrator never denies the efficacy of the construct as a 
socially disenabling space, exclusive in the literal sense: ‘it was a thing which 
paid, not by attracting people, but actually by turning people away’ (FB 36). 
However, it is also made clear that the doors of exclusivity close in as well as 
out—absurdly the hotel’s ‘very inconveniences were considered as walls 
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protecting a particular class’ (FB 37), so that the members’ obsession with class 
discrimination leads to their own privation.  
A similar ambivalence pertains to Father Brown’s irreverent explanation of 
Flambeau’s criminal method: ‘“It was no new thing to [the waiters] that a swell 
from the dinner party should pace all parts of the house like an animal at the zoo”’ 
(FB 50). Here, the anthropomorphic simile again serves to highlight the indignity 
cast upon such figures by their indecorous representation before the general reader 
in a detective story, while Brown’s choice of the slang-term ‘swell’ suggests both 
his verbal identification with the ‘waiting’ class, and a tacit mockery of the diners’ 
grotesquely bloated stomachs. However, in a more emollient touch, the figuring of 
the guests as animals ‘at the zoo’ also suggests a degree of sympathetic regret for 
the self-imprisoning nature of their exclusivity. Just as the narrator attempts to 
goad the reader into action, Brown’s insults operate as an attempt to chivvy the 
Fishermen into breaking free of the confines of their mental and physical cages. In 
‘The Beauty of Noise’ (DN 18 Aug. 1906), Chesterton argues that a ‘wicked 
refinement […] has in our time separated the social classes more completely, 
perhaps, than they were ever separated before’ (CDN 4: 39). Dentith corroborates 
this account, as well as Chesterton’s related deprecation of the increasing 
topographical segregation that characterised modern urban life, in a discussion of 
the social conditions that particularly invite parodic literature: 
 
Strongly stratified societies […] where separate classes live in relative social isolation, 
are very likely to produce mutual parodic characterisations of the social layers, whose 
manners of speech and writing are very strongly marked by class. This is very 
strikingly the case […] in English society, between, roughly, the 1880s and the 1950s. 
This society was highly socially zoned, and its different groups lived in remarkable 
ignorance of each other (Parody 30-31). 
 
In ‘The Queer Feet’, the revelation of the theft reinforces the air of schism 
by exposing the guests’ ignorance of the men constantly surrounding them: 
‘“Know the waiter?” answered Mr. Audley indignantly. “Certainly not!”’ (FB 45). 
Chesterton discusses the alienating aspect of the class divide of the age in the 
Autobiography, noting that the upwardly mobile late-Victorian household ‘knew 
far too little of its own servants […] in the class as a whole there was neither the 
coarse familiarity in work, which belongs to democracies […] nor the remains of 
224 
 
a feudal friendliness such as lingers in the real aristocracy. There was a sort of 
silence and embarrassment’ (13). The motif of ‘silence and embarrassment’ also 
vitally informs the action-level events of ‘The Queer Feet’. Silence, in the sense of 
meaningful discourse, is the dominant theme prior to the theft—in a typically 
economical pun, the main course is eaten in ‘devouring silence’ (FB 44)—while 
embarrassment reigns in its aftermath. The theme of social embarrassment 
highlights the singular vehemence of Chesterton’s take on the comedy of 
manners, the club itself being described at the outset as ‘an institution such as can 
only exist in an oligarchical society which has almost gone mad on good manners’ 
(FB 36). Again, this dysfunctional restrictiveness is accentuated by the contrastive 
quality of the narrative voice. As we have seen, the narrator has some difficulty 
controlling his own manners in his exposition, his explosions of bile liberating 
him from the conventions of narrative ‘good manners’ even as they contribute to a 
highly sophisticated narratorial manner.  
When the theft occurs, the confused behaviour of one of the genuine 
waiters increases the guests’ sense of embarrassment and disorientation: ‘all those 
vague and kindly gentlemen were so used to the smoothness of the unseen 
machinery which surrounded and supported their lives, that a waiter doing 
anything unexpected was a start and a jar. They felt as you and I would feel if the 
inanimate world disobeyed—if a chair ran away from us’ (FB 44). Again, the use 
of ‘you or I’ highlights the insinuating tone of the narrative reportage, while the 
final image recalls Bergson’s account of the ‘unseen machinery’ of human 
repetition, here in the context of waiters being demeaned to the inanimate level of 
chairs to be complacently sat upon. Of course, the contingent absence of a chair 
where one is expected—a service conventionally rendered by the waiter—is also 
the archetypal practical joke at the expensive of inelasticity, while the vitalisation 
of the ‘inanimate world’ is a characteristic motif of nonsense, here once more 
turned to satirical purpose in order to lend pedagogic grounding to the uncanny, in 
a manner which subtly gestures back to the social critique of ‘The Blue Cross’. 
Specifically, in What’s Wrong With the World, Chesterton contrasts the perilous 
insecurity of the homes of the poor with the situation of the ‘rich man [who] 
knows that his own house moves on vast and soundless wheels of wealth’ (CW 4: 
72). This image closely corresponds to the narrator’s account of ‘the smoothness 
of the unseen machinery which surrounded and supported [the] lives’ (FB 44) of 
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the clubmen in ‘The Queer Feet’, whose extreme discomfort at the revelation of 
the waiters’ humanity leads to an immediate imaginative reification of the 
mechanistic waiting machine: ‘these modern plutocrats could not bear a poor man 
near to them, either as a slave or as a friend. That something had gone wrong with 
the servants was merely a dull, hot embarrassment’ (FB 45; my emphasis).  
The theme of schismatic alienation not only pertains across the classes, but 
also implicitly extends to the members’ equivalent ignorance of one another—in 
his capacity as fellow-diner, Flambeau must have been a mysterious presence to 
the other guests, yet they never question his identity, since their lack of 
communality ironically renders the Fishermen interchangeable to one another. As 
with Chesterton’s account of Hudge and Gudge, this interchangability also 
corrupts reassuringly clear-cut political distinctions, to convey an unprincipled 
travesty of the utopian reconciliation of existential binaries: Mr Audley sometimes 
‘embarrassed the company by phrases suggesting that there was some difference 
between a Liberal and a Conservative’ (FB 43). The relativistic connotations of 
this conceit evoke Chesterton’s combined ethical and psychological fear of the 
‘starry abyss of nonsense’ that is disclosed by a complete absence of wit. In an 
echo of his intertwined critique of the aloof detachment of decadence and the 
derangement of nonsense, here the ‘yawning […] abyss of inanity’ in the official 
feast combines with the ‘horrible modern abyss between the souls of the rich and 
the poor’ (my emphases), to evoke a thoroughgoing breach of ‘the Covenant of 
Things’.  
In order to combat this vertiginous disintegration of meaning, Chesterton 
reinstates wit in the story at hand, precisely through a satirical manipulation of 
disturbingly uncanny nonsense imagery. To this end, the narrator not only 
employs images of reification to characterise the waiters, but also the clubmen, 
figuring them as lifeless marionettes when the revelation of the missing cutlery 
dawns upon them: ‘none of the company could say anything except the man of 
wood—Colonel Pound—who seemed galvanised into an unnatural life’ (FB 45). 
Here, the reification in wood, followed by the Frankenstein’s-monster-like 
‘galvanisation’, emphasises the unheimlich quality of the club’s inhabitants. 
Similarly, the phrase ‘could say anything’, rather than ‘could think of anything to 
say’ again conveys a sense of petrifaction caused by extreme torpor—of indolent 
satiety coalescing with a paradoxical physical absence. Chesterton’s imagery 
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implicitly connects linguistic infelicity—‘could say anything’—to physical 
inanition as comparable examples of degeneration into lifeless automatism, 
against which his own mode of ‘spontaneous’ narrative composition again stands 
in striking opposition. Chesterton’s interactive game-playing with his secretaries 
not only contrasts with the Fishermen’s aloof ignorance of the waiters, but also 
challenges his mental dexterity, by compelling him to improvise complex 
plotlines in real-time. 
Again, Bergsonian theory offers an informative context through which to 
understand Chesterton’s methodology in the story at hand, insofar as the former’s 
description of unreflective habit as ‘a mechanism superimposed upon life’ 
(Laughter 45) is directly related to the workings of the highly-codified ceremony: 
‘the stiff and starched formality of any ceremonial suggests to us an image of this 
kind. For, as we forget the serious object of a solemnity or a ceremony, those 
taking part in it give us the impression of puppets in motion. Their mobility seems 
to adopt as a model the immobility of the formula. It becomes automatism’ 
(Laughter 45-46). In Bergsonian terms, the inelasticity of the guests invites 
Flambeau’s arch parody: ‘we are imitable, says Bergson, when we act 
mechanically’ (Habib 67). However, as with Chesterton’s critique of bourgeois 
domesticity in ‘The Human Circulating Library’, he departs from Bergson in the 
specifically historicised satire of contemporary society that he is pursuing. As 
Habib notes, ‘Bergson’s critique […] is debilitated by its ahistorical foundation: 
what are actually tendencies of a specific era of bourgeois predominance—such as 
mechanisation, exhaustion of individual by group identity, transformation of 
human into thing—are ascribed by Bergson indiscriminately to “society”’ (69). 
Conversely, while Chesterton frames his action-level account with comparably 
enduring cultural archetypes to those cited by Bergson—in this instance, the 
formalised ceremony—his narrative-level exposition also explicitly states that it is 
the conditions of this particular society which promulgate the schism depicted: it 
is ‘wholly the product of our time’ (FB 44-45). 
In ‘The Uncanny’ (1919), Freud quotes Jentsch’s assertion that an 
atmosphere of the uncanny arises whenever there is ‘“doubt as to whether an 
apparently animate object really is alive and, conversely, whether a lifeless object 
might not perhaps be animate”’ (Uncanny 135). A comparable uncertainty is 
promoted by Chesterton’s imagery in ‘The Monstrosity’ (DN 11 Mar. 1911), 
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published five months after ‘The Queer Feet’, in which he takes his earlier image 
of imperial Britain as a senile dandy one stage further, employing the corpse as a 
still-more gruesomely burlesque physical metaphor of the imperial body politic: 
‘When a dead body is rotting, it does not diminish; it swells. [...] Our own country 
is really in this state of swollen decay’ (CDN 7: 88). Since this imagery echoes 
Father Brown’s use of slang in describing the Fishermen as ‘swells’, Chesterton’s 
choice of ‘Moocher’ as the title of the Fishermen’s colonial associate would seem 
to convey a further subtle satire of imperial politics, since the word connotes, in 
British slang, aimless loitering, and in American slang, thievery. While the 
nomenclatural levelling effect of ‘Moocher’ echoes Brown’s recourse to unrefined 
slang, forcibly conferring upon the upper-class figure a term which is usually 
associated with the lower class, the colonial activities of Moocher are parodied by 
Flambeau, who loiters in the clubmen’s indigenous environment with apparently 
unproductive aimlessness, while surreptitiously appropriating any valuables in the 
immediate vicinity.  
The appearance of Flambeau at the feast constitutes a parodic return of the 
repressed, which causes the silver accumulated by colonial appropriation to 
mysteriously dematerialise. In this sense, Flambeau’s mischief serves to highlight, 
through parody, an unspoken crime of the society itself, in line with Freud’s 
argument that the unmasking impetus of travesty ‘“comes into play when 
someone has seized dignity and authority by a deception and these have to be 
taken from him in reality”’ (Jokes 262). As Father Brown observes, in ‘The Red 
Moon of Meru’, ‘“the West also has its own way of covering theft with 
sophistry”’ (FB 630). Elsewhere, Freud explains that one definition of ‘heimlich’ 
is ‘“to steal secretly away”’ (Uncanny 129-30), so that ‘the term “uncanny” 
(unheimlich) applies to everything that was intended to remain secret, hidden 
away, and has come into the open’ (Uncanny 132), a principle which applies here 
to the exposure of the exclusive club itself, hidden in plain sight in central 
London, as well as the crime committed against the club by Flambeau, which, in 
turn, uncovers the colonial thefts that support the club’s existence.  
While postcolonial criticism has come to associate this revelatory action 
with ‘the response of the colonial margin to the metropolitan centre’ (Smith xvii), 
Chesterton represents an example of a writer at the heart of the metropolitan 
centre revealing the unpalatable truth to his own society. A further instance of 
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Flambeau performing this function occurs in ‘The Flying Stars’, a story which 
features a close cousin of the Fishermen—Leopold Fischer, an Anglo-German 
financier who bears more than a passing resemblance to Alfred Beit—who is the 
victim of a diamond theft. When Fischer accuses a socialist journalist of 
committing the crime, Father Brown immediately discounts this accusation: 
‘“men who mean to steal diamonds don’t talk socialism. They are more likely,” he 
added demurely, “to denounce it”’ (FB 60). Since this is precisely what Fischer 
has been doing, the implication would seem to be that, in colonial terms, it is 
capitalists like Fischer who evince a greater propensity to steal diamonds. Again, 
it is Flambeau’s crime that enables Father Brown to elaborate this moral. 
In view of Chesterton’s vision of the imperial body as a decaying corpse, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that when the Fishermen discover that the presence of 
death has accounted for the malfunction of the waiting machine their sense of 
discomfiture becomes particularly acute. At this point ‘Mr. Audley felt it 
necessary to break the silence in the interests of Tact’ (FB 45), which he achieves 
by introducing the reference to Moocher’s work in the colonies, rather than by 
acknowledging the crisis occurring in front of him—a powerful allegory of the 
attitude of his entire class as the overseas empire crumbles and the domestic social 
fabric threatens to be rent apart. When the Fishermen discover that an impostor 
has replaced the dead waiter, they become collectively aware that ‘[f]or a few 
weird seconds they had really felt as if the fifteenth waiter might be the ghost of 
the dead man upstairs. They had been dumb under that oppression, for ghosts to 
them were an embarrassment, like beggars’ (FB 46). As Bakhtin notes, in a 
remark that sheds a significant light upon Chesterton’s method, traditionally 
‘[d]uring banquets ghosts appear only to usurpers or to the representatives of the 
old dying world’ (Rabelais 296). The Fishermen might well find the presence of a 
ghost embarrassing—it might parody their own condition of living death a little 
too brutally for comfort. 
The revelation of the presence of death causes the narrator to speculate 
that it ‘may be (so supernatural is the word death) that each of these idle men 
looked for a second at his soul, and saw it as a small dried pea. One of them—the 
duke, I think—even said with the idiotic kindness of wealth: “Is there anything we 
can do?”’ (FB 46). Kindness is combined here with uselessness to devastatingly 
terse effect. At this late stage in the narrative the duke’s question strikes the reader 
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more as a plaintive entreaty (as would be implied if one were to once more 
emphasise the ‘anything’) than a disinterested offer of help. The use of jarring 
authorial interposition—the parenthetic assertion that death carries supernatural 
associations, the extraneous, conversational addition of ‘I think’ and ‘idiotic’—
serves to authorise the ‘dried pea’ remark as the narrator’s own discursive 
sentiments, making of the ‘it may be’ an implicit ‘it ought to be’. Finally, the 
choice of a dried pea as metaphor ties the description ironically to the feast-
travesty itself, through the provision of a fittingly parlous link between the diners 
and the dinner.  
This moment of epiphany for the Fishermen coincides with the appearance 
of Brown in the role of mystery disperser, explaining the burglary that motivated 
Flambeau’s ‘dance of death’. With the latter conceit, the poles of satire and the 
grotesque are skilfully balanced once more. Much as the disorientating vegetative 
depictions of Brown discussed in my opening chapter are grounded by their 
satirical opposition to the isolation of what Bakhtin terms ‘economic man’, 
Chesterton redeems the unnerving grotesquery of the skeleton by extrapolating a 
pedagogic lesson from its structure: ‘flamboyant prigs should be convinced that 
one practical joke, at least, would bowl them over, that they would fall into one 
grinning man-trap, and not rise again’ (Defendant 47). Nonetheless, his account of 
the origins of the Danse Macabre, in ‘Morality and the Clown’ (DN 28 Dec. 
1907), also elucidates the regenerative element of Flambeau’s capering: ‘It was 
the dance of death; but it was a dance. Not taking the body seriously it flung the 
body into fifty frantic attitudes. It had force, and the dance of death led the way to 
the dance of life’ (CDN 4: 388).  
As this implies, Chesterton turns to the skeleton not only as a satirically 
destructive symbol, but also as an emblem of parodic regeneration. This balancing 
principle is also discernible in Flambeau’s carnivalesque embodiment of fire, in 
contrast to the sterile ‘flame’ of Valentin’s fanaticism, a distinction which reveals 
the philosophical basis of the latter’s expulsion to be that of a discriminatory 
refinement of acceptable archetypes, based upon their relative regenerative 
efficacy. Bakhtin explains that ‘the image of fire in carnival’ is ‘[d]eeply 
ambivalent […] It is a fire that simultaneously destroys and renews the world. In 
European carnivals there was almost always a special structure (usually a vehicle 
adorned with all possible sorts of gaudy carnival trash) called “hell”’ (Problems 
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126). In ‘The Two Fires’ (DN 1 July 1911), Chesterton elaborates upon the literal 
meaning of ‘Bonfire’ as ‘the Good Fire’, which burns only the ‘bad things’ of a 
culture—Chesterton includes ‘reports of the Eugenic Congress’ amid the ‘rubbish’ 
of his own hypothetical bonfire—while preserving the ‘good things’ (CDN 7: 
162).
12
 In identifying an analogy of distinct modes of revolution from this image, 
Chesterton notes that he would like to see ‘the sneer […] struck from the face of 
the well-fed’ while nonetheless preserving ‘all that wealth of wood that might 
have made dolls and chairs and tables’ (CDN 7: 162). 
In ‘The Queer Feet’, the positive regeneration of ‘the man of wood’, 
Colonel Pound, is demonstrative of this principle—a reanimation of the dead 
which Brown and Flambeau assay through their respective employment of mental 
agility and physical vitality. The eighteenth-century English Harlequinade again 
provides the folkloric generic template here, insofar as the actor, John Rich (alias 
Lun), portrayed Harlequin as a character whose ‘necromantic powers [provided] 
an excuse for novel transformation scenes’ (Welsford, Fool 301-02). Similar 
imagery attended to the work of ‘Grock’ (born Charles Adrien Wettach) whose 
career ran contemporaneously with Chesterton’s. In discussing the regenerative 
connotations attached to Grock’s portrayal of the clown, Welsford notes that 
‘Grock’s art is not only amusing, it is vitalizing. When he passes by, unwound 
clocks begin to tick [...] and queens are driven from the circus to childbed, “so you 
see that wheresoever Grock enters the stork is never far away”’ (314).  
As Sheinberg explains, the Danse Macabre bears similar connotations, 
combining ‘the skeleton’s fearsome traits with an incongruously amused dance’, 
producing a ‘blurring of the boundaries between life and death, the animate and 
inanimate. Through this link the grotesque is also related to puppet-shows […] 
animate dolls […] and mechanised human beings’ (219). While recalling the 
mechanistic exposition of the Fishermen, this account also brings to mind the 
image of Father Brown ‘kicking his short legs like a little boy on a gate’ (FB 48), 
when he explains the circumstances of the theft to Colonel Pound. This image of 
Brown swinging his legs on a partition produces a correspondence with puppet 
theatre; in particular, Leatherbarrow’s account of the behaviour of the folk-devil, 
Petrushka, in the Russia puppet theatre, in which the character traditionally 
                                                 
12
 The reference to the Eugenic congress was an addition to the later, collected version of the essay 
(see CDN 7: 162 fn.160a). 
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‘launches […] into a wordy monologue, often with his legs dangling from the 
booth in a gesture of familiarity with the crowd’ (128). Leatherbarrow argues that 
‘[t]he primary function of Petrushka was to make people laugh, but the kind of 
laughter it sought to evoke was [...] disruptive laughter, challenging all social and 
moral conventions [...] In other words, the disruptive carnival mood invited 
collusion: It passed beyond the puppet booth and infected the audience’ (127-28).  
The efficacy of Brown’s disruptive laughter in promulgating a social 
conversion narrative that engenders benign collusion is demonstrated when he 
explains the crime to the colonel, and the latter remarks, sympathetically, ‘“I don’t 
want to get the fellow jailed; make yourself easy about that”’ (FB 48), in an echo 
of Valentin’s disinclination to arrest Flambeau at the denouement of ‘The Blue 
Cross’. Chesterton’s attempt to inscribe a degree of placatory narratorial 
ambivalence within his critique by reinstating the humanity of these men is also 
suggested by his earlier reference to the company as ‘vague and kindly 
gentlemen’, a phrase which again emphasises the members’ evanescence while 
granting a concession to their essential decency. Here we perceive the narrator 
mitigating his attacks with minor concessions, so as to maintain a degree of 
rhetorical balance which might prove efficacious in drawing readers together 
across the class and cultural divide which detective fiction comprehensively 
bridged. While Chesterton defends satirical scurrility in ‘England and Caricature’ 
(DN 28 Mar. 1908), on the grounds that traditionally ‘[m]en reminded a man 
maliciously of his bodily weakness […] if it was set-off against his worldly 
power’ (CDN 5: 44), he also acknowledges the drawbacks of excessively 
destructive satire: ‘We do not reconcile by pointing out the balance and 
distribution of glass eyes and wooden legs in all classes of the community. It 
produces equality, but hardly fraternity’ (CDN 5: 45). Chesterton finds the answer 
to this difficulty in the mediating action of caricature:  
 
this English literary style, coarse and yet kind, has done more than anything else to 
create the possibility of a genial grotesque […] The wooden leg is insisted on, but not 
with contempt, and yet, again, not with commiseration. It is insisted on with gusto, as 
if the Admiral had grown his wooden leg by the sheer energy of his character (CDN 5: 
45-46).  
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The positive revitalisation of the military ‘man of wood’ in ‘The Queer 
Feet’ operates as a microcosmic embodiment of Chesterton’s attempt to morally 
revive the corpse of the imperial body, while prefiguring the central nonsense 
conceit of The Flying Inn, in which the sign of the titular pub represents ‘the idea 
of dead wood walking about’ (Flying 188). The latter phenomenon 
pantomimically frustrates the invidious plans of Lord Ivywood, whose name 
characterises him as a creeping parasite on that same wood: ‘Ivywood, Lord 
Ivywood / He rots the tree as ivy would’ (Flying 283). Here the tree is a metaphor 
of England, returned to a consciousness of its traditions, which ‘until a little while 
ago the tree did not know that it knew’ (Flying 268), much as the parodic actions 
of Brown and Flambeau reintroduce older cultural traditions into modern society 
in order to reacquaint Colonel Pound with a benevolent heritage which he did not 
know that he knew.  
In an account that conforms closely to the purpose of Chesterton’s earliest 
Father Brown stories, Bakhtin argues that ‘Carnival is the place for working out, 
in a concretely sensuous, half-real and half-play-acted form, a new mode of 
interrelationship between individuals’ (Problems 123). To this end, Chesterton 
promotes an atmosphere of festive brotherhood at the conclusion of ‘The Queer 
Feet’, in which Brown tells ‘the story as easily as if he were telling it to an old 
friend by a Christmas fire’, while Colonel Pound, by now swept up in the 
ingenious mystery, notes admiringly that ‘“[h]e must have been a clever fellow”’ 
(FB 48). When the colonel adds coyly that ‘“I think I know a cleverer”’ (FB 48), 
the conclusion comes to echo that of ‘The Blue Cross’, in which a frank, friendly 
exchange is enabled by the socially disruptive conditions of play, once more 
breathing fictional life into Chesterton’s youthful vision of ‘the redemption of the 
world by comradeship’.  
In ‘The Uncanny’, Freud notes that ‘heimlich’ can also connote ‘familiar, 
friendly, confiding’, as well as ‘a place that is free of ghostly influences’ 
(Uncanny 133). Similarly, Brown’s confiding in the colonel—in combination with 
the narrator’s unconventionally familiar manner with the reader—successfully 
disperses the initial sense of alienation conjured by the uncanny atmosphere of the 
club. In this way, Chesterton’s unsettling satirical build-up and reassuring utopian 
denouement are both achieved through a balancing interplay of the unheimlich 
and the heimlich, or the estranging and the engaging (a duality which also 
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corresponds with striking complementarity to Bakhtin’s Romantic and 
carnivalesque forms of grotesque). My final chapter will analyse the ways in 
which these mutually informing elements went on to permeate Chesterton’s 
interaction with cultural modernity in the post-Edwardian era, as the aggressive 
challenge to his cultural authority mounted by figures such as T.S. Eliot drew 
fresh satirical sallies from Chesterton’s pen. Nonetheless, as my earlier reference 
to Eliot’s admiring obituary of Chesterton begins to suggest, this agonistic 
account is counterbalanced by an exposition of the stages through which 
Chesterton achieved an eventual reconciliation with Eliot, at the height of the 
latter’s own cultural ascendency.
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Chapter Four 
Negotiating Modernity: Chesterton and T.S. Eliot  
Reading through the Looking Glass 
 
[T]his debate about new forms in art interests me, because my reaction to it is not that 
of the ordinary reactionary. 
 
Chesterton, ‘A New Theory of Novelty’ (ILN 6 Oct. 1928; CW 34: 606) 
 
  “Do you know,” said Lord Beaumont […] “I can never quite make out which side 
you are on. Sometimes you seem so liberal and sometimes so reactionary. Are you a 
modern, Basil?” 
  “No,” said Basil, loudly and cheerfully, as he entered the crowded drawing-room. 
 
Chesterton, ‘The Painful Fall of a Great Reputation’ (CW 4: 96) 
 
In this chapter, I explore Chesterton’s parodic engagement with literary 
modernism, with particular emphasis upon his interaction with T.S. Eliot. For 
Chesterton, the rise of Eliot’s often disturbing poetic vision to a position of 
cultural ascendancy—beginning with the publication of Prufrock and Other 
Observations in 1917—seemed to augur a return to British culture of the twin 
ontological ogres of scepticism and pessimism. Consequently, his initial antipathy 
towards Eliot primarily stemmed from his sense that the same malaise that had 
forged fin de siècle decadence was regaining cultural traction. As with my 
analysis of Chesterton’s simultaneous immersion in, and striving to surmount, 
decadence between 1890 and 1910, parody again forms the means through which 
Chesterton projects a cheerful dismissal of such threats, much as he approvingly 
portrays his hero, Basil Grant, bursting obtrusively into the genteel drawing room, 
a very deliberate bull in a china shop. However, this chapter argues that 
Chesterton’s parodic response to Eliot is ‘not that of the ordinary reactionary’, but 
instead involves a considerably more ambivalent engagement with the figure 
towards whom he expresses dissent. When Chesterton has Lord Beaumont 
express confusion over Basil Grant’s cultural politics, he exposes a kernel of 
multivalence that Grant shares with his creator, and which often reveals itself 
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most tellingly in the oppositional rhetoric of Chesterton’s most fanatically playful 
jeux d'esprit.  
My analysis also demonstrates that the disproportionately visceral 
antagonism that both Eliot and his associates, Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, 
directed towards Chesterton in their early careers stemmed from much more 
complex private and public concerns than straightforward impatience with the 
spectacle of an adherent of passé values enjoying a superannuated cultural 
prominence. In this chapter, many of the parodic themes that informed my earlier 
chapters come together once more, including the ethical and psychological 
implications of nonsense, the dialogic basis of friendship, and the efficacy of self-
parody as a means of achieving personal and cultural regeneration. Having 
established the status of 1910 as Chesterton’s creative annus mirabilis in my 
previous chapter, I begin this chapter by discussing the same year as a catalytic 
phase in the burgeoning career of Eliot, in which the philosophical and aesthetic 
positions that would ultimately lead him into antagonistic dialogue with 
Chesterton later in the decade first cohered. I go on to analyse a series of parodic 
public exchanges conducted by the pair between 1917 and 1925, in order to 
explore the dialogic hall of mirrors in which this agon was played out. Finally, I 
elaborate the parodic detective work that enabled Chesterton to achieve a 
rapprochement with Eliot, during a new cultural and biographical phase 
bookended by Eliot’s publication of ‘The Hollow Men’ in 1925 and Chesterton’s 
death in 1936.  
 
What mask bizarre! Eliot in 1910 
 
No man ever preached the impersonality of art so well; no man ever preached the 
impersonality of art so personally[.] 
 
Chesterton on Whistler, ‘The Butterfly Again’ (DN 25 Mar. 1905; CDN 3:66)  
 
In January 1910, while still a student, Eliot published ‘Humoresque’ in the 
relatively modest environs of The Harvard Advocate. This poem bore the first 
fruit of his recent discovery of Jules Laforgue, through Arthur Symons’ study of 
the late-nineteenth-century continental avant-garde, The Symbolist Movement in 
Literature (1899). Eliot’s reading of Laforgue catalysed the inscrutably ironic 
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approach to poetic discourse that he went on to refine from ‘The Love Song of J. 
Alfred Prufrock’, which he began in 1910 and had completed by July 1911 (Ricks 
xxxix), to ‘The Hollow Men’ in 1925. I will ultimately consider the latter poem as 
a second pivotal moment in Eliot’s aesthetic development—both a crystallisation, 
and a sardonic survey, of his career to date. One aspect of this critical self-review 
is discernible in the ‘deliberate disguises’ which the authorial voice of Part II of 
‘The Hollow Men’ hopes to accumulate as a means of avoiding an unwanted 
‘meeting’ (CPP 84). ‘Humoresque’ first inaugurated this concern with protective 
disguise, appropriating Laforgue’s vision of the artist as a detached puppet-master 
projecting forth poetic avatars, whose capering before the reader operates as a 
textual ‘mask bizarre!’ (CPP 602) raised to the face of the elusive poet.1  
The narrator of ‘Humoresque’ expresses regret over the recent demise of 
one such puppet, a flawed model, ‘weak in body as in head’, who later makes 
contact from a new home among the ‘[h]aranguing spectres’ of ‘Limbo’ (CPP 
602). As this imagery suggests, the grotesque themes that have permeated my 
analysis of Chesterton return in strikingly comparable forms in Eliot’s early work. 
In the case of ‘Humoresque’, Eliot’s stress upon the evanescent authorial mask 
and the uncertainly animate marionette is particularly suggestive of the 
disorientating world of the Romantic grotesque—appropriately, since the title 
alludes to a form of nineteenth-century romantic music in which humour is 
divested of wit (see Randell 309). Bakhtin explains that the ‘theme of the 
marionette plays an important part in […] Romanticism [and] folk culture’ alike, 
though in the former ‘the accent is placed on the puppet as the victim of alien 
inhuman force, which rules over men by turning them into marionettes’ (Rabelais 
40). If this premise recalls the precepts of Schopenhauerian pessimism, it is telling 
that Eliot later identified Laforgue to be ‘“the nearest verse equivalent to the 
philosoph[y] of Schopenhauer”’, while explaining the latter’s philosophy to be 
that of ‘“annihilation”’ (qtd. in Habib 64). Similarly, the sub-heading of 
‘Humoresque’—‘After J. Laforgue’ (CPP 602)—frankly acknowledges the 
poem’s status as a pastiche, an aesthetic mode discussed in chapter one as a 
correlate of the value-neutral, subjectivity-undermining aspect of the grotesque, 
                                                 
1
 In the unpublished version, this line reads ‘what masque bizarre!’ (Eliot, Inventions 325), 
suggesting a wider array of disguises, worn in a textual fancy-dress ball. See Schuchard (70-86) 
for a more detailed analysis of Eliot’s debt to Laforgue. 
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which informs Chesterton’s disturbing vision of ‘a man constantly changing into 
other men that is the soul of decadence’.  
As these attributes suggest, Eliot’s early imaginative landscape is closely 
allied to the disturbing realm of academic nonsense elaborated in my second 
chapter. However, his early work also incorporates other shades of the grotesque. 
While ‘Humoresque’ is a quintessentially Romantic-grotesque conceit, ‘Suite 
Clownesque’, composed in October 1910, is more closely allied to the physicality 
of the carnivalesque. In one sense, the poem would appear to be another pastiche 
of decadence. Its evocation of a simultaneous sense of alienation from, and 
identification with, the spectacle of oneself as a grotesquely corporeal figure 
under public scrutiny not only takes inspiration from Eliot’s trips to the music hall 
during his time in Paris in 1910, but also from the decadent poetry of Symons, 
whose prologue to London Nights (1895) develops a comparable interplay 
between public and private selves: 
 
My life is like a music-hall,  
Where, in the impotence of rage,  
Chained by enchantment to my stall,  
I see myself upon the stage  
Dance to amuse a music-hall (Selected 38). 
 
However, in an important deviation from Symons’ traumatised account of a 
depersonalised spectatorship of the self, rather than the physical person being a 
painfully compromising factor in ‘Suite Clownesque’, the power of Eliot’s 
‘comedian’ derives from the discrepancy in vitality between his brazen ‘belly 
sparkling and immense’ and the enervated gentility of the ‘potted palms’ and 
‘terra cotta fawns’ (Inventions 32) within which he moves. Whereas Eliot’s 
marionette in ‘Humoresque’ is an ineffectual Pierrot, ‘[f]eebly contemptuous of 
nose’ (CPP 602), the ‘comedian’ is an invulnerable Harlequin, possessed of an 
‘[i]mpressive, sceptic, scarlet nose’ which ‘interrogates the audience’ (Inventions 
32). This dynamic, in which the clown not only insinuates himself with the 
audience, but also insinuates the audience with the abject performers, draws 
attention to the resemblance of Eliot’s technique to that of Chesterton in ‘The 
Queer Feet’. The contrast that Chesterton develops in his story between the 
enervated denizens of the club and the vibrant pantomime duo who infiltrate it 
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along with the irreverent narrator coincides with the imagery of ‘Suite 
Clownesque’, in which Eliot’s protagonist is a lithe, arch figure who ‘gets away 
with it’, invariably turning the tables on his fellow performers, while training his 
gaze back upon the complacent audience: ‘A jellyfish impertinent […] Leaning 
across the orchestra’ (Inventions 32). 
Nonetheless, two aspects are missing from this insipient correspondence—
the pedagogic action of moral satire, and the regenerative drive of the folk 
grotesque. In chapter two, I discussed Bakhtin’s account of the distinct meanings 
of the mask in differing strains of the grotesque, which Bakhtin conceives to have 
undergone a degeneration, in post-Enlightenment literature, from its earlier, 
positive representation as an image of ‘change and reincarnation’, to its later 
status as a façade overlying a ‘terrible vacuum’. The ‘mask bizarre’ worn by the 
early Eliot is most comparable to the latter model, with its connotation of the 
relativistic reaches of the parodic spectrum—an attribute drawn out by I.A. 
Richards’s account of the ‘“ghostly flavor of irony which hung about [Eliot’s] 
manner as though he were preparing a parody”’ (qtd. in Chinitz 178). This view is 
corroborated by Habib’s reading of Eliot’s early philosophical position, which 
emphasises a radical, anti-Hegelian disruption of unified identity: ‘Whereas 
Hegel’s dialectic reinstates identity, Eliot sees the potential of irony as infinite, as 
transcending all closure’ (143). In Eliot’s early work, this grotesque self-
positioning is evidenced by a disorientating pastiche of other identities, 
accompanied by a deflation of anything that looks too much like an unmediated 
expression of personal emotional conviction, through a form of programmatic 
self-parody in which bathos is deliberately engendered to derange the projection 
of earnestness. For example, the over-straining of the marionette in ‘Humoresque’ 
to assert its stylistic originality—it claims to be hawking ‘“[t]he newest style, on 
Earth, I swear”’ (CPP 602)—is perhaps a method of authorial self-policing, a 
ventriloquistic warning-to-self of the bathetic consequences of affecting pristine 
novelty, which also serves to tip off the critical reader that the poet is alive to this 
pitfall. 
Eliot’s circuitous performance of heightened self-awareness contracts a 
further debt to Laforgue, since the latter’s stress upon the ironic ‘playing [of] 
voices against one another’ (Gordon, Early 29) represented an attempt to 
complicate the reader’s understanding of the author’s position in relation to the 
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sentiments of the text. This deliberate alienating action militates against an 
uncomplicated ‘meeting’ between poet and reader, in a manner comparable to that 
which Chesterton had earlier complained of in the rise of the cultural 
‘mystagogue’, whose work represents the ultimate smirking private joke: ‘we 
have seen the process of secrecy and aristocracy introduced even into jokes. [… 
A] small school of aesthetes […] have introduced an almost insane individualism 
into that one form of intercourse which is specially and uproariously communal. 
They have made even levities into secrets’ (‘Aristocrats as Mystagogues.’ ILN 25 
Jan. 1908; CW 28: 32). This schismatic principle is espoused by the impenetrable 
ironist, Auberon Quin, in Napoleon, following the intonation of a monologue of 
incomprehensible nonsense-riddling: ‘Hitherto it was the ruin of a joke that people 
did not see it. Now it is the sublime victory of a joke that people do not see it’ 
(CW 6: 243).  
As I discussed in chapter one, a complete absence of earnestness is inimical 
to the production of moral satire. In Chesterton’s fiction, this absence is 
epitomised by the figure of Quin, who was recognised ‘by the entire reviewing 
world as Max Beerbohm’ (Ward, Gilbert 153), and styles his regiment ‘the 1st 
Decadents Green’ (CW 6: 328) in the battle of Notting Hill. Eliot’s resemblance to 
Beerbohm is an irony in itself, since his attempts to confound stable personality 
were essayed, in large part, as a defence mechanism to protect himself from the 
potential blows of parodists such as Beerbohm. As Soldo argues, Eliot’s early 
work possesses ‘the nervous humor of an intellectually astute, but emotionally 
insecure person, intent upon using humor as a protective shield to ward off 
invasions of his inner sanctum’ (144). Much as Prufrock dreads exposure to ‘The 
eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase’ (CPP 14), and carefully prepares a 
suitable mask to ward off this threat, Eliot hypothesises unmediated encounters 
with other minds as agonistic, rather than sympathetic scenarios, and in his early 
verse this apprehension manifests itself in a miasmic vortex of self-parody, 
conducted as a means of evading capture by the detecting reader. As ‘The Hollow 
Men’ has it, ‘Between the emotion / And the response / Falls the Shadow’ (CPP 
85), and despite the note of lamentation introduced here, in Eliot’s earlier work 
there is a sense that he prefers it this way. 
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Eliot later confided to Woolf that ‘“humiliation”’ (qtd. in Ackroyd 84) was 
his greatest fear. In the post-Edwardian literary arena, the threat of humiliation 
was most clearly posed by the forensic gaze of parodists such as Beerbohm—
haranguing spectres who invade the inner sanctum with mischievous intent, using 
their textual detective instincts to root out and bring to light any secret, perhaps 
subconscious, preoccupations that the ur author might have failed to efface with 
sufficient rigour. Indeed, when Beerbohm’s parodic symposium, A Christmas 
Garland, was first published, one reviewer contradicted Leavis’s later assertion 
that the ‘true effects’ of great writers are inaccessible to the parodist, noting that 
Beerbohm not only caught the ‘externals’ of his subjects, but also ‘unbared their 
brains and hearts’, having apparently obtained ‘temporary loans of their very 
minds’ (‘A Christmas Garland’). In attempting to evade the threat of satirical 
exposure augured by this disturbing mental congress, Eliot took up a position at 
the grotesque extreme of the parodic spectrum—the point at which identity 
becomes comprehensively confounded by the ungovernable energies of existential 
irony.  
It is a further irony that one of Eliot’s primary purposes in assembling his 
elusive retinue of disguises was to evade the charge of displaying an earnest 
adherence to decadence—a charge invited by his professed sympathy with the 
etiolated, defunct marionette of ‘Humoresque’. Gordon detects a ‘wilfully 
defeatist identity’ (Early 29) in the work that immediately postdates Eliot’s 
contact with Symons, a poet whose temperamental and stylistic influence upon 
Eliot’s verse has been convincingly mapped by Roger Holdsworth (13-18). While 
occasionally arresting, Symons’ verse frequently indulges in a complacent, 
sentimental pessimism, which skirts the kind of unintentional self-parody later 
mocked by Beerbohm in ‘Enoch Soames’ (1916), his tale of a second-rate 
decadent poet whose tepid volume of ‘Negations’ (Seven 13) meets with universal 
indifference.
2
 Registering this potential site of attack, Eliot took the precaution of 
filtering Symons’ monologic pessimism through Laforgue’s ironic play of voices, 
sloughing off his Weltschmerz onto a lengthy series of ambivalently conceived, 
abject poetic avatars.  
                                                 
2
 Felstiner argues that there is a marked similarity between Soames’ verse and that of Symons (9). 
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Insofar as Eliot conceives the dialogic interlocutor as a critical 
consciousness to be consistently outwitted, the apparently self-deprecatory gesture 
of the sub-heading of ‘Humoresque’ can also be read as the first of his many 
attempts to police the terms of his reception, by pointing the reader towards the 
appropriate source of influence. Disarmed by the apparent modesty of this 
concession, the reader is less likely to carry out further investigations. While 
Kenner claims that Eliot is ‘a habitual imitator, but […] a tacit imitator’ (Pound 
438), he is also a singularly indiscreet thief, who hides his purloined letters in 
plain view, stealing from others while attempting to elude capture himself, by 
ostentatiously advertising his literary debts in a manner which involves fessing up 
in advance to a lesser crime. As he famously argued, with a curious admixture of 
bravado and self-criminalisation, ‘[i]mmature poets imitate, mature poets steal’ 
(‘Philip’ 125). For my present purposes, the most important aspect of this dictum 
is its predication upon absolute self-consciousness. While imitation potentially 
connotes an unconscious appropriation which would leave the artist open to 
satirical attack, stealing is an intrinsically deliberate act. This urge to retain a 
conscious grip on his materials helps to explain why Sewell terms Eliot ‘as 
extensive a parodist as Carroll was’ (‘Lewis’ 67), and particularly why Eliot 
invokes the inventions of the White Knight in the title of the notebook of his early 
poems, Inventions of the March Hare, as a means of advertising the unlikeliness 
that he would make a comparably involuntary error to that of Carroll’s 
unconscious pasticheur.  
However, Beerbohm’s later satirical assessments of Eliot demonstrate the 
fallibility of these evasive strategies. With characteristic critical acumen, 
Beerbohm specifically identified both inscrutable irony and anaemic pessimism as 
the salient features of Eliot’s verse, glossing Prufrock and Other Observations as 
an exercise in ‘“ironically analysing an empty sardine tin”’ (qtd. in Riewald 188), 
while inferring the interrogative moral of The Waste Land (1922) to be ‘[w]ot’s 
the good o’ trying to earn a living nowadays?... Wot’s the good of ennyfink? Why, 
nuffink!’ (qtd. in Felstiner 65). In each case, a capacity to commune 
empathetically with the poet—implied in the first instance by the reattribution of 
Eliot’s anthropomorphic feline imagery to the poet himself, and in the second 
instance by the allusive gesture towards Eliot’s debt to the music hall—acts as the 
means through which Beerbohm skewers his target all the more effectively. In this 
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respect, Beerbohm confirms Eliot’s fears of being subjected to agonistic 
assessment by his peers, and his suspicion that an opening up of empathetic lines 
of communication may not be an uncomplicatedly beneficent scenario.  
Nonetheless, it is crucial to note that Beerbohm is able to identify the comic 
elements in his target so successfully because the traits that he perceives in Eliot 
derive equally from within himself. Eliot’s Laforgean doubling of perspective is 
closely comparable to that which Beerbohm had essayed when producing his 
inscrutably ironical ‘Defence of Cosmetics’, which, as Felstiner notes, constructs 
a carefully-wrought stylistic ‘mask to project the roles of aesthete and counter-
aesthete at once’ (6). A comparable prevarication between espousal and 
debunking of decadence is discernible in the comic protestations of Beerbohm’s 
narrator, in ‘Enoch Soames’, that the poet’s apparently inept verses are ‘laden 
perhaps with meanings as deep as Mallarmé’s own’ (Seven 11). Of course, the 
humour of this conceit derives from the reader’s awareness that the abject text has 
been projected from within Beerbohm himself, and Beerbohm self-consciously 
plays upon this irony, by displaying a residual pride in his poetic craftsmanship, 
even when deliberately presenting the work as bathetic, much as Eliot 
simultaneously identifies with, and distances himself from, the flaws of his 
etiolated marionette in ‘Humoresque’.  
Bentley discusses Beerbohm’s strategies of self-defence in his diary, 
observing of a family dispute that he feels ‘compelled to adopt a Max Beerbohm 
attitude—to be so openly absurd that you disarm criticism’ (13 Oct. 1896; Bod 
MS Eng.misc.e.865). As I discussed in chapter one, Chesterton’s acts of 
intentional self-parody also represent the moment at which self-mockery becomes 
indistinguishable from self-defence, as a means of advertising a self-
consciousness which draws the potential sting of the parodist. In the case of 
Beerbohm’s epigrammatic parodies of Eliot, even if they succeed in striking the 
target, the achievement is vitiated by the sense that the target got there first, 
having already learned how to ward off such blows from the example set by 
Beerbohm himself. This site of correspondence between both Chesterton and 
Bentley, and Chesterton and Eliot, is of great importance in understanding the 
confluence of similarity and difference that suffuses the personalities of the three 
men, which complicated the achievement of mutual sympathy, with more wide-
ranging consequences—in the case of Chesterton and Eliot—for their subsequent 
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reception. The most effective way of locating the crux of this ambivalent relation 
will be to take a closer look at the third, and most fully realised, of the marionettes 
conceived by Eliot in 1910, J. Alfred Prufrock. 
As Maud Ellmann notes, in ‘Prufrock’, ‘the subject is patrolled at every 
moment’, he ‘sees himself being seen’, yet also ‘acts as his own voyeur, pinned 
and wriggling under his own pitiless eye’ (69). Exorbitantly conscious of the 
potential criticisms of others, he becomes his own self-satirist, while compulsively 
evincing an urge to parody others in turn. This duality is particularly highlighted 
by Prufrock’s account of the time available for ‘visions and revisions’ (CPP 14), a 
phrase that directly correlates to the temporal dynamic of parody—in which the 
visions of the ur artist are followed by the revisions of the parodist—while 
internalising this dynamic to refer to the protagonist’s own bathetic self-revisions. 
Prufrock’s double-edged urge to parodically amend is exemplified by the time that 
it takes for him to wonder ‘“Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?”’ (CPP 14), since the 
two occasions on which he does utter this phrase constitute an archetype of formal 
repetition with deviation, amending the ‘overwhelming question’ (CPP 15), ‘Do I 
dare / Disturb the universe?’ (CPP 14), to the farcical conundrum, ‘Do I dare to 
eat a peach?’ (CPP 16), thus rendering an initially sublime vision ridiculous 
through revision.  
Significantly, the first of these questions is also an unattributed quotation 
from Laforgue (see Kenner, Invisible 21). Consequently, the peach adaptation 
constitutes a burlesque reconfiguration of a phrase of the forebear, even as it self-
deprecatingly draws the protagonist’s own inconsequentiality into the range of its 
criticism. In this way, Eliot’s parody of his mentor simultaneously enables his 
avatar to enact a self-conscious self-parody, producing a particularly economical 
expression of the carnivalesque principle of grotesque, democratic laughter, in 
which the self is drawn into a universal sphere of mockery, to become parodic 
spectator and parodied actor at once. When Prufrock’s portentous speculation that 
there will be time ‘to murder and create’ (CPP 14) resolves itself in his 
prevarication before the peach,  the revision transmutes the cerebral into the 
corporeal in the characteristic action of burlesque, reframing the original 
disturbance of the universe to connote the act of digestion, to produce a 
scatological rendition of murder and creation. If we consider the protagonist’s 
sequential questions to operate as an internal dialogue, the revision produces a 
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comparable effect to the mocking echo which the court buffoon might offer as a 
rejoinder to the pompous Prince, while winking at the audience with a ‘hark at 
him’ gesticulation. 
In Eliot’s early work, this carnivalesque element is in continual tension 
with the timorous drive to establish a more absolute detachment. Again, the latter 
quality demonstrates a temperamental affinity with Laforgue, who followed 
Schopenhauer in displaying an urge to split the subject into a dyad of ‘mocking 
commentator and droll sufferer’ (Habib 31), with the aim of establishing a 
‘second, or transcendent, self overlook[ing] in a detached fashion the activities of 
the first self’ (Habib 7). As Eliot explained in a letter to Conrad Aiken (30 Sept. 
1914), in an exposition of deliberate depersonalisation, the trick ‘is to be able to 
look at one’s life as if it were somebody else’s’ (Letters 1 58). The tensions 
produced by the ambiguous symbiosis which attends to this attempt to establish a 
distinct mind-body dualism are most clearly discernible in the ‘[i]mpersonal 
theory of poetry’ (53) that Eliot famously elaborated in ‘Tradition and the 
Individual Talent’ (1919). The ‘escape from personality’ (‘Tradition’ 58) posited 
in the essay owes a considerable debt to Schopenhauerian theory and Laforgean 
practice, while Eliot explicitly cites a ‘process of depersonalization’ (‘Tradition’ 
53) as the method through which to achieve the desired escape, deliberately 
establishing the subjectively disorientating condition which Bentley seems to have 
experienced involuntarily.  
Nonetheless, Eliot’s celebrated aesthetic theory is paradoxical in the sense 
that it posits a common identity between the observing artist and the suffering 
subject, even as it strains to establish a conceptual detachment between two 
distinct modes of being, thus connoting implication in the morass even as it strives 
to establish distance.
3
 The result is a comic dynamic comparable to Chesterton’s 
‘half-conscious eccentric’, caught in the act of humiliating self-contradiction and 
attempting to brazen it out, rather than a pristinely detached ironic intellect, 
observing the burlesque misadventures of the body with imperturbable sangfroid. 
A subtle play on this tension is perhaps encoded within Prufrock’s speculation 
that he should have ‘bitten off the matter with a smile’ (CPP 15). Here the 
                                                 
3
 Ellmann has given a full and convincing account of the contradictions to which Eliot’s theory 
leads (36-45), though she does not consider the question in the parodic light elaborated in the 
present thesis.  
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connection between the pun on eliminating ‘matter’ and the ironist’s closed-off, 
enigmatic ‘smile’ weds an anti-material principle to the corporeal image of biting, 
to reemphasise the intractable intimacy of the mind/body conjunction.  
The symbiotic link between would-be dignified intellect and buffoonish 
body internalises the combination of participation and observation which Kristeva 
identifies in the Bakhtinian ‘carnival participant’ who ‘is both actor and spectator 
[… split] into a subject of the spectacle and an object of the game’ (Kristeva 49).  
This principle is most completely embodied by Eliot’s more virile marionette of 
1910—‘the comedian’ in ‘Suite Clownesque’—but it is also a prominent feature 
of Prufrock, whose confluence of intellectual sensitivity and burlesque physicality 
renders him a hybridised binary of the self-pitying Pierrot of ‘Humoresque’ and 
the brazen Clown of ‘Suite Clownesque’. In this spirit, Prufrock’s famous 
invocation of Hamlet hybridises the blackly comic prince and the court ‘fool’ 
within a single, exorbitantly self-monitory entity, while enacting a further pastiche 
of Laforgue, whose mock-heroic rewrite of Shakespeare’s text, in his ironically 
titled parody collection, Moral Tales (1887), situates Yorick as Hamlet’s father.  
As with Chesterton’s titular conceit in The Return of Don Quixote, both 
Laforgue and Eliot conspicuously draw the reader’s attention to the panoply of 
interpretations of the same story to which they are each contributing their own 
take. Eliot’s version comes ‘after J. Laforgue’, much as Chesterton and Bentley 
took turns in offering their own buffoonish variations on Sherlock Holmes, whose 
ennui, drug addiction, and aestheticized lodgings render him as much a decadent 
archetype as Hamlet. While Eliot later explicitly parodied Doyle in the 
anthropomorphic form of ‘Macavity: The Mystery Cat’ (1939), ‘Prufrock’ is also 
a curious riff on the agonistic premises of the Poe/Doyle detection formula, with 
the protagonist’s paranoid urban perambulations recalling the air of schism that 
suffuses ‘The Man of the Crowd’, and, as a consequence, also the initial 
disorientated flight of Valentin through the streets of London in ‘The Blue 
Cross’.4 Of course, in the latter instance the chase ends in the establishment of a 
realm of camaraderie on Hampstead Heath, whereas no such re-integrative 
moment punctuates Prufrock’s journey through the ‘half-deserted streets’ (CPP 
13) of the capital.  
                                                 
4
 Ackroyd reports that Eliot ‘could quote long passages of Sherlock Holmes from memory (this 
was one of his party tricks)’ (167). 
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Instead, what Prufrock discovers at the end of each urban outing is an 
etiolated feast. As this additional context suggests, the interplay of imaginative 
similarity and difference in the visions pursued by Chesterton and Eliot in 1910 
can be elucidated with particular clarity through a comparison of ‘Prufrock’ with 
‘The Queer Feet’, a detective story which is explicitly figured as a burlesque 
rendition of Hamlet, and which was published in the same period in which Eliot 
was composing the earliest drafts of Prufrock. The central premise of both texts is 
the use of nonsense imagery to convey a carnivalesque satire of the vacuity of the 
high-society dinner party, and the manifold corporeal images and metaphors that 
permeate Chesterton’s narrative also pepper the burlesque world of ‘Prufrock’, in 
which, as Sewell notes, the protagonist’s Sisyphean ordeal is to attend an ‘endless 
tea party, interminable as the Hatter’s’ (qtd. in Ricks 8). Similarly, the agonised 
self-consciousness of Eliot’s protagonist is heightened by the extreme formality of 
the gatherings that he attends, much as Chesterton’s text is sardonically suffused 
with an oppressive ‘silence and embarrassment’.  
However, while Chesterton extrapolates a pedagogic moral from his tale, 
which enables him to build the narrative towards a harmonious note of utopian 
integration, no such denouement pertains in the world of ‘Prufrock’. If Father 
Brown possesses the human voice that wakes Colonel Pound from the nonsense 
world in which he dwells, the imaginative drift of ‘Prufrock’ is locked in an 
apprehension of encroachment upon the private self by the invasive other, in 
which the awakening from voluntary solitary confinement—a further variant on 
the conclusion of Alice—is figured as the moment at which ‘we drown’ (CPP 17). 
Chesterton’s story is a parodic reconfiguration of tragedy as festive comedy, 
whereas the isolation of the conclusion of Eliot’s poem is as absolute as that of the 
corpse strewn climax of Hamlet. In this sense, while the nonsensical rendering of 
parlous banquets in Chesterton’s story and Eliot’s poem demonstrates a marked 
formal and thematic resemblance, the site of their divergence is located in Eliot’s 
depiction of a terrifyingly incomprehensible, Hankin-like social world of pure 
nonsense, divested of the combination of moral satire and merry folk grotesque 
through which Chesterton leavens agonism with a movement towards 
reconciliation and regeneration.  
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While the alarming tendency of Prufrock’s fellow diners to ‘drop a question 
on your plate’ (CPP 14) illustrates Eliot’s stylistic debt to the disorientating 
nonsense trope of the category-mistake, Prufrock’s parenthetical speculations 
about what the guests might exclaim behind his back—‘[t]hey will say: “How his 
hair is growing thin!”’; ‘[t]hey will say: “But how his arms and legs are growing 
thin”’ (CPP 14)—invoke the inexplicable brutality of Lear’s limerick-world. The 
use of ‘[w]e will’ in the following piece gives an indication of the way in which 
Lear’s introduction of an amorphous ‘they’ invariably presages the threatened, or 
actual, infliction of verbal or physical violence upon the protagonist:  
 
There was an Old Man of Ibreem, 
Who suddenly threaten’d to scream; 
But they said, “If you do, 
We will thump you quite blue, 
You disgusting old man of Ibreem!” (130). 
 
Although Prufrock possesses too much self-restraint to suddenly threaten to 
scream, Lear’s ‘disgusting old man’ finds a close echo in the abjection that 
Prufrock insistently confers upon his own person. A further correspondence with 
Eliot’s carnivalesque ‘comedian’ is also discernible in Prufrock’s mocking jibes at 
the women who ‘come and go / Talking of Michelangelo’ (CPP 13/14), which 
convey the sing-song contempt of the stage fool, providing an arch gloss to the 
audience from a position of slight removal from the action. If it is these effete 
ladies who are whispering against the protagonist in his paranoid imaginings, his 
outbursts of misogynistic mockery are explicable as the response of a self-
consciously abject figure to the anticipated rejection of the desired other. These 
bitterly satirical attributes contribute to the text’s ultimate failure to establish the 
reconciling realm of the ‘genial grotesque’ which Chesterton pursues in ‘The 
Queer Feet’. While Prufrock is just as coercive as Chesterton’s narrator in his 
attempts to draw the reader into partnership against the vacuity of high society, his 
methodology ultimately engenders ‘equality, but hardly fraternity’, in 
Chesterton’s phrase. 
Although Eliot’s early marionettes share certain facets with Chesterton’s 
pantomime heroes, their ultimate discrepancy is not only typological—that 
between the Romantic and folk grotesque—but also social. Prufrock is 
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ambiguously implicated within high-society in a way that Chesterton’s servant-
comedians, Father Brown and Flambeau, are not. In Eliot’s poem, this leads to a 
reversal of social perspective which recalls Chesterton’s allegorical association of 
Brown and Flambeau with Death: ‘I have seen the eternal Footman hold my coat, 
and snicker’ (CPP 15). If the anticipated mockery of Prufrock’s shrinking arms, 
legs, and hair figures him as evaporating before the spectators’ astonished gaze, in 
a comically fast-forwarded disintegration that recalls Syme’s fearful anticipation 
of the collapse of Professor de Worms, Prufrock’s evanescent bearing also 
implicates him within the ontological vacuity that Chesterton had identified in the 
official feast. While Chesterton considers a dawning apprehension of the waiter to 
be the beginning of dining, Prufrock’s exorbitant sense of personal abjection 
finally vitiates his capacity to ‘force the moment to its crisis’ (CPP 15) in the 
manner that produces a liminal leap of faith into reconciliation in Chesterton’s tale 
of social crisis. Of course, this operates as an implied social indictment in itself in 
Eliot’s text, but it is equally expressive of the pessimistic enervation of the figure 
who conceives it. 
Prufrock’s fearful withdrawal from a threatening world also draws 
attention to the temperamental similarity of Eliot and Bentley, a correspondence 
which helps to account for the ambivalent play of affinity and opposition that 
Chesterton later displayed in textual dialogue with Eliot. While the letters from 
Bentley to Chesterton cited in chapter two often prefigure both Eliot’s poetic 
voice and the characters of Wonderland in their impenetrably ironic verbal games, 
Bentley’s diaries are frequently proto-Prufrockian in their adumbration of a 
lengthy catalogue of social anxieties. For example, his enduring ambivalence 
towards the domineering figure of Belloc—his ‘successful rival’ (25 Oct. 1894; 
Bod MS Eng.misc.e.862) at Oxford—is epitomised by his account of a dinner 
party held to celebrate the inauguration of the new Speaker. Here Bentley self-
critically conflates an abject appearance with an abject inner life: ‘Very annoying 
evening […] I had to go in morning clothes, which made me very angry […] 
These men are far above me. They can do things I daren’t contemplate. […] My 
mind beside Belloc’s, for example, would look a mean and disgusting thing’ (15 
July 1899; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869). While Bentley’s phrasing—‘things I daren’t 
contemplate’—prefigures Prufrock’s interminable prevarications, and his 
inappropriate ‘morning clothes’ raise the ghost of a snickering footman, the image 
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of his mind looking a ‘disgusting thing’ evokes a depersonalised observation of 
the internal self as a site of abjection, which accords with Eliot’s apprehension of 
critical antagonists distastefully rooting around in his consciousness. 
As Tigges argues, for Lear ‘nonsense was a method of self-defence, an 
escape to hide his feelings, his despair, his sense of failure’ (43). Similarly, 
Nicolas Bentley considered his father’s failure to secure a first at Oxford a pivotal 
moment in his life: a ‘failure […] of self-confidence rather than of intellect’, 
which was ‘probably a fundamental clue to his character, to the hesitancy, the 
aloofness, as it seemed to some, the withdrawal from any approach to intimacy, 
which kept him on the sidelines throughout his life’ (23). In his diaries, Bentley 
discusses the ‘feeling of black despair and self-contempt’ (21 July 1898; Bod MS 
Eng.misc.e.867) engendered by his self-perceived ‘failure as an Oxford man’ (4 
Nov. 1898; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869). A month after receiving his classification, 
he notes that ‘[t]he world is becoming very real and threatening now’ (17 Aug. 
1898; MS.Eng.misc.e.867). These accounts suggest that the ‘rigid flippancy’ that 
Chesterton ascribed to his friend should be understood as a defence mechanism, 
the recourse to arch inscrutability characteristic of the individual who feels 
unequal to the demands of improvisational repartee, and who shrinks from 
anticipated social failure into pre-emptive withdrawal. 
This debilitating outlook also helps to account for the snobbery displayed 
by both Bentley and Eliot. By 1914, Eliot confessed himself ‘a thorough snob’ 
(Letters 1 61), and his later portrayal, in The Waste Land, of the ‘small house 
agent’s clerk, with one bold stare / One of the low on whom assurance sits’ (CPP 
68) is interestingly prefigured in the Booth-like prurience with which Bentley 
contemplates those who inhabit the ‘lowest of the business classes, just where 
clerkdom begins. […] Imagine their lives among themselves—the psychological 
dirt of it’ (19 Mar. 1900; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869). While a Nietzschean take on 
the categorising rhetoric of social reform is suggested by Eliot’s vision of London, 
around 1918, which ‘divided human beings into “supermen”, “termites” and 
“wireworms”’ (Strachey qtd. in Ackroyd 96), his disdain is reflected in Bentley’s 
remarks on the populace as he gazes out on Hampstead Heath. In an account that 
lends a further instructive context to Chesterton’s positive use of the Heath in 
‘The Blue Cross’, Bentley discusses its infestation ‘with swarming heaps of 
people—the ignorant almost entirely. […] Almost all of them were young 
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unmarried people, in couples and parties, giving a frightful promise of more 
swarming heaps of the ignorant to come. It is a sombre thing to watch the People 
enjoying itself’ (16 July 1899; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.869).  
Since Bentley’s reflections come a day after the Speaker meeting, they can 
perhaps be understood as an outward projection of his sense of self-disgust in 
contemplating those ‘far above’ him, rather as Eliot’s distaste at the ‘low’ is 
tinged with a tacit envy of the ‘bold […] assurance’. In ‘The Snob’, Chesterton 
incisively analyses the ‘internal insecurity’ which motivates the masochistic 
pleasure indulged in by the snob: ‘The snob’s delight is to rise high and have all 
the time the secret joy, the purple ecstacy of feeling low’ (CDN 5: 49). 
Chesterton’s impatience with such attitudes derives from the painful process 
through which he overcame his own ‘sterile isolation’, as he characterised his 
youthful solipsism, which left him with a sense of the profound importance of 
striving to establish a state of category-defying, immersive camaraderie. The point 
is made evocatively in What’s Wrong With the World, in a passage that is central 
to a proper understanding of his message in ‘The Queer Feet’, in which ‘a sort of 
mad modesty’ replaces the self-immolating pride of the snob: 
 
No one has ever begun to understand comradeship who does not accept with it a 
certain hearty eagerness in eating, drinking, or smoking, an uproarious materialism 
[…] You may call the thing an orgy or a sacrament; it is certainly an essential. It is at 
root a resistance to the superciliousness of the individual. Nay, its very swaggering and 
howling are humble. In the heart of its rowdiness there is a sort of mad modesty; a 
desire to melt the separate soul into the mass of unpretentious masculinity. It is a 
clamorous confession of the weakness of all flesh […] This sort of equality must be 
bodily and gross and comic. Not only are we all in the same boat, but we are all seasick 
(CW 4: 95).  
 
While Chesterton often seems insufficiently aware of the potentially 
oppressive nature of his hearty adherence of ‘uproarious materialism’ to 
exceptionally sensitive individuals, it is essential to recognise that he developed 
this philosophy as an urgent remedy for his own acute sensitivity, which led him 
to seek refuge in the comforts of communality. The queasy, subjectivity-
undermining terms of his analysis frankly acknowledge the fact that this condition 
of social immersion is not uncomplicatedly psychologically reassuring, but it is 
251 
 
nonetheless posited as a healthier option than pessimistic withdrawal. Bakhtin 
argues that ‘images of the Romantic grotesque usually express fear of the world’ 
(Rabelais 39)—‘in short, I was afraid’ (CPP 15), summarises Prufrock. 
Conversely, Bakhtin explains that by reconceiving the world as ‘one great 
communal performance’, carnival is efficacious in ‘liberating one from fear, 
bringing the world maximally close to a person and bringing one person 
maximally close to another’ (Problems 160).  
Nicolas Bentley recalled that his father considered Chesterton’s conversion 
to derive from a combination of a ‘subservience […] to Hilaire Belloc’s will’ and 
a sensitive nature that ‘felt the burden of existence too heavy to support without 
[a] spiritual opiate’ (42-43). In an equally trenchant reading, Sewell argues that 
Chesterton’s personality presents an archetype of ‘the gifted individual convinced 
of his own utter worthlessness’, who seeks ‘to defend and protect the self all the 
time’ (‘Giant’ 575). While Sewell’s tendentious conclusions might seem 
counterintuitive, certain instances of Chesterton’s apparently playful self-
deprecation would appear to substantiate this reading. Perhaps the most striking of 
these is a self-portrait as caricature, in which he rather surprisingly depicts himself 
‘[a]s I would like to be’ (Coloured 112), with an image that resembles the 
dandyish Matthew Arnold, ‘singular whiskers’ and all, in contrast to the 
shambling figure of Chesterton ‘[a]s I am’ (Coloured 113): 
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This caricature again suggests the presence of a tacit self-defence 
underscoring Chesterton’s public projection of opposition to a cultural other, here 
illustrated by a visual depiction of personal abjection which renders the pared 
down Arnoldian figure an unobtainable physical ideal, even as Chesterton’s 
rhetoric more commonly figures Arnold’s pared down classicism as an 
undesirable philosophical antithesis. As I discussed in chapters one and two, 
Chesterton’s recourse to an anti-Arnoldian democratic populism formed a bulwark 
against his own youthful neuroses, and the awakening from intellectual 
detachment that Chesterton achieved in the 1890s is depicted in the progress of his 
avatar, Syme, from paranoid cultural policeman to well-adjusted constituent of the 
benign mob. According to Bentley’s testimony, in the early 1890s, Chesterton 
exclusively read classics and ‘did not care […] for lighter reading’ (qtd. in 
Clemens 3), and in this light, Canovan’s assessment of Chesterton seems 
particularly astute: he typifies ‘the reformed intellectual, whose views about his 
former vices are often as severe as those of the reformed drunkard’ (37).  
Chesterton’s youthful traumas caused his conception of the locus of 
internal abjection to become diametrically opposed to that of Eliot. For 
Chesterton, the sterility of detached intellectualism is to be feared as a harbinger 
of self-undermining mental disturbance, while in Eliot the burlesque body 
operates as a disquieting objective corollary of the abject within. The consequent 
public self-identification of the pair with, respectively, grotesque, democratic 
physicality, and refined, aloof intellectualism informs Mason’s account of the 
pledge of cultural allegiance that each seemed to demand of his readership: ‘a 
choice between “popular” bowels and “clerkly” head’ (14-15). In his important 
work of critical recalibration, T.S. Eliot and the Cultural Divide (2003), David 
Chinitz explains that Eliot’s critical proponents subsequently sought to efface any 
attributes of the poet which seemed to compromise his monologic ‘“seriousness”’: 
textual artefacts ‘not easily assimilated into Eliot’s elitist reputation, soon 
evaporated into obscurity’ (173).  
My account of the interplay of similarity and difference that characterises 
‘The Queer Feet’ and ‘Prufrock’ begins to demonstrate that the schism 
conventionally thought to bifurcate the pair—‘Chesterton is comical, democratic, 
and orthodox. Eliot is ironic, aristocratic, and a priest of art’ (39), as Oser puts 
it—is not as clear-cut as it first appears. Indeed, Vivian, in ‘The Decay of Lying’, 
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could be speaking of Chesterton and Eliot when he notes that ‘[i]n Falstaff there is 
something of Hamlet, in Hamlet there is not a little of Falstaff’ (Wilde, Intentions 
18). It is perhaps unsurprising that the narrative of clear-cut opposition stubbornly 
persists, since it was so forcefully promulgated by both men at various times, such 
was its convenience in defining the terms of the cultural propaganda war in which 
each was publically engaged. As the following account will elaborate, 
Chesterton’s success in projecting the singular persona of unreconstructed Falstaff 
on the Edwardian public stage served as ammunition for Eliot’s satirical attempts 
to establish a clear partitioning of factions in the years that followed—a project 
inspired by his discovery of a new sense of camaraderie amidst the clamorous 
band of avant-gardists who Wyndham Lewis would later dub the ‘Men of 1914’ 
(Blasting 249). 
 
The Emetic Ecstacy: Chesterton and Eliot in Parodic Dialogue 
 
It was like some frightful fancy-dress ball to which the two mortal enemies were to go 
dressed up as each other. Only the fancy-dress ball was to be a dance of death[.] 
 
Chesterton, ‘The Dagger with Wings’ (FB 473) 
 
“You! Hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!” 
 
T.S. Eliot (after Baudelaire), The Waste Land  (CPP 63) 
 
When Eliot arrived in England in 1914, he wasted little time in getting to know 
Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, having already absorbed the orthodoxy of their 
cultural likes and dislikes through a preparatory surveillance of their activities. 
The most famous collaboration between Lewis and Pound at this time had been 
BLAST 1 (20 June 1914), a self-consciously incendiary journal, in which pride of 
place is given to Lewis’s verbally coruscating manifesto of Vorticism, and 
accompanying segregation of a retinue of cultural figures and phenomena into the 
categories of the blasted and the blessed. While Chesterton is not explicitly 
blasted in Lewis’s carnivalesque litany of praise and abuse, he is implicitly de-
selected from the Vorticist friendship group by a verse contribution from Pound, 
‘The New Cake of Soap’: 
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Lo, how it gleams and glistens in the sun 
Like the cheek of a Chesterton (BLAST 1 49). 
 
Although the most obvious purpose of this stab at imagist satire is to 
pillory Chesterton’s allegedly sanitised wit, or ‘cheek’, Seaber observes that the 
indefinite article in the second line more subtly attempts to typify Chesterton as 
‘the symbol par excellence of a commercialized mass-production of “literature” 
[…] Chesterton, the commercializer, the sold-out, is himself transformed into a 
commodity’ (‘Meaning’ 199). In a contemporaneous article on ‘Futurism and the 
Flesh’ (T.P.’s Weekly 11 July 1914), Lewis maligns the ‘mechanical dribble’ (35) 
of Chesterton’s journalistic output, which, he claims, can be satisfactorily 
‘dismissed as the unavoidable drivelling of an imbecile’ (35). Pound ingrains a 
similar rhetoric of incontinent over-production in his attack, figuring ‘a 
Chesterton’ as a factory-line item, suggesting a reification caused by financial 
dependence upon the press, which results in excessive, mechanistic literary 
production. Thus, in what looks like a choreographed dual-assault, Lewis and 
Pound signal Chesterton’s cultural obsolescence at the very moment at which he 
had reached the apex of his ubiquity.  
Since Lewis and Pound were first acquainted in late 1908 (O’Keefe 143), 
their friendship long predated the appearance of Eliot, who first met Pound in 
September 1914 (Eliot, Letters 1 63 fn.1), and was introduced to Lewis by Pound 
in early 1915 (Meyers 75). Arriving late to an already established group, Eliot 
displayed a palpable anxiety to fit in to a pre-established pattern of behaviour, 
employing forms of pastiche to convey sympathy with their aims. Shortly before 
his introduction to Pound, he sent a letter to Conrad Aiken from Germany, in 
which he pastiched Lewis’s use of the terms ‘BLAST’ and ‘BLESS’ (19 July 
1914; Eliot, Letters 1 40). Having begun to correspond with Pound, Eliot 
increasingly modified his conventional tone to figure himself as one ‘egregious 
Yankee addressing another’ (Ackroyd 235). Peter Ackroyd alludes to the element 
of pastiche which suffuses these missives: Eliot demonstrated an ‘extraordinary 
ability to mimic Pound’s verbal mannerisms, as if he were willingly immersing 
himself in his personality. He even goes so far as to fabricate his signature in a 
way similar to Pound’s’ (236). As with Chesterton’s early attempts to please 
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Bentley by echoing his sentiments and modes of expression, for some time Eliot 
was keen to say the kind of things that Pound would say.  
Eliot’s behaviour can be understood partially as a manifestation of the 
politeness principle—the urge to alter one’s tone to more closely approximate that 
of the sympathetic interlocutor. As Lecercle explains, ‘the general form of the 
politeness maxims, which are all constructed according to the same syntactic 
pattern, is: let the other speaker’s advantage override yours’ (103). This pattern 
extended deep into Eliot’s subsequent cultural life. For example, referring to The 
Waste Land, Gordon notes the peculiarly self-effacing nature of ‘Eliot’s 
submissiveness to Pound’s idea of the poem’ (Early 116). His comparably 
diffident dedication of the poem to Pound—‘il miglior fabbro’ (‘the better 
craftsman’) (CPP 59)—is also significant, since ‘dedication’ is a key factor in the 
formation of friendship groups, suggesting as it does the state of being ‘devoted to 
an aim or vocation; having single-minded loyalty or integrity’ (Thompson, D. 
351). These qualities are emphasised by the allegiance rituals of undergraduate 
societies, and literalised in the dedications affixed to the works of both Eliot and 
Chesterton, which constitute public avowals of loyalty to admired friends—
though, as I discussed in chapter two in relation to Greybeards, often masking 
considerably more ambivalent private feelings.  
If Eliot’s deferential approach to Lewis and Pound calls to mind the 
youthful initiate to a fraternity, his new friends were curiously comparable in 
temperament to the other key constituents of Chesterton’s own collective, Bentley 
and Belloc, in their respective embodiment of extremes of scepticism and 
dogmatism. At the time of his earliest public renown, Lewis was wont to expound 
an ontological scepticism of dizzying proportions. In his first published novel, 
Tarr (1917), the Lewisian protagonist possesses a personality composed of ‘a 
Chinese puzzle of boxes within boxes’ (58). The narrator explains that the ‘husk 
[Tarr] held was a painted mummy case. He was a mummy case, too. Only he 
contained nothing but innumerable other painted cases inside, smaller and smaller 
ones. The smallest was not [... a] live core, but a painting like the rest. = His 
kernel was a painting. That was as it should be!’ (58-59). Notably, Tarr is 
‘remembering Schopenhauer’ (58) when this vision comes to him.  
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While Lewis’s terms recall Chesterton’s account of the ‘bottomless 
sceptics’ with whom he consorted, the dogmatic certainties that Pound brought to 
his sense of cultural mission recall Chesterton’s account of the Bellocian wing of 
his acquaintances—the ‘quite uncontrollable believers’. In a private 
correspondence with the publisher, John Quinn (21 Aug. 1917), in which Pound 
lobbies for the republication of ‘The New Cake of Soap’, he expresses a greater 
sympathy with Belloc (Letters 171), while articulating his opposition to 
Chesterton through a substitution of the rhetoric of sanitisation for that of 
contamination: Chesterton is ‘a vile scum on the pond’, because he ‘creates an 
atmosphere in which art is impossible’ (Letters 171). To return to the antipodal 
models of chapter one, the rigid implacability of Pound’s diatribe anticipates 
Leavis’s contemptuous repelling of Snow, while Lewis’s rhetoric situates him as a 
precursor of the Barthesian view of parody as a discreditable means of stifling 
multivalence. In the BLAST manifesto, Lewis particularly deprecates the 
conservatism of English humour, as a phenomenon that contributes equally to the 
impossibility of art: ‘conventionalizing like gunshot, freezing supple REAL in 
ferocious chemistry of laughter’ (BLAST 1 17). In the alliance of the two friends, 
the poles of relativism and dogmatism again converge at full circle, with Lewis’s 
espousal of a proto-Barthesian relativistic litheness becoming a complementary 
adjunct to Pound’s proto-Leavisian urge to establish a state of lofty inaccessibility 
to literary pollution.  
Lewis’s portrayal of Tarr not only accords with Eliot’s early attempts to 
establish a trapdoor personality connotative of the Romantic grotesque, but also 
with the more physical grotesquery that Eliot invests his ‘comedian’ with: Tarr 
‘needed a grinning, tumultuous mask for the face he had to cover. = The clown 
was the only role that was ample enough’ (29). This concordance between the 
visions of Eliot and Lewis can be understood to derive from a shared early leaning 
towards what Lewis termed ‘non-moral’ (Men 103) satire, a phrase that recalls 
Bentley’s discussion of ‘unhuman […] unmoral’ game-playing, as well as my 
definition of metaphysical satire as a form that stand in diametric opposition to 
moral satire. These complementary ontological (unhuman) and ethical (unmoral) 
components are explicitly highlighted by Lewis—his preferred model is 
concerned ‘with man, and not with manners’, since it diagnoses ‘a chronic 
ailment’ (Men 124), and this principle is tied to the ‘non-human’ element of the 
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grotesque, which he considers to be ‘the same thing’ (Men 121) as the kind of 
satire in which he deals.  
Like Auberon Quin, Lewis is the ‘pure satirist’. This position renders him 
a kind of hyper-Hankin, whose absolute disbelief in humanity forges an 
immaculate solipsism which authorises an unscrupulous, gloves-off approach to 
cultural controversy. As Blissett observes, the ‘“Men of 1914” took the huge 
projected image of G.K.C. and shied missiles at it as an Aunt Sally’ (‘English’ 
130). This policy shares a commonality with the distancing nonsense strategies 
adopted by Eliot. Symons argued that ‘[i]n Laforgue, sentiment is squeezed out of 
the world before one begins to play at ball with it’ (Symbolist 112), and these 
terms are closely paraphrased in Prufrock’s reflection that he perhaps ought to 
have ‘squeezed the universe into a ball’ (CPP 15) before entering into dialogue 
with others. Much as Bentley’s clerihews blithely toy with the biographies of the 
public figures that happen to fall within his purview, the early strategies of the 
Eliot, Lewis, and Pound correspond to Sewell’s account of the detachment that 
informs the cruelty of Lear’s limerick-world: ‘If people are things in the Nonsense 
game, they must, when they meet, treat one another as such, and this involves 
detachment from any form of affection or kindliness. Relationships between them 
will be matter-of-fact but not matter for feeling’ (Field 141). As Sewell explains, 
‘a good deal of rough treatment is involved’ in this denial of the target’s 
subjectivity (Field 138).  
Ironically, this election of Chesterton as an emblematic representative of 
everything to be rejected in the preceding generation is suggestive of Chesterton’s 
own occasionally unfair exaggeration of Arnold’s faults when deprecating the 
latter’s influence upon Edwardian culture. Consequently, there is a neat circularity 
to Pound’s situating of his own cultural presence as a cyclical return of Arnoldian 
values, when he explains to Quinn that ‘Chesterton is so much the mob, so much 
the multitude […] a symbol for all the mob’s hatred of all art that aspires above 
mediocrity’ (Letters 171). As Chesterton’s privately expressed wish that he might 
look just a little more like Arnold suggests, this position results in a certain degree 
of hypocrisy. Pound goes on to express dark misgivings that he ‘should probably 
like G.K.C. personally if I ever met him’, and that this suspicion had actually 
‘heightened’ (Letters 171) his reaction against him.  
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In a similar dynamic, when Eliot joined his colleagues in the public fray in 
1917, his deprecation of Chesterton’s style came just two years after he had 
privately recommended the latter’s critical works to students who attended his 
wartime extension lectures (see Schuchard 35-36). If this discrepancy between 
public condemnation and private commendation seems a tad contradictory, we 
should bear in mind that at this time Eliot also evinced an affinity with the 
expediency-driven relativism practiced by Lewis and Pound. In August 1916, he 
reported to Aiken that he was ‘still a relativist’ (Eliot, Letters 1 145), having 
previously explained ebulliently to Eleanor Hinkley, in November 1914, that 
‘[o]ne must have theories, but one need not believe in them!’ (Letters 1 73). The 
discontents yielded by the artificially segregating approach of the group are 
discernible in Eliot’s criticism of Chesterton towards the end of the war. In 1917, 
he conjures a portentous vision of cultural apocalypse, alluding to Chesterton’s 
aesthetically conservative, and exceptionally popular Ballad of the White Horse 
(1911), in his pitting of ‘“the forces of death with Mr. Chesterton at the head upon 
a white horse”’ against his friends in binary opposition: ‘“Mr. Pound, Mr. Joyce, 
and Mr. Lewis write living English”’ (qtd. in Kirk 184).  
In one sense, this account could be said to demonstrate a canny eye for 
commercial self-positioning within a radical vanguard superseding a passé older 
generation. 1917 saw the publication of the respective literary debuts of Eliot and 
Lewis—Prufrock and Tarr—and in the same period Pound figured Chesterton as 
a kind of inverted critical barometer when marketing Lewis, with Chesterton’s 
assumed disapprobation of Tarr being forwarded to the reader as a proof of its 
merits (Pound, ‘Wyndham’ 429). Nonetheless, Eliot’s account might also be 
considered a more serious-minded attempt to police the vitality of form, 
comparable to that which Chesterton and Bentley had inscribed in their critique of 
the degeneration of detective fiction into formulaic rigidity. Eliot’s panorama of 
deceased and living litterateurs turns upon a carnivalesque representation of 
Chesterton as a cultural relic who refuses to die to enable the rebirth of the 
language, and there is a further apposite circularity in Chesterton finding himself 
on the receiving end of the same accusation of redundancy that he had levelled 
against Doyle’s pedestrian acolytes less than a decade before.  
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However, Eliot’s terms can also be understood to go beyond these public 
concerns, to imply a more neurotic apprehension of the antecedent, which 
suggests that the apocalyptic inflection of Eliot’s jibe might be read as an act of 
bravado subtly motivated by fear of the subject. In Revelation, the rider on a white 
horse is represented as a warlike figure, ‘bent on conquest’ (Morris 101), ‘a 
demonic parody of Christ, evil masquerading as good’ (Resseguie 127), while the 
‘forces of Death’ are embodied by the rider on a pale horse who Chesterton had 
invoked in ‘The Queer Feet’, a figure who brings pestilence in his wake (see 
Morris 105), much as Pound depicts the ‘scum’-like Chesterton as a pernicious 
agent of cultural pollution. The pale horse has also been translated as ‘yellowish 
green’, due to the ambiguity of the term, ‘chlōros’—green or pale—in the original 
Koine Greek, which has led some interpreters to consider the horse to possess the 
‘colour of a corpse’ (Morris 104).  
When Eliot and Pound first met, the latter was fond of quoting 
Apollinaire’s dictum, ‘“you cannot carry your father’s corpse along with you 
wherever you go”’ (qtd. in Butler 231). Fear of sympathetic contagion from 
rejected representatives of an older generation is also a marked feature of 
Chesterton’s accounts of decadence, and informs the comparably black and white 
distinction between the decadents on one side, and himself and Bentley on the 
other, that he attempts to establish in the Thursday dedication. In George Bernard 
Shaw, Chesterton returns to the imaginative landscape that summoned up 
Professor de Worms, when he argues that in the 1890s, ‘[t]he decay of society was 
praised by artists as the decay of a corpse is praised by worms. The aesthete was 
all receptiveness, like the flea’ (CW 11: 401). Meanwhile, in ‘Milton and Merry 
England’, Chesterton goes so far as to describe his revolt against decadent 
abjection as the very birth moment of his literary career: ‘My first impulse to 
write’ arose from ‘a revolt of disgust with the Decadents’, who seemed to augur 
‘the end of the world’ (Fads 220).  
Chesterton’s image of the decadent artist as a parasite upon a dead cultural 
body is echoed in Eliot’s vision of Chesterton drawing a pestilent corpse in his 
wake, while Eliot’s hints of a fear of contamination accord with Chesterton’s 
reference to the flea, an archetypal symbol of infection. As I elaborated in chapter 
two, Chesterton succeeded in overcoming his apprehension of the arch-
representative of decadence, Wilde, by manipulating the latter’s taste for paradox 
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to his own ends, and it is striking that Eliot pursues precisely the same strategy in 
a further sally against Chesterton in the following year. In ‘Henry James’ (1918), 
Eliot coins the famous witticism that James possessed ‘a mind so fine that no idea 
could violate it’ (151). This counterintuitive compliment is immediately followed 
by a criticism of Chesterton by comparison, again expressed in terms of ostensible 
paradox: ‘Mr. Chesterton’s brain swarms with ideas; I see no evidence that it 
thinks’ (152). As Philip Furbank has noted, this was ‘a most unfair, and rather 
Chestertonian, remark’ (20). In other words, in an exemplary parodic gesture, 
Eliot invokes Chesterton’s rhetorical voice in order to criticise it.  
Eliot’s barb also discloses a comingling of nonsense with parody in his 
response to Chesterton. As I discussed earlier, the Alice books inspired the title of 
Eliot’s early notebook, Inventions of the March Hare, which not only associates 
the author with a mad Wonderland character, but also a symbol of regenerative 
vitality, much as Pound liked to compare himself to the wily trickster, Brer 
Rabbit. In Through the Looking Glass, Alice remarks of ‘Jabberwocky’: ‘“it 
seems to fill my head with ideas—only I don’t exactly know what they are!”’ 
(Annotated 197). Immediately after this episode, she encounters the disdainful 
Rose: ‘“It’s my opinion that you never think at all,” the Rose said, in a rather 
severe tone’ (Annotated 203). In this light, it would seem that Eliot is figuring 
himself as a fantastic Wonderland creature in the James essay, while Chesterton is 
depicted as Alice, a comparison that holds water if we consider that in his more 
stolid, bluff pronouncements, Chesterton often resembles Anthony Burgess’s 
description of Carroll’s heroine as ‘a very pert “Fiddlesticks!” Victorian miss who 
will stand no nonsense’ (‘Nonsense’ 20). In contrast, Eliot sets himself up as a 
baffling trickster figure, bamboozling his victim with disorientating wordplay, so 
as to convey a sense that Chesterton is too staid to comprehend the radical 
aesthetic gymnastics of the artists occupying the modernist Wonderland of 
Imagism, Vorticism, Futurism, etc.  
However, the terms of Eliot’s attack also carry the germ of an urge to 
surmount agonism, an aspect which is drawn out by a further textual 
correspondence to his phrase, ‘I see no evidence that it thinks’. If we consider that 
four years later, Eliot’s accusation of mental intractability would be echoed by the 
female interlocutor in The Waste Land, who is conventionally understood to 
represent Vivien Eliot addressing her husband, a sense of Eliot’s subconscious 
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identification with Chesterton, as well as the edge of hysteria underlying his 
apparently urbane criticism, comes to the fore:  
 
What are you thinking of? What thinking? What? 
I never know what you are thinking. Think (CPP 65). 
 
Coates has argued that in the James essay, ‘Eliot meant think ideologically, 
pulling no punches, accepting no qualifications, checks or balances and no 
humour, in the statement of an intellectual position’ (Edwardian 243). However, 
in the context of the wider argument of the essay it seems much more plausible 
that the opposite is true—that he is regretting the alleged absence of a Jamesian 
capacity for psychological subtlety, or nuanced private-life in Chesterton, as 
opposed to the factory-like churning out of public ‘ideas’ like so many new cakes 
of soap. As he argues elsewhere in the James essay, in a nonsense exposition 
which makes its point through a deliberate category-mistake, ‘[i]n England, ideas 
run wild and pasture on the emotions; instead of thinking with our feelings (a very 
different thing) we corrupt our feelings with ideas’ (152). When paired with its 
echo in The Waste Land, Eliot’s witticism, delivered in a ventriloquistic rendition 
of Chesterton’s rhetorical voice, comes to read as a frustrated call for personal 
sympathy, by a writer increasingly stifled by the polarised terms of the public 
argument that he had belatedly joined. Note that Eliot includes himself in the 
critique—it is ‘we’ who ‘corrupt our feelings with ideas’.  
Much as Eliot’s marionette, in ‘Humoresque’, possesses a ‘[h]alf bullying, 
half imploring air’ (CPP 602), these twin textual correspondences to Alice and 
The Waste Land reveal an apparently contradictory bipolarity of subconscious 
motivation—the first inscribing distance, due to an urge to establish distinction; 
the second identification, due to a tacit desire for sympathy. Again, this illustrates 
the fundamental ambivalence embedded within the dynamic of parody itself, 
which makes it a particularly disruptive force in cultural disputes, due to its 
simultaneous inscription of similarity and difference. As Dentith observes, 
‘parody has always been liable to oscillate into and out of the critical attitude’ 
(Parody 185). Even Eliot’s apparently clear-cut, polarising image of Chesterton at 
the head of the forces of death is embedded with a subtle get-out clause, since the 
rider on a white horse is also the only horseman who is not uncomplicatedly 
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associated with destruction, being variously interpreted as either wicked or 
righteous, and even as a Christ-like figure (see Morris 101). Thus, Eliot situates 
his antagonist as the embodiment of a hybridised binary of heaven and hell 
comparable to that which Chesterton had borrowed from Blake in his depiction of 
the heroes of Father Brown. Of course, as I discussed earlier, Flambeau’s 
excursion through the banquet of the Fishermen on his Pale Horse conveys the 
moral that ‘the dance of death [leads] the way to the dance of life’.  
In these inscriptions of subtle duality we discover Eliot selecting terms that 
explicitly project an opposition that satisfies the need to express public allegiance 
with the position of his friends, while implicitly retaining a loophole that satisfies 
a personal need to retain a productive ambiguity.
5
 If this equivocation again 
figures Eliot as dextrously evading capture, it is not in the nihilistic sense 
conveyed by the false bottoms of the Romantic grotesque, but in the more positive 
sense of retaining a dynamic capacity to traverse the parodic poles of adherence 
and departure (or imitative pastiche and adversarial satire in textual terms), rather 
than subscribing inflexibly to an extremist position, in the manner of his 
associates. In understanding the grounds of this tendency towards polarisation, it 
is important to highlight the considerable influence of T.E. Hulme’s essay, 
‘Romanticism and Classicism’ (1911), upon all three men. Hulme’s essay 
advanced a neat division between the two titular modes, rejecting ‘the infamous 
attitude of the person with catholic tastes who says he likes both’ (Hulme), while 
proposing that the allegedly monologic romanticism of the nineteenth century 
should be superseded by an equally monologic classicism.  
This attitude succeeded in persuading three writers of innately romantic 
temperament that they, and the culture from which they emerged (as presided over 
by figures such as Chesterton), needed to be ‘disciplined by order’ (Hulme). 
Although Eliot later acknowledged that he had been ‘“enormously influenced”’ 
(qtd. in Habib 66) by Hulme, his enduring reluctance to corrupt his feelings with 
ideas led to a suspicion of the neatness of this dialectical movement of 
transcendence. In this light, Eliot’s tacit inscription of identification within 
ostensibly oppositional sallies is rendered explicable by his anti-Hegelian view 
                                                 
5
 As Ackroyd observes of the kernel of ambivalence that consistently underpins Eliot’s apparently 
ingratiating gestures, ‘the instinct to conform and the instinct to stand apart merged in a subtle, 
almost ironic, imitation of those around him’ (88-89). 
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that one should be suspicious of any attempt ‘“to take the delicate and evasive 
truths of historical and literary criticism […] and dragoon them into the goose-
step of dialectic”’ (qtd. in Perl 79).  
While Chesterton might have been forgiven if he did not dwell excessively 
on the nuances of Eliot’s allusive phraseology under the barrage of criticism that 
he received from his trio of antagonists during this period, a comparable 
oscillation ‘into and out of the critical attitude’ is evident in his belated response, a 
loose parody of the themes and stylistics of Prufrock and Other Observations, 
entitled ‘To a Modern Poet’ (G.K.’s Weekly 31 May 1925). This piece offers a 
particularly valuable illustration of Chesterton’s argument, in ‘Bret Harte’, that 
‘reverence and sympathy [are of] supreme importance to humour’ (Varied 182). 
Reverence derives etymologically from the Latin, ‘vereri’, or ‘fear’ (Barnhart 
923), while sympathy, in the eighteenth-century understanding of the term, 
combines affection with distance, thus mediating anxiety over the subjectivity-
undermining connotations of identification through a recognition of the other as 
other, set against the self in dynamic relation. As Sewell articulates the dynamic, 
parody ‘relies on close emotional kinship (a kinship that itself involves a 
compelling pull toward sameness and a death of subjectivity) before ultimate self-
assertion (a pull toward difference)’ (Field 276-77).  
‘To a Modern Poet’ offers a practical exposition of this principle in action, 
combining combative nonsense rhetoric, motivated by tacit fear, with emollient 
gestures, connotative of subtle sympathy. The bulk of the parody is concerned 
with establishing the presence of a confluence of ontological pessimism and 
scepticism in Eliot’s early handling of the world of objects. The parodist discovers 
these traits in the unorthodox similes to which Eliot turns, which the more stolid 
respondent finds somewhat bemusing: 
 
[…] I am very unobservant. 
I cannot say 
I ever noticed that the pillar-box 
was like a baby 
skinned alive and screaming. 
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I have not 
a Poet’s 
Eye 
Which can see Beauty 
everywhere. 
Now you mention it, 
Of course, the sky 
is like a large mouth 
shown to a dentist, 
and I never noticed 
a little thing 
like that. 
 
But I can’t help wishing 
You got more fun out of it; 
you seem to have taken 
quite a dislike 
to things (Collected Nonsense 50-51). 
 
Here Chesterton associates Eliot’s unorthodox vocabulary with an 
apparently cultivated posture of aversion to the material world, a ‘dislike’ of 
‘things’ that renders the poet an unlikely locus of regenerative energies. This 
criticism is particularly evident in the lines ‘Of course, the sky / is like a large 
mouth / shown to a dentist’, which comically skew the terms of Eliot’s bravura 
simile of introduction to the poetic world, in which ‘the evening is spread out 
against the sky / Like a patient etherized upon a table’ (CPP 13), to evoke the 
deprecatory tenor of the original image. Eliot’s wan observations stand in marked 
contrast to the ‘passionate sense of the value of things’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 101) 
that Chesterton avowed in his correspondence with Frances in 1899, which he 
expressed through a comparable derangement of categorisation in reference to the 
evening sky: ‘If there was such a thing as blue-hot iron, it would describe the sky 
tonight’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 98). If the ‘Love Song’ of Eliot’s title conveys a 
trapdoor irony comparable to that of Wilde’s mock-paean to being earnest, 
Chesterton’s declarations constitute an uncomplicated love song to existence. As 
he complains in the Autobiography, in another anthropomorphic nonsense-image, 
which perhaps alludes to Eliot’s image of vocal vegetation, the ‘dry grass singing’ 
(CPP 73), ‘I have read modern poems obviously meant to make grass seem 
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something merely scrubby and prickly and repugnant, like an unshaven chin’ 
(338).  
In ‘Prufrock’, Eliot’s authorial stance—that of the urbane Laforguean man 
of the world, who serenely observes ‘the essential mediocrity of life […] from a 
lunar perspective’ (Habib 35)—is expressed through a combination of the 
temperamental detachment and textual derangement that Chesterton associated 
with decadence, an artistic movement which ‘outraged sanity’ without ‘attain[ing] 
exuberance’ (Defendant 45).6 Chesterton’s parody sets out to expose the decadent 
worldview that he perceives to exert a tacit influence upon the apparently 
innovative ‘observations’ of the poet, archly confessing himself to be ‘very 
unobservant’, even as he forensically pinpoints the effaced origins of Eliot’s 
apparent originality. In this sense, Chesterton’s skit corroborates Genette’s choice 
of the title, Palimpsests (1982), for his encyclopaedic conspectus of parodic 
practice, since ‘To a Modern Poet’ not only carries the ghost of Eliot’s text within 
it, but also exposes the ur text as a palimpsest of decadence, constructing a kind of 
intertextual geological survey, comparable to Stewart’s account of the White 
Knight’s song, in Alice, as a ‘language event […] caught in a historical regress. 
What the song “really is” becomes only one of its possible aspects through its 
history of use’ (116-17). This further correspondence with Carroll situates the 
Chestertonian Alice in a rather more masterful context than that into which Eliot’s 
allusion to the encounter with the Rose had placed him: ‘“the tune isn’t his own 
invention,” she said to herself’ (307), as the White Knight’s declaims his song of a 
somewhat absurd ‘aged man’ (Annotated 307).7  
The urge of Eliot’s friendship group to attain to the classicist precepts of 
Hulme makes this exposure particularly damaging, since it draws Eliot’s romantic 
discontents to light. In later years, when Lewis no longer held such a commercial 
stake in projecting group unanimity, he took to mimicking Chesterton’s unveiling 
of hidden narratives, situating Eliot as ‘the last of [the] line of romantics’ (Men 
81) stretching from Baudelaire to Wilde, and arguing that the relative level of 
disparity between author and avatar was not so vexed as Eliot sought to suggest: 
                                                 
6
 As Hurley notes in his brief discussion of the poem, for Chesterton ‘[w]hat is most distressing is 
the failure to take joy even in [...] perversity’ (Chesterton 45). Hurley does not specify the target of 
the poem, and so does not discuss the context of Chesterton’s relationship to Eliot. 
7
 One of the White Knight’s unpromising inventions is a device to prevent hair ‘falling off’ 
(Carroll, Annotated 299), a contraption that Prufrock would have much appreciated. 
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the poet ‘was a very attractive young Prufrock indeed […] moqueur to the marrow 
[…] But still a Prufrock!’ (Blasting 283). In Time and Western Man (1927), Lewis 
also refers darkly to Pound’s ‘romantic tendencies’ (55), and he later implied that 
a sort of repentant romantics’ support group had been established between the 
collaborative pair—Pound’s ‘very powerful influence’ upon the young Eliot was 
responsible for lifting him ‘out of his lunar alley-ways and fin de siècle nocturnes’ 
(Blasting 285). This process of classical re-education is conveyed by the 
Chestertonian parodist’s apprehension of the sky as a ‘large mouth’, which 
situates the artist as dentist, correcting the unwieldy profusion of nature, in a 
manner that corresponds to an austere editing down of the existential grotesque to 
the elegant restrictions of the classical. At the same time, by employing a 
quintessentially grotesque image to convey the point, Chesterton suggests that a 
tension between temperamental inclination and theoretical conviction imbues the 
cultural project with a personal urgency.  
If the increasingly spare verse of Eliot and Pound came to stand as an 
aesthetic corollary of their espousal of classicist philosophy, Chesterton’s text not 
only represents a return of the repressed, reflecting his consistent drive to expose 
all that is left spare ‘by every rationalistic system of life’, but also serves to 
subvert the commercial game-plan that the principle of sparseness satisfied. As I 
have shown, Chesterton’s own ‘large mouth’, in the form of the ‘mechanical 
dribble’ of his literary output, was the particular focus of his antagonists’ critical 
fire. Highlighting Chesterton’s ostensible surplus production served as a means of 
advertising a binary divide between the enigmatic brevity of the new school and 
an old guard characterised by exhausting verbosity. In a letter sent by Pound to 
Eliot’s father in 1915, he avers that ‘“man succeeds either by the scarceness or the 
abundance of copy”’ (28 June 1915; Eliot, Letters 1, 103). Taking note, Eliot 
wrote to a former teacher that ‘I write very little, and I should not become more 
powerful by increasing my output. […] the only thing that matters is that [the 
poems] should be perfect in their kind, so that each should be an event’ (21 Apr. 
1919; Letters 1 285).  
As I discussed in my introduction, George Eliot’s deprecation of parody 
centred upon its capacity to debase currency. This phenomenon occurs when 
scarcity is reduced, so that the commercial value of any item becomes defined to a 
large extent by the limitation of its availability. By producing a burlesque 
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addendum to T.S. Eliot’s slender oeuvre, Chesterton threatens to debase his 
currency through an act of literal appreciation. His amassing of new similes in a 
travesty of the poet’s voice divests Eliot of the agency to prevent surplus 
production, exacting an apposite revenge upon the persecutors of his alleged 
prolixity by imaginatively ransacking the mouth of the celebrated poet and 
claiming to find a hinterland of tooth decay behind the scrupulously brushed 
exterior. The economic analogy also draws attention once more to the prescience 
of Chesterton’s analysis in ‘The Queer Feet’. Eliot’s cultural position does not so 
much recall that of the complacent gentlemen or the harried underlings of the 
story, but rather the ambiguous between-role occupied by the proprietor of the 
club, Mr Lever, whose club ‘paid, not by attracting people, but actually by turning 
people away’. Lever’s commercial strategy curiously prefigures the way in which 
modernist artists fostered their success by setting up a textual ‘difficulty’ to be 
overcome by the leisured literary consumer. As Chesterton explains in the story, 
‘[i]n the heart of a plutocracy tradesmen become cunning enough to be more 
fastidious than their customers. They positively create difficulties so that their 
wealthy and weary clients may spend money and diplomacy in overcoming them’ 
(FB 36).  
This account offers a foretaste of the exceptionally ‘fastidious’ persona later 
adopted by Eliot, and the succession of riddles that he purposefully set before the 
reader, not least the miasmic ‘wild goose chase’ of ‘bogus scholarship’ 
(‘Frontiers’ 109-10) that he later acknowledged the notes to The Waste Land to 
represent. While the notes came to be viewed by Eliot’s interpreters as the 
microcosmic exemplar of his scholastic austerity, Eliot’s subsequent debunking of 
their authority suggests that they should also be understood as further proof of his 
debt to the alienating academic strain of nonsense discussed in chapter two. In one 
sense, the notes might be thought to exemplify the pedagogic aspect of parodic 
allusion as an empowering invitation to the reader to become a cultural detective. 
However, when Eliot refers the reader to a chapter of The Golden Bough in which 
Frazer describes ‘the Sibylline Books as “that convenient farrago of nonsense”’ 
(Habib 233) it seems evident that we are also dealing with the nonsense device of 
the ‘explanatory note [that is] only mock-explanatory’ (16). This conceit, which 
Malcolm identifies as a part of ‘the tradition of academic self-parody’ (Malcolm 
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21), also informs the deliberately unhelpful index of Bentley’s clerihew collection 
Biography for Beginners.
8
  
Chesterton’s account of the cultural ‘mystagogue’, who ‘succeeds because 
he gets himself misunderstood’ (CW 28: 31-32) suggests that a counterintuitive 
commercial expedient underpins the mystagogue’s alienating strategies, which 
manipulate the cultural insecurities of a snobbish audience. The narrator of 
‘Enoch Soames’ corroborates the point, when he records his diverse responses to 
the poet’s verse: ‘suppose Enoch Soames was a fool! Up cropped a rival 
hypothesis: suppose I was!’ (Seven 10). In the particular case of Eliot, his fear of 
ridicule comingles with a stratagem for achieving commercial success through 
bafflement, to produce an apparently intractable closed circuit of mutual 
alienation. As Malcolm explains, ‘the self-parodic routines of nonsense poetry are 
characteristic products of enclosed, self-conscious institutions such as clubs’ (22), 
while the mock-explanatory notes of Hoskyns’ seventeenth-century nonsense-
writing took the form of ‘pretending that he was performing an even more 
elaborate formal exercise’ (16) than initially appeared to be the case. In a 
comparable action, Eliot successfully bluffs the reader into a conviction that the 
poet is in charge of a highly exclusive club, into which all but the most erudite of 
initiates are denied membership, while covering his back by subtly informing still-
more erudite readers that he has only been playing an elaborate practical joke all 
along, a dynamic which enacts a multi-layered dog-whistle approach to reception 
management.  
This strategy was particularly alarming to Chesterton, given his fear of 
nonsense as a harbinger of alienation, a fear that derived from a combined 
apprehension of the aloof social detachment espoused by the decadents and the 
barriers to mutual comprehension deliberately established by the estranging action 
of academic nonsense. When these attributes of Eliot’s commercial and aesthetic 
practice are combined with the expressions of animosity that he projected towards 
Chesterton, it becomes unsurprising that Eliot’s cultural ascendency should have 
triggered substantial psychological unease in the older writer. Again, the 
psychological challenge at stake brings us back to Carroll’s Alice, specifically 
Lecercle’s account of the threats that she confronts in her dealings with the 
                                                 
8
 Immediately after having first met Pound, Eliot passed the academic year at Merton College, 
Oxford, the alma mater of Bentley and Beerbohm. 
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aggressively inscrutable inhabitants of Wonderland, who construct ‘the 
framework for a linguistic nightmare. Tweedledum and Tweedledee are trying to 
make Alice as mad as they are’ (84).  
As with the imaginative landscape of ‘The Queer Feet’, in which a Romantic 
grotesque atmosphere of estrangement is dispersed by a combination of the 
detective action of parody and the burlesque materiality of the carnivalesque, 
Chesterton’s means of mediating the threat of Eliot’s nonsense is through a 
parodic exploration of imagery of verbal production and digestive consumption. 
Specifically, Chesterton joins in with the derangement of language that Eliot’s 
verbal games enact, while exploring burlesque variations on his ontologically 
destabilising visions of digestive consumption. For example, the orally focused 
mockery of Chesterton’s ‘large mouth’ gambit not only alludes to the 
anthropomorphism of the opening of Prufrock, but also to Eliot’s more gruesome 
vision of a ‘[d]ead mountain mouth of carious teeth that cannot spit’ (CPP 72), in 
The Waste Land, in which disturbingly abject phraseology—dead, carious, teeth, 
spit—is applied to an image of the landscape as an enormous mouth. Again, one is 
reminded of Dixon Scott’s account of the object-world of Father Brown, ‘waxing 
horribly, like a face in a fever’, while ‘struggling to express something too 
monstrous for speech’.  
Disproportionately enlarged mouths and inexplicable screams are a repeated 
feature of Chesterton’s writing on the fin de siècle. In ‘A Nightmare’, a sketch 
from 1907, a Schopenhauerian character named Professor Pyffer expresses his 
creed eloquently by merely yawning. As an acolyte of the Professor glosses the 
moral at hand, ‘“[i]n that yawn […] he has swallowed all the stars”’ (CW 14: 89). 
Chesterton’s account of the ‘shrieks of Schopenhauer’ that had so unnerved him 
in his youth is echoed in the image of the baby ‘skinned alive and screaming’ in 
‘To a Modern Poet’—a considerably more disturbing image than anything found 
in Eliot’s oeuvre, which turns upon the depiction of a visceral removal of physical 
defences against external threats. Bakhtin explains that the image of the 
exaggerated mouth operates as a way of managing fear of death through comic 
mediation: ‘exaggeration of the mouth is the fundamental traditional method of 
rendering external comic features’, though the ‘gaping mouth is related to the 
image of swallowing, this most ancient symbol of death and destruction’ 
(Rabelais 325).  
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Again, the phrase, ‘a large mouth / shown to a dentist’, proves salient, here 
as an expression of the relationship between the parodist and the parodied artist. 
Removing teeth connotes the neutralisation of the threat ‘of being bitten’ 
(Abjection 39) which Kristeva identifies as a common anxiety of the neurotic 
patient, a fear also underpinning such whimsical flights as Chesterton’s 
illustration of Alfred Beit’s  trap-like, screaming mouth. By performing selective 
surgery upon the mouth of the ‘Modern Poet’, Chesterton is able to uncover the 
potential bathos in Eliot’s disorientating worldview, which then provides 
ammunition to counter the psychological challenge which that worldview 
presents, much as his approach to Wilde took the form of a detective hunt for 
bathos that would enable him to step back from the cultural other and reinstate a 
sense of proportionality in his response. If Chesterton conceived the ontology of 
modernism to present the danger of linguistic derangement as psychic pollutant, 
Eliot seemed happy to encourage this conception during the period in which he 
was straining to identify himself as a member of an aesthetically revolutionary 
gang. It is perhaps no coincidence that Aiken nicknamed Eliot, ‘Tsetse’ (Ackroyd 
46)—a fly that bites to pass on infection. Aiken meant this as an allusion to the 
acerbity of Eliot’s wit, but it might equally connote the infective influence of his 
derangement of language. In this sense, by pulling Eliot’s leg, Chesterton is also 
pulling his teeth.  
Chesterton’s highlighting of Eliot’s anthropomorphised mouth as a site of 
grotesque abjection is also lent a satirical bite of its own by the concluding lines 
of the parody, in which he archly acknowledges Eliot’s status as the spearhead of 
‘the New Movement / The Emetic Ecstacy’ (Collected Nonsense 51), a sardonic 
pay-off which demonstrates that his cheek was not always so entirely scrubbed 
free of Rabelaisian toilet humour as Pound had implied. While the pun on 
‘movement’ conveys a typically parodic transference of the abstractly intellectual 
to the indecorously corporeal, it also demonstrates a genuine critical insight into 
its subject, since Eliot wrote to Aiken of his enjoyment of any literature that 
possessed the capacity to ‘provoke [a] strong nausea with life’ (21 Aug. 1916; 
Letters 1 145-46). Kristeva argues that the urge to vomit is the quintessential 
expression of abjection, because in the very act of revolt against abject matter, the 
subject simultaneously projects abject matter from within (Abjection 3). In tying 
this visceral gesture to a state of ‘ecstacy’, Chesterton implies that Eliot derives a 
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curiously masochistic pleasure from the very act of vomiting out his own 
abjection, much as the snob derives a ‘purple ecstacy’ from the sensation of 
‘feeling low’.  
As we have seen, Chesterton strives to counter snobbery through his vision 
of the ‘seasick’ camaraderie of the carnivalesque, which boldly embraces a 
foreknowledge of the subject’s inexorable journey into another large mouth—that 
of the fairy-tale ‘ogre, edax rerum, who devours all without distinction’. As with 
Beerbohm’s parodies of Eliot, Chesterton hits the target in ‘To a Modern Poet’ 
because he knows that of which he speaks: Eliot’s attempts to come to terms with 
a threatening universe are also his own. In view of the shared preoccupation of 
Chesterton and Eliot with imaginatively negotiating the distancing and immersive 
extremes of the Romantic and folk grotesque, it is instructive to return to the 
binary established by Mason to define Chesterton’s distinction from Eliot: the 
‘popular bowels and clerkly head’. Bakhtin argues that the head and bowels—
though ostensibly polarised regions—directly correlate as sites of admittance 
which undermine immaculate subjectivity, an element that helps to explain why 
the vulnerability of the open mouth disturbs both men, and why Prufrock 
daydreams of the capacity to bite off matter with a closed smile. As Parsons 
explains, Bakhtin considers the status of the ‘genital and excremental’ organs as 
loci of the body’s permeability to be mirrored in the sensory organs of the head: 
‘the genital regions are not the only regions that interact with, and affect, the 
world. The senses (perception) […] may also be construed as points of 
intersection’ (94).  
While the bowels operate as a symbol of the ‘process of man’s disintegration 
and degeneration’ (Rabelais 126) in the realm of the Romantic grotesque, in old 
medicine the bowels were associated with sympathy (see Parsons 98), and, as a 
consequence, were considered a site of ‘secret affection’ (Evans 143). A 
comparable counterbalancing of sympathy with fear is demonstrated in several 
subtle ways in ‘To a Modern Poet’. While Chesterton’s parodic build-up of 
nonsense imagery ostensibly operates as a means to the end of pedagogic satirical 
instruction, it also presents him with a temporary license to practice a form that he 
deems personally verboten, opening up a half-holiday from the strictures of his 
own dogma. His appreciation of Eliot, discussed earlier in terms of mischievous 
surplus production, also functions to rebound upon the parodist in a similar 
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manner to Eliot’s production of Chestertonian witticisms, revealing similarity 
even as it strains to inscribe difference. The parodist might claim to be exposing 
and debunking the fallacious assumptions of the ur text, but it is just as valid to 
say that, divested of the author’s putative satirical intent—or what Chesterton 
terms the ‘pompous moral dicta which he fondly imagines to be his opinions’—
what the parodist has produced is a sympathetic appreciation of the terms of the 
original, reframed in a comic modality.  
In an echo of Father Brown’s pedagogic smashing of the pub window to 
educate Valentin, Chesterton seems to enjoy the act a little more than is strictly 
necessary—here there is a sense that he is ebulliently joining in with a game in 
which the challenge is to juggle the referents and produce different kinds of 
nonsense based on the same set of structural rules. This demonstrates what 
Phiddian terms ‘the potential volatility of parodic language’ (‘Parody’ 684), in 
complicating the satirist’s attempt to achieve a straightforwardly adversarial or 
instructional effect. A closely comparable forerunner of this dynamic is 
discernible in John Taylor’s parodies of the verbal excesses of Christopher 
Marlowe. Malcolm explains that Taylor’s mockery possessed a symbiotic 
relationship to Marlowe’s innovation, which had ‘made possible a radical 
destabilizing of poetic diction’, and ‘of that resulting instability, Taylor’s 
nonsense poetry was both a parody and an even more radical expression’ (41). 
This is evocative of Freud’s account of the ‘emotional ambivalence’ (Totem 18) of 
taboo, in which ‘the obsessional act’ of the neurotic is ‘ostensibly a protection 
against the prohibited act; but actually [...] a repetition of it’ (Totem 50). As with 
Ellmann’s analysis of The Waste Land, Chesterton’s parody ‘surreptitiously 
repeats the horror that it tries to expiate’ (95), and in this paradox reveals a further 
element of sympathetic correspondence with the preoccupations of its subject.  
The latent sympathy potentially drawn out by the ricocheting action of 
parody is also implied by the ‘but’ that bisects Chesterton’s parody, which echoes 
the emollient ‘but’ of Chesterton’s clerihew on Thomas Carlyle, which enables 
him to stress that the controversial text under consideration ‘shan’t part us’. While 
‘To a Modern Poet’ begins with a phrase that implies both an unimpressed shrug 
and an invitation to fight—‘Well, / What / about it?’ (Collected Nonsense 50)—
the eventual ‘But I can’t help wishing / You got more fun out of it’ signals that the 
parodist has talked himself down, his equivocation allowing the curious 
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concession that if Eliot could take pleasure in the concept of a pillar-box 
resembling an excoriated baby, the literary offence might not be so great. As this 
demonstrates, for Chesterton, ontological scepticism is a venial sin, when 
compared to a pessimistic rejection of the value of existence. The writer who 
locates the opening of ‘The Blue Cross’ ‘[b]etween the silver ribbon of morning 
and the green glittering ribbon of sea’ is clearly not averse to producing the 
occasional category-mistake for aesthetic effect. Likewise, when the narrator of 
The Flying Inn asserts that ‘[w]hite morning lay about the grey stony streets like 
spilt milk’ (167), this is not a barbed parody, but a sympathetic anticipation of the 
semantically deranging feline imagery which invests Eliot’s early work with such 
linguistic vitality, and blurs the borders that are conventionally thought to 
partition ‘nonsense’ literature and ‘serious’ literary invention. 
Chesterton’s parodic ventriloquism in ‘To a Modern Poet’ closely 
resembles the technique that Eliot claims to characterise successful criticism: ‘the 
reason why some criticism is good […] is that the critic assumes, in a way, the 
personality of the author whom he criticises, and through this personality is able 
to speak with his own voice’ (‘Matthew’ 112). Medcalfe identifies a comparable 
facility in Chesterton: 
 
Chesterton was much embarrassed by the disjunction between his public self and his 
real person: but the disjunction is presumably connected with his ability to 
impersonate. And it is this ability to impersonate, modified by his awareness of a 
strong system of values to judge what he is impersonating, that makes his literary 
criticism […] so good (85). 
 
Medcalfe’s connection of this critical facility to a discrepancy between public and 
private selves also hints at the ethical tensions felt by Eliot in subscribing 
unreservedly to the public line of his friendship group—tensions that also 
informed Chesterton’s complaint about the ‘sundering’ quality of Belloc’s 
disputes. Douglas Woodruff recalled that Chesterton considered that ‘the modern 
world […] should be approached in a spirit of intellectual ferocity and personal 
amiability’ (qtd. in Ward, Gilbert 473), and while ‘To a Modern Poet’ embodies 
Jerome Hamilton Buckley’s assertion that in parody ‘“laughter prod[s] eccentric 
genius into an awareness of common reality”’ (qtd. in Caesar, ‘“I Quite”’ 798), its 
ambivalently imitative action also draws the parodist himself away from an 
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excessively conservative position, to produce a dynamic of mutual convergence. 
In a discussion of Arnold’s apparently implacable hostility to Heine, Eliot neatly 
summarises the dynamic at hand: ‘We can sometimes arrive at a very satisfactory 
intimacy with our anti-masks’ (‘Matthew’ 112).  
When Habib contends that ‘“Prufrock” might be approached from a 
perspective which has suffered relative neglect at the hands of Eliot scholarship: 
the comic’ (70), we also begin to perceive the comic modulation of Chesterton’s 
parody to demonstrate a more subtle sympathy with the original than is found in 
the work of Eliot’s more stolidly earnest pasticheurs in the same period. In an 
article on ‘Robert Browning’ (DN 7 May, 1912), Chesterton pursues an argument 
about the poet’s reception that closely prefigures Chinitz’s account of the violence 
subsequently done to the richness of Eliot’s corpus by the embalmment 
procedures of his later critical adherents. Chesterton argues that the Browningites 
do their damage ‘by turning a poem into a puzzle’, with the result that 
‘Browning’s legacy is not even Browningesque; it is not a dilution of his wine; it 
is a sort of deadly antidote’ (CDN 8: 72). As Chesterton explains, the ‘whole fate 
of Browning in letters depends upon the battle which is still going on between 
Browning and the Browningites. If he conquers he will live; if his admirers 
conquer he will certainly die’ (CDN 8: 72). Eliot’s dawning awareness of the 
applicability of this dilemma to his own cultural position forms the subject of my 
next section. 
 
‘The Hollow Men’ as Carnivalesque Social Satire 
 
From one point of view, the poet aspires to the condition of the music-hall comedian.  
 
T.S. Eliot, The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism (32) 
 
“I am going to hold a pistol to the head of Modern Man. But I shall not use it to kill 
him—only to bring him to life. I begin to see a new meaning in being the skeleton at 
the feast”. 
Innocent Smith, in Chesterton’s Manalive (58) 
 
If, as Kristeva argues, an archetype of the abject is ‘a friend who stabs 
you’ (Abjection 4), abjection would seem to have been the prevailing 
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characteristic of Eliot’s friendship group in 1925. In January, he suddenly 
contracted the animus of Lewis, following his failure (due to illness) to provide a 
prompt reference on Lewis’s behalf to a house agent. This oversight coincided 
with Eliot’s publication, in The Criterion, of a piece of art criticism by one of 
Lewis’s numerous enemies, Clive Bell, a concatenation of events which drove 
Lewis to the extravagant conclusion that Eliot was engaging in acts of personal 
‘treachery’ (Lewis, Letters 149) against him. In the same month, a more public 
accusation of treachery was levelled against Eliot by Pound, with the publication 
of A Draft of XVI Cantos.
9
 At the conclusion of Canto XIV, the first of Pound’s 
scurrilous, carnivalesque travesties of Dante—the ‘Hell Cantos’—he launches an 
attack upon Eliot that carries none of the emollient concessions of Chesterton’s 
parody. Pound situates Eliot amongst the ‘unamiable liars’ (Cantos 63)—a phrase 
that conflates a withholding of camaraderie with an act of deception—while 
Eliot’s direct appearance in the text is prefaced by an extremely unamiable parody 
of the lines from The Waste Land that run, ‘If there were rock / And also water / 
And water’ (CPP 72): 
 
Bog of stupidities, 
malevolent stupidities, and stupidities,  
the soil living pus, full of vermin, 
dead maggots begetting live maggots,  
[…] 
the air without refuge of silence, 
the drift of lice, teething, 
and above it the mouthing of orators, 
the arse-belching of preachers (Cantos 63). 
 
Somewhat ironically, the free-associative quality of Pound’s lines, which 
lends them a certain protean force, recalls Eliot’s own method of automatic 
writing when constructing ‘What the Thunder Said’, while the echoes of Eliot’s 
‘dead mountain mouth of carious teeth’ and ‘not even silence in the mountains’ 
(CPP 72) render Pound’s satiric vision of Hell parasitical upon Eliot’s own vision. 
If there seems a further irony in Pound traitorously impugning a text that he 
                                                 
9
 The ‘Hell Cantos’ were conceptualised by July 1922, though Pound continued to revise them 
until their publication in January 1925 (see Bush, Genesis 244). 
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helped to bring into existence, particularly by furnishing amendments to a textual 
body that he had originally pared-down, this ambivalent dynamic is rendered 
explicable by the appearance of Eliot at the head of the preachers, as ‘…..m 
Episcopus, waving a condom full of black-beetles’ (Cantos 63).10 Eliot’s 
appearance in the text follows directly on from that of Chesterton, rather as Death 
follows the Rider on a White Horse in Revelation. Again using terms that denote 
treachery, Pound locates Chesterton amongst the ‘betrayers of language’, ‘the 
press gang […] who had lied for hire’ (Cantos 61).  
In this light, the reference to Eliot as ‘[Possu]m Episcopus’—the dots are 
intended to imply corruption—suggests that Eliot’s burgeoning religious 
conviction, first confessed to an incredulous Pound in 1923 (Gordon, Imperfect 
210), was viewed by the latter as an act of infidelity, betraying the premises upon 
which the friendship group was initially founded, in a manner which drew Eliot 
ideologically closer to the interdicted figure of Chesterton.
11
 By drawing together 
an array of images of pestilence and sterility to implicate Eliot as the source of the 
malaise that he documents, Pound’s Canto not only revisits Eliot’s association of 
Chesterton with the ‘forces of death’, but also returns to the imagery of 
incontinence and contagion that Pound and Lewis had previously employed when 
stigmatising Chesterton as dribbling and scum-like. Similarly, the juxtaposition of 
the physical ‘teething’ of lice with the verbal ‘mouthing of orators’ calls to mind 
the orally-focused element of fear that I have identified in Chesterton’s 
apprehensive negotiation of Eliot’s poetic voice.  
It is perhaps notable that Pound’s petulantly insistent revision of ‘water’ to 
‘stupidities’ serves to cancel out the yearning for fluids articulated by the voice of 
‘What the Thunder Said’, since Hulme had identified the ‘properly classical 
poem’ as ‘dry and hard’ (Hulme). In previous centuries, porousness was 
understood as a point of distinction between humour and wit, since the former 
‘“derives its name from the prevailing quality of moisture in the bodily 
                                                 
10
 Matthew Hofer has argued convincingly that this is a reference to Eliot, and that Eliot was aware 
of this, in ‘Modernist Polemic: Ezra Pound v. “the perverters of language”’ (Modernism/Modernity 
9, 3, September 2002, pp. 463-489). 
11
 Pound identifies Eliot’s religious faith with that of Chesterton in a letter to A.R. Orage, 24 Feb. 
1934 (Economic 90). A fortnight later, Pound published a negative review of Eliot’s rather 
Chestertonian social treatise, After Strange Gods (1934) (‘Mr. Eliot’s Mare’s Nest.’ New English 
Weekly 8 Mar. 1934). See Harding (186-87) for an account of this later dispute between Eliot and 
Pound.  
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temperament”’ (Hunt qtd. in Martin 30). Consequently, humour has 
conventionally been considered to ‘bond’ individuals through ‘“the earnestness of 
affection”’, whereas wit ‘laughs at others’ (Triumph 30). As I discussed in chapter 
one, Chesterton considered unalloyed wit to be a product of pure intellection, 
whereas humour’s capacity to ‘confess its inconsistency’ imaginatively aligns it 
with immersion in the material.  
In BLAST 1, Lewis explains that the aim of the Vorticist is to cultivate the 
‘separating […] solitude of LAUGHTER’ as a ‘hysterical WALL built round the 
EGO’ (26). This attempt to establish pristine distance from the rejected target of 
the laughter is echoed in Pound’s letter to Quinn, in which he asserts that ‘[t]he 
multitude of [Chesterton’s] mumblings cannot be killed by multitude but only by 
a sharp thrust’ (Letters 171). With this image, Pound inadvertently evokes 
Chesterton’s view of the sword as a symbol of oppositional satire, while 
dispensing with the balancing, existentially grotesque element of internal 
contradiction that Chesterton finds symbolised in the cross. In this light, Pound’s 
intemperate broadside against Eliot can perhaps be understood to result from 
unease at the latter’s exercising of a permeability of humour inimical to the pure 
satire espoused by Lewis and Pound, a faculty that led Eliot to traverse the 
reassuring cultural barriers that Pound had sought to establish.  
Given the strength of Pound’s attack in Canto XIV, it is particularly ironic 
that by 1925 Pound and Eliot had become associated in the public consciousness 
as a double act—‘seeming to join two persons, elusively, as one’ (241), as Anne 
Stillman puts it. If this image calls to mind Shaw’s ‘pantomime elephant’, the 
Chesterbelloc, the comparably politic foundation of the Eliot/Pound hybrid 
rendered it just as unwieldy a public contrivance. Chesterton’s approach to 
controversy always remained close to the six maxims of the politeness principle—
‘tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, sympathy’ (Lecercle 102)—in 
marked contrast to the ‘partisan viciousness’ (131) that Wells deprecated in 
Belloc, and a comparable temperamental divide characterises Eliot and Pound. 
Eliot’s willingness to modify his cultural position represents an example of the 
‘political crime’ (Lynch 103) that Derrida sees as a danger to friendship. Hofer 
argues that the presence of a disparity between personal and political relations 
‘helps to explain how Eliot could remain Pound’s collaborator and friend in one 
sense, and become a rival and enemy in another’ (478). Indeed, following Eliot’s 
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first stirrings of religious conviction, he assumed a relation to Pound comparable 
to that of MacIan and Turnbull in The Ball and the Cross—his simultaneous 
‘friend and enemy’.  
In view of Pound’s consignment of Eliot to Hell, one wonders if Lewis is 
tauntingly referring to their friend’s public attack in his truculent correspondence 
with Eliot in March 1925, when he claims that ‘the devil has you by the heel’, and 
notes that if his suspicions over Eliot’s conduct are correct he need not ‘tell you 
where to go for you will be there already’ (Lewis, Letters 154). Lewis’s paranoia 
had now brought the pair’s relationship to breaking point, with Eliot exasperatedly 
denying any involvement in an ‘intrigue’ or ‘plot’ against Lewis, and appealing to 
him, in an echo of Chesterton’s youthful advice to Bentley, to be ‘convinced by 
your own senses’ (23 Mar. 1925; Letters 2 612) on the matter. The pair continued 
to quarrel intermittently throughout the rest of the year, and Lewis later succeeded 
in clashing with Pound, in turn, in June 1925. In the same period, Lewis was 
composing Time and Western Man, which includes a traitorous attack on Pound,  
accusing the latter, in turn, of hypocrisy, by highlighting the artistic ‘discrepancy 
between what Pound said [...] and what he did’ (55). In a cycle of paradoxically 
estranging imitation, each man accuses the other of harbouring hidden, heretical 
narratives that must be unearthed, a pattern that builds up to a pathology of 
classicist neurosis. 
This degeneration of the old fraternity into a vicious circle of private 
mistrust and public recrimination would have been particularly prominent in 
Eliot’s mind at the time in which he was completing work on the final version of 
‘The Hollow Men’, in the autumn of 1925. While Lewis and Pound must have 
seemed exciting manifestations of Eliot’s vibrant ‘comedian’ made flesh in 1914, 
by 1925 they more closely resembled the ‘haranguing spectres’ that torment the 
vulnerable marionette of ‘Humoresque’. Pound’s barbed satire, which presents 
such a marked contrast with the emollient strategies of Chesterton’s parody, 
would have been particularly wounding, since Eliot had willingly admitted Pound 
into unusually close proximity. It is appropriate, then, that when Eliot cryptically 
takes leave of his erstwhile comrades in ‘The Hollow Men’, he does so by 
reintroducing his old puppets, the ‘weak’ marionette and the mocking ‘comedian’, 
in order to parody the cultural endeavour upon which their friendship was 
founded, while drawing both himself and his audience into the range of the 
279 
 
criticism, employing the democratic grotesque framework of the carnivalesque to 
set the poem up in ambiguous, metaparodic relation to his earlier work.  
This is not to suggest that the influences conventionally attributed to ‘The 
Hollow Men’—Dante, Conrad, Frazer—are a false trail. Rather, these overt, 
‘official’ influences, which Eliot drew to the reader’s attention as a means of 
investing his corpus with a ready-made mythos, are made to coexist with a 
simultaneously carnivalesque, ‘unofficial’ subtext, which playfully subverts that 
same mythos. This hitherto underexplored element of the poem comes to light 
when its free verse sections are read in ironic conjunction with the two parodies of 
the nursery rhyme, ‘Here we go round the mulberry bush’, which bookend the 
final section. These pieces were the last to be added to the poem, thus postdating 
Eliot’s quarrel with Lewis, the publication of Pound’s ‘Hell Cantos’, and 
Chesterton’s unorthodox letter of introduction, ‘To a Modern Poet’. In the first 
rhyme, Eliot replaces the bush with a cactus:  
 
Here we go round the prickly pear  
Prickly pear prickly pear  
Here we go round the prickly pear  
At five o'clock in the morning (CPP 85). 
 
The timing of this dance, which is traditionally understood to be the hour of 
Christ’s resurrection, juxtaposes Eliot’s newly discovered faith, and his 
consequent sense of personal regeneration, with a bathetic rendition of the cultural 
regeneration that he had previously thought latent within the ‘living English’ of 
his prickly pair of associates. The ‘mulberry bush’ rhyme originally derived from 
fertility ritual, and Eliot’s recourse to the children’s rhyme has often been 
discussed as an allusion to his broader sense of the enervation of his epoch. 
Chinitz argues that the poem represents the ‘culmination of a recurring theme’ in 
Eliot’s work: ‘The impossibility of resurrecting a defunct ritual’ (87), which 
would merely represent ‘an exotic confection for the delighted palates of literary 
faddists’ (86). While this assessment of Eliot’s intent seems accurate, my previous 
section particularly identified the danger of his own work becoming just such a 
parlous dish, offered up to a literary culture that resembles the club of the Twelve 
True Fishermen writ large. 
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Kenner argues that a slow drift towards ossification seemed to grip Eliot as 
he became increasingly assimilated into the mainstream of literary culture: ‘the 
vitality dwindle[s] in his prose as he grows, between The Egoist and the TLS, 
more and more like the thing he was pretending to be’ (Invisible 179). The danger 
of coming to embody the very enervation that he had sought to satirise in 
‘Prufrock’ would have become increasingly clear to Eliot as his visions began to 
be reflected back to him in the revisions of others, not only in the fairground 
mirror of Chestertonian parody, but also in the inadvertently bathetic surplus 
production undertaken by the acolytes that he increasingly accrued. As Ackroyd 
relates, in the course of the 1920s a ‘cult of “The Waste Landers” developed […] 
The poem was widely imitated by young or aspiring poets […] “It became such a 
plague that the moment the eye encountered, in a newly arrived poem, the words 
‘stone’, ‘dust’ or ‘dry’ one reached for the waste paper basket”’ (Howard qtd. in 
Ackroyd 128).  
Chesterton highlights an example of this phenomenon in an article on ‘The 
New Poetry’ (ILN 30 Jan. 1926), in which he discusses the poetry of an apparent 
pasticheur of Eliot, ‘Mr Walsh’, whose verse Chesterton is baffled to find ‘bound 
up in the same volume with works by Mr. James Joyce and Mr. Ezra Pound, 
whose notions we may regard as quite false or unphilosophical, but who are men 
of thought and reading, who generally mean something by what they say’ (CW 34: 
36). Conversely, Chesterton is nonplussed by Walsh’s account of his acts of 
‘worship’ before ‘stone images’ (CW 34: 33) which are apparently filled with 
blood. As with his later tinkering with the referents of Thursday, Chesterton has 
fun drawing out the nonsense possibilities of this conceit, listing a series of 
comparable category-mistakes: ‘the ink in icebergs, or the beer in bicycles, or the 
champagne in Bradshaw’s railway guide’ (CW 34: 35-36).  
In a follow-up essay (‘More about Modern Poets.’ ILN 6 Feb. 1926), 
Chesterton argues that this ‘sort of stone image is avowedly an Aunt Sally. 
Nobody could help laughing at it, unless he were morbidly careful only to laugh 
when he was told to by Mr. Ezra Pound’ (CW 34: 38). Since Eliot asserted that he 
felt compelled to ‘keep an attitude of discipleship’ (qtd. in Chace 221) towards 
Pound, his publically recognised allegiance to the high-priest of the new 
movement can be understood to situate him in disquieting proximity to these less-
than flattering bedfellows. This context is particularly highlighted by Jaffe’s 
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account of the ambiguous connotations of the term, Eliotic. As Jaffe explains, 
with increasing fame, Eliot became regarded more as a type than an individual: an 
‘ominous cultural signifier, a symptom of the general state of cultural affairs’ 
(72). This identity confusion was compounded by the fact that the adjectives 
Poundian and Eliotic operate in an analogic manner, identifying the style of the 
author with the pastiche of his acolytes. Citing a negative review of Pound, Jaffe 
argues that by ‘adding the suffix –ian, the reviewer, in effect, uses Pound to 
diminish Pound’s own work […] With somewhat invidious effect, the adjective 
Poundian insinuates that Pound’s work suffers because it derives from him’ (59). 
While this imputation recalls the implicit charge conventionally levelled by the 
parodist—as illustrated in a particularly visceral manner by the Hell Cantos—the 
criticism becomes still more damaging when conflated with the complementary 
sense of the adjective—‘Poundian, in this case a substantive, an admirer or 
disciple of Ezra Pound’ (Jaffe 60)—which intimately associates the author with 
the failings of his acolytes.  
Pound explained that his nickname for Eliot, ‘Old Possum’, was intended 
to evoke the latter’s ability to ‘“appear dead while … still alive”’ (qtd. in Hofer 
480), and argued that his friend’s physical bearing increasingly operated as an 
objective corollary of his critical standing in this regard—his success in 
establishing cultural authority rested upon ‘“disguising himself as a corpse”’ (qtd. 
in Chace 221). This suggests that Pound’s terms in Canto XIV can also be 
understood as a Bergsonian, monitory warning to Eliot of the dangers of lapsing 
into ‘a certain rigidity of body, mind and character’, a warning that Eliot ironically 
heeds at Pound’s expense in ‘The Hollow Men’. Eliot’s initial employment of 
‘we’ in the poem should be understood to convey a double-edged allusion to both 
the Men of 1914 and their subsequent copyists, which anticipates the charges of 
enervation and sloughs them off in a complexly rebounding gesture of immersion 
and evasion—an act of ‘emetic ecstacy’ that seeks to propel Eliot beyond an 
abject former self, to produce a Bergsonian ‘creative evolution’:  
 
We are the hollow men 
We are the stuffed men 
Leaning together 
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas! (CPP 83). 
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Since Ackroyd notes that ‘The Waste Land was sung and chanted by 
undergraduates’ (119) in the years immediately following its publication, Eliot’s 
opening lines can be read as an arch invitation to his undergraduate chorus to join 
in with a rather unflattering new air. Nonetheless, when understood in the context 
of Eliot’s increasing sense of distance from his original friendship group, this 
marching song for an ineffectual generation not only conveys an exasperated 
throwing up of the hands at the dull-wittedness of his acolytes, but also a 
retrospective sense of the futility of the machinations of the Men of 1914 
themselves. The almost instantaneous decay of the chorus prefigures Chesterton’s 
observation that in the modern age, ‘[p]oetry has become more than normally 
individualistic. The individualist can write a song; but not a song with a chorus’ 
(CW 21: 606). Similarly, the contemporaneous breakdown of Eliot’s own circle 
into paranoid whisperings is discernible in the clanging repetition of the collective 
noun, ironically juxtaposed with the simultaneously comradely, conspiratorial and 
enervated phrase, ‘Leaning together’.  
The sense that Eliot’s criticism is directed closer to home becomes still 
clearer when the mulberry bush rhyme’s travesty of fertility ritual is read in 
conjunction with the subtly deprecatory allusions to both Lewis and Pound that 
can be discerned in the sections which precede it. When the narrator discusses his 
anxiety to avoid a meeting in Part II of the poem, his account of the strategies 
necessary to achieve the required detachment not only includes adopting the 
‘deliberate disguises’ that Eliot had cultivated in his earliest work, but also 
‘[b]ehaving as the wind behaves’ (CPP 84). In Finnegans Wake (1939), which 
was first part-published as ‘Work in Progress’ in April 1924, Joyce peppers the 
text with the term, ‘wind’, as an allusive means of deprecating Lewis, by 
establishing a pun on Wyndham and his ‘blast’ of hot air (Glasheen 166-68).12 In 
adopting Joyce’s trick, Eliot sets up a dialogue between the former self who had 
spent the previous era appropriating many of Lewis’s methods, and the present 
Eliot who is beginning to apprehend their sterility.  
The position of Lewis and Pound interestingly echoes Chesterton’s criticism 
of Arnold, particularly his combined inability to engage with the ‘comic’ in his 
physical self, and his oppositional critique of Victorian culture, which Chesterton 
                                                 
12
 Lewis went on to implant a satirical parody of Joyce’s increasingly unorthodox stylistics in his 
allegorical fantasia, The Childermass (1928). 
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considered to have ‘suffered [... from] consenting merely to correct’, and therefore 
presenting only a ‘half-truth’ (Matthew x). Lewis later explained that BLAST had 
been ‘destructive in intention’ (Time 55), a phrase that accords with my 
discussion, in chapter one, of the unproductively destructive nature of intellectual 
satire when unleavened by the constructive energies of the physical grotesque. In 
his first volume of autobiography, Blasting and Bombardiering (1937), Lewis 
acknowledges that the ‘Men of 1914’ were ‘the first men of a Future that has not 
materialized’ (Blasting 256), seemingly failing to recognise this failure as an 
inevitable consequence of a programmatic eschewal of the material. While Hulme 
praised Lewis’s art as boldly transcending the ‘“transience of the organic”’ (qtd. 
in Butler 227), Eliot’s repeated recourse to ‘stone images’ (CPP 84) in ‘The 
Hollow Men’ hints at the un-regenerative endgame encoded within these precepts. 
Specifically, the phallic travesty of the prickly pear set up by Eliot’s nursery 
rhyme gestures back ironically to the self-confident Vorticist era in which Gaudier 
Brzeska had sculpted his phallic ‘hierarchic head’ of Pound—an object that Lewis 
recalled viewing from Pound’s apartment when he was first introduced to Eliot 
(see Blasting 285):  
 
This is the dead land  
This is cactus land  
Here the stone images  
Are raised, here they receive  
The supplication of a dead man's hand 
Under the twinkle of a fading star (CPP 84). 
 
When read in combination with the first parody of the nursery rhyme, the 
link to Gaudier Brzeska’s raising of stone images conjures the somewhat 
burlesque image of the Men of 1914 dancing around the un-regenerative stone 
effigy of Pound’s phallus, while a dead man’s hand, presumably that of ‘Old 
Possum’ himself, offers a grotesque parody of youthful supplication. If there is a 
curious irony in Pound’s parodic revision, in the ‘Hell Cantos’, of the very text 
which his skilful excisions helped to bring to life, there is a singularly apt riposte 
in Eliot’s reintroduction of much of the abject material expunged from The Waste 
Land into ‘The Hollow Men’, ‘transmuted’ (Kenner, Invisible 32) into a 
framework that mocks Pound’s aesthetic revolution. Importantly, Eliot’s desire to 
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inscribe a reconstructive element within the culturally oppositional, ‘destructive’ 
project of Lewis and Pound finds expression in ‘The Hollow Men’ through the 
setting up of a contrast between the nocturnal, Romantic grotesque landscape of 
the free-verse sections, and the folk grotesque of the nursery rhymes, set at dawn. 
The regenerative intent of this movement, which closely recalls the dyadic 
methodology of Chesterton’s fiction, is perhaps most clearly revealed by the 
return to the nursery rhyme at the poem’s conclusion, which parodies the refrain 
with which the verse conventionally continues—‘this is the way we clap our 
hands’: 
 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
This is the way the world ends 
Not with a bang but a whimper (CPP 86). 
 
This nursery rhyme interposition can be understood as a final, ironic return 
of the voices of Eliot’s earliest marionettes to the stage, a revision of his earlier 
visions which transmutes the figures from dead-eyed Romantic grotesque effigies 
to vibrantly energised carnivalesque embodiments of festive comic practice. By 
transposing the martial rhythm of the poem’s opening into the burlesque song-
form of the nursery rhyme, the quatrain encourages us to re-imagine the poem as a 
pantomime skit, in which the iconoclastic Clown bursts in at the moment of crisis, 
delivering his warped nursery-rhyme as a sardonic gloss, before throwing one leg 
forward with a clap of the hands as the curtain falls. Eliot’s audio performance of 
the poem further heightens this effect, conveying a serio-comic hybridised binary 
which brings to mind Chesterton’s account of Bentley’s knack of saying ‘amusing 
things with the air of one reading the burial service’ (CW 14: 440). The passage of 
linguistic aporia which precedes the final quatrain is intoned in ever-more 
deflated fashion, suggestive of a sagging Jack-in-the-box—‘A jumping-jack has 
such a frame’ (CPP 602), notes the narrator of ‘Humoresque’—only for the Jack 
to spring unnervingly back to life with gritted teeth and popping eyes for the 
manic finale. The return of the ‘comedian’ to the stage is also implied by a subtle 
textual connection between ‘Suite Clownesque’ and Part V of ‘The Hollow Men’. 
In the former, Eliot writes: 
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[…] through the painted colonnades 
There falls a shadow dense, immense 
It’s the comedian again 
Explodes in laughter, spreads his toes 
(the most expressive, real of men) 
Concentred into vest and nose (Inventions 38; my emphasis). 
 
This herald of the shadow that falls between the emotion and the response in 
‘The Hollow Men’ interpolates the ‘comedian’ into the space between Eliot’s 
emotion and the reader’s response. At the conclusion of The Use of Poetry and the 
Use of Criticism, Eliot expands upon the meaning of his parodic emendation of 
Walter Pater—‘the poet aspires to the condition of the music-hall comedian’—
explaining that ‘[e]very poet would like, I fancy, to be able to think that he had 
some direct social utility […] He would like to be something of a popular 
entertainer, and be able to think his own thoughts behind a tragic or a comic 
mask’ (‘Conclusion’ 154). Eliot explains that this urge demonstrates a desire to 
have ‘a part to play in society as worthy as that of the music-hall comedian’ 
(‘Conclusion’ 154). In this light, the progress of Part V of ‘The Hollow Men’ 
should perhaps be understood as a carnivalesque turning topsy-turvy of the tragic 
mask, essayed with the aim of achieving a ‘social utility’.  
Read in this way, the poem ends with the abortive ‘bang’ of a comedy pistol, 
a weapon that Eliot ranges against himself, his erstwhile friends, and his solemnly 
respectful audience in an all-embracing skirl of carnivalesque critical laughter. 
While Habib considers the ‘ultimate level of irony’ in Prufrock to reside in its 
‘laughing at the increasingly puzzled reader’ (78), this private joke is translated, in 
‘The Hollow Men’, into a pedagogically antagonistic relationship with the 
audience, chivvying the reader to become active, in a comparable manner to that 
essayed by Chesterton in ‘The Queer Feet’. Cavendish-Jones’s view that the final 
rhyme’s repetitive framework ‘hectors the reader into accepting [Eliot’s] 
conclusion’ (Modernity 198) is only partially correct: for ‘accepting’, read ‘daring 
to refute’. It should be read as a shaking of the reader’s shoulders, much as 
Chesterton’s Innocent Smith holds a gun to the head of ‘Modern Man’ in his 
capacity as ‘skeleton at the feast’. As Smith explains, ‘the memento mori […] isn’t 
only meant to remind us of a future life, but to remind us of a present life too’ 
(Manalive 58).  
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Again, this suggests a cross-pollination of the practices of Laforgue and 
Chesterton on Eliot’s part. As Hannoosh notes, Laforgue’s Hamlet ‘constantly 
breaks his narrative with parenthetical asides [and] direct commentary […] the 
narrator’s intervention, so frequent in parody, allegedly distances him from the 
text but, by allying us with him, it actually incorporates us into the narrative’ 
(Parody 27-28). As I discussed in chapter three, this is also a characteristically 
carnivalesque strategy, embodied by Chesterton’s narratorial clowning in ‘The 
Queer Feet’. While it has often been noted that Eliot’s attendance of Stravinsky’s 
Petrushka in Paris in 1911 influenced the puppet conceit of the ‘hollow men’ (see 
Mester 122), this inspiration should also be understood as an appropriation of the 
uncanny puppet image to carnivalesque purpose, comparable to that which 
Chesterton encoded in Father Brown’s familiar swinging of his legs on the textual 
partition in ‘The Queer Feet’. Recall Leatherbarrow’s explanation that the purpose 
of Petrushka in Russian folk myth was to provoke ‘disruptive laughter, 
challenging all social and moral conventions’, by deliberately generating a 
‘disruptive carnival mood [which] invited collusion: It passed beyond the puppet 
booth and infected the audience’. 
As with ‘The Queer Feet’, the ultimate purpose of this gesture of 
engagement is community marriage, conducted via a deliberate appropriation of 
the practices of Aristophanean festive comedy on Eliot’s part. The word, 
‘mulberry’, derives from the Greek, moros, meaning ‘a fool’ (Evans 736), and 
Eliot’s nursery rhyme conceit situates the poet imminently within the text, putting 
into effect the rather Father Brown-like personal characteristics that Aiken 
identified in Eliot: a ‘“clown”’, who ‘“[f]or all his liturgical appearance [was] 
capable of real buffoonery”’ (qtd. in Gordon 32). In this instance, Eliot is the 
high-priest in a carnivalesque marriage rite. The sardonic marching song with 
which the poem begins is lent a regenerative dimension by its resemblance to the 
‘processional nature of the komos’ (Brody 67) in ancient fertility ritual, a 
framework composed of ‘a procession to the place of sacrifice, the sacrifice itself, 
and the […] komos song addressed to Phales’, which was performed by drunken 
revellers as a prelude to ‘the Sacred Marriage’ (Brody 67).  
F.M. Cornford, whose text, The Origins of Attic Comedy (1922) Eliot read in 
the period immediately preceding his construction of ‘The Hollow Men’ 
(Matthews 117-18), notes that in the tradition of English mummery which derives 
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from Attic comedy, the players frequently ‘ran forward and satirised persons’ 
(qtd. in Brody 69) in the crowd, much as the opening chant satirises Eliot’s 
audience. Conventionally, at the ‘end of the action […] the clown goes out first 
[as] the leader of the procession’ (Brody 68) to effect the conclusion, while in the 
mummers’ play of Greatham, the clowns acted as ‘leaders of the choral section’ 
(Brody 99). While this element accords with Eliot’s engagement with the reader, 
his bathetic rendering of Pound’s stone phallus is also salient, since the Phallic 
Song of the komos possessed the ‘two elements of invective and invocation’, and 
incorporated ‘abusive caricatures of contemporary and local figures’ (Brody 70-
71).  
Cornford asserted that in ‘ancient ritual […] it is the fertility god himself 
who is the victim’ (qtd. in Brody 110). Similarly, Eliot sacrifices his textual body 
in the cause of personal and community resurrection, deriving a self-immolating 
moral from his materials which invests the conclusion with a double-edged 
pedagogic dimension. The final version of ‘The Hollow Men’ appeared in Poems 
1909—1925, published in November 1925, an event which Eliot described to 
Leonard Woolf, in characteristically abject terms, as an ‘ejection’ (17 Dec. 1925; 
Letters 2 802).
13
 In this light, the final lines of the poem can be read as the 
burlesque afterword to the collection, capping this monument to his aesthetic 
success with a comically condensed Aristophanean gloss of the tragedies that 
precede it. As Gaster explains, the ‘komos provides an appropriate finale for any 
comedy or farce, but in the case of the folk play it also’ serves to bring together 
the ‘itinerant troupe that makes the rounds, like carol singers […] a means of 
rounding up the company at the end of the performance and of marshaling them in 
procession before they move on’ (qtd. in Brody 67-68). In the present instance, 
Eliot’s ‘“company of actors inside one suit”’ (Pritchett qtd. in Ackroyd 118) is 
brought together for one last song before the poet moves on to a new phase of his 
cultural activities.  
In surveying his career in this way, Eliot also second-guesses how his 
ominous musings might be parodied, and gets in the first blow, so as to cunningly 
render parody superfluous. ‘The Hollow Men’ is an aporic crisis moment within 
Eliot’s oeuvre, a reductio ad absurdum of his work to date, invoking a moment of 
                                                 
13
 Several fragments of the poem had been published in different forms between November 1924 
and March 1925. 
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artistic impasse in its self-parodic language. It is also both his most complete 
realisation of the vortex of Laforgean irony that his career began by pastiching, 
and his simultaneous gesture of escape from the same influence. The inscription 
of stratified layers of irony, through which Eliot produces a series of supremely 
pessimistic statements that carry the seed of their own negation encoded within 
the manner of their conveyance, caused a further shadow to fall between Eliot’s 
intent and the interpretations of his critical readers. If taken at face value, the 
poem might easily by misread as a complacent, superannuated exercise in 
decadent anaemia, rehashing the characteristic imagery of The Waste Land (rats, 
broken items, moisture-less locales) to diminishing returns. For example, Bernard 
Bergonzi describes ‘The Hollow Men’ as ‘a literally hopeless poem, though 
stylish in its despair’ (104), while Kenner expresses bafflement over the way in 
which, when compared to the monologically serious ‘East Coker’ (1940), ‘even 
The Hollow Men seems to an imponderable degree satiric, the circuit around the 
prickly pear positively facetious’ (Invisible 266).  
Although Kenner’s analysis tentatively hints at some of the elements that my 
own reading has highlighted, his ‘even’ demonstrates an interpretive confusion, 
implying as it does that a text as self-evidently morose as ‘The Hollow Men’ is 
surely an inapt repository for facetiousness. This is a particularly ironic 
misreading, since Kenner originated an important theory of modernist practice in 
his analysis of the way in which the relative degree of authorial irony ascribed to 
A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1914) defines whether we view Joyce’s 
protagonist either as an archetype of the literary genius or a bathetic parody of the 
same. Jaffe considers Kenner’s interpretation to bear the implication that readers 
‘who recognize Joyce’s irony about Stephen as interpretive necessity pass 
something akin to a modernist intelligence test’ (35). My reading of Eliot’s poem 
as an ironic attempt to establish critical distance not only from his associates and 
acolytes, but also from his own former Weltschmerz, ironically via a hyperbolic 
over-production of its signifiers, posits the successful decoding of the poem’s self-
parody as a similar test of both readerly intelligence and meaningful identification 
with the author, which requires us to engage in what Colebrook terms the ‘process 
of ironic re-reading, where we dare to imagine a text as somehow meaning 
something other than what it explicitly says’ (Irony 5).  
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The interpretive tension purposefully inscribed by Eliot is strikingly 
demonstrated by Arthur Waugh’s inadvertently perspicacious assessment of 
Eliot’s verse, which he intended as a satirical blow: ‘It was a classic custom in the 
family hall, when a feast was at its height, to display a drunken slave among the 
sons of the household, to the end that they, being ashamed at the ignominious 
folly of his gesticulations, might determine never to be tempted into such a 
pitiable condition themselves’ (qtd. in Waugh, E. Little 78). As my analysis of the 
influence of the harlequinade upon the structure of ‘The Queer Feet’ 
demonstrated, the casting of the clown as a servant and the narrator as buffoon in 
more recent forms of comic ritual is undertaken with precisely this pedagogic 
purpose in mind. In view of this imaginative correspondence between the 
aesthetic practice of Chesterton and Eliot, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
former proved singularly well-equipped to correctly interpret ‘The Hollow Men’ 
in the years that followed, when the textual bucket of cold water thrown at the 
reader by Eliot’s final rhyme roused Chesterton into critical action.  
Eliot’s juxtaposition of disparate genres of the grotesque recalls 
Chesterton’s account of the value of Dickens’s stylistic practice, which effects an 
‘[a]udacious reconciliation’ (CW 15: 284), comparable to the juggling of ‘skulls 
and motley’ (CW 15: 284) in Shakespeare. As Chesterton explains, ‘[t]he more 
widely different the types talked of, the more serious and universal must be the 
philosophy which talks of them’ (CW 15: 284-85). As my final section will 
illustrate, this sympathetic understanding was efficacious in nurturing the equally 
audacious reconciliation of Chesterton and Eliot in the decade that followed. 
 
Audacious Reconciliation 
 
It cannot be too often repeated that if we are to love our enemies we must fight them. 
 
Chesterton, ‘On Mrs. Eddy and a New Creed’ (DN 11 Apr. 1908; CDN 5: 52) 
 
It is curiously serendipitous that John Dickson Carr’s most famous 
mystery story should concern a detective conceived as an affectionate parody of 
Chesterton, investigating the problem of The Hollow Man (1935), since 
Chesterton’s attempts to decode the mystery of Eliot initially took the literal form 
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of detective work. In 1925, he not only composed ‘To a Modern Poet’, but also 
published two Father Brown stories in which the priest is made to exercise his 
deductive judgement in relation to figures who closely resemble Eliot. In ‘The 
Arrow of Heaven’ (Nash’s Magazine July 1925), an American character whose 
‘conversation seemed to consist of stratified layers of irony’ (FB 379-80) is 
described as ‘dressed to the nines—up to that point, indeed, where there begins to 
be too fine a distinction between the dandy and the dummy outside a tailor’s shop’ 
(FB 389). In ‘The Mirror and the Magistrate’, published in April 1925, the finger 
of guilt temporarily falls upon an artist described as ‘“one of the new poets, and 
pretty steep to read, I believe”’ (FB 525), whose philosophy is later described as 
‘pessimistic [and] anarchial’ (FB 649).  
In both cases, the suspect’s ultimate innocence is established by Father 
Brown’s capacity to sympathetically identify with the figure under scrutiny—in 
the latter instance, ‘I set myself consciously down to be a revolutionary poet’ (FB 
649). Hunter argues that Father Brown’s method constitutes ‘a ritual act of total 
surrender of personal identity to the object he wishes to understand’ (153)—in 
other words, a willed impersonality, somewhat reminiscent of Eliot’s poetic 
method. In the two expositional narratives on Brown’s methodology with which 
Chesterton bookended the collection—The Secret of Father Brown (1927)—in 
which ‘The Mirror and the Magistrate’ appears, the priest’s deductive technique is 
described in comparable terms to the ‘sympathetic and analytical’ (Varied 181) 
approach that Chesterton lauded in Bret Harte’s parodic writing. It is an act of 
sympathetic mimicry, conceived in direct opposition to the scientific 
impersonality practiced by Holmes, which Brown claims to involve ‘treating a 
friend as a stranger’ (FB 522).  
The reverse process of sympathetic convergence, which enables Brown to 
conceive of strangers as friends, was also that engaged in by Chesterton in coming 
to terms with Eliot in the decade that followed. In 1927, Chesterton not only 
published The Secret of Father Brown, but also Robert Louis Stevenson, a critical 
study in which Eliot makes a further implicit appearance, in an analysis which 
suggests Chesterton’s success in sympathetically communing with his subject. 
Eliot reviewed the study shortly after its publication, rehearsing his old urge to 
obscure the accuracy of Chesterton’s criticism, by casting doubt upon the latter’s 
ability to correctly deduce the meaning of modernism. Eliot claims that 
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Chesterton runs aground upon the misapprehension that ‘we are […] still very 
much interested in the ‘Nineties, and somewhat like them, only worse’ (‘There’ 
445). This further attempt at public obfuscation is crowned with the assertion that 
Chesterton seems unfamiliar with any modern literature beside the pedestrian 
offerings of Michael Arlen (‘There’ 445), despite the fact that in Stevenson he 
explicitly discusses Aldous Huxley, Dorothy Richardson, and Edith Sitwell; and 
ends the study with an implicit assessment of Eliot, Lewis, and Pound. 
The nature of these analyses is particularly instructive, since Chesterton 
draws persuasively on the Victorian nonsense-world of Carroll as a means of 
achieving sympathetic engagement with the figures under discussion. He begins 
by offering a reading of Edith Sitwell, which argues that her apparently innovative 
stylistics derive largely from Stevenson’s nursery rhyme nonsense. In making his 
case, Chesterton borrows Carroll’s formal method of close parody, to render 
Stevenson’s verse in the style of Sitwell: ‘The best poetry of Miss Sitwell is after 
all a sort of parody of A Children’s Garden of Verses, decked with slightly altered 
adjectives that would mildly surprise a child’ (CW 18: 146). As he explains, while 
Stevenson discussed ‘“the shining dew on every buttercup”’ and wrote that 
‘“Whenever Aunty moves around, her dresses make a curious sound”’, in ‘Miss 
Sitwell’s version they would make a still more curious sound, the nature of which 
I have not the courage to conjecture. The shining dew might become the shrieking 
dew, or on a more moderate estimate the sniggering dew; but it would still be a 
long-lost child who stood bewildered’ (CW 18: 146). Again, Chesterton’s 
amendments compulsively return to the nonsense imagery of an object-world 
screaming and indulging in private jokes to make the point—‘the shrieking dew’, 
‘the sniggering dew’—while offering a concessionary thematic allusion to Carroll, 
which situates Sitwell as a guileless Alice, investigating a mysterious landscape 
with apprehensive wonder. 
Having parodically identified Sitwell’s debt to nursery rhyme nonsense, 
Chesterton goes on to offer an incisive account of the machinations of Eliot, 
Lewis, and Pound, which again draws on the themes of childhood and nonsense, 
in an account by turns irritated and sympathetic:  
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There is already a group, we might say a family group, of poets who consider 
themselves, and are generally considered, the last word in experiment […] and who 
are not without real qualities of deep atmosphere and suggestion. Yet all that is 
really deep in the best of their work comes out of those depths of garden perspective 
and large rooms as seen by little children […] Many have complained, and perhaps 
justly, of the almost American modernity of the artistic ambition of these artists. 
They announce their message through a megaphone; they shout it through 
pantomime masks; they hustle and push and pick quarrels; but there is something in 
them, for all their efforts to advertise—or to hide it. […] what they are really after is 
still the same [as in Stevenson]: those lost children who are themselves; lost in the 
deep gardens at dusk (CW 18: 146). 
 
While Chesterton’s reference to the poets’ ‘efforts to advertise—or to hide’ 
the true derivation of their methods again suggests his self-appointed, adversarial 
role as exposer of misleading commercial-aesthetic self-positioning, the image of 
Eliot and co. shouting their messages through pantomime masks accurately 
interprets the ‘unhuman’ grotesque strategies of their early propagandising, while 
also corresponding to my reading of Eliot’s strategy at the conclusion of ‘The 
Hollow Men’. Meanwhile, his evocation of a sense of disquiet at wandering lost 
in a childhood garden more sympathetically recalls the imaginative world of his 
own Carrollean fairy-tale, Thursday. In this way, Chesterton’s analysis hints at the 
status of his own novel as a prescient anticipation of the themes of later modernist 
practice, while refiguring the modernists’ projection of adolescent aggression as 
harmless pre-pubescent hijinks, much as the threat posed by the decadents had 
been reconceived in Thursday as the innocent roleplaying of frightened children 
navigating a threatening world with boyish bluff. This exposure of mutual 
resemblance rebounds inconclusively between agonistic and sympathetic 
registers, disclosing the effaced narrative of his aesthetic identification with, and 
anticipation of, the same figures who had so aggressively projected him as their 
rejected cultural antipode ‘through a megaphone’.  
Eliot’s review of Stevenson takes up the megaphone once more to 
denounce his interpreter, in a sustained exercise in critical froideur that implies an 
enduring reluctance to commit to a movement towards reconciliation. Having 
begun the review with the complaint that ‘I have always found Mr. Chesterton’s 
style exasperating to the last point of endurance’ (‘There’ 444), Eliot goes on to 
damn the text with the faintest conceivable praise—it is a ‘not at all stupid book’ 
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(‘There’ 445)—before ending with a further example of Chestertonian paradox 
being turned against its subject: Stevenson is ‘an author well enough established 
to survive Mr. Chesterton’s approval’ (‘There’ 446). Chesterton mentally filed 
Eliot’s jibes and responded in kind, in the following year, with an essay 
appropriately titled ‘An Apology for Buffoons’ (London Mercury June 1928). 
Here Chesterton notes that he is not, himself, in sympathy with the ‘severe and 
classic’ (CW 3: 343) stylistic method articulated in the line from Eliot’s ‘Preludes’ 
(1917) in which he refers to the ‘smell of steaks in passageways’ (CPP 22). 
Nonetheless this temperamental antipathy ‘is not a subject for these extreme 
controversial passions. If I were to say that the style of the line maddened me to 
the point of unendurance, I should be greatly exaggerating its effect on the 
emotions’ (CW 3: 343).  
While Chesterton’s selection from Eliot’s verse again serves to expose a 
certain discrepancy between his ‘severe and classic’ critical precepts and his 
somewhat burlesque poetic practice, Chesterton’s final remarks convey an 
impudent suavity that parodies Eliot’s rhetorical tone, while drawing attention to 
the unintentional paradox encoded within Eliot’s terms, via which a stylistic 
critique that strains to convey disinterest is expressed in such intemperate terms as 
to intimate hysteria. In an echo of Eliot’s appropriation of Chestertonian paradox-
mongering to frame his attacks, Chesterton’s riposte mimics Eliot’s voice in order 
to discredit it. Despite the precision of this counterblow, Chesterton was not 
always such a poised critic himself. When discussing Wilde’s literal handling of 
the world of objects in The Victorian Age in Literature, he uses precisely the same 
intemperate terms as Eliot, in a context that evokes an alarming confusion 
between the inert and the animate: ‘I for one cannot endure […] his sensual way 
of speaking of dead substances, satin or marble or velvet, as if he were stroking a 
lot of dogs and cats’ (CW 15: 519; my emphasis). In both cases, an engagement 
with the apprehended cultural father-figure results in an inadvertent lapse of 
critical distance, disclosed precisely in the haughty phraseology selected.  
Eliot responded to Chesterton’s article with a private missive, peevishly 
complaining of the latter’s slight misquotation of the ‘steak’ line from ‘Preludes’, 
‘as a humble versifier […] I prefer my verse to be quoted correctly, if at all’ (2 
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July 1928; BL MS Add.73195 ff.59).
14
 If Eliot’s imputation that Chesterton is 
guilty of the heresy of paraphrase seems a little over the top under the 
circumstances, one wonders whether the more wilful misquotations of the 
parodist, as exemplified by ‘To a Modern Poet’, may also inform the 
intemperance of Eliot’s response, especially in view of Chesterton’s further 
exposure of ‘nineties’ influence in the study of Stevenson. Nonetheless, the 
extraordinary speed with which the pair’s correspondence moved from abuse to 
praise from this point onwards suggests that Eliot had tacitly registered a critical 
insight into his youthful fears in Chesterton’s essentially sympathetic portrait in 
Stevenson, a revelation of the benign possibilities of critical engagement which 
was accompanied by a rapid thawing of  relations.  
If this was the case, the process was considerably assisted by Chesterton’s 
immediate reply to Eliot’s bad-tempered missive, which is a master-class in 
mollification, centred upon a self-deprecatory portrayal of himself as a clapped-
out member of the old guard, indulging in his own brand of nonsense: ‘I am so 
very sorry if my nonsense in the Mercury had any general air of hostility […] I 
meant it to be quite amiable; like the tremulous badinage of the Oldest Inhabitant 
in the bar parlour, when he has been guyed by the brighter lads of the village’ (4 
July 1928; BL MS Add.73195 ff.60). Again, Chesterton protests that his satirical 
swordstick is merely the harmless cane of an infirm greybeard at play, to which 
Eliot responds in terms that emphasise a sense of identification, self-deprecatingly 
sympathising with Chesterton’s famous incapacity to render quotations 
accurately: ‘I had made twelve distinct mistakes in well-known passages of 
Shakespeare’ (6 July 1928; BL MS Add.73195 ff.61).  
In the following year, Eliot writes that ‘I have much sympathy with your 
political and social views’ (8 May 1929; BL MS Add.73195 ff.67), and ends 
another letter with a compliment to Chesterton’s perspicacity as a reader, which 
particularly draws attention to his ability to correctly interpret Eliot’s intentions 
where others would erroneously infer unflattering connotations: ‘I was 
                                                 
14
 Again, Eliot’s terms echo a Wonderland creature, this time the Caterpillar, who criticises Alice’s 
tendency to commit inadvertent parodies:  
 
“That is not said right,” said the Caterpillar. 
“Not quite right, I’m afraid,” said Alice timidly: “some of the words have got altered.” 
“It is wrong from beginning to end,” said the Caterpillar; and there was silence for some 
minutes (Annotated 72). 
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particularly pleased by your noticing that footnote: I wonder how many readers 
thought it more than an attempt at smartness’ (Whit Monday, 1929; BL MS 
Add.73195 ff.68). From hopelessly muddled-headed antagonist, Chesterton comes 
full circle, to become incisive, sympathetic reader. When Eliot explains that his 
original, hostile correspondence had merely been ‘a pretext’ (21 Oct. 1928; BL 
MS Add.73195 ff.63) to establish communication, an interpersonal dynamic 
similar to that articulated by Chesterton in The Ball and the Cross emerges: 
 
“I must kill you now,” said the fanatic, “because…” 
“Well, because,” said Turnbull, patiently. 
“Because I have begun to like you” (CW 6: 429). 
 
Once having established a sympathetic private relationship through their 
correspondence in 1928-29, Chesterton’s later assessments of Eliot consistently 
employ parody to demonstrate his newfound sympathy with the poet, though—in 
a further correlation with Eliot’s own method—not always in a manner that 
rendered the precise nature of the message pellucid to his audience. Appropriately 
enough, confusion over Chesterton’s attitude towards Eliot has been particularly 
propagated by his parody of the final quatrain of ‘The Hollow Men’, which he 
delivered in a radio broadcast on ‘The Spice of Life’ (15 Mar. 1936; published in 
Listener 18 Mar. 1936), just three months before his death: 
 
Some sneer, some snigger, some simper; 
In the youth where we laughed, and sang. 
And they may end with a whimper 
But we will end with a bang (Spice 167).  
 
In view of my reading of ‘The Hollow Men’ as a transitional text that led 
Eliot on a path of divergence from Pound, towards a greater sympathy with 
Chesterton, it is particularly telling that both Pound and Chesterton felt compelled 
to respond parodically to Eliot’s final epigram. In Canto LXXIV, Pound’s 
demurral at the finale of ‘The Hollow Men’ is conveyed through precisely the 
same inversion essayed by Chesterton: ‘yet say this to the Possum: a bang, not a 
whimper, with a bang not with whimper’ (Cantos 425). As Stillman notes, in 
discussing this later, more sorrowful parody of Eliot on Pound’s part, a ‘complex 
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ventriloquism [was] mutually cultivated’ between the pair, which ‘goes beyond 
any basic opposition’ (244). The same is true of Chesterton and Eliot. The 
tendency of anthologists to reproduce Chesterton’s parodic take on ‘The Hollow 
Men’ in isolation from its original context has encouraged the inference that he 
remained implacably opposed to Eliot throughout his career, and that he expressed 
this opposition through a critically dull-witted belligerence. However, the full text 
of the broadcast, when read in combination with the tenor of his other 
pronouncements on Eliot from the same period, demonstrates that Chesterton had 
successfully interpreted the ironic double-voicing of Eliot’s poem in a manner that 
often evaded the latter’s more earnest adherents.  
Confusion over the meaning of Chesterton’s parody derives from its 
echoing of the clear-cut battle-lines that he sought to establish in the Thursday 
dedication between his own merry band on one side and their pessimistic cultural 
antitheses on the other, a drive which is accompanied here by a renewed recourse 
to the philosophical authority of Whitman, via an allusion to the lines from Leaves 
of Grass, ‘I see, dance, laugh, sing’ (26). Again, Chesterton also employs a 
division between the open ‘laugh’ and the closed ‘sneer’ as a metaphor for the 
distinct positive and negative existential positions under consideration. Since the 
presence of a division is beyond dispute, Chesterton’s attitude towards Eliot’s text 
must be determined by which side of the dividing lines he places the poet—either 
holding the fort with the ‘we’, or threatening its barriers as a constituent of a new 
band of Lear-esque ‘they’ figures—a distinction made particularly tricky by the 
ambivalent context of Eliot’s own use of ‘we’ in the opening lines of his poem.  
In a contemporaneous essay on ‘The Reaction of the Intellectuals’ 
(collected in The Well and the Shallows, 1935), Chesterton clarifies his position, 
while identifying the very ontological scepticism that he had lamented in ‘To a 
Modern Poet’ as the engine of a change in Eliot’s cultural allegiance: ‘Mr. Eliot 
[has] the sense to see that the half-truths of the sceptic are not only edged tools, 
but double-edged tools. […] in the last resort they can inoculate the mind with 
doubts about doubt itself’ (CW 3: 407). Chesterton goes on to imply that he has 
successfully identified the distance operative in Eliot’s poem, alluding to the 
conceit of the marching song when he notes that it is the ‘bold and enquiring 
spirits, who were always said to be in advance of the age, who are now most 
doubtful about the desirability of advancing’ (CW 3: 403). Chesterton speculates 
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that this quality has eluded Eliot’s acolytes—‘[a]s soon as the quite brainless mob 
of Bright Young Things discovers that it is really being despised, as a mob of dull 
old things […] there will be a panic’ (CW 3: 407). In view of his jocular 
accompanying reference to his alarm at discovering himself ‘on the side of the 
cultivated and the clever’ (CW 3: 406; my emphasis), his parody should be read 
not as a hostile satire, but as a sympathetic pastiche, reframing Eliot’s message in 
slightly differing terms, which again serve to identify a correspondence between 
Eliot’s vision and his own conception of Thursday. 
In a near-contemporaneous essay on ‘The New Bigotry’ (G.K.’s Weekly 13 
Sept. 1934), Chesterton explores the principle of schism between the poet and his 
followers further, combining an exuberant parody of the excesses of Eliot’s early 
stylistics with a mocking appraisal of the bafflement of the poet’s acolytes at their 
hero’s vault-face: 
 
A young idealistic poet, full of the new visions of beauty, writes verses 
appropriate to such a vision; as, for instance: 
 
Bug-house underbogies belch daybreak back-firing. 
Daylight’s a void-vomit; steadying legs to stump. 
 
And all the young critics know he is all right (Common 227). 
 
As with Pound’s hostile parody in the ‘Hell Cantos’, there is an air of automatic 
writing  about this parody which ironically complements Eliot’s own technique in 
constructing the final part of The Waste Land. Again, the references to belching 
and vomit invoke abject physical evacuation, while ‘bug’ forms a punning means 
of connoting the spread of contagion, and ‘underbogies’ hints at the subconscious 
anxiety that drives the parody. However, the fears of the parodist are overcome 
when Chesterton continues his narrative of the poet’s progress:  
 
a horrid whisper goes round that he was seen outside an Episcopal Church near 
Vermont. The whole horrid truth is soon known. He has admitted to a newspaper 
man that he believes in God. Then the young critics go back gloomily and stare 
at his poetry; and, strangely enough, see for the first time that there was 
something awfully old-fashioned in saying “daylight” when Binx might have 
said “sky-blank” (Common 227). 
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Chesterton ends by assuring the reader that this ‘is a strictly correct 
biography of a man of genius who has come to us from America—Mr. T.S. Eliot’ 
(Common 227). Since Eliot self-identified as an Anglican, while Pound’s Canto 
advanced the notion of his Episcopalian allegiance, the final remarks upon 
contemporaries who strain bathetically to achieve novelty should perhaps be 
considered to subtly signal his belief that Eliot has now escaped what Chesterton 
termed the ‘nonsense of the Ezra Pound period’ (CW 21: 607-08). In the following 
year, Eliot returned the favour, expressing his admiration for both Father Brown 
and Thursday, while essaying a comparable argument to that of Chesterton’s, by 
seeking to distinguish the bathetic misfiring of Chesterton’s acolytes from the 
work of the master: ‘No one admires and enjoys […] such delightful fiction as 
Mr. Chesterton’s The Man Who Was Thursday, and his Father Brown […] more 
than I do; I would only remark that when the same effect is aimed at by zealous 
persons of lesser talent […] the effect is negative’ (qtd. in Blissett, ‘English’ 133).  
Chesterton immediately precedes his parody of ‘The Hollow Men’ in the 
‘Spice of Life’ broadcast with a discussion of Eliot that seeks to establish a 
balance between identification and detachment: ‘I recognize the great realities Mr. 
Eliot has revealed; but I do not admit that this is the deepest reality […] Mr. Eliot 
described the desolation he found more than the desolation he felt. But I think that 
“The Waste Land” was at least a world in which he had wandered […] there was a 
sense in which, originally, even his inspiration was irritation’ (Spice 166). While 
Chesterton hints at an identification with the pedagogic purpose of Eliot’s status 
as an embodied memento mori, by figuring himself as a ‘skeleton at the feast [… 
with] a hollow voice from the tomb’ (Spice 161), he goes on to preface his 
variation on Eliot’s air with a return to a conceit first explored in the title of his 
publishing debut, Greybeards at Play, thirty-six years earlier: ‘It is doubtless a 
grotesque spectacle that the great-grandfathers should still be dancing with 
indecent gaiety, when the young are so grave and sad; but […] I will defend the 
spiritual appetite of my own age. I will even be so indecently frivolous as to break 
into song’ (Spice 166-67).  
The echo of Greybeards is particularly significant. In a double-sense, 
Chesterton’s combustive ‘end’ is his beginning, since, in a singularly appropriate 
correspondence, Eliot’s allusion to ‘Here we go round the mulberry bush’ had 
been prefigured by Chesterton in the Greybeards preface, as a symbol of his 
299 
 
utopian conception of friendship: ‘Behold the simple sum of things, / Where in 
one splendour spun, / The stars go round the Mulberry Bush, / The Burning Bush, 
the Sun’ (Collected Nonsense 4).15 Recall that Chesterton’s view of the 
impossibility of the ‘sum of all things being barren’ was the message that he 
sought to convey in his correspondence with Bentley. In Bentley’s diary of 1894, 
he writes, on two consecutive days, ‘I am feeling like a stuffed man’ and ‘[h]ow 
fares it, I wonder, among the dwellers in Kensington. Do they laugh and sing?’ 
(14-15 Nov.; Bod MS Eng.misc.e.862). These rather extraordinary anticipations 
of both Eliot’s poem and Chesterton’s parody begin to explicate the urgency with 
which Chesterton attempted to establish dialogic sympathy with Eliot, as a means 
of positively resolving a relationship that bore alarming similarities to the 
friendship which accompanied the traumas of his youth. 
Chesterton’s first textual reference to the mulberry bush rhyme can be 
traced to the mid-1890s. In this period he not only began conceptualising 
Thursday, but also composed ‘Shipwrecked off Fairyland’, a play in verse and 
prose, or ‘a sort of fairy farce’ (CW 10: 201) as Chesterton terms it. This sketch 
contains an interlude of ‘The Song of the Mulberry Bush’, in which ‘three old 
gentlemen’ resolve to ‘reestablish the sports of their childhood’ (CW 10: 206), 
much as Chesterton explains his intent in the ‘Spice of Life’ broadcast. 
Extraordinarily, this pursuit finds expression in the men chanting:  
 
They can snigger, but we can sing—   
Here we go round the Mulberry Bush,  
Three old fools in the staring sun (CW 10: 206).  
 
In view of the almost exact correspondence between Chesterton’s terms here and 
those in the parody of Eliot—texts separated by forty years—it seems that Eliot’s 
manipulation of the nursery rhyme must have rekindled Chesterton’s memory of 
the earliest stirrings of his own rebellion against the culture of his age. The 
adolescent sketch continues, in the vein of a Whitmanian nursery rhyme: 
 
 
                                                 
15
 In his autobiography, published four years before Eliot’s ‘East Coker’, Chesterton notes that ‘for 
me my end is my beginning’ (Autobiography 342). 
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Poets, preachers, teachers, tush!  
You have made the world grow old too soon.  
Here we go round the Mulberry Bush  
Under the April Moon (CW 10: 207).  
 
At the beginning of his journalistic career, Chesterton returned to the 
rhyme, this time investing it with a social moral in the second of his articles on 
‘Playgrounds for Adults’ in The Speaker, in which he notes that ‘[o]ne of the most 
universal and popular forms of play amongst children is that represented by “Here 
we go round the mulberry-bush,” which consists of nothing but running round in a 
ring. It consists of the circle, the very type of equality and communism, the figure 
in which all points are equally distant from the centre’ (BL MS Add.73381 ff.77). 
Having established the utopian connotations of the mulberry bush, Chesterton 
goes on to allude to anthropological studies such as The Golden Bough (1890), 
which famously went on to inform The Waste Land, in discussing the curious fact 
that while  
 
games [such] as “Here we go round the mulberry-bush” may be said to constitute the 
first class of children’s games, the purely ritualistic [… in] an age when the sense of 
ritual is supposed to have been revived it is nothing short of scandalous that human 
beings in the fulness of life and strength have not revived these elementary and 
beautiful movements (BL MS Add.73381 ff.77). 
 
Chesterton crystallises the point with a parody, in the form of reverse travesty, 
contending that if this sublime ideal of play could be achieved in the adult world,  
 
[t]he rude rhymes which are sung to them might blossom, as the ancient legends 
have blossomed, into elevated poetry. […] The song 
 
“Here we go round the mulberry-bush 
On a cold and frosty morning.” 
 
might take the form of 
 
“Though the pale day be paler with snow, 
Yet round the mulberry laden boughs we go” (BL MS Add.73381 ff.77). 
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Chesterton’s argument recalls the view set forth by Eliot in 1923 that ‘an 
aristocratic art […] is the refinement, not the antithesis, of folk art’ (Eliot 
paraphrased in Kenner, Invisible 161), a sentiment equally discernible in the 
aesthetic appropriation of the mulberry bush rhyme in ‘The Hollow Men’ and in 
Chesterton’s transmuting of the ‘Thessaly’ rhyme into the complex edifice of 
Thursday. The importance of this principle to Chesterton’s urge to re-establish a 
community of authorship perhaps explains why he was so anxious to understand 
Eliot’s position in relation to the mulberry bush rhyme. In ‘The Meaning of Mock 
Turkey’ (collected in Fancies versus Fads), written in 1920 following 
Chesterton’s participation in the ‘pageant of Nursery Rhymes’ which also yielded 
his paean to parodic community, ‘Variations on an Air’, Chesterton contends that 
‘[n]ursery rhymes are a positive network of notions and allusions of which the 
enlightened disapprove’ (Fancies 35). He goes on to argue that ‘[t]he Modern 
Movements […] cannot create the nursery rhyme [but] will they destroy it? The 
new poets have already abolished rhyme’ (Fancies 35). In the essay at hand, this 
question is left hanging in the air, but the issue of whether the figure who 
Chesterton considered the archetypal modern poet intended to destroy the nursery 
rhyme was resolved five years later by Eliot’s deliberate revival of Chesterton’s 
most treasured rhyme in ‘The Hollow Men’, a gesture that demonstrated Eliot’s 
faith in what Patricia Waugh terms the ‘communitarian ground for the practices of 
authorship’ (381).  
In an appropriately Chestertonian development, this public expression of 
engagement with a communitarian folk heritage on Eliot’s part preceded the more 
private establishment of friendly relations between Eliot and Chesterton. The 
psychological urgency of Chesterton’s desire to secure existential cohesion 
through the medium of friendship is evidenced by the reconciliation of Valentin 
and Flambeau in ‘The Blue Cross’, perhaps most tellingly via the imagery of tying 
which bookends the story. As I discussed in chapter three, Chesterton’s 
journalistic conceit of ‘Playgrounds for Adults’ was later given fiction life in the 
opening Father Brown story, ‘The Blue Cross’. In a much later story, ‘The Pursuit 
of Mr. Blue’ (Storyteller June 1934), the priest implicitly articulates the moral 
conveyed by the utopian denouement of Chesterton’s opening story, discussing 
his pleasure in games that go ‘round and round like the Mulberry-Bush’, in 
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contrast to games ‘where runners are rivals and run neck and neck and outstrip 
each other’ (FB 731).  
In William Blake, Chesterton notes that ‘the horizon line is not only hard but 
tight, like a fiddle string’, before confessing that ‘I have always a nervous fear that 
the sea-line will snap suddenly’ (47). In ‘The Blue Cross’, this psychological 
spectre is both raised and reinterred by the estranging, yet integrating semantic 
misalliance of the opening line: ‘Between the silver ribbon of morning and the 
green glittering ribbon of sea’ (FB 3). This image ties the constituents of the 
horizon-line together in a semantically abnormal context that conflates the 
metaphoric quality of a time of day with that of an elemental phenomenon, 
through a physical metaphor—a ribbon, which, when tied around a present, as 
here around a sentence, is suggestive of both completion and imminent 
unravelling.  
In this sense, it is particularly fitting that following the cognitive disarray of 
the story’s middle-section, the image is echoed at the story’s conclusion, which 
ties the narrative ribbon when ‘silver’ again returns in the context of semantic 
misalliance, preceded by a brief rhyming couplet which punningly ties the trio of 
protagonists in a bow of friendship: ‘“Do not bow to me, mon ami,” said Valentin, 
with silver clearness. “Let us both bow to our master.”’ (FB 18; my emphasis). 
Here the quotidian achievement of friendship operates as the context which 
safeguards a more mystical conception of the Covenant of Things, offering a 
reassuring safeguard against the fear of a schismatic breach in the constitution of 
the universe that consistently underwrites Chesterton’s imaginative world. In this 
respect, Valentin’s use of a rhyming couplet to articulate this new state of affinity 
is particularly significant. In ‘The Romance of Rhyme’, Chesterton argues that ‘in 
the one word identity are involved perhaps the deepest and certainly the dearest 
human things’ (Fancies 8), and crystallises the point by discussing rhyme as a 
textual expression of the principle of identity, since it formally mirrors the 
analogic operation of parody in its inscription of simultaneous similarity and 
difference.  
The republication of Chesterton’s ‘Apology for Buffoons’ in The Well and 
the Shallows (1935) presented the occasion for another tying of hitherto 
antagonistic figures in friendship, when Chesterton introduced the volume with a 
more earnest apology for the misquotation that had first prompted the 
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correspondence with Eliot, and crowned the pair’s subsequent rapprochement by 
dedicating the volume to him. That this expression of amended allegiance should 
have arisen in part from the need to apologise for a textual misattribution comes 
as an apt conclusion to the parodic duel that the two men had intermittently 
conducted over the course of twenty years. Following Chesterton’s death, in June 
1936, Eliot accepted the role of co-Vice-President of the Distributist league, the 
political movement founded by Chesterton (see Corrin, Battle 195), thus enacting 
a comparably public declaration of allegiance with his erstwhile adversary. This is 
not to say that Eliot became unerringly Chestertonian in later years. In fact, he 
became something of a one-man Chesterbentley, balancing his academic and 
popular inclinations in dynamic opposition. At meetings of the Christian 
sociology society, Eliot ‘maintained a “detachment”’ and once ‘“lampooned”’ 
everyone present ‘“with clerihews”’ (Ackroyd 222), yet he also developed a rather 
Chestertonian fondness for the more ‘“simple [...] kinds of practical joke”’ (Eliot 
qtd. in Ackroyd 234). This included the posting of a genial letter to the London 
Times offering ‘his support for Sir John Squire’s “manly and spirited defence of 
Stilton cheese”’, and proposing ‘“the formation of a Society for the Preservation 
of Ancient Cheeses”’ (Eliot qtd. in Chinitz 177).  
When Bentley recorded his grief at Chesterton’s death, he particularly 
mourned the termination of a lifelong ‘conversation’, the conclusion of which had 
‘put an end to […] much of my pleasure in existence’ (Those 46). In a similar 
spirit, Eliot’s obituary of Chesterton emphasised the sense of ‘isolation’ (531) that 
he experienced upon hearing the news. These responses attest to the success of 
Chesterton’s dialogic methods. As he recognised, the pursuit of friendship 
suffuses the everyday operation of culture. Perhaps most importantly, the cross-
cultural pull of personal affinity productively disrupts the abstract agonistic 
premises of dialectical conflict, in which schools of writers are pitted against one 
another on the basis of often arbitrary and superficial markers of cultural 
difference. As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the Janus-faced 
operation of parody also militates against the projection of a clear-cut cyclical 
march of literary movement and counter-movement, by encoding similarity and 
difference simultaneously within the expression of controversy, balancing satirical 
opposition with the existentially grotesque principle of the ‘audacious 
reconciliation’ of opposites.  
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The personal affinity discovered by Chesterton and Eliot was grounded in 
their common possession of a temperamental dualism, which found expression in 
the parodic strategies that they embedded within their literary endeavours. Rather 
than operating as the figureheads of a time-specific modernist/anti-modernist 
stand-off, both men should be understood to occupy a position within the 
diachronic, trans-generic European cultural tradition that I outlined in my 
introduction—the ancestral line of parodic writers whose textual productions 
consistently propagandise and problematize simultaneously. Once understood in 
these terms, a challenge to literary-historical compartmentalisation is 
complemented by the emergence of a new approach to genre. My account of the 
close imaginative correspondence of ‘The Queer Feet’ and ‘The Hollow Men’ 
demonstrates that both writers employed festive comic methods to parodically 
regenerate literary fields that risked ossifying into cliché. By illustrating the more 
fundamental generic likeness of textual forms that appear outwardly disparate, this 
reading disrupts conventional perception of the boundaries of genre, which has 
done so much to propound the reductive notion of a clear distinction between 
‘high’ and ‘low’, or ‘elitist’ and ‘popular’, seams in early-twentieth-century 
literature.   
In ‘A Book of the Day: Professor Bradley on Tragedy’ (DN 22 Dec. 1904), 
Chesterton expounds his dialogic approach to culture in comically intemperate 
terms: ‘A man who says the last word on a subject ought to be killed. […] The 
best kind of critic draws attention not to the finality of a thing, but to its infinity. 
Instead of closing a question, he opens a hundred; he creates his enemies as much 
as his admirers’ (CDN 2: 354). While this account presents a salutary warning to 
the critical reader whose thesis might presume, foolhardily, to say the final word 
on Chesterton himself, it also offers a useful guide to the accumulative principle 
that underpins Chesterton’s parodic disruption of literary boundaries—his vision 
of ‘renewing the varieties for ever’. Indeed, it might be said that the dialogic 
process encourages the interlocutor to become a simultaneous enemy and admirer, 
in a manner that produces an endless forking off of similarity and difference. Eliot 
explores a comparable principle in his epigrammatic summary of the operation of 
culture, ‘[f]rom one point of view we may identify; from another, we must 
separate’ (Notes 31), a sentiment that closely resembles Chesterton’s dialogic 
formula: the ‘agreement we really want is the agreement between agreement and 
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disagreement’. It has been the purpose of this thesis to draw out the value of these 
precepts, not only to the study of Chesterton, but also to exploration of the 
landscape of early-twentieth-century literature.  
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